Spratly Islands dispute

In 1968, oil was discovered in the region.[8] The Geology and Mineral Resources Ministry of the People's Republic of China (PRC) has estimated that the Spratly area holds oil and natural gas reserves of 17.7 billion tons (1.60 × 10¹⁰ kg), compared to the 13 billion tons (1.17 × 10¹⁰ kg) held by Kuwait, placing it as, potentially, the fourth largest reserve bed in the world. The United States Energy Information Administration contests this, estimating almost no oil and less than 100 billion cubic feet of natural gas exists in fields near the Spratly Islands.[9][10] Still, these large potential reserves have assisted in intensifying the territorial claims of the neighbouring countries.

In 1968 and 1970, the Philippines started to take their territorial claims more seriously and stationed troops on three islands which had been claimed by the adventurer Tomas Cloma as part of Freedomland.[11] In 1973, Vietnamese troops were stationed on five islands.[12]

On 11 March 1976, the first major Philippine oil discovery occurred off the coast of Palawan, near the Spratly Islands territory. In 2010, these oil fields supplied 15% of all petroleum consumed in the Philippines.[13] In 1992, the PRC and Vietnam granted oil exploration contracts to US oil companies that covered overlapping areas in the Spratlys. In May 1992,[14] the China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) and Crestone Energy (a US company based in Denver, Colorado) signed a co-operation contract for the joint exploration of the Wan'an Bei-21 block, a 25,155 square kilometres (9,710 sq mi) section of the southwestern South China Sea that includes Spratly Island areas.[15] Part of the Crestone's contract covered Vietnam's blocks 133 and 134, where PetroVietnam, PetroStar Energy (US) and ConocoPhillips Vietnam Exploration & Production, a unit of ConocoPhillips, agreed to evaluate prospects in April 1992. This led to a confrontation between China and Vietnam, with each demanding that the other cancel its contract.

The region is one of the world's most productive areas for commercial fishing. In 2010, the Western Central Pacific (excluding the northernmost reaches of the South China Sea closest to the PRC coast) accounted for 14% of the total world catch at 11.7 million tonnes. This was up from less than 4 million tonnes in 1970.[16] The PRC has predicted that the South China Sea holds combined fishing and oil and gas resources worth one trillion dollars. There have already been numerous clashes between the PRC and the Philippines, PRC and Vietnam, and between other nations over "foreign" fishing vessels in exclusive economic zones (EEZs), and the media regularly report the arrest of Chinese fishermen. In 1984, Brunei established an exclusive fishing zone encompassing Louisa Reef in the southeastern Spratly Islands.[17]

The region is one of the busiest shipping lanes in the world. During the 1980s, at least 270 ships passed through the Spratly Islands region each day. More than half of the world's supertanker traffic, by tonnage, passes through the region's waters every year. Tanker traffic through the South China Sea is over three times greater than through the Suez Canal and five times more than through the Panama Canal; 25% of the world's crude oil passes through the South China Sea.

Via UNCLOS, the United Nations provided for countries with coastlines to submit claims to the UN's Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) for their continental shelf to be extended beyond 200 nautical miles of their shores.[18] By 13 May 2009, a total of 48 nations made full claims, and dozens more made preliminary submissions.[19] Two of the submissions made to the CLCS addressed claims in the South China Sea (SCS) – one by Vietnam for a claim over the northern portion of the SCS (which included the Paracel Islands), and another jointly by Vietnam and Malaysia for a joint claim over a "defined area" in the middle of the SCS between the two countries, which included part of the Spratly Islands. Brunei made a preliminary submission notifying of its intention to claim a continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles from its shores.[20]

China (PRC) immediately issued protests over the two submissions and called on the United Nations not to consider them. It also issued a stern warning to countries not to claim the islands which it said were its sovereign territory.[19][21]

On 23 May 2011, Former Philippine President Benigno Aquino III warned the visiting Chinese Defense Minister Liang Guanglie of a possible arms race in the region if tensions worsened over disputes in the South China Sea. In March, the Philippines complained that Chinese patrol boats had harassed a Philippine oil exploration vessel in disputed waters near the Spratlys, and subsequently filed a formal protest at the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS).[22]

On 22 January 2013, the Republic of the Philippines instituted arbitral proceedings against the China (PRC) in the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA).[23][24] On 19 February 2013, China rejected and returned the Philippines' Notification. The Permanent Court of Arbitration acts as Registry in this arbitration.[24]

Philippine Justice Antonio T. Carpio states that the case is solely a maritime dispute, and not territorial in nature. The Philippines seeks clarification from the tribunal as to whether China's nine-dash line can negate the Philippines' Exclusive Economic Zone as guaranteed under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), of which China is a signatory. As part of the case, the Philippines also seeks clarification on whether rocks barely (1.8-meter) above water at high tide, (such as Scarborough Shoal), generate a 200-nautical-mile (370 km; 230 mi) EEZ, or only a 12-nautical-mile (22 km; 14 mi) territorial sea. Clarification of whether China can appropriate low-tide elevations, such as the Mischief Reef and the Subi Reef within the Philippines' EEZ, have also been included in the case. "The Philippines is not asking the tribunal to delimit by nautical measurements overlapping EEZs between China and the Philippines. The Philippines is also not asking the tribunal what country has sovereignty over an island, or rock above water at high tide, in the West Philippine Sea."[25]

According to a PCA press release on 12 July 2016 "[The] Tribunal concluded that, as between the Philippines and China, there was no legal basis for China to claim historic rights to resources, in excess of the rights provided for by the Convention, within the sea areas falling within the 'nine-dash line'".[26]

On 22 July 1992, ASEAN issued a declaration on the South China Sea, emphasising that the dispute should be solved peacefully without resorting to violence.[27]

Following a 1995 dispute between the PRC and the Philippines, an ASEAN-brokered agreement was reached between the PRC and ASEAN member nations whereby one country would inform the other of any military movement within the disputed territory, and that there would be no further construction.

The agreement was promptly violated by PRC and Malaysia: claiming storm damage, seven PLA Navy vessels entered the area to repair "fishing shelters" in Panganiban Reef (Mischief Reef); Malaysia erected a structure on Investigator Shoal and landed at Rizal Reef (Commodore Reef). In response, the Philippines lodged formal protests, demanded the removal of the structures, increased naval patrols in Kalayaan, and issued invitations to American politicians to inspect the PRC bases by plane.

On 4 November 2002 in Phnom Penh, the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea[28] was signed by the 10 foreign ministers of ASEAN countries and China (PRC). The parties explicitly undertook in this declaration, "to resolve their territorial and jurisdictional disputes by peaceful means, without resorting to the threat or use of force, through friendly consultations and negotiations by sovereign states directly concerned".[28] The parties also undertook to exercise self-restraint with activities that would complicate or escalate disputes and affect peace and stability, including refraining from inhabiting the presently uninhabited islands, reefs, shoals, cays, and other features. The parties pledged to carry out confidence building measures, such as: holding dialogues and exchange of views as appropriate between their defence and military officials; ensuring just and humane treatment of all persons who are in danger or distress; notifying on a voluntary basis other parties concerned of any impending joint / combined military exercise; and exchanging, on a voluntary basis, relevant information. The parties may also explore or undertake cooperative activities such as: marine environmental protection; marine scientific research; safety of navigation and communication at sea; search and rescue operations; and combating transnational crime, including but not limited to trafficking in illicit drugs, piracy, armed robbery at sea, and illegal traffic in arms.

The declaration eases tensions, but falls short of a legally binding code of conduct.

In July 2012, China (PRC) announced that it is open to launching discussions on the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea, but called for all parties to exercise self-restraint in keeping with the spirit of previous declarations and United Nation conventions. This announcement has been criticised by many neighbouring states because of the contradictions seen in the Scarborough Shoal at that time where China has established de facto control.[29]

On 2 August 2012, the United States Senate unanimously passed a resolution declaring that China's July 2012 actions to unilaterally assert control of disputed territories in the South China Sea "are contrary to agreed upon principles with regard to resolving disputes and impede a peaceful resolution."[30]

Subi Reef being built up into an artificial island, 2015

In 2014 Janes reported that during 2013–2014 China had begun a substantial program of dredging and land reclamation at three sites in the Spratlys. Janes concluded that 'The strategic effect of China's dredging and land reclamation makes it the most significant change to the South China Sea dispute since the 1988 Johnson South Reef Skirmish. If completed as envisioned in the CGI designs, China will have its first airstrip in the Spratly islands – and a base from which to impose its interpretation of the surrounding features' sovereignty'.[2]

Janes also noted that in contrast to the previous construction projections of other countries in the Spratlys, 'The main difference between these activities and China's is that they modified existing land masses, while Beijing is constructing islands out of reefs that for the most part were under water at high tide'.

There is no known official term for the projects; the phrase "Great Wall of Sand" was first used by Harry Harris, commander of the US Pacific Fleet, in March 2015.[31]

In April 2015 new satellite imagery revealed that China was rapidly constructing an airfield at Fiery Cross Reef, in addition to its ongoing dredging activities in the Spratlys.[4] In September, China had completed a 3125-metre runway.[32]

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Location of the major islands/islets in the Spratly Islands

Legend:
 Brunei 1：Louisa Reef
 Malaysia 1：Swallow Reef 2：Ardasier Reef 3：Dallas Reef 4：Erica Reef 5：Investigator Shoal 6：Mariveles Reef
 People's Republic of China 1：Yongshu 2：Meiji 3：Zhubi 4：Huayang 5：Nanxun 6：Chigua 7：Dongmen
 Philippines 1：Flat Island 2：Lankiam Cay 3：Loaita Cay 4：Loaita Island 5：Nanshan Island 6：Northeast Cay 7：Thitu Island
8：West York Island 9：Commodore Reef 10：Irving Reef 11：Second Thomas Shoal
 Republic of China 1：Taiping 2：Zhongzhou

 Vietnam 1：Southwest Cay 2：Sand Cay 3：Namyit Island 4：Sin Cowe Island 5：Spratly Island 6：Amboyna Cay 7：Grierson Reef
8：Central London Reef 9：Pearson Reef 10：Barque Canada Reef 11：West London Reef 12：Ladd Reef 13：Discovery Great Reef
14：Pigeon Reef 15：East London Reef 16：Alison Reef 17：Cornwallis South Reef 18：Petley Reef 19：South Reef
20：Collins Reef 21：Lansdowne Reef 22：Bombay Castle 23：Prince of Wales Bank 24：Vanguard Bank 25：Prince Consort Bank
26：Grainger Bank 27：Alexandra Bank 28：Orleana Shoal 29：Kingston Shoal

An 1801 map of the East Indies Isles which shows the placement of the Spratly Islands. Most of the names have changed since then.

The Republic of the Philippines claims the Spratly islands and are based on sovereignty over the Spratly Islands on the issues of res nullius and geography.

The Philippines contend their claim was res nullius as there was no effective sovereignty over the islands until the 1930s when France and then Japan acquired the islands. When Japan renounced their sovereignty over the islands according to the San Francisco Treaty, there was a relinquishment of the right to the islands without any special beneficiary. Therefore, the islands became res nullius and available for annexation, according to the claim.

In 1956, a private Filipino citizen, Tomás Cloma, unilaterally declared a state on 53 features in the South China Sea, calling it "Freedomland". In December 1974, Cloma was arrested and forced to sign a document to convey to the Philippines whatever rights he might have had in the territory for one peso.[33] Cloma sold his claim to the Philippine government, which annexed (de jure) the islands in 1978, calling them Kalayaan. On 11 June 1978, President Ferdinand Marcos of the Philippines issued Presidential decree No. 1596, declaring the Spratly Islands (referred to therein as the Kalayaan Island Group) as Philippine territory.[34]

Territorial map claimed by the Philippines, showing internal waters, territorial sea, international treaty limits and exclusive economic zone.

The Philippine claim to Kalayaan on a geographical basis can be summarised using the assertion that Kalayaan is distinct from other island groups in the South China Sea, because of the size of the biggest island in the Kalayaan group. A second argument used by the Philippines regarding their geographical claim over the Spratlys is that all the islands claimed by the Philippines lie within its 200-mile exclusive economic zone according to the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. This argument assumes that the islands were res nullius.[35] The Republic of the Philippines also contend, under maritime law that the People's Republic of China can not extend its baseline claims to the Spratlys because the PRC is not an archipelagic state.

On July 12, 2016, the Permanent Court of Arbitration ruled in favor of the Philippines on most of its submissions. It clarified that while it would not "rule on any question of sovereignty ... and would not delimit any maritime boundary", China's historic rights claims over maritime areas (as opposed to land masses and territorial waters) within the "nine-dash line" have no lawful effect unless entitled to under UNCLOS. China has rejected the ruling, as has Taiwan. Eight governments have called for the ruling to be respected, 35 issued generally positive statements noting the verdict but not called for compliance, and eight rejected it. The United Nations itself "doesn't have a position on the legal and procedural merits of the case or on the disputed claims", and on 12 July the Secretary-General "expressed his hope that the continued consultations on a Code of Conduct between ASEAN and China under the framework of the Declaration of the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea will lead to increased mutual understanding among all the parties.[36][37][38][39]

Brunei claims the part of the South China Sea nearest to it as part of its continental shelf and exclusive economic zone (EEZ). In 1984, Brunei declared an EEZ encompassing the above-water islets it claims in Louisa Reef.[17][40] Brunei does not practice military control in the area.

Brunei's claims to the reef are based on the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).[41][42] Brunei states that the southern part of the Spratly Islands chain is actually a part of its continental shelf, and therefore a part of its territory and resources.[43]

Malaysia claims a small number of islands in the Spratly Islands and its claims cover only the islands included in its exclusive economic zone of 200 miles as defined by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Malaysia has militarily occupied five islands that it considers to be within its continental shelf.[44] Swallow Reef (Layang Layang / Terumbu Layang / Pulau Layang Layang) was under control in 1983 and has been turned into an island through a land reclamation which now also hosts a dive resort.[45] The Malaysian military also occupies Ardasier Reef (Terumbu Ubi), and Mariveles Reef (Terumbu Mantanani).[40]

Malaysia's claims are based upon the continental shelf principle, and have clearly defined coordinates within the limits of its EEZ defined in 1979.[45][46] This argument requires that the islands were res nullius and this requirement is said to be satisfied as when Japan renounced their sovereignty over the islands according to the San Francisco Treaty, there was a relinquishment of the right to the islands without any special beneficiary. Therefore, the islands became res nullius and available for annexation.[40][47]

Map of the South China Sea Islands, by Ministry of the Interior, ROC, 1947.

The People's Republic of China (PRC) claims are based on history and not UNCLOS.[48] However, the PRC still claims all of the Spratly Islands as part of China. The PRC is a party to the UNCLOS, signing the agreement on 29 July 1994.

The Republic of China (ROC), which ruled Mainland China before 1949 and has been confined to Taiwan since 1949, also claims all of the Spratly Islands.

Chinese fishermen have fished around the islands since 200 BC.[49] China claims to have discovered the islands in the Han dynasty in 2 BC. The islands were claimed to have been marked on maps compiled during the time of Eastern Han dynasty and Eastern Wu (one of the Three Kingdoms). Since the Yuan dynasty in the 12th century, several islands that may be the Spratlys have been labelled as Chinese territory according to the Yuanshi, an official history commissioned by the Hongwu Emperor of the Ming dynasty in 1369, which has been subject to criticism for its lack of quality and numerous errors.[50][51] This labeling has also occurred in the Qing dynasty from the 13th to 19th century;[52] the islands may have appeared on a 1755 map, among others.[52][53] Archaeological surveys have found the remains of Chinese pottery and coins in the islands, cited as proof for the PRC claim, but they are more likely to have come from shipwrecks of passing Chinese junks.[54]

In the 19th century, Europeans found that Chinese fishermen from Hainan annually sojourned on the Spratly Islands for part of the year, while in 1877 it was the British who launched the first modern legal claims to the Spratlys.[55][56]

When the Spratlys and Paracels were being surveyed by Germany in 1883, China issued protests against them. China sent naval forces on inspection tours in 1902 and 1907 and placed flags and markers on the islands. The Qing dynasty's successor state, the Republic of China, claimed the Spratly and Paracel Islands under the jurisdiction of Hainan.[57]

The Spratlys and the Paracels were conquered from France[58] by Japan in 1939. Japan administered the Spratlys via Taiwan's jurisdiction and the Paracels via Hainan's jurisdiction.[55] The Paracels and Spratlys were handed over to Republic of China control from Japan after the 1945 surrender of Japan,[59] since the Allied powers assigned the Republic of China to receive Japanese surrenders in that area.[57]

After World War II ended, the Republic of China was the "most active claimant". The Republic of China then garrisoned Itu Aba (Taiping) Island in 1946 and posted Chinese flags and markers on it along with Woody island in the Paracels, France tried, but failed to make them leave Woody island.[55] The aim of the Republic of China was to block the French claims.[57][60] The Republic of China drew up the map showing the U shaped claim on the entire South China Sea, showing the Spratly and Paracels in Chinese territory, in 1947.[57]

Taiwan's garrison from 1946 to 1950 and 1956–present on Itu Aba represents an "effective occupation" of the Spratly Islands.[61][62]

On May 15, 1996, the PROC submitted to the United Nations its geographic baseline, which included the Paracel Islands and Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, but did not include the Spratly Islands.[63][64][65]

Taiwan garrison forces actively fended off Philippine efforts to build on the Spratly before 1971. After the UN vote to recognize the PRC, the ROC government in Taiwan no longer was in position to defend its rights. The Philippines and Vietnam took this opportunity to establish outposts in the Spratlys.

Territorial monument of the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam) on Southwest Cay, Spratly Islands, defining the cay as part of Vietnamese territory (to Phước Tuy province). Used from 22 August 1956 until 1975, when replaced by another one from the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (successor state after the Fall of Saigon)

On 25 July 1994, Vietnam ratified the UNCLOS. Upon ratification it declared:

The National Assembly reiterates Viet Nam's sovereignty over the Hoang Sa and Truong Sa archipelagoes and its position to settle those disputes relating to territorial claims as well as other disputes in the Eastern Sea through peaceful negotiations in the spirit of equality, mutual respect and understanding, and with due respect of international law, particularly the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, and of the sovereign rights and jurisdiction of the coastal States over their respective continental shelves and exclusive economic zones[66]

Vietnam's response to China's claim is that Chinese records on Qianli Changsha and Wanli Shitang are records about non-Chinese territories.[67] For example, Qianli Changsha and Wanli Shitang were referred to in the ancient Chinese texts Ling Wai Dai Da[68] and Zhu Fan Zhi[69] as being in the Sea of Jiaozhi, Jiaozhi being the old name for a Chinese province in modern-day northern Vietnam, or as writings on foreign countries.

Vietnam's view is that the Chinese records do not constitute the declaration and exercise of sovereignty and that China did not declare sovereignty over the Spratlys until after World War II.

On the other hand, Vietnam claims the Spratlys based on international law on declaring and exercising sovereignty.

Vietnam People's Navy Naval Infantry marching on Spratly Island

Vietnam claims that it has occupied the Spratly and the Paracel islands at least since the 17th century, when they were not under the sovereignty of any state, and that they exercised sovereignty over the two archipelagos continuously and peacefully until they were invaded by Chinese armed forces.[70] In Phủ biên tạp lục (撫邊雜錄, Miscellaneous Records of Pacification in the Border Area) by the scholar Lê Quý Đôn, Hoàng Sa (Paracel Islands), and Trường Sa (Spratly Islands) were defined as belonging to Quảng Ngãi District. In Đại Nam nhất thống toàn đồ (大南ー統全圖), an atlas of Vietnam completed in 1838, Trường Sa was shown as Vietnamese territory.[71] Vietnam had conducted many geographical and resource surveys of the islands.[71] The results of these surveys have been recorded in Vietnamese literature and history published since the 17th century. After the treaty signed with the Nguyễn dynasty, France represented Vietnam in international affairs and exercised sovereignty over the islands.[71]

The Cairo Declaration, drafted by the Allies and China towards the end of World War II, listed the territories that the Allies intended to strip from Japan and return to China. Despite China being among the authors of the declaration, this list did not include the Spratlys.[72] Vietnam's response to China's claim that the Cairo Declaration somehow recognised the latter's sovereignty over the Spratlys is that it has no basis in fact.

At the San Francisco Conference on the peace treaty with Japan, the Soviet Union proposed that the Paracels and Spratlys be recognised as belonging to China. This proposal was rejected by an overwhelming majority of the delegates. On 7 July 1951, Tran Van Huu, head of the Bảo Đại Government's (State of Vietnam) delegation to the conference declared that the Paracels and Spratlys were part of Vietnamese territory. This declaration met with no challenge from the 51 representatives at the conference.[71]

The text of the Treaty of San Francisco did not list the Spratlys, or any other island territories, to be returned to China.[73]

The Geneva Accords, which China was a signatory, settled the First Indochina War end. French Indochina was split into three countries: Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam. Vietnam was to be temporarily divided along the 17th Parallel.

Chapter I, Article 4 states:

The provisional military demarcation line between the two final regrouping zones is extended into the territorial waters by a line perpendicular to the general line of the coast. All coastal islands north of this boundary shall be evacuated by the armed forces of the French Union, and all islands south of it shall be evacuated by the forces of the People's Army of Viet-Nam.[74]

On 26 October 1955, the Republic of Vietnam "South Vietnam" replaced the State of Vietnam (part of the French Union) and inherit of its rights. The Vietnamese government's Vietnam United Youth League, which runs the newspaper Thanh Niên News, claims that although, nothing was said explicitly about offshore archipelagos, which was of small interest by that times, it was clearly understood by all the parties that the Republic of Vietnam inherit of all the French Indochina's Vietnamese territories under the 17th Parallel. As the Paracel and the Spratly archipelagos (which lay below the 17th parallel) were part of the French Indochina since 1933, they were part of "South Vietnam" territory. The French bestowed its titles, rights, and claims over the two island chains to the Republic of Vietnam.[75]

The Republic of Vietnam (RVN) exercised sovereignty over the islands, by placing border markers on the Spratlys to indicate South Vietnamese sovereignty over the archipelago. Up to the end of the Vietnam War the Republic of Vietnam Navy held military control over the majority of the Spratly Islands until 1975, when North Vietnamese troops attacked South Vietnamese troops and occupied the islands. After the Vietnam War, the unified Vietnam SRV (Socialist Republic of Vietnam) continued to claim the Spratly islands as an indisputably integral part of Vietnam.

The letter sent by PM Phạm Văn Đồng of North Vietnam to Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai in 1958 regarding the 12-nautical mile breadth of China's territorial waters.

China has produced a letter written by North Vietnam's former Prime Minister Phạm Văn Đồng in 1958 as proof that it holds sovereignty over the Paracel and Spratly islands. The Vietnamese newspaper Thanh Niên News claims China has intentionally misrepresented the letter, which contains no direct reference to either island chain. In addition, they claim that China is ignoring the spirit and time in which the letter was written. During that time, the two communist neighbors shared extremely close ties and the US navy was patrolling the Taiwan Strait, threatening them both. The letter, according to the newspaper, represented a diplomatic gesture of goodwill that has no legal relevance to the current territorial dispute.[75]

On 4 September 1958, with the seventh fleet of the US Navy patrolling the Taiwan Strait, China announced its decision to extend the breadth of its territorial waters to 12 nautical miles. The United Nations (to which China was not yet a member) had just held its first Conference on the Law of the Sea in Switzerland in 1956, and the resulting treaties, including the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, were signed in 1958. Though the UN conference was considered a success, it left the exact breadth of each nation's territorial waters somewhat unresolved; the US, for instance, said it should extend just three nautical miles.[75]

On 14 September 1958, North Vietnam's PM Phạm Văn Đồng wrote his letter to PM Zhou Enlai in response to China's declaration. The Vietnamese newspaper Thanh Nien News claims that the letter has no legal relevance in China's sovereignty claims to the Paracel and Spratly archipelagos for the three following reasons:

• Point 1: The Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam) was not in control of the Paracel and the Spratly archipelagos at the time PM Dong wrote his letter.
• Point 2: The Constitutions of 1946 and 1957 of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam stipulated that territorial transfers must be decided by an act of parliament, the most powerful body in the country. As such, the Prime Minister had no right to relinquish the islands.
• Point 3: PM Pham Van Dong's letter is a unilateral declaration written solely as a response to China's declaration on a 12 nautical mile territorial waters. The letter makes no mention, whatsoever, of territorial sovereignty over any archipelago.[75]

The islands occupied by Vietnam are organised as a district of Khánh Hòa Province. According to the 2009 census, the Trường Sa District has a population of 195 people.[76] At the 12th National Assembly (2007–2011) Election held early in Trường Sa, the people and soldiers also voted for their local district government for the first time. For the first time, Trường Sa is organised like a normal inland district, with a township (Trường Sa) and two communes (Sinh Tồn and Song Tử Tây). Forty nine people were elected to the communes' people's councils. In July 2012 the National Assembly of Vietnam passed a law demarcating Vietnamese sea borders to include the Spratly and Paracel Islands.[77][78]

Champa historically had a large presence in the South China Sea. The Vietnamese broke Champa's power in an invasion of Champa in 1471, and then finally conquered the last remnants of the Cham people in a war in 1832.[79] The Vietnamese government fears that using the evidence of Champa's historical connection to the disputed islands in the South China Sea would expose the human rights violations and killings of ethnic minorities in Vietnam such as in the 2001 and 2004 uprisings, and lead to the issue of Cham autonomy being brought to attention.[80]