Ismael Moreno Pino

A protégé of Manuel Tello,[29] then the Foreign Secretary, Moreno Pino joined the Foreign Office in 1952 and the Diplomatic Service in 1955, after passing the necessary examinations.[29] Originally, he was hired as a legal advisor to the Mexican delegation to the Organization of American States in Washington, D.C.[30]

Returning to Mexico, he worked in the Bureau for International Organization Affairs, collaborating closely with Octavio Paz,[31] who would be awarded the Nobel Prize in Literature in 1990, and with Jorge Castañeda,[32] who would serve as Foreign Secretary. In 1960, succeeding the latter, he served as Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs.[33] Between 1964 and 1965, he served as Undersecretary for Multilateral Affairs.[34] In 1964, President Adolfo López Mateos appointed him to the rank of Ambassador of Mexico.

Ismael Moreno Pino, Ambassador of Mexico to Germany, arriving at the Hammerschmidt Villa for the presentation of letters of credence to Dr. Gustav Heinemann, the President of the Federal Republic of Germany

As a non-aligned country in a Cold War context, Mexico was treading a fine line between the Western Bloc, led by the United States, and the Warsaw Pact countries, led by the USSR. This was exacerbated after Fidel Castro came to power in Cuba in 1959, providing no easy solutions for Mexican foreign policy: "wholehearted support for the Cuban Revolution would create an unsustainable tension with the United States, the business community and the Catholic Church; meanwhile, wholehearted support for the United States would provoke an unsustainable tension with the revolutionary government of Cuba, the Mexican intelligentsia and other left-wing sectors which could become radicalized. The Mexican political system entrusted this delicate mission to the Foreign Ministry headed at that time by Manuel Tello, Foreign Secretary, and José Gorostiza, Deputy Foreign Secretary and, next to them, a noteworthy cadre of career diplomats educated in a tradition that [dates back] to the times when the proverb 'a Texan might beat a Mexican in a fight, but he is lost if he tries to argue with him' was minted."[35]

Moreno Pino actively participated in shaping Mexico's response to the Cuban Revolution and its aftermath, including the Bay of Pigs Invasion (1961) and the Cuban Missile Crisis (1962). Indeed, Moreno Pino was one of the key Mexican delegates in the Punta del Este meeting (1962)[36][37][38] held after the Cuban Revolution, during which it was decided, contrary to the express wishes of the United States, not to expel Cuba from the Organization of American States (OAS). During the meeting, Secretary Tello declared that Cuba's communist ideology was incompatible with OAS membership (pleasing the US); nevertheless, Mexico argued that the OAS Charter had no provision for the expulsion of a member state (pleasing Cuba).[39] Mexico also advocated for non-interventionism, as established in the Estrada Doctrine.[11]

During these crises, Mexico successfully maintained close relations both with the United States and Cuba. In June 1962, President John F. Kennedy carried out a state visit to Mexico[40] and Moreno Pino was invited to act as interpreter. During the visit, Kennedy "recognized that the fundamental goals of the Mexican Revolution were the same as those of the Alliance for Progress: social justice and economic progress in a framework of individual and political liberty." On the other hand, Fidel Castro extended his recognition "to Mexico, to the Mexican government that has maintained the strongest position, we can say that it inspires us with respect, that with the Mexican government we are willing to talk and discuss, and... we are willing to commit ourselves to maintaining a policy subject to norms, inviolable norms of respect for the sovereignty of each country and of not interfering in the internal affairs of any country."[41]

Another sensitive issue at the time was the representation of China in the United Nations; this issue was particularly delicate because China had a permanent seat in the UN Security Council. After the Chinese Revolution of 1949, the Communists led by Mao Zedong had established the People's Republic of China (PRC) while Chiang Kai-shek and his followers took refuge in Taiwan, continuing the regime of the Republic of China. During the first two decades of the Cold War, the latter was known as "Nationalist China", while the former was known as "Communist China" (Two Chinas). Despite Mao's triumph, most Western countries, including Mexico, continued to recognize "Nationalist China". During these years, the question of which of the two had the right to be China's legitimate representative before the UN was one of the biggest headaches for multilateral diplomacy. Between 1949 and 1971, Taiwan continued to represent China in the United Nations to the chagrin of the Soviet bloc.

In December 1961, while serving as Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs, responsible for supervising Mexico's relations with the United Nations, Moreno Pino persuaded Secretary Tello to instruct Ambassador Luis Padilla Nervo, then Mexico's Permanent Representative to the UN, to vote in favor of United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1668, which, proposed by the United States, established that any proposal that tried to change the representation of China in the UN required a supermajority of votes in the UN General Assembly.[42] This resolution delayed the accession of Communist China to the UN for a decade, until, in 1971, United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2758 was passed, recognizing the PRC as "China's sole legitimate representative to the United Nations."[43]

After the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, it became obvious to Latin American and Caribbean countries that they had to protect themselves in the case of a nuclear conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union.[44]

President Adolfo López Mateos, "who extended Mexico's diplomatic networks beyond their traditional limits and devoted significant effort to promoting Latin American integration",[6] promoted denuclearization in the region. Indeed, Mexico had been at the forefront of the efforts to denuclearize Latin America; as early as 22 March 1962, Manuel Tello, then the Foreign Secretary, made a unilateral declaration before the United Nations Conference on Disarmament held in Geneva, Switzerland establishing that Mexico would be free of nuclear weapons.

By 1963, Mexico sought backing in creating a nuclear-free zone in Latin America from Presidents Victor Paz Estenssoro (Bolivia), Joao Goulart (Brazil), Jorge Alessandri (Chile) and Carlos Julio Arosemena (Ecuador).[45] Reflecting on Mexico's leadership during the negotiations, Alfonso García Robles noted that: "the prohibition of nuclear weapons in Latin America constitutes, in effect, an undertaking to which Mexico has had the privilege of making a contribution of extraordinary value."[46]

The chief negotiators appointed by Mexico to guide these negotiations included three important diplomats:

Ismael Moreno Pino, Ambassador of Mexico

The minutes of the negotiations reveal the names of diplomats of enormous stature: Alfonso García Robles, a distinguished jurist and promoter of the treaty, who served as Secretary of Foreign Affairs of Mexico and won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1982 for his role in negotiating the treaty [...] Jorge Castañeda y Álvarez de la Rosa, an international jurist who later would later serve as Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and, finally, Ismael Moreno Pino, a staunch defender of multilateralism in Mexico who served as Ambassador in the European capitals and in the United Nations. That brilliant generation was replicated in the quality of the delegations of other countries present in Tlatelolco.

— Alejandro Alday González, director general of the Matías Romero Institute in the Mexican Foreign Ministry[6]

The Preliminary Meeting on the Denuclearization of Latin America (REUPRAL) gathered thirteen nations and created the "Preparatory Commission for the Denuclearization of Latin America", (COPREDAL). The United Nations General Assembly authorized COPREDAL on 27 November 1963 and the negotiations began in November 1964 and were carried out in four sessions until the Treaty was finally signed in February 1967.

Alfonso García Robles, then Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs, was appointed as the Permanent Representative to CORPREDAL. Moreno Pino, then the Undersecretary for Multilateral Affairs, was originally appointed as the Alternate Representative.[47] However, as García Robles was appointed as the Chairman of COPREDAL, Moreno Pino had to take his place and represent Mexico's interests throughout the negotiations.[48] He continued in this role even as he was appointed Ambassador of Mexico to Chile.

During the inauguration in November 1964, Moreno Pino delivered the keynote address to the representatives of the countries gathered in Mexico City. In his speech, he remarked that even though Mexico was undergoing a presidential transition, Gustavo Díaz Ordaz, then the President-Elect, was as committed as his predecessor in supporting the cause of denuclearization. He stated his opposition to the nuclear arms race, noting that the believed such a race was "dangerous as it could degenerate into war." Finally, he mentioned that the competition between the Great Powers for supremacy in their nuclear arsenals had "diverted economic resources that should be used to satisfy the most pressing needs of the people."[49]

The Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (commonly referred to as the Treaty of Tlatelolco) was signed in the Foreign Ministry in Mexico City on 14 February 1967. It entered into force two years later on 22 April 1969. Cuba was the last country to ratify the Treaty on 23 October 2002. The treaty is now signed and ratified by all 33 nations of Latin America and the Caribbean. It established a nuclear-weapon-free zone throughout Latin America and the Caribbean, thus becoming the first inhabited nuclear-free zone in the world. "Its historical significance is unquestionable. From its intellectual conception to its signature, the most distinguished minds from the American continent participated in its formulation, faithfully representing a generation anguished by the horrors of two world wars and the threat of a third one [...] incessantly seeking peace and harmony among nations."[6]

Moreno Pino, himself, later wrote:

     Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones      NW states      Nuclear sharing      NPT only

Concluded in the midst of the cold war, its genesis and subsequent development required a long, tenacious and patient series of negotiations that finally culminated in what U Thant, the Secretary General of the United Nations, described as "an event of historical significance in the global effort to prevent proliferation and stop the nuclear arms race in Latin America," since it came to establish "the necessary statute for the creation, for the first time in history, of a nuclear-free zone in an inhabited part of the Earth."

— Ismael Moreno Pino, writing in Law and Diplomacy in Inter-American Relations in 1999[8]

The Tlatelolco Treaty inspired other regions in Asia, Australasia and Africa to become nuclear-weapon-free zones. Similarly, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was signed in 1968 and entered into force in 1970.

After 1969, he served as a delegate to The Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL),[50] an UN-backed agency headquartered in Mexico City, which is the sole international organization in the world entirely devoted to nuclear disarmament and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.[51]

In 1966, in recognition of his work during the negotiations, the Government of Brazil awarded him the Grand Cross of the Order of the Southern Cross.[52] Prior to that, President Juscelino Kubitschek, had already awarded him membership of the Order as a Grand Officer.[53]

To this day, Mexico remains one of few countries possessing the technical capability to manufacture nuclear weapons,[54] having successfully achieved the creation of highly enriched uranium. Following the Treaty of Tlatelolco, however, it has pledged to only use its nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. (See: Mexico and weapons of mass destruction). Argentina and Brazil are the two other regional powers that might also have the technical ability to develop nuclear weapons but have decided to abstain from doing so as they too are signatories to the Tlatelolco Treaty.

With Eduardo Frei, President of Chile between 1964 and 1970.

On 19 April 1965, President Díaz Ordaz appointed him Mexican Ambassador to Chile.[55][56] After his appointment was ratified by the Mexican Senate and the Chilean government granted their agrément, he arrived in Santiago de Chile on 25 May.[57] On 28 May, he presented his letters of credence to President Eduardo Frei Montalva at the La Moneda Palace.[58][59] He later stated that heading the diplomatic mission "in Chile was a watershed in my professional life: it was not only my first embassy; It was also my first direct experience with bilateral diplomacy. In addition to the difficulties faced by all newly arrived Ambassadors, I later added the challenge and the opportunity to serve as Dean of the Diplomatic Corps accredited in Chile. As in most of the South American nations, in that country the Apostolic Nuncio is, ex officio, Dean of the Diplomatic Corps; As Vice-Dean, I had to replace three different nuncios during their oftentimes prolonged absences."[30]

Some months after arriving in Chile, he purchased the ambassadorial residence still owned by Mexico in Santiago.[30]

With Salvador Allende, President of Chile (1970–1973), at the ambassadorial residence in Santiago

In excerpts published in 2021 from the memoirs of Alexander Anikin, the Soviet ambassador to Chile, he recalls a series of conversations he had with Moreno Pino in which the Mexican diplomat offered insights into the political landscape of Chile during a series of meetings held between 1965 and 1967. These conversations provide a valuable perspective on Moreno Pino's view of Chilean politics during a crucial period in its history.[60]

In one of their conversations, Moreno Pino highlighted the serious economic and political challenges facing the Chilean government under the presidency of Frei. The President's land reform proposal faced strong resistance from right-wing parties in the National Congress. He also pointed out internal contradictions within the Christian Democratic Party. He observed that while a significant and influential faction, led by Alberto Jerez, advocated for bold economic and social reforms, President Frei and most ministers seemed to favor more moderate approaches and compromises with the right.[60]

With Augusto Pinochet, president of Chile between 1973 and 1990

Moreno Pino also characterized the internal political situation in Chile as highly challenging and complex, emphasizing significant divisions within the major political parties such as the Christian Democrats, Radicals, and Socialists. In particular, he noted a growing rift within the Christian Democratic Party, with elements of leftist tendencies gaining prominence, potentially leading to a deeper split between the party and the government. Similarly, Moreno Pino observed tensions within the Socialist Party. In his view, Salvador Allende's group represented more liberal and flexible tendencies within the Socialist Party, while Raúl Ampuero's group was perceived as more hardline.[60]

Furthermore, as early as June 1967, Moreno Pino accurately predicted that the upcoming presidential elections of 1970 would be a contest between the Christian Democratic candidate, Radomiro Tomic, the candidate of the Popular Unity coalition, Salvador Allende, and the Conservative candidate, Jorge Alessandri. He noted that the conservatives, if necessary, would support the Christian Democratic candidate to prevent Allende's victory. Finally, he warned that if Allende were to win, "it was likely that the United States would intervene with the aim of preventing events in Chile from developing in a way that was dangerous to their interests."[60]

Three years later, Moreno Pino would witness the 1970 Chilean presidential election. In an interview held in November 1999, he recalled the events of that year and reflected on their impact on Chile:

"At the end of his term, the Frei government called for elections. The candidates were Jorge Alessandri, nominated by the party which had resulted from unifying of the old Liberal and Conservative parties; Salvador Allende, candidate of the Popular Unity, a group resulting from the electoral union of the Communist and Socialist parties; and Radomiro Tomic, for the Christian-Democratic party.

The presidential elections of 1970 were a close-run affair, but civility reigned. In my opinion, the electoral process was impeccable, although it led to a three-way division of the electorate. According to Chilean law, a second round had to be held in Congress between the two front-runners: Salvador Allende, with the largest relative vote in his favor, and Jorge Alessandri. Although that was the law, a frequently observed tradition established that whoever obtained the first majority was always elected. Keeping with this tradition, Allende followed the strategy of conducting himself as President-Elect. His statements and public actions were in that tenor. Under these circumstances, I began to receive a series of requests —they were never really pressures— to visit him in my capacity as Dean of the Diplomatic Corps, a position I held at the time. However, to prevent my visit from being interpreted as an undue intervention in the Chilean electoral process, I delayed this visit as much as possible.

Although the Christian Democrats hadn't yet announced their decision, an important sector of the party, led by Radomiro Tomic himself, had shown their desire to respect tradition [...] As more Christian Democratic demonstrations took place in favor of avoiding new electoral phases, and after Allende had received the visit of some Ambassadors, especially from the Warsaw Pact countries, I finally decided to visit him myself in order to avoid the loss of all my authority as Dean. Dr. Allende appreciated the gesture, and I did not receive any criticism from the Foreign Ministry, the political parties, or the newspapers. Instead, I managed to keep intact the authority of the Dean.

Indeed, tradition indicated that the Diplomatic Corps offered a gala dinner to the new President of the republic; a courtesy that, in other circumstances, would not have implied any difficulties. However, given the Marxist-Leninist ideology of President Allende, the organizing committee for the gala dinner, which I chaired, had to carry out complicated maneuvers to get the event to take place. Not all countries with a diplomatic mission in Chile were as enthusiastic about President Allende's accession to power as the socialist countries, which had received the triumph of the Popular Unity with joy.

In conclusion, Salvador Allende did not lead a Marxist-Leninist government because, as he repeatedly stated, the mission of his government was to prepare the path, under a democratic framework, so that, in due course, a Marxist-Leninist government could come to power. As far as I could observe, he kept his word, his government never acted like a totalitarian government."[61]

He also made the following observations about the Allende administration:

"Salvador Allende's government —in my opinion, a democratic one— had to face, among other difficulties, opposition from governments like the United States, which was not at all satisfied with the accession to power of a President of Marxist-Leninist sympathies. It also faced a very adverse economic situation: for example, in 1965 [under the Frei government], people lacked purchasing power but there was a relatively well-stocked consumer market in Chile; With the Allende government, the opposite happened: people had money in their pockets, but there was nothing to buy. Without a doubt, this harmed the new government.

In the domestic political sphere, the Allende government also faced a governance problem, derived, as I have already mentioned, from an electoral process that divided the electorate into three parts.

There were also some excesses among his supporters. In general, members of the communist Party were much more disciplined than the socialists, Allende's party, who felt that many of their expectations were not being met. With the occupation of factories by workers, and farms by farmers and peasants, the situation became extremely difficult.

Under these conditions, a good part of Chilean society, particularly the middle class, urged the army to stand against Allende remaining in the presidency. The army, for its part, was highly professional. They were well-trained and educated people, and nothing suggested the eventual fall of Allende. Although there were difficulties, the truth is that the coup that General Pinochet would later carry out was not yet a foregone conclusion.

While I was still in Santiago, General Pinochet if I remember correctly, was commander of the garrison of Santiago; he was not yet a member of the cabinet. The commander-in-chief of the Chilean Army was General Carlos Prats who, because of an incident, resigned from his post and went to live in Argentina. Allende then appointed General Pinochet as commander of the Army.

Salvador Allende proclaimed himself a democrat and revolutionary. However, when reflecting on it, it could be concluded that if he acted as a democrat, he was not going to carry out a revolution, and if he acted as a revolutionary, he was not going to be a democrat. This, of course, was due to the division of the country into three different camps, none of which had the means to govern on their own. These types of contradictions, among other elements, undermined the strength of the Allende government, particularly in Congress, where he was increasingly unable to carry out his government program.

Allende was a clever politician; an excellent politician. However, the circumstances did not lend themselves to achieving spectacular things. Counting only on the support of the Popular Unity party, he could not get his bills passed in Congress, so he had to maneuver, depending on the issue, to win the support of either the Christian Democrats or the right-wing parties." [61]

The ceremony during which Ismael Moreno Pino, Ambassador of Mexico, presented the Bernardo O'Higgins Military Academy with a bust of Benito Juárez. The ceremony was presided over by General Carlos Prats, Commander-in-Chief of the Chilean Army.

With Luis Echeverría, president of Mexico between 1970 and 1976

Writing in confidential diplomatic cables to Emilio Óscar Rabasa, then the Foreign Secretary, Moreno Pino raised concerns regarding the Chilean economy, noting that to win popular support, Allende had increased worker's wages by up to 55%. To finance this, the Allende government resorted to printing money which, in turn, led to an inflationary spiral.[62] Increasingly, economies in the capitalist bloc were persuaded by the Nixon White House, anxious to destabilize the Allende administration,[63] to boycott the Chilean economy, which meant that (as previously noted) the workers had money in their pockets, but there was little for them to buy as inventories emptied out. Emilio Rabasa would later admit to Joseph J. Jova, the US Ambassador in Mexico, that "Allende was a bad administrator and understood very little about economic problems, however, he was a great patriot who wanted to end the oligarchy that controlled Chile."[64]

Although Mexican relations with South America had "traditionally been limited", after the López Mateos administration, Mexico "began to deviate from its tradition of self-imposed diplomatic isolation".[65] During the period that Moreno Pino was Ambassador in Chile, the relations between Mexico and Chile became a foreign policy priority for both countries. Mexican President Luis Echeverria, who had carried out studies in Chile during his youth,[66] was known to be an admirer of Salvador Allende[67] and "had expressed great sympathy with the [Allende] government", fostering a special relationship between the two countries.[65] Indeed, "from 1971 to 1973 Luis Echeverría sought a rapprochement with the socialist Chile of Salvador Allende, which was carried out within the framework of [...] ideological pluralism, expansion of diplomatic relations and diversification of political relations; all this as an effort to recompose the legitimacy of Mexican political institutions, a legitimacy that was seriously damaged after the events of 1968."[68] In April 1972, Luis Echeverría carried out a prolonged state visit to Chile; it was reciprocated by another visit by Allende to Mexico in December 1972. After the 1973 Chilean coup d'état, Echeverría severed diplomatic ties with Pinochet's Chile;[65] they wouldn't be restored until the restoration of democracy in 1990. Echeverría also gave political refuge to Chilean refugees, including Hortensia Bussi de Allende, Allende's widow and the former First Lady of Chile.[69]

Sometime after his state visit to Chile, Echeverria took the decision to name Moreno Pino as Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany. At the time, Walter Scheel, a close friend of Moreno Pino, was serving as Vice-Chancellor of Germany and Foreign Minister. Moreno Pino subsequently presented letters of credence to Dr. Gustav Heinemann, President of Germany, at the Hammerschmidt Villa in Bonn, Germany.[70][71] In Chile, meanwhile, Moreno Pino, the career diplomat who was apolitical, was replaced with Gónzalo Martínez Corbalá,[62] a seasoned Institutional Revolutionary Party politician with leftist sympathies[72] who was personally and ideologically close to President Echeverría.[73] Before he left for Germany, Moreno Pino was awarded the Grand Cross of the Order of Merit by President Allende in gratitude for his efforts in strengthening Chile–Mexico relations during his seven years as Ambassador and dean of the diplomatic corps.[74]

As a delegate to the General Assembly of the United Nations in New York

Moreno Pino hosting Fernando Belaúnde Terry, President of Peru (1963–1968; 1980–1985) onboard the ARM Cuauhtémoc (BE01), the sail training vessel of the Mexican Navy

After his initial posting in Santiago, Moreno Pino served in various other posts, including Washington, D.C., Berlin, The Hague, Geneva and New York, amongst others. In 1990, he was recalled to Mexico to act as a Senior Foreign Policy Adviser to President Carlos Salinas de Gortari; throughout his diplomatic career, he advised seven Presidents and nine Foreign Secretaries.

In 1990, at the end of his diplomatic mission in The Hague, he was knighted by Beatrix, Queen of the Netherlands, who awarded him the Grand Cross of the Order of Orange-Nassau in recognition of his efforts in strengthening Mexico–Netherlands relations.[75]

Between 1986 and 1990, he was a member of the administrative council of the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague, The Netherlands.[76]

During his career, he developed into one of the most eminent policy experts in the Foreign Office on International Organizations and on the Western Hemisphere. He participated in drafting the amendments carried out to the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (TIAR)[77] under the Protocol of Buenos Aires (1967), the Protocol of San José (1975) and the Protocol of Cartagena de Indias (1985). The TIAR had established the "hemispheric defense" doctrine which establishes that an attack against one OAS member state should be considered an attack against them all.

As a distinguished multilateralist, he acted as a Special Ambassador to many international organizations over the years. In this capacity, he represented Mexico in the Organization of American States in Washington, D.C.[78][79] and in United Nations offices in New York and in Geneva, Switzerland.[80][81] Throughout his career, he was a delegate in over fifty international conferences on various issues ranging from disarmament to reciprocal assistance; on many occasions, he served as a delegate in the United Nations General Assembly in New York.[82][83]

He was the Secretary General of the Mexican Delegation to the First United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, held in Geneva, Switzerland, between February and April 1958. The conference was important in establishing the modern legal framework of the law of the sea.[84]

He also represented Mexico in the Eighteen Nations Disarmament Committee (ENCD) that was held in Geneva between March and August 1962.[85] Starting in 1969, he was an alternate representative before the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL).50

Likewise, between 1965 and 1972, he was the permanent representative to the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America (CEPAL), the UN agency responsible for promoting the economic and social development of the region.[86]

An adjunct professor of international law, he lectured at Georgetown University, the Mexico City College (UDLAP), Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México (ITAM) and Instituto Matias Romero.[87]

In 1963, he and his wife were the subjects of a photograph[98] by Henri Cartier Bresson, the famed French photographer, which is now part of the permanent collection at the Victoria and Albert Museum in London. It is described as follows by the V&A Museum:

"Black and white photograph depicting guests at a drinks reception for the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in Mexico City. There are two men wearing tuxedos standing on the left holding drinks, whilst two women sit separately on elaborate chairs. The women are wearing almost identical outfits with fur coats. Two people present in the image are Ambassador Ismael Moreno Pino and Guadalupe Mercedes González de Hermosillo y Quirós."[99]

The photograph is also published in Cartier Bresson’s Mexican Notebooks 1934 – 64 (in French: Carnets Mexicains 1934 - 1964)[100] which includes several works by Cartier Bresson during his time living in Mexico.[101]