Gang war in Haiti
Since 2020, Haiti's capital Port-au-Prince is the site of an ongoing gang war[7][3][2] between two major criminal groups and their allies: The "Revolutionary Forces of the G9 Family and Allies" (FRG9 or G9) and the G-Pep.[7] The Government of Haiti and security forces struggle to maintain control in Port-au-Prince amid this conflict,[3] with gangs reportedly controlling up to 90% of the city by 2023.[8]
Gang war in Haiti | ||||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Part of the crime in Haiti and the 2017–2023 Haitian crisis | ||||||||
| ||||||||
Belligerents | ||||||||
G9 alliance and supporters |
G-Pep alliance 400 Mawozo gang[1][2] |
Haitian security forces Bwa kale vigiliantes[3] | ||||||
Commanders and leaders | ||||||||
Jimmy Chérizier | Gabriel Jean-Pierre | Ariel Henry | ||||||
Casualties and losses | ||||||||
3,700+ deaths[lower-alpha 1] |
In response to the escalating gang fighting, an armed vigilante movement known as bwa kale (from French bois calé) also emerged to battle the gangs.[3][9] On 2 October 2023, United Nations Security Council resolution 2699 was approved, authorizing a Kenya-led "multinational security support mission" to Haiti.[10]
Background
From the 1950s, non-state armed groups have been firmly established in Haiti. This process began with the establishment of the Tonton Macoute paramilitaries by Haitian dictator François Duvalier, used to violently suppress dissidents.[11][2] After the dictatorship ended with the removal of Jean-Claude Duvalier from power in 1986, non-state violence continued. The Tonton Macoute were disbanded, but never disarmed and thus reorganized as far-right vigilantes. Haitian political actors continued to employ armed groups to defend their interests, manipulate elections, and suppress public unrest. In 1994, President Jean-Bertrand Aristide outlawed pro-Duvalier armed groups and disbanded the Haitian military, but this did not solve the issue, as there was again no disarmament. Thus, ex-soldiers and ex-militiamen further swelled the ranks of unofficial militant factions. From 1994 to 2004, a de facto anti-Arisitide insurgency took place in Port-au-Prince, as ex-soldiers attacked the government.[11] In response to the chaos, youth set up self-defense groups called chimères;[2] these groups were supported by the police and the government to shore up its position. Enjoying de facto state support by Aristide's Fanmi Lavalas party, the youth gangs took control of entire communes and became increasingly independent-minded.[12] U.S. diplomat Daniel Lewis Foote argued that "Aristide started [the gangs] on purpose in the early 1980s, as a voice, as a way to get some power, [...] and they morphed over the years".[13]
Following the 2010 Haiti earthquake, younger and more ruthless gangs overcame the dominance by older, more politically aligned gangs. These armed youth groups grew increasingly powerful.[14] The earthquake also resulted in the mass breakout of criminals from damaged prisons in Haiti.[13] The United Nations MINUSTAH (a UN peacekeeping operation in Haiti started after the end of the 2004 coup d'état) failed to contain the unrest, and committed abuses of its own.[13] Since the end of the MINUSTAH in October 2017, there was an increase of the gang-related violence, also against civilians, like the 2018 Port-au-Prince massacre that killed 25 civilians.[15][16] From 2017 to 2021, Haiti's political leadership became embroiled in a crisis, and the Haitian parliament entered a deadlock, public administration gradually ceased to operate due to a lack of funding, and the judicial system effectively fell apart.[17] Scheduled elections were repeatedly postponed. The economy of Haiti suffered under the repeated natural disasters and the growing unrest, further contributing to the crisis.[6] Vox journalist Ellen Ioanes summarized that "Haiti has faced serious and compounding crises, including a devastating 2010 earthquake, floods, cholera outbreaks, hurricanes, and corrupt, dictatorial, and incompetent leaders".[13] Gangs stepped into this power vacuum, seizing political power through cooperative politicians and economic control through protection rackets, kidnappings, and murders.[17]
Known gangs
By 2022, researchers estimated that about 200 gangs operated across Haiti. Of these, half were located in Port-au-Prince. The more influential gangs control large swaths of territory, including entire municipalities and communes.[14]
- "G9 alliance",[18] officially Fòs Revolisyonè G9 an Fanmi e Alye (Revolutionary Forces of the G9 Family and allies):[19] It was founded and is led by Jimmy Chérizier, called Barbecue, an ex-police officer.[19][20] G9 is based in the capital's communes of Delmas, Pétion-Ville, and parts of Carrefour. The G9 alliance includes many former soldiers and policemen in its ranks, and was long connected to the PHTK party; however, it distanced itself from the PHTK since Ariel Henry became president. The G9 now portrays itself as a revolutionary organization,[21] and has begun to create a nation-wide alliance network dubbed "G20".[20]
- Delmas 6 Gang: Personal gang of Jimmy Chérizier, overall head of G9.[20] The gang was already operating while Chérizier was still an active police officer, signifying the gang's strong links to the Haitian security forces.[2]
- "Baz Pilate": One of the capital's most important gangs, mainly consists of ex-SWAT elite police.[22]
- Baz Krache Dife[20]
- Nan Ti Bwa[20]
- Simon Pelé's gang[20]
- Baz Nan Chabon, Waf Jérémie[20]
- Nan Boston,[20] also called "Boston gang"[23]
- Belekou gang[20][23]
- "G-Pep": This gang alliance was formed in direct response to G9. It was organized by the Nan Brooklyn gang and its head Jean Pierre Gabriel (alias "Ti Gabriel"). The G-Pep is believed to be connected to Haitian opposition parties and/or "a well-known Haitian businessman". It is centered on Port-au-Prince's Cité Soleil.[22]
- "400 Mawozo": The largest gang in Haiti, it is mainly based in Ganthier and in Port-au-Prince's Tabarre and Pétion-Ville. It largely consists of deportees, former leaders of opposition groups, former smugglers, and police officers. In 2022, it aligned itself with "G-Pep" after its leader was extradited to the United States.[1]
- "Grand Ravine" and "5 Second": Two youth gangs based in Port-au-Prince's Martissant; mainly consists of vigilantes and "popular organizations" previously connected to Fanmi Lavalas.[22]
- "Baz Galil": Based outside the capital, it mainly consists of deportees from the United States. Closely connected to the PHTK, various government agencies, and other gangs.[18]
- "Titanyen gang": Operates in Cabaret.[23]
- "Base 5 Secondes": Operates in Cabaret.[23]
- "Canaan gang": Operates in Cabaret.[23]
- "Village de Dieu"[2]
The conflict
In May 2020, a coalition of eleven gangs (Delmas 19 gang, Delmas 6 gang, Delmas 95 gang, Nan Barozi gang, Nan Belekou gang, Nan Boston gang, Nan Chabón gang, Nan Ti Bwa gang, Pilate Base gang, Simon Pele gang, Wharf de Jeremie gang) was founded to attack several neighborhoods in Port-au-Prince as a way to secure and expand territorial control. In the same month, they attacked civilians in the hoods of Port-au-Prince, killing 34 people. By the end of the month, the coalition was dissolved.[24]
After those attacks, in a video on YouTube, another coalition of nine gangs was announced to be founded in Port-au Prince in June 2020. This became the "G9 Alliance" led by Jimmy "Barbecue" Chérizier.[2][19] All of member gangs had previous links to the ruling PHTK party of President Jovenel Moïse.[25] The coalition is led by Jimmy Chérizier. Since the coalition was founded, it has been responsible for multiple massacres against civilians and clashes with other rival gangs. From 2020 to 2021, the G9 was responsible for a dozen massacres, in which at least 200 people were killed.[19] The G9 was believed to have had close ties to the government of Moïse, which was accused of large-scale corruption. The coalition members frequently evaded persecution after the massacres and the clashes; Chérizier stood out in this regard because despite the arrest warrants against him, he continued to move freely and maintain an active presence on social media with no attempts by Haitian government forces to effectively arrest him. The G9 also began attacking neighborhoods in which civilians protested against the president, and also started clashes against rival gangs with the support of the police.[19][26]
In response to the growing dominance of G9, a rival gang alliance called "G-Pep" was founded[27] in July 2020. It mainly consisted of those gangs in Port-au-Prince's Cité Soleil who were strongly opposed to joining G9.[2] G-Pep was suspected of being connected to various opposition parties, and thus opposed G9 and its ties to Moïse.[28] In the following months, both gang alliance began to expand beyond their initial areas of operation.[2]
Escalation
After the assassination of Jovenel Moïse, on July 7, 2021, the G9 started to help the government in the manhunt against the 28 foreign perpetrators. After the killing of the Moïse, Ariel Henry, believed to be linked to the killing of Moïse, became acting president of Haiti. This was followed by an increase in violence,[29] as the gangs exploited the government's weakness.[2] On May 12, 2021, during a clash with G-Pep, Chérizier was reported to be wounded.[30] After the death of his suspected ally Moïse, G9 leader Jimmy Chérizier increasingly voiced political ambitions and began to openly opposing the Haitian government of Henry. On 17 October 2021, G9 forced President Henry to flee an official commemoration event, and then began a month-long blockade of the country's largest oil terminal. Though G9 initially declared that it would only lift the blockade if the government resigned, Henry refused to step down; instead, the two sides eventually agreed to a secret deal and G9 retreated from the oil terminal.[2] In general, Henry holds only limited power; U.S. diplomat Foote described the Haitian President as "kind of a clown. [The gangs] in several instances have made him pay them a bunch of money in order for him to attend an event or hold a ceremony — and then they won't let him do it."[13]
By 2022, most gangs in the capital had aligned themselves with either G9 or G-Pep.[14] In May 2022, the powerful 400 Mawozo gang aligned itself with G-Pep, greatly improving the latter's position in the gang war and causing a further escalation of violence.[2] On 10 June, the Village de Dieu gang captured the Court of First Instance of Port-au-Prince.[2] From 8 to 9 July, 2022, the violence between the two gangs increased after the start of a battle in the hoods of Port-au Prince that killed 89 people and injured 74.[5] The battle caused the nearby Varreux field terminal, the country's largest fuel depot, to pause operations, leading to a drastic shortage in fuel as two fuel tankers were unable to be unloaded; Doctors Without Borders has stated that the organization has been unable to access the slum due to the violence.[31] In September, amid the increase of the price of the fuel for the socioeconomic crisis, the G9 began a blockade of the Varreux fuel terminal. On 6 November, after two weeks of negotiations with the Haitian government and after an armed offensive launched by the Haitian National Police, the G9 gang coalition relinquished control of the Varreux fuel terminal.[32]
From late 2022, an anti-gang bwa kale vigiliante movement emerged to attack and kill any gang members. The vigiliantes often burned captured gang members alive.[3][9] The vigiliantes also began to turn against regular security forces, murdering at least one police officer who had no known gang connections. The gangs responded to the growth of the vigiliante groups with counter-attacks, murdering community leaders who expressed support for self-defense actions.[6] By March 2023, Haitian officials speculated that up to 90% of the capital was controlled by gangs.[8] In April 2023, three gangs, namely Titanyen, Base 5 Secondes, and Canaan, conducted an "offensive" in the Cabaret commune (outside Port-au-Prince) in an attempt to break a blockade imposed by local self-defense groups. At least 100 people were killed in this battle. On 14 April, another battle erupted in Port-au-Prince's Cité Soleil between G-Pep's Nan Brooklyn gang and G9's Belekou and Boston gangs. This clash lasted six deays and resulted in at least 70 deaths.[23]
By mid-2023, the gang war between G9 and G-Pep continued unabated,[7][3] while the resistance by anti-gang vigiliantes also grew in scope. Thousands of people were displaced by the clashes.[6] The severity of the ongoing gang war in Haiti has led to the United Nations Security Council authorizing one-year deployment of an international force led by Kenya to help the Haitian government deal with the crisis.[33][10] Chérizier declared that G9 would resist if an international intervention force committed "human rights abuses", claiming that it would "be a fight of the Haitian people to save the dignity of our country".[6]
Notes
- By mid-2022, about 1,100 people had been killed in the gang war.[4][5] In late 2023, the United Nations estimated that an additional 2,439 people had been killed from January to August 2023.[6]
References
- Walker 2022, pp. 4, 17–18.
- Diego Da Rin (July 27, 2022). "New Gang Battle Lines Scar Haiti as Political Deadlock Persists". Crisis Group. Retrieved October 2, 2023.
- Evan Dyer (May 8, 2023). "In Haiti, a grassroots vigilante movement is fighting back against gang warfare". cbc. Retrieved September 30, 2023.
- "UCDP – Uppsala Conflict Data Program". ucdp.uu.se. Retrieved July 28, 2022.
- Charles, Jacqueline (July 13, 2022). "Gang continues deadly attack on Haiti slum, sparking violent protests over fuel shortages". Miami Herald. Retrieved July 13, 2022.
- "United Nations statistics underscore 'extreme brutality' of Haiti's gangs". al-Jazeera. August 19, 2023. Retrieved October 6, 2023.
- Matt Rivers (July 31, 2023). "Rare glimpse inside neighborhood at the center of Haiti's gang war". ABC. Retrieved September 30, 2023.
- "Chaos In Haiti Escalates as Gang Violence, Fuel Shortages Threaten Access to Health Care". Partners in Health. March 24, 2023. Retrieved September 30, 2023.
- Chéry, Ons (November 18, 2022). "Bwa kale: Protests still draw people fed up in Haiti, despite risks". The Haitian Times.
- Robles, Frances; Fassihi, Farnaz (October 2, 2023). "U.N. Approves Kenya-Led Security Mission to Help Haiti Stamp Out Gangs". The New York Times. ISSN 0362-4331. Retrieved October 3, 2023.
- Walker 2022, p. 5.
- Walker 2022, pp. 5–6.
- Ellen Ioanes (March 26, 2023). "Haiti's gang violence crisis, briefly explained". Vox (website). Retrieved October 6, 2023.
- Walker 2022, p. 6.
- "UN peacekeepers leave Haiti: What is their legacy?". Al Jazeera. October 6, 2017. Retrieved January 15, 2019.
- Charles, Jacqueline (November 18, 2018). "Anti-corruption protest in Haiti turns into referendum on Haitian president". miamiherald. Retrieved January 15, 2019.
- Walker 2022, pp. 3–4.
- Walker 2022, p. 19.
- "UCDP – Uppsala Conflict Data Program". ucdp.uu.se. Retrieved July 28, 2022.
- Walker 2022, p. 17.
- Walker 2022, p. 16.
- Walker 2022, p. 18.
- ACLED 2023, p. 2.
- "UCDP – Uppsala Conflict Data Program". ucdp.uu.se. Retrieved July 28, 2022.
- Walker 2022, p. 13.
- "Haiti gang leader declares 'revolution' as violence spreads". Al Jazeera. Reuters. June 24, 2021. Archived from the original on July 7, 2021. Retrieved July 8, 2021.
- Walker 2022, p. 7.
- Walker 2022, p. 4.
- "UCDP – Uppsala Conflict Data Program". ucdp.uu.se. Retrieved July 28, 2022.
- "Barbecue" Cherizier, Haiti's top gang leader, shot in gunfight". The Haitian Times. May 14, 2021. Archived from the original on May 14, 2021. Retrieved July 8, 2021.
- "Thousands trapped as gangs battle for control in Port-au-Prince". Al Jazeera. Retrieved July 14, 2022.
- Dupain, Etant; Alam, Hande Atay (November 6, 2022). "Critical Haiti gas terminal freed after weeks of talks with G9 gang leader". CNN. Retrieved November 7, 2022.
- Coto, Danica; Lederer, Edith. "UN to vote on resolution to authorize one-year deployment of armed force to help Haiti fight gangs". Associated Press. Retrieved October 1, 2023.
Works cited
- Walker, Summer (October 2022). "Gangs of Haiti: Expansion, power and an escalating crisis" (PDF). Geneva: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime. Retrieved September 30, 2023.
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(help) - "Regional Overview Latin America & the Caribbean April 2023" (PDF). Geneva: ACLED. May 2023. Retrieved October 2, 2023.
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