BitLocker

Windows Mobile 6.5, Windows RT and core editions of Windows 8.1 include device encryption, a feature-limited version of BitLocker that encrypts the whole system.[20][21][22] Logging in with a Microsoft account with administrative privileges automatically begins the encryption process. The recovery key is stored to either the Microsoft account or Active Directory, allowing it to be retrieved from any computer. While device encryption is offered on all versions of 8.1, unlike BitLocker, device encryption requires that the device meet the InstantGo (formerly Connected Standby) specifications,[22] which requires solid-state drives, non-removable RAM (to protect against cold boot attacks) and a TPM 2.0 chip.[20][23]

Starting with Windows 10 1703, the requirements for device encryption have changed, requiring a TPM 1.2 or 2.0 module with PCR 7 support, UEFI Secure Boot, and that the device meets Modern Standby requirements or HSTI validation.[24]

In September 2019 a new update was released (KB4516071[25]) changing the default setting for BitLocker when encrypting a self-encrypting hard drive. Now, the default is to use software encryption for newly encrypted drives. This is due to hardware encryption flaws and security concerns related to those issues.[26]

Three authentication mechanisms can be used as building blocks to implement BitLocker encryption:[27]

• Transparent operation mode: This mode uses the capabilities of TPM 1.2 hardware to provide for transparent user experience—the user powers up and logs into Windows as usual. The key used for disk encryption is sealed (encrypted) by the TPM chip and will only be released to the OS loader code if the early boot files appear to be unmodified. The pre-OS components of BitLocker achieve this by implementing a Static Root of Trust Measurement—a methodology specified by the Trusted Computing Group (TCG). This mode is vulnerable to a cold boot attack, as it allows a powered-down machine to be booted by an attacker. It is also vulnerable to a sniffing attack, as the volume encryption key is transferred in plain text from the TPM to the CPU during a successful boot.
• User authentication mode: This mode requires that the user provide some authentication to the pre-boot environment in the form of a pre-boot PIN or password.
• USB Key Mode: The user must insert a USB device that contains a startup key into the computer to be able to boot the protected OS. Note that this mode requires that the BIOS on the protected machine supports the reading of USB devices in the pre-OS environment. BitLocker does not support smart cards for pre-boot authentication.[28]

The following combinations of the above authentication mechanisms are supported, all with an optional escrow recovery key:

• TPM only[29]
• TPM + PIN[30]
• TPM + PIN + USB Key[31]
• TPM + USB Key[32]
• USB Key[33]
• Password only[34]

The "Transparent operation mode" and "User authentication mode" of BitLocker use TPM hardware to detect if there are unauthorized changes to the pre-boot environment, including the BIOS and MBR. If any unauthorized changes are detected, BitLocker requests a recovery key on a USB device. This cryptographic secret is used to decrypt the Volume Master Key (VMK) and allow the bootup process to continue.[41] However, TPM alone is not enough:

• In February 2008, a group of security researchers published details of a so-called "cold boot attack" that allows full disk encryption systems such as BitLocker to be compromised by booting the machine from removable media, such as a USB drive, into another operating system, then dumping the contents of pre-boot memory.[42] The attack relies on the fact that DRAM retains information for up to several minutes (or even longer, if cooled) after the power has been removed. The Bress/Menz device, described in US Patent 9,514,789, can accomplish this type of attack.[43] Similar full disk encryption mechanisms of other vendors and other operating systems, including Linux and Mac OS X, are vulnerable to the same attack. The authors recommend that computers be powered down when not in physical control of the owner (rather than be left in a sleep mode) and that the encryption software be configured to require a password to boot the machine.[42]

• On 10 November 2015, Microsoft released a security update to mitigate a security vulnerability in BitLocker that allowed authentication to be bypassed by employing a malicious Kerberos key distribution center, if the attacker had physical access to the machine, the machine was part of a domain and had no PIN or USB flash drive protection.[44]
• BitLocker still does not properly support TPM 2.0 security features which, as a result, can lead to a complete bypass of privacy protection when keys are transmitted over Serial Peripheral Interface in a motherboard.[45]

All these attacks require physical access to the system and are thwarted by a secondary protector such as a USB flash drive or PIN code.

Although the AES encryption algorithm used in BitLocker is in the public domain, its implementation in BitLocker, as well as other components of the software, are proprietary; however, the code is available for scrutiny by Microsoft partners and enterprises, subject to a non-disclosure agreement.[46][47]

According to Microsoft sources,[48] BitLocker does not contain an intentionally built-in backdoor, i.e., there is no way for law enforcement to have a guaranteed passage to the data on the user's drives that is provided by Microsoft. In 2006, the UK Home Office expressed concern over the lack of a backdoor and tried entering into talks with Microsoft to get one introduced.[49] Microsoft developer and cryptographer Niels Ferguson denied the backdoor request and said, "over my dead body."[50] Microsoft engineers have said that FBI agents also put pressure on them in numerous meetings in order to add a backdoor, although no formal, written request was ever made; Microsoft engineers eventually suggested to the FBI that agents should look for the hard copy of the key that the BitLocker program suggests its users to make.[51]

Niels Ferguson's position that "back doors are simply not acceptable"[50] is in accordance with Kerckhoffs's principle. Stated by Netherlands born cryptographer Auguste Kerckhoffs in the 19th century, the principle holds that a cryptosystem should be secure, even if everything about the system, except the key, is public knowledge.

Starting with Windows 8 and Windows Server 2012, Microsoft removed the Elephant Diffuser from the BitLocker scheme for no declared reason.[52] Dan Rosendorf's research shows that removing the Elephant Diffuser had an "undeniably negative impact" on the security of BitLocker encryption against a targeted attack.[53] Microsoft later cited performance concerns, and noncompliance with the Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS), to justify the diffuser's removal.[54] Starting with Windows 10 version 1511, however, Microsoft added a new FIPS-compliant XTS-AES encryption algorithm to BitLocker.[1] Starting with Windows 10 version 1803, Microsoft added a new feature called "Kernel DMA Protection" to BitLocker, against DMA attacks via Thunderbolt 3 ports.[55][56]

In October 2017, it was reported that a flaw (ROCA vulnerability) in a code library developed by Infineon, which had been in widespread use in security products such as smartcards and TPMs, enabled private keys to be inferred from public keys. This could allow an attacker to bypass BitLocker encryption when an affected TPM chip is used.[57] Microsoft released an updated version of the firmware for Infineon TPM chips that fixes the flaw via Windows Update.[58]