Jiang Zemin

Jiang Zemin was born in the city of Yangzhou, Jiangsu, China on 17 August 1926.[1] His ancestral home was the Jiang Village (江村) in Jingde County, Anhui. This was also the hometown of a number of prominent figures in Chinese academic and intellectual establishments. Jiang grew up during the years of Japanese occupation. His uncle, also his foster father, Jiang Shangqing, died fighting the Japanese in World War II and is considered in Jiang Zemin's time to be a national hero. Since Shangqing had no heirs, Shangqing's elder brother, Jiang's biological father Jiang Shijun, let Jiang become the adopted son of Shangqing's wife, his aunt, Wang Zhelan, whom he referred to as "Niáng" (Chinese: 娘; lit. 'Mom').

Graduation photo of Jiang, taken in 1947.

Jiang attended the Department of Electrical Engineering at the National Central University in Japanese-occupied Nanjing before transferring to National Chiao Tung University (now Shanghai Jiao Tong University). He graduated there in 1947 with a bachelor's degree in electrical engineering.

Jiang joined the Chinese Communist Party when he was in college.[2] After the establishment of the People's Republic of China, Jiang received his training at the Stalin Automobile Works in Moscow in the 1950s. He also worked for Changchun's First Automobile Works. He was eventually transferred to government services, where he began to rise in prominence and rank, eventually becoming a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, Minister of Electronic Industries in 1983.

In 1985, Jiang became Mayor of Shanghai, and subsequently the Communist Party Committee secretary of Shanghai. Jiang received mixed reviews as mayor. Many of his critics dismissed him as a "flower pot", a Chinese term for someone who only seems useful, but actually gets nothing done.[3] Many credited Shanghai's growth during the period to Zhu Rongji.[4] Jiang was an ardent believer, during this period, in Deng Xiaoping's economic reforms. In an attempt to curb student discontent in 1986, Jiang recited the Gettysburg Address in English in front of a group of student protesters.[5][6]

Jiang in 1962

Jiang had a passable command of several foreign languages,[7] including English and Russian. He enjoyed engaging foreign visitors in small talk on arts and literature in their native language, in addition to singing foreign songs in the original. Jiang remains the only paramount leader of China known to be able to speak in English.[7]

Jiang was elevated to national politics in 1987, automatically becoming a member of the Politburo of the CCP Central Committee because it is customarily dictated that the Party secretary of Shanghai would also have a seat in the Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party. In 1989, China was in crisis over the Tiananmen Square protest, and the central government was in conflict on how to handle the protesters. In June, Deng Xiaoping dismissed liberal Zhao Ziyang, who was considered to be too conciliatory toward the student protestors. At the time, Jiang was the Shanghai Party secretary, the top figure in China's new economic center. In an incident with the World Economic Herald, Jiang closed down the newspaper, deeming it to be harmful. The handling of the crisis in Shanghai was noticed by Beijing, and then by paramount leader Deng Xiaoping. As the protests escalated and then CCP general secretary Zhao Ziyang was removed from office, Jiang was selected by the Party leaders as a compromise candidate over Tianjin's Li Ruihuan, premier Li Peng, elders Li Xiannian, Chen Yun, and the retired elders to become the new general secretary. Before that, he had been considered to be an unlikely candidate.[8] Within three years, Deng had transferred most power in the state, party and military to Jiang.

Jiang was elevated to the country's top job in 1989 with a fairly small power base inside the party, and thus, very little actual power.[2] His most reliable allies were the powerful party elders – Chen Yun and Li Xiannian. He was believed to be simply a transitional figure until a more stable successor government to Deng could be put in place. Other prominent Party and military figures like President Yang Shangkun and his brother Yang Baibing were believed to be planning a coup. Jiang used Deng Xiaoping as a back-up to his leadership in the first few years. Jiang, who was believed[9] to have a neo-conservative slant, warned against "bourgeois liberalization". Deng's belief, however, stipulated that the only solution to keeping the legitimacy of Communist rule over China was to continue the drive for modernization and economic reform, and therefore placed himself at odds with Jiang.

At the first meeting of the new CCP Politburo Standing Committee, after the Tiananmen Square massacre of 1989, Jiang criticized the previous period as "hard on the economy, soft on politics" and advocated increasing political thought work.[10] Anne-Marie Brady wrote that "Jiang Zemin was a long time political cadre with a nose for ideological work and its importance. This meeting marked the beginning of a new era in propaganda and political thought work in China." Soon after, the Central Propaganda Department was given more resources and power, "including the power to go in to the propaganda-related work units and cleanse the ranks of those who had been supportive of the democracy movement."[10]

Deng grew critical of Jiang's leadership in 1992. During Deng's southern tours, he subtly suggested that the pace of reform was not fast enough, and the "central leadership" (i.e. Jiang) had most responsibility. Jiang grew ever more cautious, and rallied behind Deng's reforms completely. In 1993, Jiang coined the new "socialist market economy" to move China's centrally-planned socialist economy into essentially a government-regulated capitalist market economy. It was a huge step to take in the realization of Deng's "Socialism with Chinese characteristics". At the same time, Jiang elevated many of his supporters from Shanghai to high government positions, after regaining Deng's confidence. He abolished the outdated Central Advisory Committee in 1992, an advisory body composed of revolutionary party elders. He became general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party and chairman of the Central Military Commission in 1989, followed by his election to the presidency in March 1993.

In the early 1990s, post-Tiananmen economic reforms had stabilized and the country was on a consistent growth trajectory. At the same time, China faced myriad economic and social problems. At Deng's state funeral in 1997, Jiang delivered the elder statesman's eulogy. Jiang had inherited a China rampant with political corruption, and regional economies growing too rapidly for the stability of the entire country. Deng's policy that "some areas can get rich before others" led to an opening wealth gap between coastal regions and the interior provinces. The unprecedented economic growth and the deregulation in a number of heavy industries led to the closing of many state-owned enterprises (SOEs), breaking the iron rice bowl.[11]

As a result, unemployment rates skyrocketed, rising as high as 40% in some urban areas. Stock markets fluctuated greatly. The scale of rural migration into urban areas was unprecedented anywhere, and little was being done to address an ever-increasing urban-rural wealth gap. Official reports put the figure on the percentage of China's GDP being moved and abused by corrupt officials at 10%.[12] A chaotic environment of illegal bonds issued from civil and military officials resulted in much of the corrupted wealth ending up in foreign countries. The re-emergence of organized crime and a surge in crime rates began to plague cities. A careless stance on the destruction of the environment furthered concerns voiced by intellectuals.

Jiang's biggest aim in the economy was stability, and he believed that a stable government with highly centralised power would be a prerequisite, choosing to postpone political reform, which in many facets of governance exacerbated the ongoing problems.[13] Jiang continued pouring funds to develop the Special Economic Zones and coastal regions. Beginning in 1996, Jiang began a series of reforms in the state-controlled media aimed at promoting the "core of leadership" under himself, and at the same time crushing some of his political opponents. The personality enhancements in the media were largely frowned upon during the Deng era, and had not been seen since the Mao era in the late 1970s.

The People's Daily and CCTV-1's 7 pm Xinwen Lianbo each had Jiang-related events as the front-page or top stories, a fact that remained until Hu Jintao's media administrative changes in 2006. Jiang appeared casual in front of Western media, and gave an unprecedented interview with Mike Wallace of CBS in 2000 at Beidaihe. He would often use foreign languages in front of the camera, albeit not always fluently. In an encounter with a Hong Kong reporter in 2000 regarding the central government's apparent "imperial order" of supporting Tung Chee-hwa to seek a second term as Chief Executive of Hong Kong, Jiang scolded the Hong Kong journalists as "too simple, sometimes naive" in English.[14][15] The event was shown on Hong Kong television that night.

Foreign policy

Jiang Zemin with U.S. President Bill Clinton in 1999.

Jiang went on a state visit to the United States in 1997, drawing various crowds in protest from the Tibet Independence Movement to supporters of the Chinese democracy movement. He made a speech at Harvard University, part of it in English, but could not escape questions on democracy and freedom. In the official summit meeting with president Bill Clinton, the tone was relaxed as they sought common ground while largely ignoring areas of disagreement. Clinton would visit China in June 1998, and vowed that China and the United States were partners in the world, and not adversaries. When American-led NATO bombed the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade in 1999, Jiang seemed to have put up a harsh stance for show at home, but in reality only performed symbolic gestures of protest, and no solid action.[13] Jiang's foreign policy was for the most part passive and non-confrontational. A personal friend of former Canadian prime minister Jean Chrétien,[21] Jiang strengthened China's economic stature abroad, attempting to establish cordial relations with countries whose trade is largely confined to the American economic sphere. Despite this, there were at least three serious flare-ups between China and the US during Jiang's tenure: the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1996, the NATO bombing of Serbia, and the Hainan Island incident in April 2001.

Jiang Zemin with his wife and George W. Bush with his wife in Crawford, Texas, 25 October 2002.

In November 2002, Jiang stepped down from the powerful Politburo Standing Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and as general secretary at the age of 76 to make way for a "fourth generation" of leadership headed by Hu Jintao, beginning a transition of power that would last several years. Hu assumed Jiang's title as party head, becoming the new general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party. At the 16th Party Congress held in the autumn of 2002, observers noted at the time that six out of the nine new members of Standing Committee were considered part of Jiang's so-called "Shanghai Clique", the most prominent being vice president Zeng Qinghong, who had served as Jiang's chief of staff for many years, and vice premier Huang Ju, a former party secretary of Shanghai.

Although Jiang retained the chairmanship of the powerful Central Military Commission, most members of the commission were professional military men. Liberation Army Daily, a publication thought to represent the views of the CMC majority, printed an article on 11 March 2003 which quotes two army delegates as saying, "Having one center is called 'loyalty', while having two centers will result in 'problems.'"[23] This was widely interpreted as a criticism of Jiang's attempt to exercise dual leadership with Hu on the model of Deng Xiaoping.

Hu succeeded Jiang as CCP general secretary in November 2002. To the surprise of many observers, evidence of Jiang's continuing influence on public policy abruptly disappeared from the official media. Jiang was conspicuously silent during the SARS crisis, especially when compared to the very public profile of Hu and the newly anointed premier, Wen Jiabao. It has been argued that the institutional arrangements created by the 16th Congress have left Jiang in a position where he cannot exercise much influence.[24] Although many of the members of the Politburo Standing Committee were associated with him, the Standing Committee does not necessarily have command authority over the civilian bureaucracy.

On 19 September 2004, after the 4th Plenary Session of the 16th Central Committee, Jiang, at the age of 78, relinquished his post as chairman of the party's Central Military Commission, his last post in the party. Six months later in March 2005, Jiang resigned his last significant post, chairman of the Central Military Commission of the state, which marked the end of Jiang’s political career. This followed weeks of speculation that forces inside the party were pressing Jiang to step aside. Jiang's term was supposed to have lasted until 2007. Hu also succeeded Jiang as the CMC chairman, but, in an apparent political defeat for Jiang, General Xu Caihou, and not Zeng Qinghong was appointed to succeed Hu as vice chairman, as was initially speculated. This power transition formally marked the end of Jiang's era in China, which roughly lasted from 1989 to 2004.[25]

Jiang Zemin's inscription engraved on a stone in his hometown, Yangzhou

The policies of his successors, Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao, have widely been seen as efforts to address perceived imbalances and move away from a sole focus on economic growth toward a broader view of development which incorporates non-economic factors such as health and the environment.[37]

Domestically, Jiang's legacy and reputation is mixed. While some[38] people attributed the period of relative stability and growth in the 1990s to Jiang's term, others argue that Jiang did little to correct systemic imbalance and an accumulation of problems which resulted from years of breakneck-pace economic reforms, leaving the next administration facing innumerable challenges, some of which may have been too late to solve.[39]

The fact that Jiang rose to power as the direct beneficiary of the political aftermath of Tiananmen has shaped the perception of his rule. Following the Tiananmen protests, Jiang threw his support behind elder Chen Yun's conservative economic policies, but subsequently changed his allegiance to Deng Xiaoping's reform-oriented agenda following the latter's "Southern Tour". This shift was not only seen as the exercise of a political opportunist, it also sowed confusion among party loyalists in regards to what direction the party was headed or what the party truly believed in.[40] While continued economic reforms resulted in an explosion of wealth around the country, it also led to the formation of special interest groups in many sectors of the economy, and the exercise of state power without any meaningful oversight. This opened the way for the sub-optimal distribution of the fruits of growth, and an expanding culture of corruption among bureaucrats and party officials.[39]

Historian and former Xinhua journalist Yang Jisheng wrote that Jiang may well have been given a positive historical assessment had it not been for his decision to 'overstay his welcome' by remaining in the Central Military Commission post after Hu had formally assumed the party leadership. Moreover, Jiang took credit for all the gains made during the 13 years "between 1989 and 2002," which not only evoked the memories of Jiang being a beneficiary of Tiananmen, but also neglected the economic foundations laid by Deng, whose authority was still paramount until the mid-1990s. Additionally, Jiang was also criticized for his insistence on writing the "Three Represents" into the party and state constitutions (see below), which Yang called Jiang's attempt at "self-deification", i.e., that he saw himself as a visionary along the same lines as Deng and Mao. Yang contended, "The 'Three Represents' is just common sense. It is not a proper theoretical framework. It's what any ruler would tell the people to justify the continued rule of the governing party."[41]

Jiang married Wang Yeping, also a native of Yangzhou, in 1949.[47] She is his cousin (Jiang's adoptive mother is Wang's aunt). She graduated from Shanghai International Studies University.[48] They had two sons together, Jiang Mianheng (born in 1951) and Jiang Miankang (born in 1956). Jiang Mianheng went on to be an academic and businessman, working within the Chinese space program, and founded Grace Semiconductor Manufacturing Corporation.

It is believed that Jiang has had a long-running friendship with the singer Song Zuying, Chen Zhili and others.[49][50][51][52][53][54] Following the rise of Xi Jinping, Song and other Jiang loyalists, including her brother Song Zuyu, fell under investigation for corruption.[55][56]

•  Brazil:
  • Grand Cross of the Order of the Southern Cross (23 November 1993)[57]

•  Brunei:
  • Royal Family Order of the Crown of Brunei (17 November 2000)[58]

•  Congo:
  • Grand Cross of the Order of Merit (20 March 2000)[59]

•  Cuba:
  • Order of José Martí (21 November 1993)[60]

•  Djibouti:
  • Order of the Great Star of Djibouti (18 August 1998)[61]

•  French Polynesia:
  • Grand Cross of the Order of Tahiti Nui (3 April 2001)

•  Greece:
  • Grand Cross of the Order of the Redeemer (22 April 2000)[62]
  • Athens Gold Medal (22 April 2000)[63]

•  Kazakhstan:
  • Order of the Golden Eagle (19 November 1999)[64]

•  Mali:
  • Grand Cross of the National Order of Mali (17 May 1996)[65]

•  Palestine:
  • Medal 'Bethlehem 2000' (15 April 2000)[66]

•  Russia:
  • Medal of Pushkin (31 October 2007)[67]

•  South Africa:
  • Grand Cross of the Order of Good Hope (5 May 1999)[68]

•  Turkey:
  • First Class of the Order of the State of Republic of Turkey (19 April 2000)[69]

•  Ukraine:
  • First Class of the Order of Prince Yaroslav the Wise (2 December 1995)[70]

•  Venezuela:
  • Grand Cordon of the Order of the Liberator (17 April 2001)[71]

• Jiang Zemin (2010). Selected Works of Jiang Zemin. Vol. I (1st ed.). Beijing: Foreign Languages Press. ISBN 978-7-119-06025-5.
• — (2012). Selected Works of Jiang Zemin. Vol. II (1st ed.). Beijing: Foreign Languages Press. ISBN 978-7-119-07383-5.
• — (2013). Selected Works of Jiang Zemin. Vol. III (1st ed.). Beijing: Foreign Languages Press. ISBN 978-7-119-07978-3.

• History of the People's Republic of China (1989–2002)
• Politics of China
• Shanghai clique
• Toad worship, an internet meme spoofing Jiang Zemin in China.
• 1998 State Visit by Jiang Zemin to Japan
• The Man Who Changed China: The Life and Legacy of Jiang Zemin, a biography of Jiang by Robert Lawrence Kuhn

Wikiquote has quotations related to Jiang Zemin.

• Gilley, Bruce. Tiger on the Brink: Jiang Zemin and China's New Elite. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998. 395pp. This was the first biography of Jiang to appear in the West. A comprehensive and highly readable journalistic account of Jiang's early years, his ascendancy within the Party bureaucracy, and his ultimate rise to power as Deng Xiaoping's successor in the wake of Tiananmen.
• Kuhn, Robert Lawrence = The Man Who Changed China: The Life and Legacy of Jiang Zemin, Random House (English edition) 2005. Century Publishing Group, Shanghai (Chinese edition) 2005. The book is a general biography of Jiang with a more favorable stance towards him.
• China Daily, chinadaily.com.cn. Retrieved 19 June 2015.
• Lam, Willy Wo-Lap. "The Era of Jiang Zemin"; Prentice Hall, Singapore: 1999. General Jiang-era background information and analysis, not comprehensive biography.

• Appearances on C-SPAN