Jacob L. Devers

In August 1939, Devers and his wife, Georgie, boarded the Army transport Leonard Wood, bound for the Panama Canal Zone. There was at the time a genuine fear that a hostile nation might strike at the United States with an attack on the Panama Canal and prevent the movement of ships between the Pacific and the Atlantic. The outbreak of World War II in Europe in September 1939 led to an escalation of fears. Reinforcements including the 5th and 13th Infantry were sent to Panama. Devers became Chief of Staff to Major General David L. Stone, and then to Daniel Van Voorhis, who replaced Stone in December. He supervised construction projects and other improvements to the Panama Canal Zone defenses.[36]

On the recommendation of the new Chief of Staff of the Army, General George C. Marshall, and with the approval of Secretary of War Henry H. Woodring,[37] Devers was promoted over 474 other colonels to brigadier general on 1 May 1940,[38] becoming, at age 52, the youngest brigadier general in the army.[37][39] In July he was recalled to Washington from the Panama Canal Zone to assume command of the Provisional Brigade in the District of Columbia area. In September, Marshall, with the approval of new Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, named Devers Senior U.S. Army representative to the Presidential Board tasked with surveying bases in the Caribbean and Newfoundland to be leased from the British under the Destroyers for Bases Agreement. When Devers said that he could use an Air Corps officer, Marshall told him to take the one outside his door, who happened to be Lieutenant Colonel Townsend E. Griffiss.[40]

Devers was promoted to major general on 1 October 1940 and was sent to command the newly-formed 9th Infantry Division at Fort Bragg (now Fort Liberty), North Carolina, to replace Brigadier General Francis W. Honeycutt, who had been killed in an air crash. Devers would supervise training of the 9th and manage Bragg's huge base expansion program. Devers directed basic and advanced infantry training at Bragg for the thousands of troops under his command: regular army, national guard, reservists, and draftees. Among his colonels was Alexander M. (Sandy) Patch, the commander of the 47th Infantry. During Devers's tour, Fort Bragg's strength grew from 5,400 to 67,000 soldiers. Meanwhile, he pushed forward immense construction projects for base housing, training facilities and roads on the overcrowded post. By working closely and co-operatively with engineers, local contractors, quartermasters and staff and by cutting through red tape, Devers oversaw completion of 2,500 buildings and 93 miles (150 km) of roads in six months.[40][41][42]

On 1 August 1941, General Marshall named Devers Chief of the Armored Force,[38][29] headquartered at Fort Knox, Kentucky, replacing the terminally-ill Major General Adna R. Chaffee, Jr.[29] Devers reported directly to Marshall. He was responsible for inspecting, organizing and training the army's armored divisions and separate non-divisional tank battalions, including all non-tank personnel assigned. McNair's Army General Headquarters (GHQ) was in tactical charge of all U.S. ground forces, but GHQ specifically did not control the semi-autonomous Armored Force,[43] which was considered a "quasi-arm."[44] The Armored Force had complete control of its own training, doctrine, and organization.[45] In a major reorganization of the War Department in March 1942, McNair was named Commander of a new component, Army Ground Forces (AGF), which replaced GHQ.[46] Relations between GHQ/AGF and the Armored Force were distant, and lines of authority and responsibility were often unclear. McNair seemed to prefer leaving Devers alone.[47]

An M3 Lee tank at Fort Knox

When Devers took command, the Armored Force had two operational armored divisions: the 1st Armored Division at Fort Polk (now Fort Johnson), Louisiana, and the 2nd Armored Division at Fort Knox, as well as one independent tank battalion, the 70th Tank Battalion at Fort George G. Meade, Maryland.[48] Both divisions participated in the large-scale war games of the Louisiana Maneuvers in August and September 1941 and the Carolina Maneuvers in November 1941.[49] Despite some successes, the maneuvers revealed armored unit and equipment operational deficiencies, as well as a general lack of combat readiness. Devers attributed much of the poor performance to poorly-trained junior and staff officers but also saw doctrinal deficiencies, which hampered the co-ordination of tanks, the infantry, and the artillery.[50]

In particular, post-maneuver reports emphasized the vulnerability of tanks to antitank fire. That bolstered the antitank gun, which were strongly supported by McNair. Devers differed by countering that the number of tank "kills" credited to antitank gunners was unrealistic and biased and felt that "we were licked by a set of umpires' rules."[51] McNair continued to push for an independent tank destroyer force,[52] but Devers argued that "the weapon to best the tank is a better tank."[53] Nevertheless, in November, Marshall authorized creation of a tank destroyer force. The Tank Destroyer Center was created, and the War Department ordered the activation of 53 tank destroyer battalions.[51] Battlefield experience would prove that Devers was correct. In combat, most tanks were knocked out by other tanks, and tank destroyers were mainly used as mobile artillery support. The tank destroyer program was scaled back, and tank destroyer battalions were deactivated. At the end of the war, the tank destroyer quasi-arm was disbanded.[54][53]

Before Devers' arrival, Armored Force doctrine emphasized light tanks weighing no more than 15 short tons (14 t). American doctrine held that tanks were for exploitation, not fighting other tanks.[55] He rejected the M6 heavy tank and recommended to McNair for it to be canceled, citing concerns about its weight, mobility, and reliability, which was seen as support for that position,[56] but Devers wanted a medium tank, preferably by mounting something like a 105mm howitzer. He was appalled to find that the Armored Force's tanks were armed with nothing heavier than a 37mm gun. A new medium tank had started to come off the production line, the M3 Lee. Devers observed testing of one of them just days after taking command, and he was unimpressed. American industry was unable to cast a turret large enough to hold a 75mm gun and so the M3 carried a 37mm gun, with a 75mm in a sponson. That gave it a limited traverse and made it difficult to engage moving targets. To make matters worse, the designers shortened the barrel to improve the M3's mobility, which Devers realized also reduced the gun's muzzle velocity and hence its effectiveness against armor.[57] In practice, M3 crews attempted to engage German armor with the 75mm, as the 37mm was ineffective against it. It was found that the 75mm could penetrate the frontal armor of German tanks at 400 yards (370 m), but German tanks destroyed M3s at up to 1,100 yards (1,000 m).[58] Devers pronounced the M3 "overweight, underpowered, and insufficiently armed."[59]

Often against the views of his superiors, Devers lobbied for a still more heavily-armored and better-armed medium tank, the M4 Sherman. He played an important role in the M4's design, development and manufacturing, particularly its engine and armament. Throughout his tour as Chief of the Armored Force, he worked closely with the United States Army Ordnance Department, manufacturers and the Armored Force Board at Fort Knox on the research and testing of tanks, guns, armored vehicles and ammunition. The biggest obstacle was engines. Those of prewar tanks were rated at 250 horsepower (190 kW), insufficient for a 35 short tons (32 t) medium tank. Devers wanted an 800 horsepower (600 kW) engine, but that was beyond the ability of the American automotive industry to produce. Extraordinary efforts resulted in the development of a number of 400 horsepower (300 kW) engines. He controversially rejected the General Motors 6046 diesel engine in favor of a gasoline engine. Battlefield experience would demonstrate that the diesel engine was superior. The quest for a better engine eventually settled on the Ford GAA engine,[60][61] but there was a persistent shortage of tank engines.[62] Some 49,234 of the reliable, versatile, low-cost M4 Sherman and its variants would be produced.[63]

After the GHQ Maneuvers, the Army expected to have a period of "remedial training" to fix problems. The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941 shattered those expectations and plunged a not fully-prepared United States into the war.[53][64] In early 1942, two armored divisions were operational and three were in training: the 6th Armored Division was activated in February, followed by the 7th Armored Division in March.[65] McNair recommended for one division in five to be an armored division,[66] which meant up to 50 armored divisions by the end of 1943.[67] Pressure increased on Devers, who was promoted to lieutenant general (equal in rank to McNair) on 6 September 1942,[38] to push more armored units through the pipeline even more quickly. Training was sometimes neglected because of the pressing need to get units ready for overseas deployment.[68] Initially, the Armored Force trained all of the components of the armored division, but after March 1942, it became restricted to tank personnel, with other personnel coming from their own branch training centers.[47][69] Devers sent Patton, now commander of I Armored Corps, to set up the Desert Training Center (DTC) in the California-Arizona Mojave Desert, where soldiers could train for desert warfare. When it closed in 1944, 20 infantry and armored divisions had trained there; although none fought in the desert, and five of them were sent to the Pacific.[70]

Devers was an articulate proponent of the Army's now-emerging tactical doctrine of combined arms: infantry-artillery-armor-close air support.[71] He carried a translation of a German manual on the components of the Panzer division.[72] Devers was neither the first nor the only general to embrace combined arms as the doctrinal solution to the problem of how best to employ tanks, but he was well-placed to act upon it.[73] At his direction, an updated comprehensive (460 pages) Armed Force Field Manual: Tactics and Technique FM 17–10 was written, published, and distributed in March 1942.[74] A German manual on tank platoon tactics, with a foreword by Heinz Guderian, was translated into English and issued as an Armored Force publication.[75]

March 1942 saw a reorganization of the armored divisions in the wake of the 1941 maneuvers. Devers added an artillery headquarters to the armored division and reorganized the artillery component into three battalions, each of three batteries of six M7 Priest self-propelled guns. A division trains headquarters was added to coordinate logistical activities.[63][76] In a first, at Devers' insistence, a flight of light aircraft to be used for artillery spotting and reconnaissance were included in the new Table of Organization and Equipment (TO&E) for each division.[76] He was a strong and early supporter of the development of the DUKW, an amphibious truck. Vannevar Bush later recalled that in the early stages of its development, Devers was the only man in the Army who fully appreciated its possibilities.[77] Its value would be demonstrated during the Allied invasion of Sicily in July 1943.[78]

An M4 Sherman tank

From 14 December 1942 to 28 January 1943, Devers went on an inspection tour of the battlefields in North Africa, along with Major General Edward H. Brooks and Brigadier General Williston B. Palmer from the Armored Force, and Gladeon M. Barnes from the Ordnance Department. He spoke with key British generals, including Harold Alexander, Bernard Montgomery, and Richard McCreery, and U.S. commanders including Eisenhower, Patton, Thomas B. Larkin and Orlando Ward, and received a great deal of feedback about American equipment. Eisenhower was defensive since he was suspicious that Marshall may have sent Devers to replace him and was nervous when Devers had critical comments about the handling of the 1st Armored Division. Devers noted that the M4 Sherman was superior to the M3 Lee with which the 1st Armored Division was equipped, but he urged the development of the more powerful 76mm gun.[79][80]

The intelligence that was gathered was nearly lost when their B-17 lost its way returning to England and crashlanded in Athenry, Republic of Ireland. Fortunately, nobody was injured, and the entire group, with the critical intelligence, made their way by train to Northern Ireland early the following morning.

In 1943, McNair took an axe to the armored division organization and dramatically downsized it. For all but the 2nd and 3rd Armored Divisions, the number of armored battalions was reduced to three.[81] Devers favored the older larger organization.[82] The surplus armored battalions were utilized as separate armored battalions and so by the end of 1943, there were 54 armored battalions in armored divisions and 65 non-divisional battalions. By then, the planned number of Army Ground Force divisions had been dramatically cut to 90, and McNair considered that only ten armored divisions were required and suggested for six of the sixteen armored divisions already active to be broken up. His proposal was not accepted, and the number of armored divisions was frozen at sixteen.[81]

On 3 May 1943, while on an aerial inspection tour, Lieutenant General Frank M. Andrews,[83] European Theater of Operations, United States Army (ETOUSA) commander since replacing Eisenhower on 5 February 1943,[84] was killed in an air crash in Iceland.[83] Marshall appointed Devers to replace Andrews.[85] Devers arrived in England on 9 May 1943.[86] His principal tasks were overseeing preparation of detailed plans and the buildup of men and materiel for Operation Overlord and supporting the Combined Bomber Offensive.[87] At the end of May 1943, there were 133,000 US troops in the United Kingdom, of which 19,000 were in the ground forces, 74,000 in the air forces, and 34,000 in the services of supply. By the end of the year, their numbers had grown to 774,000, of which 265,000 were in the ground forces, 286,000 in the air forces, and 220,000 in the services of supply.[88] In preparing the plans for Overlord, he worked closely with the Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander (COSSAC), British Lieutenant General Frederick E. Morgan[83] with whom he had a good working relationship.[87] Devers' main objection to the COSSAC plan was that he did not want American units smaller than corps directly subordinated to British command,[89] based on what he called "the Pershing Principle."[90]

An M26 Pershing tank

Devers clashed with Eisenhower over the diversion of ETOUSA resources to Eisenhower's North African Theater of Operations. On 28 July 1943, Eisenhower and Lieutenant General Carl Spaatz asked that four groups of Boeing B-17 Flying Fortress bombers be sent to the North African Theater to help support Operation Avalanche, the Allied invasion of Italy. The planned assault area at Salerno was at the extreme range of Allied fighters based in Sicily, and long-range bombers were needed to isolate the battlefield. Eisenhower and Spaatz felt that their theater should have priority. However, the four groups represented about a third of the Eighth Air Force's heavy bombers, and their departure would greatly impact the Combined Bomber Offensive, so Devers turned down the request. Devers and Eighth Air Force's commander, Major General Ira C. Eaker, spoke to the British Chiefs of Staff Committee, who agreed with them. When Eisenhower appealed to Washington, Marshall and General Henry H. Arnold, the Chief of Army Air Forces, also supported Devers. In August, Eisenhower asked for permission to retain three groups of Consolidated B-24 Liberator bombers in the North African Theater. Devers again turned down his request, and Marshall and Arnold again supported him. In September, however, when Avalanche came under severe pressure from German counterattacks, Devers readily acceded to a request for the return of the three groups.[91][92] Stephen Ambrose later noted, "Eisenhower was not accustomed to having his requests to Marshall turned down and found it difficult to accept."[93]

In September 1943, AGF representatives met with Devers to discuss his needs, and he asked for 250 of the new T26E1 tanks, later redesignated the M26 Pershing, to be produced and shipped as a matter of urgency. The Ordnance Department concurred, but added on 1,000 T23 series tanks, an advanced design handicapped by problems with the reliability of its electric transmission. McNair rejected the request,[94][95][96] writing that "the M4 tank, particularly the M4A3, has been widely hailed as the best tank on the battlefield today.... Other than this particular request, which represents the British view—there has been no call from any theater for a 90mm tank gun. There appears to be no fear on the part of our forces of the German Mark VI (Tiger) tank... there can be no basis for the T26 tank other than the conception of a tank versus tank duel—which is believed unsound and unnecessary.... there is no indication that the 76mm antitank gun is inadequate against the Mark VI (Tiger) tank."[97]

At the Tehran Conference in November 1943, President Roosevelt named Eisenhower as the Supreme Allied Commander for Overlord. Devers hoped that he would be appointed commander of the First Army Group, but he was instead sent to the Mediterranean as Commander North African Theater of Operations, United States Army (NATOUSA), which was primarily a logistical administrative organization.[98] American formations in the theater included Lieutenant General Mark W. Clark's Fifth Army and George Patton's Seventh Army; the Twelfth Air Force, led by Major General John K. Cannon; the Fifteenth Air Force, commanded by Major General Nathan Twining; and the NATOUSA Services of Supply, headed by Major General Thomas B. Larkin.[99][100] Eaker went with Devers as Commander in Chief of the Mediterranean Allied Air Forces.[101][99] Devers, who arrived at Allied Force Headquarters (AFHQ) in Algiers on 4 January 1944,[102] was also deputy to the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater, British General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson.[99] Devers and Wilson worked well together, and despite the administrative nature of his position, Devers spent most of his time at the front. Wilson often had Devers deal with difficult cases like the French and the Poles,[103] and Devers was later decorated by the Polish government-in-exile for allowing Poles who were captured in German uniform to join the Polish II Corps in Italy.[104]

Devers (left) with British General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson.

At the beginning of 1944, Allied Armies in Italy (AAI) fighting on the Italian Front were bogged down south of Rome in front of the German Gustav Line. The chain of strong defensive positions in mountainous terrain was anchored in the middle at Monte Cassino. Operation Shingle, Clark's plan for a surprise end run to outflank the German Winter Line called for Allied landings at Anzio on Italy's west coast, thirty miles south of Rome. On 7 January 1944, just days after he had become Wilson's deputy, Devers attended a conference in Marrakesh to discuss Shingle. In attendance was British Prime Minister Winston Churchill; General Wilson, General Sir Harold Alexander, Commander-in-Chief of the AAI; Admiral of the Fleet Sir Andrew Cunningham; and Major General Walter Bedell Smith. Devers wondered why such a high-level conference was required for what he saw as a simple military decision, but he noted in his diary that "the individuals present all favored an amphibious operation at Anzio."[105]

Devers clashed with Smith over the latter's attempt to obtain officers for Eisenhower's command. He tried to be accommodating, and consented to release a number of officers, including Patton and Major General Everett Hughes, but declined to give up others, including Larkin, Brigadier General Clarence Adcock and in particular Major General Lucian Truscott, who was commanding the 3rd Infantry Division. Eisenhower wanted Truscott to command a corps in the assault in Operation Overlord. Devers foresaw him doing the same in southern France.[106][107] Eisenhower appealed to Marshall, who supported him, but Devers protested that Truscott was about to lead the 3rd Infantry Division ashore at Anzio in a few days' time. Not wanting to deprive Devers of a key subordinate on the eve of battle, Marshall backed down.[108] Soon after the landing, Devers flew to the beachhead to see Truscott but was dismayed to find that the advance had halted on Clark's orders.[109] Major General John P. Lucas' VI Corps did not achieve the desired result at Anzio, and Clark's attempted crossing of the Rapido River was a disaster.[110][111]

At Monte Cassino, the historic abbey overlooked Allied positions below. Ground commanders were sure the monastery was being used by the Germans as an observation post. Lieutenant-General Bernard C. Freyberg, commander of the New Zealand Corps, who was preparing for a new assault on the mountain, had repeatedly requested for the abbey to be bombed. Taking advantage of the German practice of not giving away their positions by firing on small planes, Devers and Eaker flew low over the monastery and saw what they believed to be a radio aerial and enemy soldiers moving in and out. Wilson reluctantly agreed to its bombing. On 15 February Devers watched waves of American bombers level the monastery with Alexander, Clark, Freyberg, and Eaker.[112][113] However, follow-up attacks that day and over the next eight days, failed to take the position, much less break the Gustav Line.[112] Devers visited Anzio on 16 February and agreed with Alexander that Lucas should be relieved. Clark did so on 22 February.[114][115]

Lieutenant-General Sir Oliver W. H. Leese (left), commander of the British Eighth Army, with Devers and Lieutenant-General Sir Richard L. McCreery (right), commanding the British X Corps, at Eighth Army Tactical Headquarters.

The continuing failure to advance in Italy prompted the Combined Chiefs of Staff to postpone Operation Anvil, the on-again-off-again proposal for Allied landings along the coast of Southern France coinciding with Overlord. Clark told Devers that another attack on the Gustav Line could not be mounted until May, and VI Corps could not be withdrawn from Anzio until it succeeded.[116] However, planning continued for Anvil, which had begun in mid-January by AFHQ's Force 163 in Algiers.[117] Initially, Clark was to lead the assault, with Lucas taking over Fifth Army. Devers did not have much faith in either of them, even before Lucas's relief. Lyman Lemnitzer later recalled that Fifth Army staff feared that Devers would relieve Clark every time both met.[118]

Marshall insisted that Anvil required an experienced commander, and with Patton gone, Clark was the only one in the theater. Then, Devers received a cable that IV Corps headquarters was on its way to the theater. It was commanded by Major General Alexander Patch, who had a distinguished combat record by leading the soldiers and Marines of XIV Corps in the Guadalcanal campaign in the Pacific; before that, he had commanded the 47th Infantry Regiment of the 9th Division when Devers was commanding the 9th. With Marshall's concurrence, Devers appointed Patch to replace Patton as commander of the Seventh Army and Force 163 on 2 March.[119] While Patch and his staff planned the operation, Devers ensured that the supplies that had been accumulated for it were not dissipated.[120]

A successful Allied offensive in May finally broke through the Gustav Line, and Rome fell to Clark's Fifth Army on 4 June.[121] On 13 June, Devers ordered Larkin to shift priority for supplies from Fifth Army in Italy to Seventh Army.[122] Two days later, Wilson ordered VI Corps to be withdrawn from the front line in preparation for Anvil.[123] Virtually all of the material needed for the assault was on hand, on the way, or promised because of Devers's efforts to preserve the stockpile of Anvil stores and supplies even when the operation was in doubt.[122] To command the assault, he created a special headquarters on Corsica called Advanced Detachment AFHQ, with Devers in command.[124]

Devers sent a cable to Marshall on 1 July proposing for an army group to be formed, with himself as commander.[125] Eisenhower concurred with this on 12 July.[124] It would have been easy enough to add the Seventh Army to Bradley's 12th Army Group, but that would have meant that Eisenhower would have to deal with the French, and after his experience in Operation Torch, Eisenhower preferred to let Devers do so.[126] Marshall made the appointment on 16 July. Thus, Devers wore four "hats" for the operation: Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater; Commanding General NATOUSA; Commander, Advanced Detachment AFHQ, which was activated on 29 July; and Commanding General, 6th Army Group, which Devers activated on 1 August.[124]

Anvil commanders (left to right): Lieutenant General Ira C. Eaker, Major General John K. Cannon, Devers, and Major General Thomas B. Larkin

Operation Dragoon was a crushing success. In a few short weeks, the French and American forces drove the Germans from southeastern France and captured major ports, including Marseille, on 28 August.[127] On 15 September 1944, the 6th Army Group became operational and assumed control of Patch's Seventh Army and General Jean de Lattre de Tassigny's French First Army, as it became on 19 September.[128] The French First Army was the largest French force that was ever amassed under a foreign military leader.[39][129] Eisenhower's SHAEF assumed operational control of the 6th Army Group although Devers retained his own logistical system via the Mediterranean.[128] The campaign was not without cost, and concurrent combat in Normandy and Italy created a shortage of replacements, especially infantry, which left VI Corps about 5,200 men short.[127]

Devers remained in command of NATOUSA[130] and so he sent Clark a message on 19 October suggesting for units to be rested to keep casualties down.[131] Devers had written to McNair on 4 February 1944 and noted that when divisions were left in the line for more than 30 to 40 days, fatigue, carelessness, and exposure resulted in increased casualty and sickness rates.[132] Clark replied that "your radio indicates a lack of appreciation of our tactical situation, the terrain, enemy resistance, and my mission."[131] Devers noted in his diary that Clark's response "shows quite well his lack of judgment and tact and indicate definitely that he is not a team player,"[118] and he recommended to Marshall that Eaker, not Clark, be his successor in the Mediterranean. Marshall chose Lieutenant General Joseph T. McNarney on 22 October.[130][133]

The activation of the French First Army left Seventh Army with only one corps. Devers asked for IV Corps to be transferred from Italy, but Wilson argued that would adversely affect operations in Italy against the Gothic Line, and the Combined Chiefs agreed.[134] Instead, Devers proposed on 26 September that Major General Wade H. Haislip's XV Corps to be transferred from Patton's Third Army, which had severe logistical difficulties, to the Seventh Army. Devers argued that they could better be supported over the 6th Army Group's line of communications from the Mediterranean. Eisenhower agreed and further ordered for three more divisions scheduled to join Bradley's 12th Army Group in Northern France (although they were unlikely to do so until the supply and the transport situations improved), be diverted to Marseilles, and join the 6th Army Group.[135] Haislip was a good fit: he spoke French fluently, had fought in France during World War I, had attended the École Superieure de Guerre from 1925 to 1927, and was attuned to French sensibilities.[136][137] Above all, Haislip got along well with Major General Philippe Leclerc de Hauteclocque, the mercurial commander of the French 2nd Armored Division.[130] Devers was shocked when Leclerc informed him that he and his men wanted to serve with the U.S. Army, not the French First Army, which he considered dominated by Vichy French traitors.[138]

Despite the administrative nature of his position, Devers spent most of his time at the front.

Devers may have oversold the benefits of the southern line of communications.[139] Marseille had been captured, but the harbor entrance was blocked with 75 sunken ships; the harbor basin had been sown with naval mines; the quays, jetties and cranes had been demolished; and the surrounding area had been filled land mines and booby traps. The U.S. Navy cleared the harbor, and the 1051st Port Construction and Repair Group undertook the rehabilitation of the port. Ships were able to discharge in the stream from 5 September, and the first Liberty ship docked on 15 September.[140] Beyond the port, there were numerous breakages in the rail network, and many bridges were down. To get the railroad from Marseille working, Devers turned to Brigadier General Carl R. Gray, Jr., the commander of the 1st Military Railway Service. By 25 September, the railroad had reached Lyon with a capacity of 3,000 short tons (2,700 t) per day. Devers pressed Gray for 15,000 short tons (14,000 t). By 1 October, when Devers had promised Eisenhower that he could support ten divisions by rail, sufficient supplies were arriving for just one. The rest had to be supported by road.[141][142] Not until the third week in October could all of the Seventh Army's needs, including those of XV Corps, be met.[143]

Devers conceded that he could supply Patton with only 1,000 short tons (910 t) per day from 15 November, which only increased Eisenhower's resolve to give priority to opening the port of Antwerp, in the north. Devers was ordered to clear the Germans from the west bank of the Rhine in his sector.[144] His offensive went well; the French 1st Armored Division reached the Rhine on 19 November,[145] and Leclerc captured Strasbourg on 23 November.[146] Devers inflicted a crushing defeat on the German Nineteenth Army, nearly destroying six of its eight divisions.[147] A large German presence remained west of the Rhine, which came to be called the Colmar Pocket.[148] When Eisenhower and Bradley visited 6th Army Group on 24 November, they were astonished to find Devers, Patch, and Haislip energetically planning a crossing of the Rhine in early December. Bradley drew attention to the formidable defenses on the far bank, and Devers told him that he had spoken to patrols, who had found them empty. Eisenhower would have none of it. His strategy remained to destroy the German forces on the west bank before he would attempt a crossing.[149][150] Official historians described this decision as "difficult to understand."[151]

Lieutenant Generals Lucian K. Truscott Jr. and Alexander M. Patch with Devers

An attempt to reduce the Colmar Pocket on 15 December was called off by Eisenhower when Bradley was hit by the German Ardennes Offensive,[152] which Brigadier General Garrison H. Davidson, the Seventh Army Engineer, felt might have been avoided entirely if Devers had been allowed to proceed with the Rhine crossing.[153] In response to the crisis, Eisenhower ordered Devers to cease offensive operations and to assume responsibility for much of Patton's front, which would allow the Third Army to turn north.[154] That left the Seventh Army holding a 126-mile (203 km) front with six infantry and two armored divisions.[155] Eisenhower ordered Devers to withdraw to a shorter line, but Devers balked at that, and there was a violent French reaction to the prospect of abandoning Strasbourg.[156] On 31 December 1944, the Seventh Army was struck by Operation Nordwind.[157] Between 5 and 25 January 1945, there were four more major German attacks against the 6th Army Group by Heinrich Himmler's Army Group Oberrhein.[158] Seventh Army suffered some 14,000 casualties, but the Germans did not break through, and Strasbourg was held.[159] In Devers' estimation Brooks, the commander of VI Corps, "fought one of the great defensive battles of all times with very little".[159]

Devers now turned his attention to the Colmar Pocket.[160] He had expected the Germans to withdraw and thought that the French First Army could reduce the pocket.[148] He later admitted that he had underestimated the German determination to hold it and had overestimated de Lattre’s ability to keep moving against renewed and strengthened German resistance.[152][161] Eisenhower regarded the pocket as a "sore" and sent five additional American divisions to 6th Army Group. After the Ardennes Offensive and Operation Northwind, Devers regarded it as petty of Bradley to begrudge him the additional divisions.[162] French and American troops finally eliminated the Colmar Pocket on 5 February 1945.[163] Against Eisenhower's preference, Devers was promoted to general on 8 March 1945, ahead of Spaatz, Bradley, and Patton,[164] remaining the second-highest ranking American officer in Europe, after Eisenhower.[165]

Seventh Army crossed the Rhine on 26 March and began advancing into Germany.[166] On 5 May 1945, General Hermann Foertsch surrendered Army Group G unconditionally to Devers. Patch, Haislip, and other American generals were present, but there was no representative of the French First Army. That caused a final diplomatic tussle with the French over the status of the German Twenty-Fourth Army, which de Lattre insisted should surrender to him. Devers refused to hand Schmidt over to de Lattre. Two days later, Eisenhower accepted a general surrender of the German armed forces at his headquarters at Reims.[167]

Following the surrender of Germany on 8 May 1945, Seventh Army was transferred to 12th Army Group, and the French First Army reverted to French control, which left 6th Army Group with little to do, although Devers acted as commander of 12th Army Group in Bradley's absence.[168] In June 1945, Devers was appointed Chief of Army Ground Forces,[169] in succession to General Joseph Stilwell, who had left to command the Tenth United States Army on Okinawa.[170] Army Ground Forces still controlled schools and training centers in the United States,[171] but their focus was demobilization and the co-ordination of the redeployment of units from Europe to the Pacific, where the war with Japan continued until it also surrendered on 14 August 1945.[172] Devers hired a civilian secretary, Dorothy Benn, a widow whose husband, an Army Air Forces pilot, had been listed as missing in action in New Guinea in 1943 and was presumed dead until his body was found in 1957.[173]

A Bell 47 helicopter

The Army Service Forces were abolished on 14 May 1946 on the recommendation of War Department's Simpson Board, but the Army Ground Forces remained. Devers's November 1945 testimony before the board had urged for the Army Service Forces to be retained.[174] Army Ground Forces was given control of the six armies in the United States,[175] but as demobilization continued, the strength of the army shrank dramatically.[176] Devers was faced with the unpleasant task of informing many officers that they were being demoted.[177] One reform that he achieved was to reduce the number of combat branches to three: infantry, armor, and artillery.[176]

McNair had established Army Ground Forces headquarters at the Army War College campus, where Devers lived,[177] but Stilwell had moved the headquarters into the Pentagon. Eisenhower, as the new Chief of Staff of the Army, decided that the Army Ground Forces headquarters should be co-located with the Army Air Forces' Tactical Air Command at Fort Monroe, Virginia, not far from Langley Field.[178] Devers opened his headquarters there on 1 October 1946.[176]

Further reorganization occurred on 10 March 1948, when Army Ground Forces was renamed Army Field Forces. Control of the armies was transferred to the Department of the Army, and Army Field Forces were reduced to a coordinating staff agency.[179]

As a member of the Joint Research and Development Committee with Spaatz, Devers took an interest in the development of helicopters and took rides in different machines. He met with Larry Bell, the founder of Bell Aircraft. The company was in a poor financial situation, and Bell hoped the army would buy fifty of his new Bell 47 helicopters. Devers was impressed with the aircraft and agreed to do so but for $25,000 each, rather than the $35,000 asked for by Bell; Devers found the money from Army Ground Forces funds. The Bell H-13 Sioux would go on to become one of the world's most recognizable helicopters.[180][181]