Headquarters Mobile Support Unit

The Headquarters Mobile Support Unit (HMSU) is the police tactical unit of the Police Service of Northern Ireland. The HMSU was originally formed in the then Royal Ulster Constabulary part of Special Branch and was involved in several controversial shootings during The Troubles.

Headquarters Mobile Support Unit
Active1980[1] - Present
AgencyPolice Service of Northern Ireland
TypePolice tactical unit
RoleCounter-terrorism
Law enforcement
Part ofSpecialist Operations Branch (C4)[2]
AbbreviationHMSU

Background

The Headquarters Mobile Support Unit (HMSU) was a uniformed elite unit established by the Royal Ulster Constabulary, intended to be their equivalent of the Special Air Service. Members of the HMSU were enrolled into Royal Ulster Constabulary Special Branch and were trained by the Special Air Service to on how to confront Irish Republican Army (IRA) members and other opponents with "firepower, speed and aggression".[3]

The unit had its prototype in the Bessbrook Support Unit set up in 1977 as part of the scaling-up of the Royal Ulster Constabulary's numbers and capabilities under Chief Constable Kenneth Newman to "Ulsterise" as far as possible the maintenance of security. The intensively trained and highly armed Bessbrook Support Unit were intended to take over from the Special Air Service the role of deployment along the South Armagh border to intercept IRA active service units. The Bessbrook Support Unit were in 1979 replaced with a Special Patrol Group, which was in turn replaced in 1981 by the Special Support Unit (SSU).[4] The SSU was subsequently renamed the Headquarters Mobile Support Unit (HMSU) after two of its members were convicted of kidnap and murder.[5] The two, John Weir and Billy McCaughey, implicated some of their colleagues in a range of crimes including giving weapons, information and transport to loyalist paramilitaries as well as carrying out shooting and bombing attacks of their own.[6] Weir alleged that senior officers, including Chief Superintendent Harry Breen, were aware of and approved of their activity. Additionally it was felt he initials SSU were considered too similar to SAS suggesting a military-style unit.[7]

"Shoot to kill"

The SSU were infamously involved in the alleged "shoot-to-kill" incidents of November and December 1982, when six republican paramilitaries were shot dead in three separate incidents, all of whom turned out to be unarmed. These incidents, and evidence which came out in court of organised falsification of the details of the encounters, led to the setting up of the 1984–86 Stalker Inquiry.

In this period, according to evidence given in court at the time by Royal Ulster Constabulary deputy chief constable Michael McAtamney, officers selected for the unit underwent an immensely tough two-week assessment of fitness, mental ability and endurance under pressure, followed by a four-week course including seven days devoted exclusively to weapons training; with the focus being to "eliminate the threat" posed to officers.[7]

In addition to standard weaponry, the unit additionally used Ingram sub-machine guns; Remington pump-action shotguns and Browning semi-automatic shotguns; the Ruger Mini-14 light semi-automatic rifle; and 14-shot Smith & Wesson Model 59 9mm pistol carried as personal sidearms.[7] According to one subsequent report, at the time of the 1982 shootings, the HMSU that had been active in the constabulary's southern region comprised two dozen men, working in field teams of six, travelling in pairs of specially armoured unmarked Ford Cortinas, the front passenger with a Sterling submachine gun, the rear passenger a Ruger rifle, and all three including the driver were armed with pistols.[8]

The unit was based at Lisnasharrah, East Belfast, and worked closely with the plain-clothes intelligence gathering unit E4A. Many were English and/or ex-soldiers. According to reports, as uncovered by the Stalker Inquiry, the units operated almost as a law unto themselves, taking orders only from a small group at Gough Barracks in Armagh that was in charge of tasking and co-ordination, who in turn answered only to Special Branch at constabulary headquarters at Knock. Members generally refused to recognise the authority of senior officers not in the unit, a constable on one occasion telling a CID detective to leave the site and come back after he had had a meal.[7][8]

According to American writer J. Bowyer Bell there were two such units in all at the time, of 24 members each;[9] although a 1985 newspaper article claimed at least 12 such squads were active.[10] The same article explained their rationale: "The circumstances of the shootings have to be put into the context of Northern Ireland. In the same period two constabulary officers who approached a car parked outside a County Down post office were shot dead by IRA men about to stage a robbery. Unionists were not slow to claim that if anyone was shooting to kill, it was the Republican paramilitaries."[10]

Post-1982

Following the 1982 shootings, the HMSU was reined in. Subsequently, the Royal Ulster Constabulary played only a supporting role in such operations, but the active role in intelligence-led covert ambushes was returned to the British Army, in particular the Special Air Service and similarly trained units, under ultimate police operational control.[11]

Tasking of these operations was put into the hands of a joint committee that included the Intelligence Corps and MI5 as well as senior police officers, rather than the original exclusive tight control by a close-knit small group of Royal Ulster Constabulary officers reporting to HQ-level Special Branch. Some measures were also taken to make the Special Branch less of a force within a force, with regional assistant chief constables having to be informed of Special Branch operations in their areas, and a single senior assistant chief constable position created, with oversight responsibility for both CID and Special Branch.[12] The HMSU continued to take part in "rapid reaction" duties, including raids on suspected paramilitary properties, and spearheading riot control.

The HMSU continued in being throughout the 1980s and 1990s as an operational sub-department of Special Branch department E4.[13] In this time the unit traced and arrested several IRA members in Northern Ireland.

Police Service of Northern Ireland

On 4 November 2001, the Royal Ulster Constabulary was reformed and renamed the Police Service of Northern Ireland following recommendations of the 1999 Independent Commission on Policing for Northern Ireland report implementing the terms of the 1998 Good Friday Agreement.[14]

On 29 April 2003, HMSU officers fatally shot Neil McConville during a vehicle intercept.[15]

In March 2004, the command of the HMSU changed to the newly formed Crime Operations Department with the HMSU becoming part of C4 Specialist Operations Branch separating from Special Branch which was renamed the Intelligence Branch.[16][17][2]

In November 2014, HMSU officers were photographed following an operation at a house in Newry to arrest members of the Continuity IRA.[18][19]

HMSU officers undergo a 26-week training programme including firearms, unarmed combat, roping, driving, close personal protection and photography.[20] HMSU officers are trained to Specialist Firearms Officer and Counter Terrorist Specialist Firearms Officer standards.[21]

References
  1. Police Federation for Northern Ireland. "Benevolent Fund Benefits From HMSU Charity Drive". Policebeat: The News Magazine of the Police Federation for Northern Ireland (February 2011). Retrieved 15 July 2017.
  2. "PSNI Policy for Special Operations Branch - Policy Directive 04/07" (PDF). Police Service of Northern Ireland. Archived from the original (PDF) on 19 September 2010.
  3. Abstracts on Organisations: H, CAIN website, University of Ulster
  4. Graham Ellison, Jim Smyth (2000), The Crowned Harp: Policing Northern Ireland. London: Pluto Press. ISBN 978-0-7453-1393-1. p. 90
  5. Richard Doherty, The Thin Green Line – The History of the Royal Ulster Constabulary GC, pp. 17; Pen & Sword Books; ISBN 1-84415-058-5
  6. Center for Civil & Human Rights Archived 15 June 2007 at the Wayback Machine, www.nd.edu; accessed 20 February 2014.
  7. David Sapsted and Richard Ford, RUC set to cover its elite squad, The Times, 24 October 1986.
  8. David Leigh, Jonathan Foster and Paul Lashmar, Ulster death squad secrets exposed, The Observer, 12 October 1986; p.1
  9. J. Bowyer Bell (1997), The secret army: the IRA, 3rd ed. Transaction Publishers. ISBN 978-1-56000-901-6 p. 532
  10. Paul Johnson, Ulster's undercover squads trained to kill, The Guardian, 16 February 1985
  11. Ellison and Smyth (2000), The Crowned Harp, p. 128.
  12. David Hearst, Kelly faces obstinate questions on trail pioneered by Stalker, The Guardian, 18 February 1988.
    House of Commons debates, 17 February 1988, 3:30 pm via They Work For You
  13. e.g. Report of the Billy Wright Inquiry, section 5.53 Archived 10 December 2010 at the Wayback Machine, 14 September 2010, describing the structure of Special Branch as at December 1997
  14. Independent Commission on Policing in Northern Ireland (September 1999). A New Beginning: Policing in Northern Ireland - The Report of the Independent Commission on Policing in Northern Ireland (PDF). Retrieved 15 July 2017.
  15. "Report on the circumstances of the death of Mr Neil McConville on 29 April 2003" (PDF). Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland. Retrieved 16 July 2017.
  16. "Crime Operations Department". Police Service of Northern Ireland. Archived from the original on 8 June 2008.
  17. Police Service of Northern Ireland. Chief Constable's Annual Report 2003-2004 (PDF). Retrieved 16 July 2017.
  18. "Prosecutors fail in bid to overturn bail granted to four accused over CIRA terror plot meetings". The Irish News. 25 September 2015. Retrieved 15 July 2017.
  19. Allen, Tony (25 January 2015). "Frontline in the War on Terror: Revealed: Inside the PSNI'S Elite Branch". Belfast Telegraph.
  20. "PSNI Final EQIA – Proposals to Introduce Taser - Glossary of Terms - Appendix Four" (PDF). Police Service of Northern Ireland. November 2008. Retrieved 15 July 2017.
  21. "PSNI Manual of Policy, Procedure and Guidance on Conflict Management - Chapter 9 - Police Use of Firearms PB 4/13" (PDF). Police Service of Northern Ireland. Retrieved 16 July 2017.
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