Kerensky offensive

Kerensky exhorting Russian troops in spring or summer, 1917

Russian War Minister Alexander Kerensky, despite the events in February and March 1917, promised the Entente that Russia could still fulfill its promises for a summer offensive. Supreme commander Aleksei Brusilov planned the attacks, but, according to Prit Buttar, "Brusilov warned Kerensky that there was no enthusiasm amongst the troops in the front line for an attack." This prompted Kerensky to visit the front lines, "...exhorting the troops to fight heroically in defence of the revolution, which he told them was threatened by German militarism."[1]

Discipline within the Russian Army had reached a point of crisis since the Tsar's abdication. The Petrograd Soviet Order No. 1 tremendously weakened the power of officers, giving an overriding mandate to "soldier committees". The abolition of the death penalty was another contributing factor, as was the high presence of revolutionary agitators at the Front, including Bolshevik agitators, who promoted an anti-war agenda (and whom Kerensky tolerated considerably more than conservative agitators). What is more, the High Command failed to act appropriately, as they failed to effectively combat the democratisation of the army and were sluggish in reacting to the difficulties that the officers had faced. There were very few commands that the Stavka was able to implement in regards to controlling the body of troops and restoring officer power; simply because they would have been ignored by the men.[2]

According to Buttar, "As a result of the weakening of the army by the revolution and a catastrophic fall in output from Russia's munitions factories, the new offensive planned for the summer of 1917 would have to be more limited." On 29 June, the main effort would be along Southwestern Front, the Eleventh Army and Seventh Army would advance towards Lemberg, a distance of 58 miles (93 km). On 16 July, the West Front would attack, followed by the Northern Front on 18 July, and the Romanian Front on 22 July. The Eleventh Army, commanded by Ivan Georgevich Erdeli, would attack the seam between Felix Graf von Bothmer's South Army and Eduard von Böhm-Ermolli's Second Army.[1]

On 29 June, the Eleventh Army started its artillery bombardment, and, on 1 July, the Russians were able to capture Koniukhy. On 2 July, the Russians were able to advance through Zboriv. On 3 July, fighting continued, but little territory changed sides. By then the Russians had lost 40,000 men, while the defenders only 12,500. According to Buttar, "... gains were modest and bought at huge cost...Although the Russian Army had demonstrated that it still had the ability to mount an offensive, it also showed that its troops...were unreliable, particularly if prolonged fighting was required." In the meantime, Bothmer was preparing a large counteroffensive.[1]^{: 154–163}

On 6 July, Lavr Kornilov's Russian Eighth Army commenced its attack on Stanislau, defended by Karl Tersztyánszky von Nádas' K.u.k. Third Army. On 8 July, the Russians had captured Yamnytsia, and on 9 July advanced 6 miles (9.7 km) from Stanislau to Kalusz. On 10 July, Tersztyánszky was replaced by Karl Křitek, as German reinforcements arrived to stem the Russian advance into Halicz and Nowica. On 11 July, the Russians were able to take Kalusz, and on 11 July, moved against Voinyliv. On 12 July, Kritek took command of the Third Army, and by 16 July, had retaken Kalusz. The Russian West Front attacks on 7 July made only modest gains, which were soon relinquished, and the Northern Front attacks lasted less than a day. According to Buttar, "It was the high tide mark for the armies of Russia."[1]^{: 164–179}

However, the Russian advance collapsed altogether by 16 July. On 19 July, the Germans and Austro-Hungarians counter-attacked, led by Arnold von Winckler, meeting little resistance and advancing through Galicia and Ukraine as far as the Zbruch River. The Russian lines were broken on 20 July, and, by 23 July, the Russians had retreated about 240 kilometres (150 mi) (Vinny). "The only limit to the German advance was the lack of the logistical means to occupy more territory".[3]^: 134 According to Buttar, "Eleventh Army had effectively disintegrated and Seventh Army was rapidly following suit. To the south of the Dniester, Eighth Army began to pull back..."[1]^{: 180–189}

On 25 July, the Russians abandoned Tarnopol as was Stanislau. On 2 August, they abandoned Czernowitz.[1]^{: 186–189}

The front in July 1917

According to Buttar, "But more important than the change of territory, was the complete disintegration of the Russian Army. Those killed, wounded or taken prisoner exceeded 400,000; the number of deserters was perhaps just as great."[1]^: 189 Kerensky blamed Brusilov for the failed offensive, and Kornilov replaced Brusilov as commander-in-chief. Kerensky expected Kornilov to restore discipline, and the death penalty for desertion was re-imposed by Kornilov and the Russian Provisional Government as a consequence. This led to a period of unrest in Petrograd known as the July Days.[1]^{: 189–198}