13th Airborne Division (United States)

Between August 1943 and February 1945, the 13th Airborne Division remained in the United States and did not serve overseas or participate in any airborne operations, as it began training to become a combat-ready formation. In comparison, the 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions had been assigned as active combat formations to serve overseas in Europe, the 11th Airborne Division was scheduled to be deployed to the Pacific Theater of Operations, and the 17th Airborne Division had been assigned as the United States strategic reserve formation.[11] During this period, the activities of the division primarily involved airborne training, as well as taking part in several training exercises. However, while airborne training for the first four American airborne divisions was conducted during 1943, the 13th encountered considerable difficulties when it came to its turn for training.[12] By the last few months of 1943 the 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions had conducted airborne exercises and finished their training, and had then been transferred to Europe; to ensure the divisions could conduct airborne operations, a majority of the transport aircraft available in the United States had been sent with them, and even more were transferred to Europe as replacements after the American airborne landings in Normandy in June 1944.[13] Consequently, very few transport aircraft were available for use by the 13th, and the original training exercise for the division that had been scheduled for June 1944 had to be postponed until 17 September, and then once again until 24 September.[14]

Major General Eldridge G. Chapman and Lieutenant General Lesley J. McNair, commander of Army Ground Forces, inspect troopers of the 13th Airborne Division, 13 May 1944.

The divisional training exercise took place around Camp Mackall, North Carolina, and suffered from a number of difficulties and problems. Poor weather delayed the beginning of the exercise until the night of 25 September, and it was only then that the aircraft carrying the first three battalions of paratroopers could take off and attempt to drop the airborne troops on three separate drop zones.[15] A combination of poor visibility, and a lack of sufficient training for the pilots of the transport aircraft, resulted in the paratroopers being dispersed widely when dropped. Only sixty-five percent of the airborne troops and equipment dropped on the first drop zone were ready for action ninety minutes later, and in the second drop zone the airborne troops were so scattered that by 10:00 the next morning the commander of the battalion only had control over twenty percent of his men.[15] A similar number of paratroopers missed the third drop zone, although the majority were dropped in a relatively small area where they could gather.[15] Further problems were encountered, as a plane crash killed eight paratroopers and four aircrew, and the glider-borne elements of the division due to land were delayed by poor weather. After the initial night, the exercise continued for a further three days and included a complex supply mission designed to test whether it was possible to supply an isolated battalion of airborne troops.[15]

Overall, observers present for the exercise reported that they had been impressed with the performance of the glider-borne elements of the division. However, several noted that the training of the aircraft pilots for night formation flying and navigation was far from satisfactory. A recommendation was made that night glider landings should be considered only when an emergency existed, and that otherwise gliders should take off during the night and land during daylight to avoid the wide dispersal of airborne troops and a decrease in efficiency.[15] After these exercises had ended, the division continued to train, but encountered further delays. These were caused when 1,652 men were removed from the division to provide reinforcements for U.S. Airborne units in the European Theater; this drastically reduced the strength of the division and forced it to extend its training period for a further four months.[16][17] After completing its training in January the division was preparing to transfer to the Pacific Theatre in early 1945. However, the rapid advances made by German forces during the Battle of the Bulge led to the division being transferred to the European Theatre of Operations to reinforce Allied divisions already in combat.[18]

The division arrived in the European Theater of Operations in early February, coming under the command of the First Allied Airborne Army, and Major General Chapman was informed that there was a possibility that the division would be required to conduct airborne operations during the closing stages of the Battle of the Bulge. However, the campaign in the Ardennes ended before the division could be transported there.[3] The next chance for the 13th to participate in an airborne operation, and to actually see combat, was in March 1945 when the Allies had penetrated into Germany itself and reached the River Rhine. A few weeks before the division was to participate in a combat jump over the Rhine it was reorganized, after a conference by the War Department had decided that a more efficient composition for an airborne division was two Parachute Infantry Regiments and only a single Glider Infantry Regiment. Subsequently, the 517th Parachute Infantry Regiment, a veteran unit that had served in Italy, Southern France and the Ardennes, joined the division in early March, and the 88th Glider Infantry Regiment was combined into the 326th Glider Infantry Regiment that remained as the division's sole glider-based element.[3] The 517th had recently fought during the Ardennes campaign, and had received a Presidential Unit Citation for its actions.[1]

Allied disposition in western Europe by March 1945.

The Rhine river was a formidable natural obstacle to the Allied advance,[19] but if breached would allow the Allies access to the North German Plain and ultimately to advance on Berlin and other major cities in Northern Germany. Following the 'Broad Front Approach' laid out by General Dwight D. Eisenhower, the Supreme Allied Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force, it was decided to attempt to breach the Rhine in several areas.[20] Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery, commanding the Anglo-Canadian 21st Army Group, devised a plan to allow the forces under his command to breach the Rhine, which he titled Operation Plunder, and which was subsequently authorized by Eisenhower. Plunder envisioned the British Second Army, under Lieutenant-General Miles C. Dempsey, and the U.S. Ninth Army, under Lieutenant General William Simpson, crossing the Rhine at Rees, Wesel, and an area south of the Lippe Canal. To ensure that the operation was a success, Montgomery insisted that an airborne component was inserted into the plans for the operation to support the amphibious assaults that would take place, which was code-named Operation Varsity.[21] Three airborne divisions were initially chosen to take part in Varsity, these being the British 6th Airborne Division, the U.S. 17th Airborne Division, and finally the 13th, all of which were assigned to U.S. XVIII Airborne Corps, commanded by Major General Matthew Ridgway.[5] However, it was discovered that there were only enough transport aircraft available in Europe to transport two airborne divisions into combat, and as such it was removed from Operation Varsity due to its lack of combat experience.[4]

After its removal from Operation Varsity, the division remained in reserve as the Allied armies advanced even further into Germany, moving to Oise, France, on 3 April for supply and administrative tasks.[22] The division was scheduled to participate in several other airborne operations; however, these were all cancelled before they could take place.[23] The first of these was Operation Arena, which envisioned landing between six and ten divisions into what was termed a 'strategic airhead' in the Kassel region of Northern Germany; the planners of the operations envisioned that the operation would deny a large swathe of territory to the German defenders and give the Allied armies a staging area for further advances into Germany. The 13th was chosen to participate, along with the 17th, 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions and the British 6th and 1st Airborne Divisions.[24] A preliminary date for 1 May was set for the operation once all of the required airborne and air-landed infantry divisions had been located and supplied, but it was ultimately cancelled on 26 March due to the rapid movement of Allied ground forces negating the need for the operation.[25] Two other airborne operations were planned to include the 13th. Operation Choker II was to be an airborne landing on the east bank of the Rhine near Worms, Germany; planning for the operation got to an advanced stage, and the division was only hours from taking off from airfields in France when the operation was cancelled due to Allied ground forces overrunning the proposed landing areas. Operation Effective was designed to land the 13th south of Stuttgart, seize a nearby airfield and create an airhead for further forces to land in near the Black Forest. The operation was scheduled for 22 April, but was cancelled on 18 April due to Allied units encircling the Black Forest region and making it unnecessary.[26]