Paul Reynaud

Although Reynaud was increasingly popular, the Chamber of Deputies elected him premier by only a single vote with most of his own party abstaining; over half of the votes for Reynaud came from the French Section of the Workers' International (SFIO) party. With so much support from the left, and opposition from many parties on the right, Reynaud's government was especially unstable; many on the Right demanded that Reynaud attack not Germany, but the Soviet Union.[9]^: 524 The Chamber also forced Daladier, whom Reynaud held personally responsible for France's weakness, to be Reynaud's Minister of National Defense and War. One of Reynaud's first acts was at a meeting of the Anglo-French Supreme War Council held in London on 28 March 1940, whose main outcome was the signing of a declaration with British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain that neither of the two countries would sign a separate peace. A joint communiqué declared 'Both Governments mutually undertake that during the present war they will neither negotiate nor conclude an armistice or treaty of peace except by mutual agreement. They undertake to maintain after conclusion of peace a community of action for so long as may be necessary'.[13] On 15 June 1940 the French cabinet rejected a British proposal, imagined by Jean Monnet and defended by De Gaulle, for the union of both countries.[14] Reynaud abandoned any notion of a "long war strategy" based on attrition. Aiming at diverting German attentions from France, Reynaud entertained suggestions to expand the war to the Balkans or northern Europe; he was instrumental in launching the allied campaign in Norway, though it ended in failure. Britain's decision to withdraw on 26 April prompted Reynaud to travel to London to lobby the British personally to stand and fight in Norway.[9]^: 533

The Battle of France began less than two months after Reynaud came to office. France was badly mauled by the initial attack in early May 1940, and Paris was threatened. On 15 May, five days after the invasion began, Reynaud contacted Churchill and famously remarked, "We have been defeated... we are beaten; we have lost the battle.... The front is broken near Sedan." Indeed, such was the situation regarding equipment and morale that Reynaud received a postcard found on the body of an officer who had committed suicide in Le Mans. It stated: "I am killing myself Mr President[15] to let you know that all my men were brave, but one cannot send men to fight tanks with rifles."[16]

On 18 May Reynaud removed commander-in-chief Maurice Gamelin in favour of Maxime Weygand.[17]

On 26 May, around lunchtime, Reynaud attended a meeting in London with Churchill. At 2 pm Churchill reported to the War Cabinet that Reynaud had stated that the French military situation was hopeless, that he had no intention of signing a separate peace with Germany, but that he might be forced to resign and that others in the French government might sign such a treaty. At this stage Churchill told Reynaud that he did not rule out talks with Mussolini altogether (Italy was still neutral). The Foreign Secretary Lord Halifax met Reynaud later in the afternoon, before the latter's return to France. This was the beginning of the British May 1940 War Cabinet Crisis, in which Halifax favoured what was euphemistically described as "the Reynaud Option": approaching the Italians to see if acceptable peace terms could be negotiated, perhaps by giving up some British territory in the Mediterranean. Halifax was eventually overruled by Churchill.[18]^: 217

On 28 May Churchill sent a telegram to Reynaud stating that there would be no approach to Mussolini at that time but still leaving the possibility open. Mussolini had rejected an approach by President Roosevelt along the lines suggested by Britain and France. On 28 May, it was learned that Italy was planning to enter the war on Germany's side, which would happen on 10 June.[18]^{: 223–227}

In early June Charles de Gaulle, whom Reynaud had long supported and one of the few French commanders to have fought the Germans successfully in May 1940, was promoted to brigadier general and named undersecretary of war.[17]

Reynaud vacillated a little on his return from London on 26 May, but otherwise wanted to continue to fight. However, he was unable to persuade enough of his colleagues.[19]^{: 138–142} Italy entered the war on 10 June; on that same day, Commander-in-Chief General Weygand strode into Reynaud's office and demanded an armistice. At around 11 pm that night Reynaud and de Gaulle left Paris for Tours; the rest of the government followed the next day. De Gaulle was unable to persuade Reynaud to sack Weygand.[20]^{: 195–196}

At the Anglo-French conference at the Chateau du Muguet, Briare, on 11–12 June, Churchill urged the French to carry on fighting, either in Brittany or in French North Africa, or by guerrilla warfare, meeting strong resistance from Deputy Prime Minister Marshal Pétain. At the Cabinet meeting on the evening of 12 June it was clear that there was a growing movement for an armistice, and it was decided to move to Bordeaux rather than to a fortified Brittany.[20]^{: 197–198}

At the next Anglo-French conference at Tours on 13 June, Reynaud demanded that France be released from the agreement which he had made with Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain in March 1940, so that France could seek an armistice. Churchill said that he "understood" the French action but (contrary to later claims that he approved) that he did not agree with it. At the Cabinet meeting that evening (Churchill had returned to London rather than address the French Cabinet as Reynaud had wished) Pétain strongly supported Weygand's demand for an armistice, and said that he himself would remain in France to share the suffering of the French people and to begin the national rebirth.[20]^{: 199–201} President Albert Lebrun refused Reynaud's resignation on 13 June.[20]^{: 204–205}

Edward Spears recorded that Reynaud was, from the evening of 13 June, under great stress. Paul Baudouin and Marie-Joseph Paul de Villelume had been leaning on Reynaud to seek an armistice with Germany, as had his mistress, the Comtesse Hélène de Portes, a Fascist sympathizer.[19]^{: 138–142}[21] On 14 June Villelume and de Portes called on the American diplomat Anthony Joseph Drexel Biddle Jr. and stated that France had no alternative but to seek an armistice and that they were speaking on behalf of Reynaud, although Biddle did not believe them.[19] ^{: 138–142}

At Cabinet on 15 June, Reynaud urged the Cabinet to adopt the Dutch example, that the Army should lay down its arms so that the fight could be continued from abroad; Pétain was sympathetic.[22]^: 82–86 Pétain was sent to speak to General Weygand (who was waiting outside, as he was not a member of the Cabinet).[23]^{: 325–327} Weygand persuaded him that this would be a shameful surrender. Chautemps then suggested a fudge proposal, an inquiry about terms.[22]^: 82–86 The Cabinet voted 13-6 for the Chautemps proposal. Reynaud tried to resign on the spot but Lebrun shouted at him. Admiral Darlan, who had been opposed to an armistice until 15 June, now agreed, provided the French fleet was kept out of German hands.[23]^{: 325–327} On 15 June, Reynaud threw two glasses of water over de Portes at dinner; a key telegram had been found in her bed after it went missing.[19]^{: 138–142}

On 16 June de Portes kept putting her head around the door during a meeting and US diplomats testified that she was constantly coming and going from Reynaud's office.[19] ^{: 138–142} President Roosevelt's reply to Reynaud's inquiry, stating that he could do little to help without Congressional approval, was then received on the morning of Sunday 16 June.[22]^: 82–86 Churchill's telegram also arrived that morning, agreeing to an armistice provided the French fleet was moved to British ports, a proposal unacceptable to Darlan, who argued that it would leave France defenceless.[22]^: 82–86 De Gaulle was in London that afternoon for talks about the planned Franco-British Union, a far-reaching and imaginative proposal which Churchill and his advisers had hastily put together in a desperate effort to support Reynaud against his armistice-minded ministers and keep France - but especially its extensive naval fleet - in the war on the side of Britain. It was De Gaulle who telephoned Reynaud to inform him that the British Cabinet had agreed, reporting that "a sensational declaration" was imminent, amounting to a proposal for no less than the union of the two nations into a single Franco-British government. Time was desperately short, and De Gaulle ended up dictating the "Declaration of Union" to an astonished and gratified Reynaud over the telephone, word for word, so that Reynaud could present it to his Cabinet that very afternoon in a bid to fend off armistice.[20]^{: 203–204} What Reynaud did not know was that General Weygand had instructed army listeners to tap his phone, and therefore had advance warning of what was coming, robbing Reynaud of the element of surprise. When the French Cabinet met in Bordeaux that afternoon, Reynaud presented the British union plan and - with Georges Mandel - declared his determination to fight on, but events were moving fast and the grand British offer was by then not sufficient to win round the waverers.[24] Contrary to Lebrun's mistaken recollection, no formal vote appears to have been taken at Cabinet on Sunday 16 June.[20]^{: 204–205} The outcome of the meeting is unclear.[22]^: 82–86 Ten ministers wanted to fight on while seven favoured an armistice, though these included the two Deputy Prime Ministers: Pétain and Chautemps. An armistice was also favoured by Weygand. Another eight ministers were undecided, but ultimately swung towards an armistice. This time, Lebrun reluctantly accepted Reynaud's resignation, and the government of France - at this historic and fateful moment - fell into the hands of Petain and those who favoured armistice and, ultimately, collaboration with the German invader. De Gaulle later wrote that Reynaud was "a man of great worth unjustly crushed by events beyond measure".[20]^{: 204–205}

Julian Jackson writes that Reynaud felt guilty for 20 years for having let Pétain into power, and gave ever more convoluted explanations of what had happened: despite his own fighting spirit, apart from a brief vacillation on 26 May, "he had failed to be Clemenceau (France's great war Prime Minister of 1917-18), but missed the chance to be de Gaulle and never forgave himself". Reynaud later claimed that he had hoped Pétain would resign if the armistice terms were too harsh, which if true was wishful thinking in Jackson's view. There were claims that he could have mustered a majority in the Cabinet for fighting on, so he later claimed that he could not have argued against the political weight of the "softs", especially Pétain and Weygand, France's two leading soldiers.[19]^{: 138–142}

Spears recorded that Reynaud appeared relieved to be rid of his burden. In the immediate aftermath, he appears to have been in denial, hoping still to meet Churchill at Concarneau on 17 June (in fact Churchill, who was at Waterloo Station, had cancelled his travel plans on learning of Reynaud's resignation).[19]^{: 138–142}

Jules Jeanneney and Édouard Herriot, Presidents respectively of the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies, urged Lebrun to reappoint Reynaud as Prime Minister (all four men wanted to continue the war from North Africa). Lebrun felt he had little choice but to appoint Pétain, who already had a ministerial team ready, as Prime Minister. Pétain became the leader of the new government (the last one of the Third Republic), and signed the armistice on 22 June.[20]^{: 206–207} De Gaulle had returned to Bordeaux at around 10pm on 16 June. He visited Reynaud, who still hoped to go to North Africa and declined to come to London. Reynaud still had control of secret government funds until the handover of power the next day, and made money available to de Gaulle. De Gaulle flew to London with Edward Spears at 9 a.m. on 17 June, and the next day made his famous broadcast announcing that he would fight on. It has been suggested that Reynaud had ordered de Gaulle to go to London, but no written evidence has ever been found to confirm this.[20]^: 209

Reynaud would later provisionally accept Pétain's offer of the post of French Ambassador to the USA. Lebrun refused to confirm the appointment, apparently as he admired Reynaud and wanted to save him from association with the Pétain government.[20]^{: 209, 238}

Reynaud and de Portes left the Hotel Splendid, Bordeaux, driving southeast ahead of the advancing German armies, intending to stop at Reynaud's holiday home at Grès, Hérault, (other sources state they were bound for his daughter's home at Sainte-Maxime[25]) before fleeing to North Africa. On 28 June, with Reynaud at the wheel, their Renault Juvaquatre car inexplicably left the road and hit a plane tree at la Peyrade, near Sète; de Portes was all but decapitated while Reynaud escaped with relatively minor head injuries.[26][27] While hospitalized at Montpellier, Reynaud allegedly told Bill Bullitt, American ambassador, "I have lost my country, my honour, and my love."[28]

Reynaud was arrested on his discharge on Pétain's orders and imprisoned at Fort du Portalet.[29] Pétain decided against having Reynaud charged during the Riom Trial of 1942, but handed him over to the Germans instead, who removed him firstly to Sachsenhausen concentration camp, thence Itter Castle near Wörgl, Austria, where he remained with other high-profile French prisoners until liberated by Allied troops on 7 May 1945.[30] Major Josef Gangl, a Wehrmacht officer who had gone over to the anti-Nazi Austrian resistance, was killed by a sniper's bullet while trying to move Reynaud out of harm's way during the Battle for Castle Itter on 5 May 1945.[31]