Iraqis in Syria

Iraqis in Syria do not live in tented refugee camps or collective centers, but many are forced to stay in dirty and over-crowded apartments.[15] Most lease agreements are made without a written contract, leaving tenants vulnerable to exploitation by Iraqi and Syrian landlords as rental prices spiral increasingly upwards.[16] Due to their status as "guests," Iraqi refugees are not permitted to work legally in Syria. Consequently, Iraqi unemployment rates are high: 80% for women, and 53% for men.[17] Most Iraqis initially live off limited savings; when these run out, some improvise ways to find employment in Syria's informal economy, where they work in a variety of positions. However, Iraqis are often forced to work for meager wages and can be subject to exploitation at the hands of their employers. A number of the refugees also subsist on rental income from their properties in Iraq, remittances, or live off government pensions or salaries.[18] While the Syrian government occasionally offers work permits to well-established Iraqi professionals and entrepreneurs, Syrian partners are usually necessary to register businesses. Nevertheless, Iraqi businesses flourish in neighborhoods with a prominent Iraqi presence.[19]

Iraqi children have access to Syrian elementary and secondary schools, where attendance is free for Syrians and Iraqis alike, though refugee families usually incur the cost of supplies, uniforms, and occasionally textbooks. Unfortunately, many Syrian schools were already crowded prior to 2003; since then, the education system has strained to accommodate the massive influx of refugee children, particularly in the Damascus area.[20] In 2007, the Syrian Ministry of Education indicated that only 30,000 Iraqi children—only 10% of the estimated number of school-age refugees—were enrolled in public schools.[21] Analysts attribute the low enrollment numbers to the difficulty of enrolling after the beginning of the school year or without the requisite documentation, overcrowding, curriculum and proficiency gaps between Syrians and Iraqis of the same age, long commutes between home and school, financial conditions which force some families to have their children work, and social fears due to high levels of psychological trauma among children.[22][23] Though enrollment rose to nearly 50,000 in the 2007-8 school year, the number fell back down to 32,000 in 2008–09.[24] Sadly, nearly half of the small fraction of children who manage to enroll ultimately drop out.[25] As a consequence, illiteracy is rapidly on the rise among Iraqi children in Syria, prompting a number of aid organizations and concerned teachers in Syria to offer remedial lessons and summer classes to help Iraqis catch up to their Syrian classmates.[26] In 2007, it was estimated that only 770 Iraqis were attending university in Syria, with a large number at the private Syrian International University outside Damascus.[27]

All Iraqi citizens in Syria received free public health care until 2006, at which time prohibitive costs forced Syrian authorities to introduce restrictions.[28] Though government hospitals sometimes treat Iraqis nationals for free, especially in emergency cases, refugees usually rely on clinics managed by charities, churches, or humanitarian organizations such as the Syrian Arab Red Crescent. At SARC clinics, UNHCR-registered patients were only responsible for 20% of the costs until 2009, at which time the UNHCR replaced the percentage system with a flat rate. Today, the Syrian government and various NGOs are still working the standardize the healthcare system for Iraqi refugees.[29] In addition, the UNHCR has found that there is a serious need for psychological support to the refugees, nearly all of whom have been traumatized to varying degrees over recent years, with many still under overwhelming psychological stress today.[30]

Some Iraqi families, particularly wealthier ones, have managed to flee together to Syria. However, a large number of refugees have either experienced the death of an immediate family member, belong to families which have been split up, or have left Iraq on their own. Occasionally male family heads send their children, spouses, or entire families to Syria for security reasons, while they continue to work in Iraq or commute back and forth as drivers or traders. As such, SARC has estimated that 13% of Iraqi households in Syria are managed by women, roughly half of whom have no source of income and struggle to scrape by.[31] Children from poor families are increasingly forced to work as shophands, street vendors, errand-runners, maids, or engage in menial labor to contribute to the family income, making on average under $2 income per day's work.[32] A number of children are separated from their immediate families and live with relatives, while estimates suggest 1% of all Iraqi nationals in Syria are children who are fully unaccompanied.[33]

One result of these conditions is that prostitution in Syria, though already on the rise prior to 2003, has rapidly expanded and systematized due to the Iraqi refugee crisis.[34] A number of Iraqi women and girls have been tricked, sold, or forced to engage in prostitution. Some Iraqis have been trafficked into Syria, while others are kidnapped after they arrive.[35] Young girls may be pressured or forced into the sex trade by their own parents or new husbands, while older girls and women may work at nightclubs or brothels for lack of better options.[36] As the situation has developed, networks of Iraqi men and sometimes women have organized to profit from the trade.[37] Additionally, in 2009, UNHCR identified 900 victims of sexual and gender-based violence, indicating that a number of Iraqi refugees face the threat of sexual and economic exploitation in domestic and public contexts.[38]

Most residents of Damascus believe Iraqis have pushed the capacity of their city and country far past its limits: one taxi driver imagined there were eight million refugees in Syria, while other Damascenes routinely quote numbers ranging between three and six.[46] Many Syrians blame Iraqis for overcrowding Damascus, stealing jobs and housing from Syrian citizens, and raising costs of all kinds. Iraqis are also often blamed for any number of domestic problems, including perceived increases in crime and prostitution.[47] Consequently, tensions between refugees and Syrians have increased in some urban areas, though security services have prevented any open violence. Some Sunni Syrians are anxious about the influx of Shi'a refugees, though instances of open sectarian violence seem rare.[48] In fact, it seems that living under trying conditions in a foreign country, along with escaping the divisive discourses and politics of post-2003 Iraq, has engendered tolerance and noticeable cross-socialization among Iraqis of different sects.[49] While some Syrians view Iraqis as arrogant thugs, Iraqis sometimes view Syrians as "greedy and corrupt," particularly blaming local landlords for charging exorbitant rent costs. At the same time, many Syrians appear proud of their government's efforts to live up to its ideals of pan-Arab solidarity, while many refugees admit that they could not expect better treatment elsewhere.[50]

Syria didn't sign the 1951 Refugee Convention and therefore considers refugees as ‘guests’ and does not give them the opportunity to apply for asylum or get refugee status. The government has been forced to balance the needs of the displaced Iraqs with its commitment to the Syrian people. The Syrian government feels that it has undergone considerable stress to deal with the effects of the American invasion of Iraq, and shows some concern that Iraqi refugees could undermine the country's stability.[51] By assisting the Iraqi refugees, the government does attract some international funds and gains a measure of moral and pan-Arab legitimacy. It also deters the United States from hostile posturing while compelling diplomatic engagement, though the US has resisted incorporating the issue into a broader dialogue. Some observers, though, have expressed surprise that Syria has not done more to strategically advertise its efforts on the international stage to attract more funds or gain political leverage.[52]

The government has partnered closely with the Syrian Arab Red Crescent Society and has, after initial reluctance, increasingly coordinated with the UNHCR and other international agencies, including those with close links to the United States. It appears Syrian officials did not foresee the refugee presence as a long-term problem, but imagined Iraqis would return home once their nation stabilized, resulting in their hesitance to accept outside help and relatively passive stance toward the inflow of Iraqis until it reached crisis levels in 2007.[53] Since then, the government's initial satisfaction with the beleaguered American occupation of Iraq has evolved into concern for Iraq's stability and the potential for spillover violence.[54] In 2007, Syrian authorities asserted that the aggregate cost of hosting the Iraqi refugees amounted to a billion dollars per year, and asked the international community to provide $257 million to help expand its health, education, and security structures to better manage the crisis. While the Syrian government has expressed disappointment with the response from foreign governments, the state donors have noted that their assistance is obstructed by long approval processes and the government's inhibitory requirements for oversight and control. As of 2010, no plans have been made to facilitate permanent or prolonged Iraqi settlement in Syria.[55]

Syria permitted Iraqi nationals unhindered entry at the border through 2006, granting three-month visas which were renewable at immigration centers throughout the country.[56] By 2007 the influx of refugees had risen to over 2,000 refugees per day, causing Syria to implement a requirement that temporary residents return to the border every three months for a new visa. As refugee numbers continued to spiral upward, the government finally implemented a restricted visa policy in after Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki gave the idea his blessing in October 2007, catching Syrian officials by surprise.[57] Though the new policy stemmed the tide of Iraqi refugees considerably, visa regulations permit 14 categories of Iraqis to enter the country, including anyone who shows documentation proving they need medical assistance in Syria. By 2010, the number of Iraqi residents in Syria had stabilized, with about 500 entering and exiting per day.[58] Nevertheless, many Syrian officials remain ambivalent about abrogating from the tradition of a pan-Arab borders policy, and the issue is still debated within the government today.[57]

In 2007, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, António Guterres, called upon Iraq to engage more closely with its refugee populations in Syria and Jordan.[59] That December, the Government of Iraq delivered $15 million in bilateral assistance for education and health services, which was regarded as a token gesture by some Syrian officials.[60] Iraq's Ministry of Migration and Displacement remains under-resourced, and its efforts to recruit displaced nationals back to Iraq have been largely unsuccessful.[61] While Iraq's government desires to retain its population, Syrian officials have expressed disappointment in Iraq's weak enthusiasm to lend assistance.[62]

In 2007, the U.S. State Department created the Iraq Refugee and Internally Displaced Persons Task Force, signaling an acceleration of humanitarian assistance and resettlement efforts. In 2008 the Bush Administration doubled its funding for Iraqi refugee aid programs to $318 million. Later that year, the Obama Administration announced that "America has moral obligation and a responsibility" to assist the Iraqi refugees and pledged to provide $2 billion to aid programs. In 2009, the Department of State spent $1.58 billion in Migration and Refugee Assistance, while it plans to spend another $2 billion in 2010 with $50 million earmarked for Iraqi refugees.[63] In contrast to Jordan, which has reportedly received over $700 million in refugee-related economic aid since 2003, Syria has not received direct aid from the United States, prompting frustration among Syrian officials.[64] While the US increased its support to UNHCR's Iraq budget to over 50% of the costs, humanitarian organizations have called upon the US to do more.[65] The US had only taken in a total of 466 Iraqis by the end of 2007, but UNHCR records show that over the next two years it accepted over 11,000 Iraqi refugees from Syria alone. Other countries which have resettled a noteworthy, but still limited, number of Iraqi refugees from Syria include Germany, Canada, Finland, and Sweden.[66]

Syria, like Jordan, is not a party to the 1951 UNHCR Convention and 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, which explicitly prohibit refoulement. However, the principle of non-refoulement is recognized as customary international law, and therefore binding on the entire international community. It is nevertheless evident that Syria has worked hard, through 2007, to take on as many refugees as possible in absence of substantial international funding. Up to this point, Syrian officials have not made any wide-scale effort to deport illegal refugees from the country. While the US may have a "moral responsibility" to the Iraqi refugees, under existing international law it has been difficult to establish a case that the United States bears primary legal responsibility.[67]