HMS Agincourt (1913)

Right elevation and plan view of Agincourt

Fantasy drawing of Sultan Osman I underway for the Ottoman Navy. The royal yacht Ertuğrul is at left, and the cruiser Hamadieh is in the background.

In the unstable period during and following the 1889 coup in Brazil, which deposed Emperor Dom Pedro II, and the 1893–94 navy revolt, the Brazilian Navy found itself unable to care for its own ships, let alone acquire new vessels.[3] Meanwhile, Chile had agreed to a naval-limiting pact in 1902 with Brazil's principal rival, Argentina, as part of solving a larger boundary dispute, but they both retained the vessels built in the interim, many of which were significantly more modern and powerful than Brazil's ships.[4][upper-alpha 1] The Brazilian Navy was left behind its Argentine and Chilean counterparts in quantity as well—by the turn of the 20th century, Chile's total naval tonnage was 36,896 long tons (37,488 t), Argentina's 34,425 long tons (34,977 t), and Brazil's 27,661 long tons (28,105 t)—even though Brazil had nearly three times the population of Argentina and almost five times that of Chile.[6][7]

Rising international demand for coffee and rubber in the early 20th century brought Brazil an influx of revenue.[5] Simultaneously, the Baron of Rio Branco spearheaded a drive by prominent Brazilians to force the leading world nations to recognize Brazil as an international power.[8] The National Congress of Brazil inaugurated a large naval acquisition program in late 1904. They ordered three small battleships in 1906, but the launch of Dreadnought caused the Brazilian Navy to reconsider their purchase. In March 1907, they signed a contract for three Minas Geraes-class battleships. Two ships would be constructed immediately by the British companies Armstrong Whitworth and Vickers, with the third to follow.[9]

Alarmed at the Brazilian move, Argentina and Chile quickly nullified their 1902 pact and sought dreadnoughts of their own.[6] Argentina's orders, after a drawn-out bidding process, went to an American company, Fore River Shipbuilding Company, while Chile's orders, delayed by the 1906 Valparaíso earthquake, went to Armstrong.[10] Since Brazil's relations with Argentina were warming and the country's economic boom was losing steam, the government negotiated with Armstrong to remove the third dreadnought from the contract, but without success. They borrowed the necessary money, and Armstrong laid down Rio de Janeiro's keel in March 1910.[11]

The Brazilian Navy had divided into two distinct factions, based on the size of the main battery. The outgoing naval minister favoured an increase over the 12-inch guns mounted on board the Minas Geraes class, while his incoming counterpart, Admiral Marques Leão, favoured keeping the smaller but faster-firing gun. While the exact influences upon the Brazilian government are unclear, Leão was advocating strongly for his position in meetings with President Hermes da Fonseca. Other events probably influenced them as well, such as the November 1910 Revolt of the Lash, payments on loans taken out for the dreadnoughts, and a worsening economy that had led to high government debt compounded by budget deficits.[12][upper-alpha 2] By May 1911, Fonseca had made up his mind:

When I assumed office, I found that my predecessor had signed a contract for the building of the battleship Rio de Janeiro, a vessel of 32,000 tons, with an armament of 14 in. guns. Considerations of every kind pointed to the inconvenience of acquiring such a vessel and to the revision of the contract in the sense of reducing the tonnage. This was done, and we shall possess a powerful unit which will not be built on exaggerated lines such as have not as yet stood the time of experience.[14]

A contract to build the ship that would become Agincourt was signed on 3 June 1911, and its keel was laid on 14 September 1911. The design called for fourteen 12-inch guns, an extreme number that historian David Topliss attributed to political necessity: the ship had to appear more powerful to the Brazilian populace than her predecessors (with twelve 12-inch guns) but, without increasing the gun size, the only option left was increasing the total number of guns.[15]

Agincourt depicted on a postcard, prior to the British modifications

Rio de Janeiro, as Agincourt was named by her first owners, was laid down on 14 September 1911 by Armstrongs in Newcastle upon Tyne and launched on 22 January 1913.[2] After the keel-laying, the Brazilian government found itself in an unenviable position: a European depression after the end of the Second Balkan War in August 1913 reduced Brazil's ability to obtain foreign loans, while at the same time Brazil's coffee and rubber exports collapsed, the latter due to the loss of the Brazilian rubber monopoly to British plantations in the Far East.[31][upper-alpha 3] In addition, reports on new dreadnought construction coming in from overseas indicated that the vessel would be outclassed upon completion.[32] These factors caused Brazil to put the ship up for sale in October 1913, and she was sold to the Ottoman Navy for £2,750,000 on 28 December 1913.[33] Renamed Sultân Osmân-ı Evvel, she underwent trials in July 1914 and was completed in August, just as the First World War began.[34]

The war broke out during her sea trials before delivery. Even though the Ottoman crew had arrived to collect her, the British Government took over the vessel for incorporation into the Royal Navy. The Turkish captain, waiting with five hundred Turkish sailors aboard a transport in the River Tyne, threatened to board his ship and hoist the Turkish flag; First Lord of the Admiralty Winston Churchill gave orders to resist such an attempt "by armed force if necessary."[35] At the same time, the British also took over a second Ottoman battleship, a King George V class-derived vessel being built by Vickers—Reşadiye—which was renamed HMS Erin. Such an action was allowed in the contract only if Britain was at war at the time, but since Britain was not yet at war, these actions were illegal; the British government nevertheless determined to present the Ottomans with a fait accompli. On 3 August, the British ambassador to the Ottoman Empire informed the government that Britain had seized the ships.[36] Churchill did not want to risk the ships being used against the British, but it had consequences.[37]

The takeover caused considerable ill will in the Ottoman Empire, where public subscriptions had partially funded the ships. When the Ottoman government had been in a financial deadlock over the budget of the battleships, donations for the Ottoman Navy had come in from taverns, cafés, schools and markets, and large donations were rewarded with a "Navy Donation Medal". The seizure, and the gifts of the German battlecruiser Goeben and the cruiser Breslau to the Ottomans, influenced public opinion in the Empire to turn away from Britain, and they entered the war on the side of Germany and the Austro-Hungarian Empire against the Triple Entente of Britain, France, and Russia on 29 October, after Goeben had attacked Russian facilities in the Black Sea.[38]

The Royal Navy made modifications to Agincourt before commissioning her: in particular, it removed the flying bridge over the two centre turrets. The ship was also initially fitted with Turkish-style lavatories that had to be replaced.[39] Her name, "Agincourt", was a favourite of Churchill's, and had initially been allocated to a sixth vessel of the Queen Elizabeth class ordered under the 1914–15 Naval Estimates, but not yet begun at the war's outbreak.[40] Her nickname, The Gin Palace, came from her luxurious fittings and a corruption of her name ("A Gin Court"), pink gin being a popular drink among Royal Navy officers at the time.[41]

The Admiralty was unprepared to man a ship of Agincourt's size on such short notice and her crew was drawn "from the highest and lowest echelons of the service: the Royal yachts, and the detention barracks." Agincourt's captain and executive officer came from HMY Victoria and Albert, most of whose crew was also transferred to Agincourt on 3 August 1914. Most of the naval reservists had already been called up by this time and sent to other ships, so a number of minor criminals who had had their sentences remitted were received from various naval prisons and detention camps.[42]

Agincourt was working up until 7 September 1914, when she joined the 4th Battle Squadron (BS) of the Grand Fleet.[43] The fleet anchorage at Scapa Flow was not yet secure against submarine attack and much of the fleet was kept at sea, where Agincourt spent forty of her first eighty days with the Grand Fleet. This was the beginning of "a year and a half of inaction, only broken by occasional North Sea 'sweeps' intended to draw the enemy from his bases."[44]

4th Battle Squadron in the North Sea in 1915. Agincourt is the second ship from the front.

On 1 January 1915, Agincourt was still assigned to the 4th BS, but had been assigned to the 1st Battle Squadron before the Battle of Jutland on 31 May 1916. She was the last ship of the Sixth Division of the 1st BS, along with Hercules, Revenge and the flagship, Marlborough, the most heterogeneous group possible as each ship was from a different class. The Sixth Division was the starboardmost column of the Grand Fleet as it headed south to rendezvous with the ships of Admiral Beatty's Battle Cruiser Fleet, then engaged with their opposite numbers from the German High Seas Fleet in the North Sea.[45] Admiral Jellicoe, commander of the Grand Fleet, kept it in cruising formation until 18:15,[upper-alpha 4] when he ordered it to deploy from column into a single line based on the port division, each ship turning 90° in succession. This turn made the Sixth Division the closest ships in the Grand Fleet to the battleships of the High Seas Fleet, and they fired on each ship as they made their turn to port. This concentration of fire later became known as "Windy Corner" to the British, as the ships were drenched by German shell splashes although none were hit.[46]

Agincourt in 1918

At 18:24, Agincourt opened fire on a German battlecruiser with her main guns. Shortly afterwards her six-inch guns followed suit as German destroyers made torpedo attacks on the British battleships to cover the turn to the south of the High Seas Fleet.[47] Agincourt successfully evaded two torpedoes, although another struck Marlborough.[48] Visibility cleared around 19:15, and she engaged a Kaiser-class battleship without result before it was lost in the smoke and haze.[49] Around 20:00, Marlborough was forced to reduce speed because of the strain on her bulkheads from her torpedo damage and her division mates conformed to her speed.[50] In the reduced visibility the division lost sight of the Grand Fleet during the night, passing the badly damaged battlecruiser SMS Seydlitz without opening fire.[51] Dawn found them with only the detritus from the previous day's battle in sight and the division arrived back at Scapa Flow on 2 June.[52] Agincourt fired 144 twelve-inch shells and 111 six-inch shells during the battle, although she is not known to have hit anything.[43]

Both of the seized Ottoman ships in 1918: Agincourt (foreground) with Erin

Although the Grand Fleet made several sorties over the next few years it is not known if Agincourt participated in them. On 23 April 1918, Agincourt and Hercules were stationed at Scapa Flow to provide cover for the Scandinavian convoys between Norway and Britain when the High Seas Fleet sortied in an attempt to destroy the convoy. The reports from German Intelligence were slightly off schedule, as both the inbound and outbound convoys were in port when the Germans reached their normal route, so Admiral Scheer ordered the fleet to return to Germany without spotting any British ships.[53]

Agincourt was later transferred to the 2nd Battle Squadron[43] and was present at the surrender of the High Seas Fleet on 21 November 1918.[54] She was placed in reserve at Rosyth in March 1919. After unsuccessful attempts to sell her to the Brazilian Government, she was listed for disposal in April 1921, but was used for experimental purposes later that year.[25] The Royal Navy then planned to convert her in to a mobile naval base and she was recommissioned on 21 November[55] in preparation for the conversion, which would have included the removal of five of her seven turrets with their barbettes converted into storage and workshops; Nos. 2 and 5 turrets would have been retained.[56] The conversion was cancelled on 23 February 1922 after the Washington Naval Treaty was signed that limited the battleship tonnage allowed to the RN and she was paid off on 7 April and listed again for disposal.[55]

The ship was sold on 22 January 1923 to J&W Purves for £25,000 with the proviso that she had to be demolished 18 months after the treaty had been ratified. Her contract was immediately transferred to the Rosyth Shipbreaking Co. which had leased facilities at Rosyth Dockyard for that purpose. As the deadline of 17 January 1925 approached, the ship did not yet meet the treaty standards for scrapping. The Admiralty agreed that cutting the hull in half would be acceptable and the company attempted to move the ship through the dockyard locks on the highest Spring Tide to its beaching ground to complete the demolition. Bad weather thwarted that effort and the Admiralty agreed to allow the use of one of Rosyth's dry docks to meet the deadline. Two days later the hull had been severed and both halves had been floated out so they could be beached.[57]

• Burt, R. A. (1986). British Battleships of World War One. Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press. ISBN 0-87021-863-8.
• Dodson, Aidan (2021). "Warship Notes: The Mobile Naval Base". In Jordan, John (ed.). Warship 2021. Oxford, UK: Osprey Publishing. p. 196. ISBN 978-1-4728-4779-9.
• Dodson, Aidan (2022). "Warship Gallery: The Scrapping of HMS Agincourt, New Zealand, and Princess Royal at Rosyth, 1923–1925". In Jordan, John (ed.). Warship 2022. Oxford: Osprey Publishing. pp. 219–224. ISBN 978-1-4728-4781-2.
• Friedman, Norman (2008). Naval Firepower: Battleship Guns and Gunnery in the Dreadnought Era. Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press. ISBN 978-1-59114-555-4.
• Fromkin, David (1989). A Peace to End All Peace: The Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the Creation of the Modern Middle East. New York: H. Holt. ISBN 978-0-8050-0857-9.
• Gibbons, Tony (1983). The Complete Encyclopedia of Battleships: A Technical Directory of Capital Ships from 1860 to the Present Day. New York: Crescent Books. ISBN 0-517-37810-8.
• Grant, Jonathan (2007). Rulers, Guns, and Money: The Global Arms Trade in the Age of Imperialism. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. ISBN 978-0-674-02442-7. OCLC 166262725.
• Harner, Robert (2006). "Question 18/02: British Naval Base at Addu Atoll". Warship International. XLIII (2): 152. ISSN 0043-0374.
• Hough, Richard (1967). The Great Dreadnought: The Strange Story of H.M.S. Agincourt: The Mightiest Battleship of World War I. New York: Harper & Row. OCLC 914101.
• Livermore, Seward (1944). "Battleship Diplomacy in South America: 1905–1925". Journal of Modern History. 16 (1): 31–48. doi:10.1086/236787. ISSN 0022-2801. JSTOR 1870986. OCLC 62219150. S2CID 145007468.
• Martin, Percy Allen (1967) [1925]. Latin America and the War. Gloucester, Massachusetts: Peter Smith. OCLC 468553769.
• Massie, Robert (2004). Castles of Steel: Britain, Germany and the Winning of the Great War. New York: Random House. ISBN 0-224-04092-8.
• Murfin, David (2020). "Warship Notes: The Mobile Naval Base". In Jordan, John (ed.). Warship 2020. Oxford, UK: Osprey. pp. 188–192. ISBN 978-1-4728-4071-4.
• Newbolt, Henry (1997). Naval Operations. History of the Great War: Based on Official Documents. Vol. V (reprint of the 1931 ed.). London: Imperial War Museum and Battery Press. ISBN 1-870423-72-0.
• Parkes, Oscar (1990) [1966]. British Battleships, Warrior 1860 to Vanguard 1950: A History of Design, Construction, and Armament (New & rev. ed.). Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press. ISBN 1-55750-075-4.
• Preston, Antony (1985). "Great Britain and Empire Forces". In Gardiner, Robert & Gray, Randal (eds.). Conway's All the World's Fighting Ships 1906–1921. Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press. pp. 1–104. ISBN 0-85177-245-5.
• Scheina, Robert (1987). Latin America: A Naval History, 1810–1987. Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press. ISBN 0-87021-295-8.
• Tarrant, V. E. (1999) [1995]. Jutland: The German Perspective: A New View of the Great Battle, 31 May 1916. London: Brockhampton Press. ISBN 1-86019-917-8.
• Topliss, David (1988). "The Brazilian Dreadnoughts, 1904–1914". Warship International. XXV (3): 240–289. ISSN 0043-0374.
• Vanterpool, Alan (1969). "The Riachuelo". Warship International. VI (2): 140–141. ISSN 0043-0374.

Wikimedia Commons has media related to HMS Agincourt (ship, 1913).

• Dreadnought Project – Technical material on the weaponry and fire control for the ship
• Maritimequest HMS Agincourt Photo Gallery
• Agincourt Class Battleship – includes a diagram of her layout
• Navypedia – Agincourt battleship
• Battle of Jutland Crew Lists Project – HMS Agincourt Crew List