Melvin Dresher

Melvin Dresher (born Dreszer; March 13, 1911 – June 4, 1992) was a Polish-born American mathematician, notable for developing, with Merrill Flood, the game theoretical model of cooperation and conflict known as the Prisoner's dilemma while at RAND in 1950 (Albert W. Tucker gave the game its prison-sentence interpretation, and thus the name by which it is known today).

Melvin Dresher
Melvin Dresher, early 1940s
Born	(1911-03-13)March 13, 1911 Krasnystaw, Poland
Died	June 4, 1992(1992-06-04) (aged 81) Kern, California, US
Alma mater	Yale University
Known for	Prisoner's dilemma
Scientific career
Fields	Mathematics
Institutions	RAND

Dresher came to the United States in 1923. He obtained his B.S. from Lehigh University in 1933 and his Ph.D. from Yale University in 1937; the title of his dissertation was "Multi-Groups: A Generalisation of the Notion of Group." Dresher worked as instructor of mathematics, Michigan State College, 1938–1941; statistician, War Production Board, 1941–1944; mathematical physicist, National Defense Research Committee, 1944–1946; professor of mathematics, Catholic University, 1946–1947; research mathematician, RAND, from 1948.

He was the author of several RAND research papers on game theory, and his widely acclaimed The Mathematics of Games of Strategy: Theory and Applications (originally published in 1961 as Games of Strategy: Theory and Applications) continues to be read today.

The Mathematics of Games of Strategy: Theory and Applications by Melvin Dresher

Dresher's research has been referred to and discussed in a variety of published books, including Prisoner's Dilemma by William Poundstone and A Beautiful Mind by Sylvia Nasar.

References

Obituary, July 2, 1992 issue of the Palisadian-Post newspaper (Pacific Palisades, California).
"In Remembrance", July 9, 1992 issue of RAND Items (a biweekly publication for employees of RAND).

Topics in game theory
Definitions	Congestion game Cooperative game Determinacy Escalation of commitment Extensive-form game First-player and second-player win Game complexity Graphical game Hierarchy of beliefs Information set Normal-form game Preference Sequential game Simultaneous game Simultaneous action selection Solved game Succinct game
Equilibrium concepts	Bayesian Nash equilibrium Berge equilibrium Core Correlated equilibrium Epsilon-equilibrium Evolutionarily stable strategy Gibbs equilibrium Mertens-stable equilibrium Markov perfect equilibrium Nash equilibrium Pareto efficiency Perfect Bayesian equilibrium Proper equilibrium Quantal response equilibrium Quasi-perfect equilibrium Risk dominance Satisfaction equilibrium Self-confirming equilibrium Sequential equilibrium Shapley value Strong Nash equilibrium Subgame perfection Trembling hand
Strategies	Backward induction Bid shading Collusion Forward induction Grim trigger Markov strategy Dominant strategies Pure strategy Mixed strategy Strategy-stealing argument Tit for tat
Classes of games	Bargaining problem Cheap talk Global game Intransitive game Mean-field game Mechanism design n-player game Perfect information Large Poisson game Potential game Repeated game Screening game Signaling game Stackelberg competition Strictly determined game Stochastic game Symmetric game Zero-sum game
Games	Go Chess Infinite chess Checkers Tic-tac-toe Prisoner's dilemma Gift-exchange game Optional prisoner's dilemma Traveler's dilemma Coordination game Chicken Centipede game Lewis signaling game Volunteer's dilemma Dollar auction Battle of the sexes Stag hunt Matching pennies Ultimatum game Rock paper scissors Pirate game Dictator game Public goods game Blotto game War of attrition El Farol Bar problem Fair division Fair cake-cutting Cournot game Deadlock Diner's dilemma Guess 2/3 of the average Kuhn poker Nash bargaining game Induction puzzles Trust game Princess and monster game Rendezvous problem
Theorems	Arrow's impossibility theorem Aumann's agreement theorem Folk theorem Minimax theorem Nash's theorem Negamax theorem Purification theorem Revelation principle Sprague–Grundy theorem Zermelo's theorem
Key figures	Albert W. Tucker Amos Tversky Antoine Augustin Cournot Ariel Rubinstein Claude Shannon Daniel Kahneman David K. Levine David M. Kreps Donald B. Gillies Drew Fudenberg Eric Maskin Harold W. Kuhn Herbert Simon Hervé Moulin John Conway Jean Tirole Jean-François Mertens Jennifer Tour Chayes John Harsanyi John Maynard Smith John Nash John von Neumann Kenneth Arrow Kenneth Binmore Leonid Hurwicz Lloyd Shapley Melvin Dresher Merrill M. Flood Olga Bondareva Oskar Morgenstern Paul Milgrom Peyton Young Reinhard Selten Robert Axelrod Robert Aumann Robert B. Wilson Roger Myerson Samuel Bowles Suzanne Scotchmer Thomas Schelling William Vickrey
Miscellaneous	All-pay auction Alpha–beta pruning Bertrand paradox Bounded rationality Combinatorial game theory Confrontation analysis Coopetition Evolutionary game theory First-move advantage in chess Game Description Language Game mechanics Glossary of game theory List of game theorists List of games in game theory No-win situation Solving chess Topological game Tragedy of the commons Tyranny of small decisions

Authority control databases
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Academics	MathSciNet Mathematics Genealogy Project zbMATH
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