David M. Kreps

David Marc "Dave" Kreps (born 1950 in New York City) is a game theorist and economist and professor at the Graduate School of Business at Stanford University (since 1980). The Stanford University Department of Economics appointed Kreps the Adams Distinguished Professor of Management. He is known for his analysis of dynamic choice models and non-cooperative game theory, particularly the idea of sequential equilibrium, which he developed with Stanford Business School colleague Robert B. Wilson.

David M. Kreps
Alma mater	Stanford University
Children	3
Awards	John Bates Clark Medal, Erwin Plein Nemmers Prize in Economics, John J. Carty Award for the Advancement of Science
Scientific career
Fields	Game theory, Decision Theory, Finance
Institutions	Stanford University
Doctoral advisor	Evan Lyle Porteus
Doctoral students	Chi-fu Huang Robert Gibbons

He earned his A.B. from Dartmouth College in 1972 and his Ph.D. from Stanford in 1975. Kreps won the John Bates Clark Medal in 1989. He was awarded an honorary Ph.D. by the Université Paris-Dauphine in 2001. With colleagues Paul Milgrom and Robert B. Wilson, he was awarded the 2018 John J. Carty Award for the Advancement of Science. He is a member of the National Academy of Sciences. In 2018, Kreps was awarded the Erwin Plein Nemmers Prize in Economics by Northwestern University.

He has also written many books, including Microeconomics for Managers,[1] A Course in Microeconomic Theory, and Game Theory and Economic Modeling.[2]

External links

David M. Kreps' home page at Stanford University
David M. Kreps; John Roberts; Robert B. Wilson (July 1986), Contributions to the New Palgrave (PDF), Research paper, vol. 892, Palo Alto, CA: Graduate School of Business, Stanford University, pp. 30–35, (Draft of articles for the first edition of New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics), retrieved 7 February 2011

References

David M. Kreps (2004). Microeconomics for Managers. Norton. ISBN 978-0-393-97678-6.
David M. Kreps (1990). Game Theory and Economic Modelling. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-828381-2.

John Bates Clark Medal recipients

Topics in game theory
Definitions	Congestion game Cooperative game Determinacy Escalation of commitment Extensive-form game First-player and second-player win Game complexity Graphical game Hierarchy of beliefs Information set Normal-form game Preference Sequential game Simultaneous game Simultaneous action selection Solved game Succinct game
Equilibrium concepts	Bayesian Nash equilibrium Berge equilibrium Core Correlated equilibrium Epsilon-equilibrium Evolutionarily stable strategy Gibbs equilibrium Mertens-stable equilibrium Markov perfect equilibrium Nash equilibrium Pareto efficiency Perfect Bayesian equilibrium Proper equilibrium Quantal response equilibrium Quasi-perfect equilibrium Risk dominance Satisfaction equilibrium Self-confirming equilibrium Sequential equilibrium Shapley value Strong Nash equilibrium Subgame perfection Trembling hand
Strategies	Backward induction Bid shading Collusion Forward induction Grim trigger Markov strategy Dominant strategies Pure strategy Mixed strategy Strategy-stealing argument Tit for tat
Classes of games	Bargaining problem Cheap talk Global game Intransitive game Mean-field game Mechanism design n-player game Perfect information Large Poisson game Potential game Repeated game Screening game Signaling game Stackelberg competition Strictly determined game Stochastic game Symmetric game Zero-sum game
Games	Go Chess Infinite chess Checkers Tic-tac-toe Prisoner's dilemma Gift-exchange game Optional prisoner's dilemma Traveler's dilemma Coordination game Chicken Centipede game Lewis signaling game Volunteer's dilemma Dollar auction Battle of the sexes Stag hunt Matching pennies Ultimatum game Rock paper scissors Pirate game Dictator game Public goods game Blotto game War of attrition El Farol Bar problem Fair division Fair cake-cutting Cournot game Deadlock Diner's dilemma Guess 2/3 of the average Kuhn poker Nash bargaining game Induction puzzles Trust game Princess and monster game Rendezvous problem
Theorems	Arrow's impossibility theorem Aumann's agreement theorem Folk theorem Minimax theorem Nash's theorem Negamax theorem Purification theorem Revelation principle Sprague–Grundy theorem Zermelo's theorem
Key figures	Albert W. Tucker Amos Tversky Antoine Augustin Cournot Ariel Rubinstein Claude Shannon Daniel Kahneman David K. Levine David M. Kreps Donald B. Gillies Drew Fudenberg Eric Maskin Harold W. Kuhn Herbert Simon Hervé Moulin John Conway Jean Tirole Jean-François Mertens Jennifer Tour Chayes John Harsanyi John Maynard Smith John Nash John von Neumann Kenneth Arrow Kenneth Binmore Leonid Hurwicz Lloyd Shapley Melvin Dresher Merrill M. Flood Olga Bondareva Oskar Morgenstern Paul Milgrom Peyton Young Reinhard Selten Robert Axelrod Robert Aumann Robert B. Wilson Roger Myerson Samuel Bowles Suzanne Scotchmer Thomas Schelling William Vickrey
Miscellaneous	All-pay auction Alpha–beta pruning Bertrand paradox Bounded rationality Combinatorial game theory Confrontation analysis Coopetition Evolutionary game theory First-move advantage in chess Game Description Language Game mechanics Glossary of game theory List of game theorists List of games in game theory No-win situation Solving chess Topological game Tragedy of the commons Tyranny of small decisions

Authority control databases
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Academics	CiNii MathSciNet Mathematics Genealogy Project zbMATH
Other	IdRef

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David M. Kreps

See also

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References