Collective Security Treaty Organization

The CSTO holds yearly military command exercises for the CSTO nations to have an opportunity to improve inter-organization cooperation. A CSTO military exercise called "Rubezh 2008" was hosted in Armenia, where a combined total of 4,000 troops from all seven constituent CSTO member countries conducted operative, strategic and tactical training with an emphasis towards furthering efficiency of the collective security element of the CSTO partnership.[5]

The largest of such exercises was held in Southern Russia and central Asia in 2011, consisting of more than 10,000 troops and 70 combat aircraft.[6] In order to deploy military bases of a third country in the territory of the CSTO member-states, it is necessary to obtain the official consent of all its members.[7] It also employs a "rotating presidency" system in which the country leading the CSTO alternates every year.[8]

Scenarios of the exercises are grouped around:[9]

• "Cooperation" command-post exercises of the collective forces of operative reaction,
• "Search" special maneuvers with the participation of intelligence forces,
• "Echelon" material and technical supply drills
• "Frontier"
• "Endurable Brotherhood"

Similar to NATO, the CSTO maintains a Parliamentary Assembly.[10]

On 6 October 2007, CSTO members agreed to a major expansion of the organization that would create a CSTO peacekeeping force that could deploy under a U.N. mandate or without one in its member states. The expansion would also allow all members to purchase Russian weapons at the same price as Russia.[11]

In January 2022, the CSTO deployed 2,000 of its peacekeepers to Kazakhstan.[12]

On 4 February 2009, an agreement to create the Collective Rapid Reaction Force (KSOR) (Russian: Коллекти́вные си́лы операти́вного реаги́рования (КСОР)) was reached by five of the seven members, with plans finalized on 14 June. The force is intended to be used to repulse military aggression, conduct anti-terrorist operations, fight transnational crime and drug trafficking, and neutralize the effects of natural disasters.[13][14]

Belarus and Uzbekistan initially refrained from signing on to the agreement. Belarus did so because of a trade dispute with Russia, and Uzbekistan due to general concerns. Belarus signed the agreement the following October, while Uzbekistan has never done so. A source in the Russian delegation said Uzbekistan would not participate in the collective force on a permanent basis but would "delegate" its detachments to take part in operations on an ad hoc basis.[13][14]

On 3 August 2009, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Uzbekistan criticized plans by Russia to establish a military base in southern Kyrgyzstan for the CSTO rapid reaction force, stating,

The implementation of such projects on complex and unpredictable territory, where the borders of three Central Asian republics directly converge, may give impetus to the strengthening of militarization processes and initiate all kinds of nationalistic confrontations. […] Also, it could lead to the appearance of radical extremist forces that could lead to serious destabilization in this vast region.[15]

An Euler diagram showing the relationships among various supranational organisations in the territory of the former Soviet Unionv • d • e

On 15 May 1992, six post-Soviet states belonging to the Commonwealth of Independent States — Russia, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan—signed the Collective Security Treaty (also referred to as the Tashkent Pact or Tashkent Treaty).[16] Three other post-Soviet states—Azerbaijan, Belarus, and Georgia—signed in 1993 and the treaty took effect in 1994. The CST was set to last for a 5-year period unless extended. On 2 April 1999, six of the nine—all but Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Uzbekistan—agreed to renew the treaty for five more years. At the same time, Uzbekistan joined the GUAM group, established in 1997 by Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova, and largely seen as intending to counter Russian influence in the region.[17] In 2002, the 6 member states agreed to create the Collective Security Treaty Organization as a military alliance.[18]

During 2005, the CSTO partners conducted some common military exercises.

Uzbekistan later withdrew from GUAM in 2005 and joined the CSTO in 2006 as a full member and its membership was later ratified by the Uzbek parliament on 28 March 2008.[19]

In June 2007, Kyrgyzstan assumed the rotating CSTO presidency.

In October 2007, the CSTO signed an agreement with the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), in the Tajik capital of Dushanbe, to broaden cooperation on issues such as security, crime, and drug trafficking.[20]

On 6 October 2007, CSTO members agreed to a major expansion of the organization that would create a CSTO peacekeeping force that could deploy under a U.N. mandate or without one in its member states. The expansion would also allow all members to purchase Russian weapons at the same price as Russia.[21]

On 29 August 2008, Russia announced it would seek CSTO recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Three days earlier, on 26 August, Russia recognized the independence of Georgia's breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.[22]

On 5 September 2008, Armenia assumed the rotating CSTO presidency during a CSTO meeting in Moscow, Russia.[23]

In 2009, Belarus boycotted the CSTO summit due to their Milk War with Russia.[24] After refusing to attend a CSTO summit in 2009, Lukashenko said: "Why should my men fight in Kazakhstan? Mothers would ask me why I sent their sons to fight so far from Belarus. For what? For a unified energy market? That is not what lives depend on. No!"[25]

After Kurmanbek Bakiyev was ousted from office as President of Kyrgyzstan as a result of riots in Kyrgyzstan in April 2010, he was granted asylum in Belarus. Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko expressed doubt about the future of the CSTO for failing to prevent Bakiyev's overthrow, stating: "What sort of organization is this one, if there is bloodshed in one of our member states and an anticonstitutional coup d'état takes place, and this body keeps silent?"[26]

Lukashenko had previously accused Russia of punishing Belarus with economic sanctions after Lukashenko's refusal to recognize the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, stating: "The economy serves as the basis for our common security. But if Belarus's closest CSTO ally is trying ... to destroy this basis and de facto put the Belarusians on their knees, how can one talk about consolidating collective security in the CSTO space?"[27]

During a trip to Ukraine to extend Russia's lease of the Crimean port Sevastopol in return for discounted natural gas supplies, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev was asked about whether Belarus could expect a similar deal and responded: "Real partnership is one thing and a declaration of intentions is another; reaching agreement on working seriously, meeting each other halfway, helping each other is one thing and making decisions about granting permanent residence to people who have lost their job is another." The Belarusian President defended himself against this criticism by citing former Russian President Vladimir Putin's invitation of Askar Akayev to Russia after he was ousted as President of Kyrgyzstan during the 2005 Tulip Revolution.[28]

The following month, President Medvedev ordered the CEO of Russia's natural gas monopoly Gazprom to cut gas supplies to Belarus in a dispute over outstanding debts.[29] Subsequently, the Russian television channel NTV, run by Gazprom, aired a documentary film which compared Lukashenko to Bakiyev.[30] Then the Russian President's foreign policy adviser Sergei Prikhodko threatened to publish the transcript of a CSTO meeting where Lukashenko said that his administration would recognize Abkhazian and South Ossetian independence.[31]

In June 2010, ethnic clashes broke out between ethnic Kyrgyz and Uzbeks in southern Kyrgyzstan, leading interim Kyrgyz President Roza Otunbayeva to request the assistance of Russian troops to quell the disturbances. Kurmanbek Bakiyev denied charges that his supporters were behind the ethnic conflict and called on the CSTO to intervene.[32] Askar Akayev also called for the CSTO to send troops, saying: "Our priority task right now should be to extinguish this flame of enmity. It is very likely that we will need CSTO peacekeepers to do that." The organisation was considered by some a "paper tiger" since it failed to intervene.[33]

Russian President Dmitry Medvedev said that "only in the case of a foreign intrusion and an attempt to externally seize power can we state that there is an attack against the CSTO", and that, "all the problems of Kyrgyzstan have internal roots", while CSTO Secretary General Nikolai Bordyuzha called the violence "purely a domestic affair".[34] Later, however, Bordyuzha admitted that the CSTO response may have been inadequate and claimed that "foreign mercenaries" provoked the Kyrgyz violence against ethnic Uzbek minorities.[35]

On 21 July 2010, interim Kyrgyz President Roza Otunbayeva called for the introduction of CSTO police units to southern Kyrgyzstan saying: "I think it's important to introduce CSTO police forces there, since we're unable to guarantee people's rights on our own." She also added: "I'm not seeking the CSTO's embrace and I don't feel like bringing them here to stay but the bloodletting there will continue otherwise."[36] Only weeks later the deputy chairman of Otubayeva's interim Kyrgyz government complained that their appeals for help from the CSTO had been ignored.[37] The CSTO was unable to agree on providing military assistance to Kyrgyzstan at a meeting in Yerevan, Armenia, which was attended by Roza Otunbayeva as well as Alexander Lukashenko.[38]

The CSTO meeting in Nur-Sultan, Kazakhstan, 8 November 2018

On 10 December 2010, the member states approved a declaration establishing a CSTO peacekeeping force and a declaration of the CSTO member states, in addition to signing a package of joint documents.[39]

Since 21 December 2011, the Treaty parties can veto the establishment of new foreign military bases in the member states of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). Additionally, Kazakhstan took over the rotating presidency of the CSTO from Belarus.[7]

On 28 June 2012, Uzbekistan suspended its membership in the CSTO.[40]

In August 2014, 3,000 soldiers from the members of Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan participated in psychological and cyber warfare exercises in Kazakhstan under war games managed by CSTO.[41]

On 19 March 2015, the CSTO Secretary General Nikolai Bordyuzha offered to send a peacekeeping mission to Donbas, Ukraine. "The CSTO has a peacekeeping capacity. Our peacekeepers continuously undergo corresponding training. If such a decision is taken by the United Nations, we stand ready to provide peacekeeping units".[42]

In July 2021, CSTO Secretary-General Stanislav Zas was criticised by Armenian politicians for calling an incursion by Azerbaijani forces onto Armenian territory a "border incident", where the CSTO remained inactive during the conflict.[43]

CSTO Summit 2022

In July 2021, Tajikistan appealed to members of CSTO for help in dealing with security challenges emerging from neighboring Afghanistan.[44] Thousands of Afghans, including police and government troops, fled to Tajikistan after Taliban insurgents took control of many parts of Afghanistan.[45]

On 5 January 2022, CSTO peacekeepers were announced to be deployed to Kazakhstan in response to anti-government unrest in the country.[46] On 11 January the same year, CSTO forces began their withdrawal from Kazakhstan.[47]

After the start of renewed fighting between Armenia and former member Azerbaijan on 13 September 2022, Armenia triggered Article 4 of the treaty and a CSTO mission, including CSTO Secretary General Stanislav Zas and Anatoly Sidorov was sent to monitor the situation along the border. [48][49]

After the CSTO mission took a rather uncommitted position in the conflict, criticism towards CSTO membership inside Armenian political circles increased, with the secretary of the Armenian Security Council Armen Grigoryan even stating that he saw no more hope for the CSTO.[50] This coincided with a visit from US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi to Yerevan on 17 September 2022, largely seen as an effort to reorient the security alliance structure of Armenia.[51]

Member states of the Collective Security Treaty Organization:

Country	Membership	Year of entry
Armenia	full member	1994
Belarus	full member	1994
Kazakhstan	full member	1994
Kyrgyzstan	full member	1994
Russia	full member	1994
Tajikistan	full member	1994

In May 2007, the CSTO secretary-general Nikolai Bordyuzha suggested Iran could join the CSTO saying, "The CSTO is an open organization. If Iran applies in accordance with our charter, we will consider the application".[55] If Iran joined it would be the first state outside the former Soviet Union to become a member of the organization.

The National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia and the Wolesi Jirga (lower house) of the National Assembly of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan were accorded observer status in the CSTO Parliamentary Assembly in 2013, though the Islamic Republic collapsed in 2021 as the Taliban took over.[56] Also, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Union of Belarus and Russia has observer status in the CSTO Parliamentary Assembly.[57]

In 2021, Uzbekistan, after becoming observer to EAEU on 11 December 2020,[58] conducted a bilateral military exercise with Russia and trilateral military exercise with Russia and Tajikistan, while its president joined a CSTO meeting as a guest, sparking rumours about potential reentry into CSTO.[59]

The member states adopted measures to counter cyber security threats and information technology crimes in a Foreign Ministers Council meeting in Minsk, Belarus.[61] Foreign Minister Abdrakhmanov put forward a proposal to establishing a Cyber Shield system.[61]

• International Institute for Strategic Studies (14 February 2018). The Military Balance 2018. London: Routledge. ISBN 9781857439557.
• Rozanov, Anatoliy A.; Douha, Alena F. (2013). "Collective Security Treaty Organisation 2002 – 2012" (PDF). Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces.
• Douhan, A.F.; Rusakovich, А.V. (2016). "COLLECTIVE SECURITY TREATY ORGANIZATION AND CONTINGENCY PLANNING AFTER 2014" (PDF). Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces.
• Weitz, Richard (October 2018). "ASSESSING THE COLLECTIVE SECURITY TREATY ORGANIZATION: CAPABILITIES AND VULNERABILITIES" (PDF). United States Army War College Press.