Battle of Rossbach

At the start of the war, Frederick had one of the finest armies in Europe: his troops—any company—could fire at least four musket volleys a minute, and some of them could fire five; his army could march 20–32 km (12–20 mi) a day, and was able to conduct, under fire, some of the most complex maneuvers known.[6] After overrunning Saxony, Frederick campaigned in Bohemia and defeated the Austrians on 6 May 1757 at the Battle of Prague. He was initially successful, but after the Battle of Kolín, everything went awry: what had started as a war of movement by Frederick's agile army turned into a war of attrition.[7]

By summer 1757, Prussia was threatened on two fronts. In the east, the Russians, under Field Marshal Stepan Fyodorovich Apraksin, besieged Memel with 75,000 troops. Memel had one of the strongest fortresses in Prussia, but after five days of artillery bombardment, the Russian army successfully stormed it.[8] The Russians then used Memel as a base to invade East Prussia and defeated a smaller Prussian force in the fiercely contested Battle of Gross-Jägersdorf on 30 August 1757. However, the Russians were unable to take Königsberg, the capital of East Prussia, after using up their supplies of cannonballs at Memel and Gross-Jägersdorf, and retreated soon afterward. The logistics of supplying a large army remained a problem for the Russians throughout the war.[9] Although previous experiences in wars with the Ottoman Empire had exposed these problems, the Russians had not solved the challenge of supplying their army at a distance from Moscow.[10] Even so, the Imperial Russian Army offered a new threat to Prussia, forcing Frederick to abandon his invasion of Bohemia and to withdraw further into Prussian territory.[11]

In Saxony and Silesia, the Austrian forces slowly reclaimed territory held by Frederick earlier in the year. In September, at the Battle of Moys, Prince Charles's Austrians defeated the Prussians commanded by Hans Karl von Winterfeldt, one of Frederick's most trusted generals, who was killed in the battle.[12] As summer ended, a combined force of French and the Reichsarmee (Imperial Army) troops, approaching from the west, intended to unite with Prince Charles's main Austrian force, which itself advanced west to Breslau. Prince Soubise and Prince Joseph of Saxe-Hildburghausen shared command of the Allied force.[13]

If these armies were to unite, Prussia's situation would be dire indeed. Recognizing this threat, Frederick used the strategy of interior lines to advance in a quick, arduous march reminiscent of the forced marches of his great grandfather, Frederick William I, the "Great Elector". An army marches only as fast as its slowest components, which are usually the supply trains, and Frederick obtained needed supplies ahead of the army, which enabled him to abandon his supply wagons. His army covered 274 km (170 mi) in only 13 days. Bringing his enemy to battle proved difficult, as the Allies flitted out of his reach. Both Frederick and his enemies moved back and forth for several days, trying to maneuver around each other but ending up in a stalemate. During this time, an Austrian raiding party attacked Berlin and almost captured the Prussian royal family.[9]

On the morning of 5 November 1757 the Prussian camp lay between Rossbach on the left and the village of Bedra on the right, facing the Allies. Charles, the Prince Soubise, commanding the French, and the Prince Saxe-Hildburghausen, commanding the Holy Roman Empire's forces, had maneuvered in the preceding days without giving Frederick an opportunity to begin fighting. Their forces were located to the west, with their right flank near the town of Branderoda and their left at Mücheln. The advanced posts of the Prussians stood in villages immediately west of their camp, those of the Allies on the Schortau hill and the Galgenberg.[20]

The Allies possessed a numerical superiority of two to one, and their advanced post, commanded by Claude Louis, Comte de Saint-Germain, overlooked all parts of Frederick's camp. The French and Habsburg Imperial (Reichsarmee) troops consisted of 62 battalions (31,000 infantry), 84 squadrons (10,000) of cavalry, and 109 artillery, totaling some 41,110 men, under Soubise's and Saxe-Hildburghausen's command.[2] The Allies had taken the lead in the maneuvers of the previous days, and Saxe-Hildburghausen decided to take the offensive. He had some difficulty inducing Soubise to risk a battle, so the Allies did not begin to move from their campground until after eleven a.m. on 5 November. Soubise probably intended to engage as late in the day as possible, with the idea of gaining what advantages he could in a partial action before nightfall. Their plan called for the Allied army to march by Zeuchfeld, around Frederick's left, which no serious natural obstacle covered, and to deploy in battle array facing north, between Reichardtswerben on the right and Pettstädt on the left. Saxe-Hildburghausen's proposed battle and the more limited aim of Soubise appeared equally likely to succeed by taking this position, which threatened to cut Frederick off from a retreat to the towns on the Saale. The Allies could attain this position only by marching around the Prussian flank, which could put them in the tenuous position of marching across their enemies' front. Consequently, the Allies posted a sizable guard against the obvious risk of interference on their exposed flank.[20]

Troops maneuver for position

On the other side, Frederick commanded 27 battalions of infantry (17,000 men) and 43 squadrons of cavalry (5,000 horse), plus 72 companies of artillery, for a total of 22,000 men.[21] He also had several of the siege guns from Leipzig, which arrived late in the morning. He spent the morning watching the French from the Goldacker manor rooftop in Rossbach. The initial stages of Allied movement convinced him that the Allies had started retreating southward towards their magazines; he sent out patrols to learn from the peasants what could be gleaned. They reported back that Soubise had taken the Weissenfels road; it led not only to that village, but also toward Freiburg, where Soubise could find supplies, or to Merseburg, where they would cut the Prussians off from the Saale. At about noon Frederick went to dinner, leaving the young captain Friedrich Wilhelm von Gaudi to observe French movements. Two hours later, his watch captain reported the French approaching. Although Gaudi's excited report at first appeared to confirm a French-Reichsarmee retreat, Frederick observed that Allied columns, which from time to time became visible in the undulations of the ground, appeared to turn eastwards from Zeuchfeld. When Frederick saw for himself that hostile cavalry and infantry were already approaching Pettstädt, he realized his enemy's intentions: to attack him in the flank and rear, and break his communications line, if not crush him completely. They now offered him the battle for which he had maneuvered in vain, and he accepted it without hesitation.[20]

Frederick realized the gambit by 2:30 pm. By 3:00 pm, the entire Prussian army had struck camp, loaded their tents and gear, and fallen into line. Friedrich Wilhelm von Seydlitz took his 38 squadrons of cavalry and moved toward the Janus and Pölzen, small hills between Rossbach and Reichardtswerben. Except for a few moments, the advance was hidden entirely from view. He was followed by Colonel Karl Friedrich von Moller's battery of 18 guns, which positioned themselves temporarily on the reverse of the Janus between the infantry's left and the cavalry's right. Seven squadrons remained in Rossbach to contain Saint-Germain's advanced post.[20]

Although aware of some of these movements, Soubise thought the Prussians were in full retreat. He ordered his advanced guard to hasten toward the Janus hill, but he issued no instructions on where, how and when to deploy. The Allied infantry moved in three long columns: at the head were the French regiments of Piedmont and Mailly, and on the flanks and in front of the right column were two regiments of Austrian cuirassiers and the Imperial cavalry. Ten French squadrons remained in reserve and twelve others protected the left flank. Soubise, who undoubtedly knew better, ordered no ground reconnaissance and sent no advanced guard. His army marched blindly into Frederick's clutches.[20]

The Trap is set.

When the Prussians broke camp, they left a handful of light troops to demonstrate before the French advance post commanded by the Comte de Saint-Germain. These light troops constituted the flank guard on the Schartau hill, which lay at right angles to the Janus and Pölzen. Frederick had no intention of either forming a line parallel to the enemy or of retreating. His army could move as a unit twice as fast as the Allies' army. If, at the moment of contact, the Allies had already formed their line of battle facing north, then his attack would strike their right flank; if they were still on the move in columns eastwards or northeastwards, the heads of their columns would be crushed before the rest could deploy in the new direction, deployment being a lengthy affair for most armies.[22]

The Allies marched in normal order in two main columns, the first line on the left, the second line on the right; farther to the right, though, marched a column consisting of the foot reserve, and between the first and second lines trundled the reserve artillery. The right wing cavalry advanced at the head and the left wing cavalry at the tail of the two main columns. Noting some Prussian movement, Soubise ordered a wheeling pivot to the east,[23] a complicated maneuver under parade-ground conditions, and difficult in the field, with troops unfamiliar with each other, on uneven terrain. At first, the columns retained regulation distance, wheeling eastward toward Zeuchfeld, but then part of the reserve infantry moved between the two main columns, hampering the movements of the reserve artillery. In addition, the troops on the outer flank of the wheel found themselves unable to keep up with the overly rapid movement of the inner pivot.[22]

Soubise and Saxe-Hildburghausen ignored the confusion as their own troops struggled in the wheeling pivot. From their vantage point, it appeared to the Allied commanders that the Prussians were moving eastward; Soubise and Saxe-Hildburghausen presumed that the Prussians were about to retreat in order to avoid being taken in their flank and rear. The Allied generals hurried the march, sending on the leading (right wing) cavalry towards Reichardtswerben. They also called up part of the left wing cavalry from the tail of the column and even the flank guard cavalry to take part in what they presumed would be the general chase. Any semblance of the wheeling pivot was lost in these fresh maneuvers, and the remaining columns lost all cohesion and order.[22]

Moller's artillery on Janus hill again opened fire on this confusion of men and horses at 3:15 pm. When they came under the fire of Moller's guns, the Allied cavalry, which now lay north of Reichardtswerben and well ahead of their own infantry, suffered from the barrage, but the commanders were not particularly concerned about the display of cannon fire. It was usual to employ heavy guns to protect a retreat, so the Allies assured themselves that Frederick was retreating and contented themselves with bringing some of their field guns into action. The cavalry hurried to get themselves out of range, but this further disorganized the Allied infantry lines, and caused any remaining unit cohesion to break down.[22]

Unseen by the Allies, Seydlitz assembled his cavalry into two lines, one of 20 squadrons and the second of 18, and reduced the speed of his approach until they reached the screening ridge of the Pölzen hill. There, they waited. Seydlitz sat at the head of the lines, calmly smoking his pipe. When the Allied cavalry came within striking distance, 1000 paces from the crest of the ridge, he tossed his pipe in the air: this was the signal to charge. At 3:30 pm, Seydlitz crested the hill and his first 20 squadrons descended on the Allied army; the leading Allied cuirassiers managed to deploy to meet Seydlitz's squadrons, but the momentum of the Prussian attack penetrated the Allied lines and wrought havoc among the disorganized mass. Prussian cavalry rode flank to flank; their training had taught them to form a line three and four deep from a column without breaking pace; once formed into a line, the troopers rode with knees touching, the horses' flanks touching, and horses riding tail to nose. Any attack of Prussian cavalry on open ground meant a line of horses—big Trakehners[Note 2]—bearing down on infantry or cavalry columns, lines, or squares. The horsemen could maneuver at a full gallop, to the left or right, or in an oblique.[22]

The fighting soon devolved into man-on-man combat; Seydlitz himself fought like a trooper, receiving a severe wound. He ordered his last 18 squadrons, still waiting at the Janus, into the fray. The second charge struck the French cavalry at an oblique angle. The mêlée drifted rapidly southward, past the Allied infantry. Part of the Allied reserve, which had become entangled between the main columns, was extricating itself by degrees and endeavoring to catch up with the rest of the reserve column away to the right, but the sweep of horses and Allied infantry pulled them into the fighting. The Allied reserve artillery proved useless; caught in the middle of the infantry columns, it could not deploy to support any of the endangered Allied troops. The Prussian infantry on the Shartau hill waited in echelon from the left. Those Allied units who escaped the artillery and the horsemen ran headlong into a hail of musket fire from Prince Henry's infantry.[22] Attempted French counterattacks dissolved into confusion. Most of the Allied cavalry units in front were smashed by the initial charge and many of them trampled over their own men trying to flee. The field was littered with riderless horses and horseless men, wounded, dying and dead. This part of the action took about 30 minutes.[25]

Seydlitz recalled his cavalry. This in itself was unusual: normally, a cavalry attacked once, maybe twice, and spent the rest of the battle chasing fleeing troops. Seydlitz led his rallied force toward the flank and rear of the Allied army, about 2 km (1 mi) out of the fighting and into a copse of trees between Reichardtswerben and Obschutz. There, horses and men could catch their breath. The Allies, relieved to see the last of the horsemen, became preoccupied with the Prussian infantry, about four battalions of it, threatening in linear formation to their left. Instead of forming into a similar line of attack, though, the Allied battalions formed into columns, fixed their bayonets and marched forward, prepared for a charge.[26]

As the Allies advanced, not yet in bayonet range, they came within range of Prince Henry's infantry; disciplined Prussian volleys shredded the orderly Allied columns. Then Moller's artillery, reinforced by siege guns from Leipzig, tore some additional gaps. The leading ranks faltered; the following ranks crowded into them, goaded on by their officers. Prince Henry's infantry advanced, still firing. Finally, seemingly out of nowhere, Seydlitz brought his cavalry in a flanking attack, this time all 38 squadrons in a massed attack; their sudden and energetic appearance at the flank and rear caused havoc and despair among the already demoralized Reichsarmee units assembled there. Three regiments of Franconian Imperial troops threw aside their muskets and ran, and the French ran with them. Seydlitz's troopers pursued and cut down the fleeing Allies until darkness made the chase impossible.[27]

The tower of manor house at Rossbach offered Frederick a vantage point from which to watch the Allied army and to command his troops; from here he also watched Seydlitz's cavalry launch its final attack.

The battle had lasted less than 90 minutes and the last episode of the infantry fight no more than fifteen minutes. Only seven Prussian battalions had engaged with the enemy, and these had expended five to fifteen rounds per man.[22]

Soubise and Saxe-Hildburghausen, who had been wounded, succeeded in keeping one or two regiments together, but the rest scattered over the countryside. The French and Imperial troops lost six generals, an unusually high count in eighteenth century warfare, although not surprising given the emphasis on cavalry action in this battle. Among the French and German Imperial troops, the Austrian demographer Gaston Bodart counted 1,000 dead (including six generals) and approximately 3,500 wounded (including four generals),[Note 3] for a total of 8.3% wounded or dead, and 12.2% (approximately 5,000) missing or captured. Other historians might place the numbers of captured higher, at almost one third, or about 13,800.[29] The Prussians took as trophies 72 cannons (62% of the Allied artillery), seven flags, and 21 standards.[21] The Prussians captured eight French generals and 260 officers.[30]

Prussian losses are more controversial: Frederick boasted of negligible casualties. In his thorough study of regimental histories, Bodart counted 169–170 Prussian dead (including seven officers), and 430 wounded (including Prince Henry, Seydlitz and two other generals, and 19 officers), or about 2.4% of the total Prussian force; these casualties amount to less than 10% of the engaged Prussian force. Other recent sources agree that the Prussians lost as few as 300 and as many as 500 among the wounded. In an assessment of surviving regimental records, modern sources place Prussian losses at even fewer than Bodart did: one colonel was killed, plus two other officers, and 67 soldiers.[30]

Soubise has historically taken the blame for the loss, but this may be an unfair assessment. While he did owe his rank to his good relationship with Madame de Pompadour, the mistress of King Louis XV, he was neither blessed with extraordinary military acumen nor with the best troops: he could do nothing about the former, and most of the latter were with Louis Charles César Le Tellier, fighting in the Rhineland. Under Soubise's command, the French had conducted a notorious march across Germany, characterized by persistent pillaging. His army also had approximately 12,000 civilian camp followers. There were chefs, hair dressers, perruquiers, barbers, wives and mistresses, pastry chefs, tailors and clothiers of all kinds, saddle makers, bridle makers, grooms, and servants of all varieties who served the nobility. In addition, the army had its usual motley crew of farriers, grooms, veterinarians, surgeons, and cooks that sustained an army on the march. After the battle, the Comte de Saint-Germain, who had commanded the advanced guard and also the rear guard that struggled to keep up with the fleeing army, complained that the troops in his charge had been defective, a gang of robbers, murderers, and cowards who ran at the sound of a gunshot.[31]

The Imperial army, although smaller, was not much better, and certainly not the battle-hardened army the Prussians had faced at Kolín. This was the Reichsarmee, an army consisting of units sent by the constituent members of the Holy Roman Empire. Their commander had reported that they were defective in training, administration, armaments, discipline and leadership. The same might be said of their commander, Saxe-Hildburghausen, an indolent and slow-moving man. The Imperial regimental officers often lacked even basic garrison training. These units had little experience working together, much less fighting together, a problem that expressed itself most evidently in the disastrous wheeling pivot. Furthermore, the Reichsarmee contingents came from many principalities, some of which were Protestant, and many of which were unhappy about any alliance with the French; most were more adverse to the French than they were to the Prussians.[32] Once news of the battle's uneven resolution spread, some Germans felt satisfaction; the battle could be seen as retribution for the years of suffering under the French atrocities in the Rhineland and Palatinate during the wars of Louis XIV like the Nine Years' War. Mostly, though, Rossbach was significant for the strengthening of Prussia's relationship with Frederick's uncle, King George, and George's other subjects. The British could now see the advantage of keeping the French occupied on the Continent while they continued their offensives against French territories in North America.[33]

While Frederick was engaging the combined Allied forces further west, that autumn the Austrians had slowly retaken Silesia: Prince Charles Alexander of Lorraine had captured the city of Schweidnitz and moved on Breslau in lower Silesia. While heading back to Silesia, Frederick learned of the fall of Breslau (22 November). He and his 22,000 men reversed tracks, and covered 274 km (170 mi) from Rossbach to Leuthen (now Lutynia, Poland), 27 km (17 mi) west of Breslau in twelve days. On the way, at Liegnitz, they joined with the Prussian troops who had survived the fighting at Breslau. The augmented army of about 33,000 troops arrived at Leuthen to find 66,000 Austrians in possession. Despite his troops' exhaustion from the rapid march from Rossbach, Frederick won yet another decisive victory at Leuthen.[34]