Operation Deny Flight

In April 1994, Bosnian Serbs forces launched an attack on the UN Safe Area of Goražde. Initially, US Secretary of Defense William Perry told reporters that the United States would "not enter the war to stop" the Serbs from overrunning Goražde, and other senior officials publicly downplayed the possibility of using air strikes.[28] Several days into the attack, however, a number of UNPROFOR soldiers were injured, and one was killed by Serb fire. Thus, General Michael Rose, the UNPROFOR Commander, requested NATO strikes under the mandate of UNSCR 836.[29]

On 10 April, in response to the request, two US Air Force F-16s dropped 4 bombs on Serb targets, including a tank and a command post. The next day, two US Marine Corps F/A-18C aircraft strafed additional targets in the area. That same day, General Ratko Mladić, the commander of the Bosnian Serb army, called General Rose and threatened the safety of his forces, saying "one more attack and I will shoot down aircraft – cannot guarantee safety of UNPROFOR and will attack UNPROFOR and your headquarters".[30] Making good on his threat, from 12 April to 14 April, Mladić ordered his forces to surround 150 UNPROFOR peacekeepers, effectively taking them hostage. Mladić then telephoned General Rose and told him "that if NATO did not stop its actions, not one UN soldier would leave alive".[31] Some of the UNPROFOR hostages were from NATO member states, notably the United Kingdom and France, who pushed for an immediate end to the strikes out of fear for the safety of their personnel. In response to the British and French concerns, NATO temporarily recalled its forces, but on 15 April, in response to increased Serb attacks, aircraft were again deployed to the area.[32]

As Mladić had promised, the Bosnian Serb army around Goražde attempted to shoot down NATO aircraft. On 15 April 1994, a French Dassault Étendard IV jet was hit by ground fire while conducting a reconnaissance mission in the area. The jet was damaged, but returned safely to its carrier, the Clemenceau.[11] On 16 April, a British Sea Harrier from the carrier HMS Ark Royal[33] was called in by UN forces to strike a tank. After making several unsuccessful passes at the target, the Sea Harrier was targeted by a Bosnian Serb shoulder-launched surface-to-air missile and was subsequently shot down. The pilot ejected and was successfully repatriated. After the Harrier shootdown, NATO did not carry out any further strikes around Goražde, and on 17 April, Mladić released most of the hostages he had taken. Over the next several days, the Serbs agreed to, and then broke, several ceasefires in the Goražde area. In an effort to secure Goražde and to force the Serbs to honor agreements, NATO and the UN issued an ultimatum for Bosnian Serb forces to cease their attacks and withdraw their forces or face additional air strikes on 22 April. The Serbs complied with the ultimatum, requiring a withdrawal of heavy weapons from a 20 kilometers (12 mi) zone and all forces from a 3 km (1.9 mi) zone. Because of the Serb compliance, NATO ceased its operations around Goražde.[11]

In February 1994 (when air strikes were originally threatened), NATO had created a heavy weapons exclusion zone around Sarajevo, and collected weapons at a number of sites. On 5 August, the VRS seized several weapons from the Illidža Weapons Collection site in clear violation of the exclusion zone agreement. During the seizure, Serb forces injured a Ukrainian UNPROFOR peacekeeper. In response to the attack, the UN once again requested NATO air support. Two U.S. A-10 aircraft repeatedly strafed Serb targets, and the Serbs returned the seized weapons to the collection site.[34]

On 22 September, UNPROFOR again requested NATO air support in the Sarajevo area after Serb forces attacked a French armored personnel carrier. In response, two British SEPECAT Jaguar aircraft struck near a Serb tank, destroying it.[11]

On 28 February 1994, a NATO Airborne Early Warning aircraft flying over Hungary vectored two US F-16s to an area south of Banja Luka, where six J-21 Jastreb and two J-22 Orao were flying back to their base after bombing the "Bratstvo" military factory at Novi Travnik, in blatant violation of the non-fly zone. Four Serb aircraft were shot down and another crashed while trying to escape in low-level flight. This marked the first combat mission in NATO's history.[35]

Bihać

The location of Bihać within Bosnia and Herzegovina

In October and November 1994, during the Siege of Bihać, the Muslim-Croat Federation launched a large offensive around the town of Bihać, in far northwestern Bosnia. The Serbs soon launched a counterattack, and in support of their operations, launched air strikes with aircraft based at a former JNA military airport in Udbina, south of Bihać, located in the Serbian Krajina in Croatia. The Serb aircraft dropped napalm and cluster bombs. Although most of the ordnance came from old, unreliable stocks and failed to explode, the attacks were a clear violation of the no-fly zone, and a challenge to NATO.[36] NATO immediately looked for ways to respond, but its forces were not permitted to carry out operations in Croatian airspace, and due to Bihać's proximity to the border, Serb aircraft could attack into Bosnia, then cross back into Croatia before being intercepted. As such, NATO was powerless to stop the incursions.[37]

Udbina

The location of Udbina within Croatia

In recognition of the situation, the Security Council passed Resolution 958, which allowed NATO aircraft to operate in Croatia. On 21 November, NATO acted under its new authority with a strike on the Udbina airfield. The strike, which involved 39 aircraft, was the largest combat operation in NATO's history up to that time;[10] nonetheless, it was criticized as a "pinprick" that did little real damage to Serb capabilities, only temporarily disabling runways.[38] The NATO forces deliberately refrained from attacking Serb planes at the airfield, and only targeted runways and anti-aircraft capabilities.[39] Following the Udbina strike, NATO continued to launch strikes in the area, and on 23 November, after a NATO reconnaissance plane was illuminated by the radar of a surface-to-air missile (SAM) system, NATO planes attacked SAM sites at Otoka and Dvor with AGM-88 HARM anti-radiation missiles.[38] The Serbs reacted to these strikes by immediately seizing 250 UNPROFOR hostages, and a total of 500 by early December. While the hostages were treated fairly well, some were used as human shields, including three who were forced to lie on the tarmac at the Bosnian Serb airbase in Banja Luka.[40]

After the strikes at Otoka and Dvor, Bosnian Serb forces continued to target NATO aircraft with surface-to-air missiles, while advancing against the Bihać enclave. On 24 November, Serb forces fired radar-guided missiles at two British Tornado F3 aircraft. The next day, Serb forces fired on two NATO F-16s.[41] In response to this growing SAM threat, and the UNPROFOR hostages, NATO suspended flights in Bosnian airspace on 2 December.[40]

Shortly after the suspension of NATO flights, former US President Jimmy Carter personally negotiated a four-month ceasefire in Bosnia. Although there were some violations of this ceasefire, most of the parties in the conflict heeded it. NATO ordered its planes back in the air, but due to the diminished hostilities, they did not engage in any significant operations for the next several months.[42] The reduced tensions resulting from the Carter ceasefire and the cessation of NATO air operations also led to the release of most of the UNPROFOR hostages over the next several weeks.[43][44][45]

While NATO was planning its new strategy, the ceasefire expired, and, as predicted, fighting resumed. As the fighting gradually widened, Bosnian Muslim forces launched a large-scale offensive in the area of Sarajevo. In response to the attack, the Bosnian Serbs seized heavy weapons from a UN-guarded depot, and began shelling targets.[47] As a retaliation for these actions, the UN commander, Lt. General Rupert Smith requested NATO air strikes. NATO honored the request on 25 and 26 May 1995 by bombing a Serb ammunition dump at Pale.[11] The mission was carried out by USAF F-16s and Spanish Air Force EF-18As Hornet armed with laser-guided bombs.[48] The Serbs then seized 377 UNPROFOR hostages and used them as human shields for a variety of targets in Bosnia, forcing NATO to end its strikes.[49]

Facing a second hostage crisis, General Smith and other top UN commanders began shifting strategies. The UN began to redeploy its forces to more defensible locations, so that they would be harder to attack or take hostage. More importantly, Gen. Rose established the UN Rapid Reaction Force, a heavily armed unit with more aggressive rules of engagement, designed to take offensive action if necessary to prevent hostage-taking and enforce peace agreements.[50]

Captains T.O. Hantford, Scott O'Grady, and Bob Wright at a press conference after O'Grady's rescue

After the seizure of the 377 hostages, NATO did not carry out further air strikes, but it did continue regular air patrol operations in support of the no-fly zone. On 2 June 1995, Captain Scott O'Grady of the United States Air Force was sent on a routine no-fly zone patrol in his F-16. While on patrol, O'Grady's F-16 was shot down by a Serb SA-6 surface-to-air missile system near Mrkonjić Grad. O'Grady ejected safely, but found himself trapped in Serb-controlled territory. According to many US officials, he may have been deliberately targeted so that the Serbs could take an American hostage.[51]

After O'Grady was shot down, tensions increased greatly between NATO and the Bosnian Serbs. A number of US commanders called for immediate retaliatory air strikes; however, the Serbs still held the majority of the hostages seized after the bombing of Pale. The threat to the hostages prevented NATO from acting more forcefully, and the Serbs released 121 hostages immediately after the incident in an effort to cool tensions. Nonetheless, the situation remained explosive for the next six days until O'Grady was rescued on 8 June by the 3rd Battalion 8th Marines 2nd Marine Division, ending the calls for immediate offensive action. Shortly thereafter, the Serbs released the remaining hostages.[52] As a result of the incident, NATO ordered that all further sorties be accompanied by aircraft designed for suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD).[53]

On 11 August,[54] a USAF MQ-1 Predator UAV was shot down by Serb antiaircraft fire in the same area,[55] while another was lost to mechanical failure on 14 August.[54][56]

A month after the O'Grady incident, on 6 July, the VRS launched an offensive against the UN safe- area of Srebrenica. Dutch peacekeepers in the area considered calling for NATO air strikes in response to the attack, but they decided against them because the Serbs were not using heavy weapons, and out of fear of another hostage crisis.[57] On 10 July, as the fighting intensified, the Dutch troops finally requested close air support from NATO, but due to communication problems in the "dual key" system, the request was not authorized until the next day.[58]

On 11 July, NATO prepared for a large-scale mission in Srebrenica involving 60 aircraft. At 2:30 PM, the first wave of the assault, two Dutch F-16s, bombed two Serb tanks on the outskirts of the town. Two USAF F-16s were dispatched next to attack an artillery piece, but they failed to find their target. Soon thereafter, Bosnian Serb troops seized several Dutch peacekeepers as hostages and threatened to kill them if NATO did not call off its attacks. The Dutch commander reported this back to his government, and Dutch Defense Minister Joris Voorhoeve immediately telephoned the NATO operations center and ordered an end to the attacks.[59]

By the end of the day, Srebrenica had fallen to Bosnian Serb forces, who began a brutal campaign of ethnic cleansing that left roughly `8,000 men dead. In the wake of this tragedy, many observers blamed NATO for failing to use its airpower more forcefully. David Rohde, a journalist, later wrote that "if NATO close air support had been used earlier ... the 7,079 missing might still be alive today".[60] This feeling that NATO could have prevented thousands of deaths by acting more strongly led to increased planning for Operation Deliberate Force.[61]

After the events at Srebrenica, sixteen nations met at the London Conference, which began on 21 July 1995, to consider new options for Bosnia. As a result of the conference, UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali gave General Bernard Janvier, the UN military commander, the authority to request NATO airstrikes without consulting civilian UN officials.[62] The North Atlantic Council, NATO's top political body, and the UN also agreed to use NATO air strikes in response to attacks on any of the other safe areas in Bosnia. The participants at the conference also agreed in principle to the use of large-scale NATO air strikes in response to future acts of Serb aggression.[63]

A US Marine Corps F/A-18 prepares for a mission in Bosnia in December 1995.

As one of the first major combat tests of NATO airforces, Deny Flight provided several important military lessons. Most importantly, Deny Flight helped to prove the effectiveness, or drive the development of several technologies. For example, during the operation, the F/A-18D Hornet was proven to be a "highly resourceful multirole platform" for the United States Marine Corps.[72] Deny Flight was also important in the move towards precision-guided munitions, as nearly 70% of the munitions dropped by NATO during the conflict were precision-guided,[17] versus only 8% during the Gulf War.[73] For the Royal Navy, Deny Flight led to a re-evaluation of the Sea Harrier and a number of upgrades to it. In particular, the Royal Navy added the Paveway II laser-guided bomb to the Harrier, giving it a precision capability, and upgraded electronics aboard the aircraft in response to the necessities of combat in Bosnia.[74] The lessons of Bosnia also led the Royal Air Force to deploy the Harrier GR7 aboard Royal Navy carriers for future operations in order to deliver more offensive force projection capability.[75]

The four NATO aircraft shot down during Operation Deny Flight also forced NATO members to consider new defensive measures for their aircraft, including increased stealth capabilities.[17] Deny Flight also demonstrated the necessity of better communications and integration among forces operating together, and led to some calls for technical training of UN personnel to work with NATO military systems.[17] Finally, the rules of engagement established under Deny Flight also played an important role in shaping the rules of engagement for later NATO operations other than war, including Operation Joint Endeavor, and even NATO operations in Afghanistan.[76]

Operation Deny Flight, and other NATO operations during the Bosnian War, resulted in significant tension within NATO and the Atlantic relationship. Deny Flight and other early operations "forced the Allies to consider the question of NATO's military responsibility for territory outside of its traditional defense perimeter, and it was one over which they were deeply divided".[77] Disagreements between the United States and its European allies over when and how to use air power "made intra-alliance diplomacy more problematic" during the period.[78] Many of these problems in the relationship were the result of concerns from European nations who had forces on the ground in UNPROFOR that might be taken hostage. The fact that the United States pushed for air strikes without placing its own forces on the ground in Bosnia greatly exacerbated this problem.[79][80]

Deny Flight also helped set the path for future UN-NATO relations. Throughout the operation, NATO "felt the frustration of having its wings clipped by a parallel UN authority",[81] while United Nations officials worried about the effect that NATO air strikes would have on the perceived neutrality of the United Nations.[82] Frustration with the "dual key" procedure of authorization for NATO action also led NATO officers to reject such an arrangement in the future. Admiral Leighton Smith, the commander of NATO's forces during Deny Flight, expressed this sentiment quite bluntly, saying "Don't ever have another dual key."[83] These difficulties in negotiating the UN-NATO relationship during Deny Flight were a major factor in the decision to place later NATO forces in the Balkans under the sole control of the NATO chain of command.[84][85] While many of these effects on UN-NATO relations were negative, Deny Flight also had positive implications. During the operation, NATO and the UN exchanged liaison officers for the first time in their respective histories, establishing a precedent for military cooperation between the two.[86] The communication and coordination failures during Deny Flight also instilled "a desire for mutual understanding and common solutions" between the two organizations.[87] This desire for cooperation was crucial to the establishment of IFOR, and later UN-NATO cooperation in Bosnia and elsewhere.[87]

Deny Flight also played a significant role in shaping the war in Bosnia, although its exact impact is debated. While Richard Holbrooke, the American special envoy for Bosnia, recognized Operation Deliberate Force as "a historic development in post-Cold War relations" and as a crucial element in ending the war in Bosnia,[88] the actual impact of Deny Flight on the course of the conflict was more muted. None of the air strikes in Deny Flight were on the scale of those in Deliberate Force, and they did not significantly change the balance of power. Notably, however, Deny Flight was successful in that it "neutralised the Serbs' advantage in fixed-wing air-power".[89] Deny Flight also paved the way for Operation Deliberate Force. According to Robert E. Hunter, then the US Ambassador to NATO, Deny Flight was crucial to the process of building "consensus support for increasingly robust use of airpower over Bosnia", which eventually culminated in Operation Deliberate Force.[90]

While the material impact of Deny Flight was minimal, it did have a significant political impact. From the very beginning, according to Michael Beale, "the operation's implied objective was to demonstrate UN and NATO determination to stabilize the situation in Bosnia so that a peaceful settlement could be achieved".[22] Given the many violations of Deny Flight by helicopters, and the frequent failure of coordination between NATO and the UN, it is uncertain whether Deny Flight accomplished this mission. Nonetheless, NATO's limited air strikes under Deny Flight "demonstrated its determination to protect United Nations personnel" and Bosnian civilians, according to Michael R. Gordon, chief military correspondent for The New York Times. This determination eventually held the key to peace.[29]

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