Felix Zollicoffer

In an effort to prevent a Union Army incursion into east Tennessee, Zollicoffer took the initiative and occupied Cumberland Gap on September 14, 1861.[23] Zollicoffer then was responsible for guarding the 128 miles (206 km) of Confederate line between Cumberland Gap and Tompkinsville, Kentucky.[24][25] For 71 miles, this line crossed the Cumberland Mountains.[24] On September 15, 1861, General Albert Sidney Johnston assumed command of Confederate forces in the Western Theater between the Appalachian Mountains and the Mississippi River.[26] He retained Zollicoffer as district commander in east Tennessee.[27]

On September 17, 1861, Zollicoffer sent a force through the Cumberland Gap along the Wilderness Road to drive the Union Army from Barbourville, Kentucky, relieve pressure on the recently established Confederate line at Bowling Green, Kentucky and thwart an expected drive by Union Brigadier General George H. Thomas into eastern Tennessee and the Cumberland Gap by forcing him to retain his force in Kentucky.[27] On September 19, 800 of Zollicoffer's men under Colonel Joel Battle ambushed the Union force of about 150 home guards while they were foraging and pushed them out of Barbourville at the minor Battle of Barbourville.[25][27][28] Another detachment of Zollicoffer's force under Colonel James Rains dispersed an encampment of Union recruits at Laurel Bridge, Kentucky, on September 26, 1861, while the Goose Creek Salt Works were attacked by a second Confederate unit under Colonel D. H. Cummings, which carried off 200 barrels of salt.[25][29] Zollicoffer's force was essentially on a raid and soon withdrew.[30][31]

In mid-October 1861, a large part of Zollicoffer's force marched 40 miles (64 km) from Cumberland Gap to London, Kentucky.[31] At the Battle of Wildcat Mountain on October 21, Zollicoffer's force was stymied by a prepared Union force fighting on rugged terrain, and he soon retreated into rural eastern Tennessee, which remained rife with Union sentiment.[25][32]

In November 1861, Zollicoffer changed strategy and advanced westward, then back into southeastern Kentucky to strengthen Confederate control in the area just south of Somerset.[30] He hoped this would put him in a position to be reinforced by Confederate forces from Bowling Green and to drive Thomas's force from the area.[30] Before he moved west, Zollicoffer left forces to guard the Cumberland Gap and three other approaches to east Tennessee.[30]

Zollicoffer moved west and established an encampment at Mill Springs, Kentucky, (near present-day Nancy, Kentucky) on the south bank of the Cumberland River.[30] By December 6, he had moved his force to the north bank of the river, where he thought he could better support the supply of his men, build fortifications and keep watch on Thomas's force.[33][34] This was a risky tactic because Zollicoffer's men were poorly equipped, ill-trained and ill-disciplined.[33][35] They were not properly prepared to meet the growing Union threat and Zollicoffer's expectation that he would solve this problem by receiving supplies and reinforcements at Beech Grove, opposite Mill Springs, was too optimistic.[33] Many of the men in Confederate service in Tennessee who could have reinforced Zollicoffer remained unarmed.[36] Zollicoffer's own reserve force at Knoxville was mostly unarmed.[37]

Under the circumstances in December 1861, without needed supplies or reserves, Zollicoffer was in no position to move against the Union force.[37] On December 20, 1861, Zollicoffer did not respond to a movement by a force under Brigadier General Albin F. Schoepf, who was attempting to provoke Zollicoffer to commit his force to an engagement in the open.[34] Colonel William H. Carroll did not leave Knoxville with his brigade to join Zollicoffer until January 16, 1862.[37] Ultimately, he could bring only a single regiment to Mill Springs, having been ordered to send the rest of his men to Bowling Green.[38]

Unaware of the situation in east Tennessee and of Zollicoffer's plan, on December 8, 1861, Confederate President Jefferson Davis appointed Major General George B. Crittenden to command the district of East Tennessee in order to lead a force into Kentucky.[39] Crittenden assumed command of the district, only to find that the ten regiments he expected to find there did not exist.[39] Crittenden retained Zollicoffer as commander of the 1st Brigade in his army. On December 15, Zollicoffer sent word to Crittenden that Thomas had ten regiments under his command.[39] While lingering at Knoxville for two more weeks, Crittenden sent word to Zollicoffer to move back to the south side of the Cumberland River.[39] Zollicoffer now had only two rafts to cross the swollen river which was nearly at flood stage,[39] so he stayed at Beech Grove on the north side of the river.[39]

On January 1, 1862, Thomas moved from his camp at Lebanon, Kentucky, to join with Schoepf's troops from Somerset.[39] On January 2, Crittenden arrived at Mill Springs and decided the Confederates should attack Thomas before he could join with Schoepf.[39] The Confederate force of about 6,500 men might have withstood an attack within their fortifications, but Thomas's larger force would have the advantage in the open field.[40] Because of the incessant rain and resulting mud, Thomas needed 18 days to move his force and equipment from Lebanon to Logan's Crossroads.[41]

"First in the fight and first in the arms of the white winged angel of glory, with his hero heart at the feet of God and his wounds to tell the story" —grave of General Felix K. Zollicoffer at Nashville City Cemetery.

On January 18, 1862, Crittenden ordered an advance at midnight, while the two Union forces under Thomas and Schoepf were separated by the rain-swollen Fishing Creek.[40] Zollicoffer led the first brigade toward Logan's Crossroads, while Carroll commanded the following brigade.[35][40]

After marching 8 miles (13 km) in a driving rain, Zollicoffer's skirmishers attacked the Union pickets 1 mile (1.6 km) south of the intersection of the Mill Springs and Columbia-Somerset roads.[40][42] The Battle of Mill Springs, sometimes called the Battle of Fishing Creek or the Battle of Logan's Crossroads, a three-hour fight in driving rain, fog and the smoke of battle over thickly wooded ground, followed.[40] The untrained Confederates were totally confused in this situation and their organization was lost.[40] Adding to the confusion, some of the Confederates were wearing blue uniforms.[43]

The 15th Mississippi Infantry Regiment mistook the Union 4th Kentucky Infantry Regiment for blue-clad Confederates.[43] In the confusion, the near-sighted Zollicoffer, wearing a white raincoat, rode into the lines of the 4th Kentucky and began to discuss the problem with the Union colonel, Speed S. Fry.[43] A Confederate aide then rode out of the fog firing at the Union force.[43] Union soldiers returned fire, killing Zollicoffer who had begun to ride away as the incident unfolded.[43] Historian Larry J. Daniel follows some other accounts which claim that Fry recognized and shot Zollicoffer.[44] He further stated that Fry, not Zollicoffer, had ridden into the enemy lines and had begun the conversation, only turning upon Zollicoffer when the Confederate aide rode up.[44] Historian Stuart W. Sanders discusses the encounter at the greatest length and also quotes a subsequent account by Colonel Fry.[45] He states that both officers rode out from their lines and that Fry initially thought Zollicoffer was a Union officer.[45] Fry claimed to have shot Zollicoffer.[46] Other accounts state that Fry also called to a few of his men to fire, although Fry later denied this.[47][48]

Many of the old Confederate flintlock weapons would not fire in the wet conditions and Zollicoffer's death caused his demoralized men to start a retreat.[43] Thomas sent six regiments against the weak Confederate flank, causing the Confederate line to collapse and retreat to Beech Grove.[43] Crittenden moved the remaining force across the Cumberland River overnight on a small steamboat and a few barges.[49] He left his artillery, mules, equipment and most of his food supply on the north bank, shattering his ordnance and logistical strength[49]