Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946

The need to modernize the national legislature became evident during the Great Depression of the 1930s and World War II. During those years of economic crisis and global war, the federal government took on vast new responsibilities—responsibilities that stretched to the breaking point of the capacity of the national legislature, as it was then structured, to cope with a vastly increased workload. At the same time the power and prestige of Congress were rapidly eroding. During the depression, and even more so during the war, Congress delegated sweeping authority to the administration of Franklin D. Roosevelt to implement legislation as he and his agents in the executive branch saw fit. In addition, the war caused Congress a severe loss of prestige. Suddenly, it seemed legislators became the object for all the pent up frustrations and anxieties of war. Some influential commentators charged that Congress's antiquated traditions, cumbersome procedures, and long delays in considering legislation rendered it incapable of meeting the needs of the modern world. The future, they said, rested with the president.

By the end of the war, many legislators had concluded that the only way to recapture their lost stature was to reform the Congress. A key leader of the reform movement was the veteran Wisconsin senator Robert M. La Follette Jr., scion of Wisconsin's famous political dynasty. In 1945, he and Oklahoma representative A. S. "Mike" Monroney co-chaired a joint committee of Congress to consider what might be done to make the body more efficient and effective. The following year, the committee recommended sweeping reforms, and the committee's co-chairs incorporated many of those reforms into a reorganization measure.

The Act produced mixed results. Probably its greatest success was in equipping legislators and their committees with staffs of experts to help draft bills and analyze the complex issues that come before Congress. Legislative oversight of the executive branch also improved as a result of reorganization. In other areas reorganization fell short. The positive effects of reducing committee numbers was at least partly counterbalanced by the unexpected proliferation of subcommittees, which were not regulated in the act. Many lobbyists exploited loopholes in the act to avoid full compliance. The ambitious reform of the budget process failed to work and was abandoned after a couple of years. Above all, the act failed to achieve its major objective. It slowed but did not reverse the flow of power and prestige from the legislative branch to the executive branch.

Title III of the Act was the Regulation of Lobbying Act (60 Stat. 839), intended to reduce the influence of lobbyists and to provide information to members of Congress about those that lobby them.[3] The Regulation of Lobbying Act was later repealed by the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995.[4]

Title IV of the Act was the Federal Tort Claims Act (60 Stat. 842), permitting private parties to sue the United States in a federal court for most torts committed by persons acting on behalf of the United States. Historically, citizens have not been able to sue their state—a doctrine referred to as sovereign immunity. The FTCA constitutes a limited waiver of sovereign immunity, permitting citizens to pursue some tort claims against the government.

Title V of the Act was the General Bridge Act (60 Stat. 847), providing for the: "construction, maintenance, and operation of bridges and approaches thereto over the navigable waters of the United States" and repealed provisions of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899.

• Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970
• List of current United States House of Representatives committees
• List of defunct United States congressional committees