Manuel Noriega

U.S. President Jimmy Carter shaking hands with Torrijos after signing the Panama Canal Treaty.

Arias was elected president in 1968 following a populist campaign. Soon after taking office he launched a purge of the National Guard, sending much of its general staff into "diplomatic exile" or retirement.[26] In response, Torrijos and a few other officers led a coup against him, ousting him after an eleven-day presidency.[26] The coup was set in motion by Martínez, as the leader of the garrison at Chiriquí, and received the support of most military officers. A power struggle followed between the various forces involved in the coup, and chiefly between Torrijos and Martínez.[26] Noriega was an important supporter of Torrijos during this conflict.[27] In February 1969, Torrijos's men seized Martínez and exiled him to Miami giving Torrijos control of the country.[26]

At the end of 1969 Torrijos went to Mexico on holiday. A coup was launched in his absence, in which Noriega's loyalty allowed Torrijos to hang on to power, greatly enhancing Torrijos's image.[26][5] Noriega was promoted to captain a month after the coup attempt:[5] just 18 months later, in August 1970, Torrijos promoted him to the position of lieutenant colonel and appointed him chief of military intelligence. According to Dinges, by this point had left his undisciplined past behind him.[28] When Arias's supporters launched a guerrilla uprising in his home province, Noriega as the head of intelligence played an important role in putting it down within a year.[26]

Torrijos retained power as a military ruler until 1981: during this time he negotiated the Torrijos–Carter Treaties with U.S. President Jimmy Carter, which ensured that control over the Panama Canal would pass to Panama in 1999.[23] These treaties, as well as a new labor code that included maternity leave, collective bargaining rights, and bonus pay, made Torrijos popular in Panama despite the absence of democratic elections.[29] Torrijos's relationship with Noriega was symbiotic; Torrijos provided the political acumen, while Noriega enforced his unpopular decisions with force, when necessary.[30] Noriega would provide intelligence and carry out covert operations that were critical to Torrijos successfully negotiating the release of the Panama Canal from the U.S.[31]

Upon seizing power in 1968, Torrijos's government had passed legislation favorable to foreign corporations, including banks in the U.S.[32] The following years saw a large expansion in international business activity and the influx of foreign capital, thereby giving participating corporations a stake in the continued existence of the military government.[33] The government used its access to foreign capital to borrow extensively, fueling a rapid expansion of the state bureaucracy that contributed to the military regime's stability.[34] Panama's borrowing peaked in 1978 when the Panama Canal treaty was being negotiated, a time at which the Carter government was particularly supportive of the Torrijos regime.[33] The Carter administration's interest in signing a new treaty led it to largely overlook the increasing militarization of the Panamanian government, and its involvement in drug-trafficking.[35]

Noriega proved to be a very capable head of intelligence. During his tenure, he exiled 1,300 Panamanians whom he viewed as threats to the government. He also kept files on several officials within the military, the government, and the judiciary, allowing him to blackmail them later.[30] Noriega also held the positions of head of the political police and head of immigration.[28] His tenure was marked by intimidation and harassment of opposition parties and their leaders.[15] He was described as doing much of Torrijos's "dirty work".[36][37] For instance, Noriega ordered the death of Jesús Héctor Gallego Herrera, a priest whose work at an agricultural cooperative was seen as a threat by the government. Gallego's body is reported to have been thrown from a helicopter into the sea.[37] He also made an effort during this period to portray Panama as a hub of enforcement against drug smuggling, possibly as a result of pressure from Torrijos.[38]

By the early 1970s, American law enforcement officials had reports of Noriega's possible involvement with narcotics trafficking.[39] No formal criminal investigations were begun, and no indictment was brought: according to Dinges, this was due to the potential diplomatic consequences.[39][40] This evidence included the testimony of an arrested boat courier, and of a drug smuggler arrested in New York.[40] Though Torrijos frequently promised the U.S. cooperation in dealing with drug smuggling, Noriega would have headed any effort at enforcement, and the U.S. began to see Noriega as an obstacle to combatting drug smuggling.[41] Dinges writes that the U.S. government considered several options to move Noriega out of the drug trafficking business, including assassinating him, and linking him to a fictional plot against Torrijos. Though no assassination attempt was made, the other ploys may have been tried in the early 1970s, according to Dinges.[41] Dinges wrote that beginning in 1972 the U.S. relaxed its efforts at trapping individuals involved with smuggling within the Panama government, possibly as a result of an agreement between Torrijos and U.S. President Richard Nixon.[42]

During the early 1970s, Noriega's relationship with the U.S. intelligence services was regularized.[43] The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) placed him on its payroll in 1971, while he held his position as head of Panamanian intelligence; he had previously been paid by U.S. intelligence services on a case-by-case basis.[12][13][28][44] Regular payments to him were stopped under the Carter administration, before being resumed and later stopped again under the administration of Ronald Reagan.[45] The CIA valued him as an asset because he was willing to provide information about the Cuban government and later about the Sandinista government in Nicaragua.[46] Noriega also served as the U.S. emissary to Cuba during negotiations following the Johnny Express incident in December 1971.[42] Noriega was given access to CIA contingency funds, which he was supposed to use to improve his intelligence programs, but which he could spend with little accountability. The contingency funds were as high as US$100,000 in some years.[28]

The CIA was aware that Noriega was selling intelligence on the U.S. to Cuba while he was working for it.[46][47] Noriega also undertook a number of activities while nominally working for the CIA that served his own ends at the expense of the U.S. government.[47] Journalist Frederick Kempe wrote in 1990 that Noriega had been linked to a series of bombings targeting the U.S. territory in the Panama Canal Zone during the prelude to the U.S. Presidential election in 1976 after the administration of U.S. President Gerald Ford stepped back from negotiations about the Panama Canal.[36] The bombings highlighted to the U.S. government the difficulty of holding on to the Panama Canal Zone in the face of hostility within Panama.[48] Kempe stated that the U.S. knew of Noriega's involvement in the bombings but decided to turn a blind eye toward them.[49] In a December 1976 meeting with George H. W. Bush, then the Director of Central Intelligence, Noriega flatly denied involvement, instead suggesting that the CIA was responsible.[50]

During negotiations for the Panama Canal treaties, the U.S. government ordered its military intelligence to wiretap Panamanian officials. Noriega discovered this operation in early 1976, and instead of making it public, bribed the U.S. agents and bought the tapes himself; the incident came to be known as the "Singing Sergeants affair".[47][51] Although some intelligence officials wanted Bush to prosecute the soldiers involved, he declined to do so, because that would have exposed Noriega's role in the matter.[12][24] The CIA did not report this incident to either the National Security Agency or the U.S. Justice Department.[24] Noriega and Torrijos later used their knowledge of the U.S. wiretapping operations to tilt the Panama Canal negotiations in their favor.[52] Noriega's drug-related activities came to the U.S. government's attention once again during the ratification process for the Panama Canal treaties, but were once again downplayed by the U.S. intelligence services in order to get the treaty ratified by the U.S. Senate.[53]

After the Nicaraguan Revolution was launched by the Sandinistas against U.S.-backed authoritarian ruler Anastasio Somoza Debayle in August 1978, Torrijos and Noriega initially supported the rebels, providing them with surplus National Guard equipment and allowing Panama to be used as a cover for arms shipments from Cuba to Nicaragua.[54] Torrijos sought for himself the same aura of "democratic respectability" that the Sandinista rebels had in Nicaragua, and so abandoned the title of "Maximum Leader" he had taken in 1972, promising that elections would be held in 1984.[54] Noriega also arranged for weapons purchased in the U.S. to be shipped to the Sandinista forces, a deal on which he made a profit.[55] The U.S. discovered Noriega's role in supplying weapons, and though the episode proved embarrassing to the Carter administration in the U.S., no charges were brought against Noriega because the U.S. did not wish to anger a friendly government, and the issue was rendered moot by the Sandinista victory in 1979.[56] After Somoza's overthrow, Noriega continued to smuggle weapons, selling them to leftist guerrillas fighting the U.S.-backed authoritarian government in El Salvador.[57] After one of these shipments was captured, Torrijos, who had friends in the Salvadoran military government, reprimanded Noriega, though the shipments did not stop altogether.[57]

Torrijos died in a plane crash on July 31, 1981. A later investigation by the aircraft manufacturer stated it was an accident; Noriega's authority over the government investigation led to speculation about his involvement.[58] Florencio Flores Aguilar had inherited Torrijos position, but true power lay with the trio of Noriega, Díaz Herrera, and Rubén Darío Paredes, who ranked just below him. Flores was removed in a quiet coup on March 3, 1982. By general agreement, Paredes was made leader until 1983, after which the military would work together to ensure his election as the president in the election scheduled for 1984.[59] During this period Noriega became a full colonel and the National Guard's chief of staff, effectively the second-highest rank in the country.[60][61] He reformed the National Guard as the Panama Defense Forces (PDF), and with the financial assistance of the U.S., expanded and modernized it. The quick promotions they received earned him the officer corps' loyalty.[62] Among the steps he took to consolidate his control was to bring the various factions of the army together into the PDF.[1] On August 12, 1983, in keeping with Noriega's earlier deal with Paredes, Paredes handed over his position to Noriega, newly appointed a general, with the understanding that Noriega would allow him to stand for president.[63] However, Paredes never received the political support he expected, and after assuming his new position Noriega reneged on the deal, telling Paredes he could not contest the election.[63] Noriega, now head of the PDF, thus became the de facto ruler of Panama.[27][59]

The Contras in Nicaragua, who received support from the U.S. via Noriega's administration.

Between 1981 and 1987 the relationship between Noriega and the U.S. grew considerably. It was driven both by the U.S.'s pursuit of its security interests, and Noriega using these as an effective means of gaining favor.[80] The emergence of internal conflicts in Nicaragua and El Salvador between 1979 and 1981 led the Reagan administration to look for allies in the region, including in Panama.[81] Noriega acted as a conduit for U.S. support, including funds and weapons, to the Contra rebels in Nicaragua. He allowed the CIA to establish listening posts in Panama,[43] and also helped the U.S.-backed Salvadoran government against the leftist Salvadoran insurgent Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front.[27][81] U.S. spy ships used bases in Panama in their operations against the Nicaraguan government, and much of the intelligence gathered by these ships was processed in the U.S. bases in Panama. Noriega permitted these activities despite the Panama Canal treaties restricting the use of the U.S. bases to protecting the canal.[82]

Bush, now U.S. vice president, met again with Noriega in December 1983 to discuss support for the Contras.[83] Noriega had a working relationship with U.S. Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North by 1985. Noriega offered to assassinate or sabotage Sandinista leaders in return for North helping Noriega improve his image with the U.S. government.[1][84] In June 1985 North met with Noriega in Panama and Noriega agreed to train Contra soldiers in Panama for an invasion of Nicaragua in 1986.[83][85] In return for Panama's support for U.S. and Israeli efforts to supply the Contras with arms, the U.S. ignored Noriega's use of weapons-shipment networks to smuggle drugs into the U.S.[81] Noriega was reported to have played a role in the Iran–Contra affair in the mid-1980s.[27][85]

There are varying reports about how much Noriega was paid by United States sources. In early 1990, Noriega biographer Frederick Kempe reported that the United States gave Noriega or his intelligence services annual payments in the range of $110,000 in 1976 increasing to $185,000 to $200,000 when he came to power during the Reagan administration.[86][87] Dinges said that he could find no one willing to confirm persistent reports that he received a $200,000 per year stipend from the CIA.[88]

Prior to and during Noriega's trial, Noriega's lead attorney Frank A. Rubino claimed that Noriega had received $11 million in payments from the CIA.[89][90] In January 1991, federal prosecutors filed a financial report indicating that Noriega had received a total of $322,000 from the United States Army and the CIA over a 31-year period from 1955 to 1986.[13] They stated that the release of information was to rebut allegations from defense attorneys that Noriega had been paid "millions of dollars" from the CIA.[13] These payments included a total of $76,039 as "gifts and incentives" from the CIA.[13]

Despite Noriega's alliance with the U.S., he also maintained close relationships with bitter enemies of the U.S., including Cuba, Libya, and Nicaragua.[91] A 1990 book discussing Noriega's administration stated that he had sold thousands of Panamanian passports to the Cuban government for use by its intelligence services.[1] Cuba also obtained hardware imports from Panama that were restricted by the U.S. embargo, while it provided Panama with weapons and military advisers.[91] Libya, as well as some U.S. allies, provided Noriega with funds when the U.S. was seeking to remove him from power.[91]

Panama's and Noriega's involvement in drug-trafficking grew considerably over the early 1980s, peaking in 1984.[92] Intensifying conflicts in Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua had led to the creation of covert transportation networks that Noriega used to transport drugs to the U.S., particularly cocaine.[93][92] During this period Colombia's Medellín Cartel was also seeking allies. Noriega became intimately involved with their drug trafficking and money-laundering operations, and received considerable sums as protection money, bribes, or shared of profits.[92] In June 1986, investigative journalist Seymour Hersh recorded a U.S. White House official as saying that reducing Noriega's activities could greatly reduce international drug trafficking.[46]

Hersh reported unnamed U.S. officials as saying that Noriega had amassed a personal fortune in European banks as a result of his illegal activities, as well as owning two homes in Panama and one in France.[46] The wealth generated for the Panamanian military from drug-smuggling also helped stabilize the authoritarian government that it dominated. However, the military's control over wealth from illicit trade alienated the Panamanian business elite that had previously also benefited from such trade. Under Noriega, these profits were shared within the military less evenly than under Torrijos, eventually creating friction in the military leadership.[94]

Many of the operations Noriega benefited from were run by associates such as Floyd Carlton and Cesar Rodríguez. Large sums from drug revenues were brought in from Miami and elsewhere to Panama for laundering, and Noriega received protection payments in these instances as well.[95] American Steven Kalish also began a large scale business selling drugs, laundering money and selling hardware to the Panamanian military for considerable profits with Noriega's assistance.[96] Dinges writes that at the time of the 1984 election, Kalish was preparing to ship a load of marijuana worth U.S. $1.4 million through Panama, for which Noriega had agreed to provide false Panamanian customs stamps; Noriega was to be paid $1 million for this exercise.[97]

Beginning in 1984 Noriega appeared to reduce the scale of his operations, and even ordered a raid against a cocaine factory in the interior of Panama, a raid which he then emphasized as evidence of his cooperation with the U.S. in their fight against drugs.[98] He also ordered a crackdown on money laundering by Colombian cartel figures Jorge Ochoa and Gilberto Rodríguez Orejuela.[99] Noriega's new image as an opponent of drug trafficking was symbolized by his being invited as a speaker in 1985 to Harvard University, for a conference on the role of the military in Central America's wars, a speech which received a lot of attention in Panama's pro-government press.[100] In 1986, a convoluted operation involving the East German Stasi and the Danish ship Pia Vesta ultimately aimed to sell Soviet arms and military vehicles to South Africa's Armscor, with the Soviets using various intermediaries to distance themselves from the deal. Noriega was apparently one of these intermediaries but backed out on the deal as the ship and weapons were seized at a Panamanian port.[101][102][103]

Hugo Spadafora was a physician and political activist who had first clashed with Noriega when they were both members of Torrijos's government. Though an ally of Torrijos, he and Noriega had been personal enemies for a long time.[104] Despite not being a member of the opposition, he became a vocal critic of Noriega after returning to Panama from Guatemala in 1981.[105] Spadafora amassed evidence of corruption within the government by using his position as an ally of Torrijos to question Noriega's allies, including Rodriquez and Carlton.[106] This included a lengthy conversation with Carlton in mid-1985 after his drug operations had collapsed due to conflicts over a missing shipment, and he had received negative publicity in the Panamanian press.[107] In September 1985 he accused Noriega of having connections to drug trafficking and announced his intent to expose him. The drug trafficking charges threatened Noriega's support among his own constituency of middle class individuals who had benefited under his and Torrijos's government.[108][109][110]

According to writers R. M. Koster and Guillermo Sánchez, on an occasion when Spadafora was traveling by bus from Costa Rica to Panama, witnesses saw him being detained by the PDF after crossing the border.[111] His decapitated body was later found wrapped in a United States Postal Service mail bag showing signs of brutal torture.[112] Noriega was widely believed to be responsible for the murder, and according to Koster and Sánchez, the U.S. had intelligence implicating Noriega. On the day of Spadafora's arrest, the U.S. National Security Agency monitored a telephone conversation between Noriega and Luis Córdoba, the military commander in Chiriquí province where Spadafora was arrested. During the conversation Córdoba told Noriega, "We have the rabid dog." Noriega responded "And what does one do with a dog that has rabies?"[113]

Spadafora's murder badly damaged Noriega's image, both within and outside Panama,[23][114] and created a crisis for the Panamanian regime.[115] Barletta, who was in New York City when Spadafora was murdered in September 1985, announced his intention to appoint an independent commission to investigate the murder. Upon his return to Panama, however, he was forced to resign by the PDF and was replaced by Vice President Eric Arturo Delvalle.[116][117][118] Barletta was highly regarded in the Reagan administration, and his removal brought a downturn in the relations between the U.S. and Noriega.[119] After Spadafora's murder the U.S. began to view Noriega as a liability rather than an asset, despite his ongoing support for U.S. interventions elsewhere.[23][114] The U.S. response included reducing economic assistance and pressuring Panama to reform its banking secrecy laws, crack down on narcotics trafficking, investigate the murder of Spadafora, and reduce the PDF's role in the government.[116] The response to Spadafora's murder created divisions within the PRD, and further damaged the credibility of the government-controlled news media.[118]

Díaz Herrera considered using the uproar around Spadafora to seize power during a brief period that Noriega was traveling outside the country, but despite mobilizing some troops, eventually decided against following through with the coup, realizing he could not count on sufficient support.[120] Furthermore, Noriega had made a deal with his deputy, to the effect that he would step down as military leader in 1987 and allow Díaz Herrera to succeed him. In 1987, however, Noriega went back on this agreement, announced he would be heading the military for the next five years, and assigned Díaz Herrera to a diplomatic post.[121] Díaz Herrera retaliated by making public statements accusing Noriega of rigging the 1984 election, murdering Spadafora, and of trafficking in drugs, as well as of assassinating Torrijos with a bomb on his plane.[121]

Díaz Herrera's statements provoked huge protests against Noriega, with 100,000 people, approximately 25% of the population of Panama City, marching in protest on June 26, 1987.[121] As with Spadafora's murder, these incidents strengthened and brought together the internal opposition to Noriega.[122] Noriega charged Díaz Herrera with treason, and cracked down hard on the protesters.[121] The U.S. Senate passed a resolution asking Noriega to step down until Díaz Herrera could be tried; in response Noriega sent government workers to protest outside the U.S. embassy, a protest which quickly turned into a riot. As a result, the U.S. suspended all military assistance to Panama, and the CIA stopped paying Noriega a salary.[121] The Senate resolution had the effect of identifying the U.S. with the effort to remove Noriega; Noriega exploited the rising anti-American sentiment to strengthen his own position.[123] Without the support of the U.S., Panama defaulted on its international debt, and that year the country's economy shrunk by 20%.[1] Though the U.S. considered not recognizing Delvalle as president, the state department decided against it, as it would have amounted to breaking relations with Noriega.[124]

Noriega's relationship with the U.S. deteriorated further during the late 1980s, particularly after the U.S. began to suspect that Noriega was supporting other intelligence services.[23][27] Hersh wrote in 1986 that U.S. intelligence officials suspected that Noriega was selling intelligence to the Cuban government of Fidel Castro;[46] his report received widespread attention. Bob Woodward published a story about Noriega in The Washington Post soon afterward, going into even greater detail about Noriega's intelligence connections. Woodward and Hersh's reputations made certain that the stories were taken seriously.[125] Spadafora had also informed the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) of some of his findings about Noriega's involvement in drug smuggling.[126] Multiple U.S. agencies continued to investigate Noriega despite opposition from the Reagan administration.[127] In 1988 Noriega was indicted by U.S. federal grand juries in courts in Miami and Tampa on charges of drug-trafficking.[27][128] The indictment accused him of "turning Panama into a shipping platform for South American cocaine that was destined for the U.S., and allowing drug proceeds to be hidden in Panamanian banks".[1] Soon afterward an army colonel and a few soldiers made an attempt to overthrow Noriega; their poorly planned effort was crushed within a day.[129]

The presidential election of May 1989 was marred by fraud and violence. Coalición para la Liberación Nacional (Coalition for National Liberation), a pro-military coalition led by the PRD, named Carlos Duque, a former business partner of Noriega, as its candidate.[130] The Alianza Democrática de Oposición Cívica (Democratic Alliance of Civic Opposition), an opposition coalition, nominated Guillermo Endara, a member of Arias' Panameñista Party, and two other prominent oppositionists, Ricardo Arias Calderón and Guillermo Ford, as vice-presidential candidates.[131] Anticipating fraud, the opposition tracked ballot counts at local precincts on the day of the election (local ballot counts were done in public).[132] As an exit poll made it clear that the opposition slate was winning by a wide margin, reports of missing tally sheets and seizures of ballot boxes by the PDF soon emerged. In the afternoon of the day after the election, the Catholic bishops conference announced that a quick count of public tallies at polling centers showed the opposition slate winning 3–1. Official tallies the day after that, however, had Duque winning by a 2–1 margin.[132]

Rather than publish the results, Noriega voided the election, claiming that "foreign interference" had tainted the results. Former U.S. President Jimmy Carter, present in Panama as an observer, denounced Noriega, saying the election had been "stolen", as did Archbishop of Panama Marcos G. McGrath.[133][134] Noriega had initially planned to declare Duque the winner regardless of the actual result. Duque knew he had been badly defeated and refused to go along.[133] The next day, Endara, Arias Calderón, and Ford rolled through the old part of the capital in a triumphant motorcade, only to be intercepted by a detachment of Noriega's paramilitary Dignity Battalions. Arias Calderón was protected by a couple of troops, but Endara and Ford were badly beaten. Images of Ford running to safety with his guayabera shirt covered in blood were broadcast around the world. When the 1984–1989 presidential term expired, Noriega named a longtime associate, Francisco Rodríguez, acting president. The U.S. recognized Endara as the new president.[133][134] Noriega's decision to void the election results led to another coup attempt against him in October 1989. A number of Noriega's junior officers rose up against him, led by Lieutenant Colonel Moisés Giroldi Vera, but the rebellion was easily crushed by the members of the PDF loyal to Noriega. After this attempt, he declared himself the "maximum leader" of the country.[1][134][135][136] The rebels were captured and taken to a military base outside Panama City, where they were tortured and then executed.[134]

In March 1988, the U.S. government entered into negotiations with Noriega seeking his resignation. Panama was represented at these negotiations by Rómulo Escobar Bethancourt.[137] Negotiations collapsed after several months of lengthy and inconclusive talks; according to Dinges, Noriega had no intentions of ever resigning.[138] On December 15, 1989, the PRD-dominated legislature spoke of "a state of war" between the United States and Panama. It also declared Noriega "chief executive officer" of the government, formalizing a state of affairs that had existed for six years.[139] The U.S. government stated that Noriega's forces were harassing U.S. troops and civilians. Three incidents in particular occurred very near the time of the invasion, and were mentioned by Bush as a reason for the invasion.[140] In a December 16 incident, four U.S. personnel were stopped at a roadblock outside PDF headquarters in the El Chorrillo neighborhood of Panama City. The United States Department of Defense said that the servicemen were traveling unarmed in a private vehicle, and that they attempted to flee the scene only after their vehicle was surrounded by a crowd of civilians and PDF troops. First Lieutenant Robert Paz of the United States Marine Corps was shot and killed in the incident.[141] An American couple who witnessed the incident was also arrested and harassed by the PDF.[142]

The U.S. launched its invasion of Panama on December 20, 1989. Although the killing of the Marine was the ostensible reason for the invasion, the operation had been planned for months before his death.[27] The move was the largest military action by the U.S. since the Vietnam War, and included more than 27,000 soldiers,[1] as well as 300 aircraft.[143]

The invasion began with a bombing campaign that targeted Noriega's private vehicles, and the PDF headquarters located in Panama City. Several slums in the middle of the city were destroyed as a result.[143] The day after the invasion, Noriega's deputy Colonel Luis del Cid retreated with some soldiers to the mountains outside David City, after laying mines in the airport. Though this was part of a contingency plan for the invasion, del Cid quickly decided that the Panamanian military was not in a position to fight a guerrilla war against the U.S., and negotiated a surrender.[144] Twenty-three U.S. soldiers were killed in the operation, including two that were killed by friendly fire; 324 soldiers were injured.[145] Casualties among the Panamanian forces were much higher; between 300 and 845.[1][143] The U.S. government reported between 202 and 250 civilian deaths; Americas Watch estimated 300 civilian deaths; and the United Nations estimated 500 civilian deaths.[143][146]

On December 29, the United Nations General Assembly voted, 75–20 with 40 abstentions, to condemn the invasion as a "flagrant violation of international law".[147][148] According to a CBS poll, 92% of Panamanian adults supported the U.S. incursion, and 76% wished that U.S. forces had invaded in October during the coup.[149] Activist Barbara Trent disputed this finding, saying in a 1992 Academy Award-winning documentary The Panama Deception that the Panamanian surveys were completed in wealthy, English-speaking neighborhoods in Panama City, among Panamanians most likely to support U.S. actions.[150] Human Rights Watch described the reaction of the civilian population to the invasion as "generally sympathetic".[151]

Noriega being escorted onto a U.S. Air Force aircraft by agents from the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) on January 3, 1990

Noriega received several warnings about the invasion from individuals within his government; though he initially disbelieved them, they grew more frequent as the invasion drew near, eventually convincing Noriega to go on the run.[152] Noriega used a number of subterfuges, including lookalikes and playbacks of his recorded voice, to confuse U.S. surveillance as to his whereabouts.[153] During his flight Noriega reportedly took shelter with several supportive politicians, including Balbina Herrera, the mayor of San Miguelito.[154] The last two days of his flight were spent partly with his ally Jorge Krupnick, an arms dealer also wanted by the U.S.[155] Kempe reported that Noriega considered seeking sanctuary in the Cuban or Nicaraguan embassies, but both buildings were surrounded by U.S. troops.[156] On the fifth day of the invasion, Noriega and four others took sanctuary in the Apostolic Nunciature, the Holy See's embassy in Panama. Having threatened to flee to the countryside and lead guerrilla warfare if not given refuge, he instead turned over the majority of his weapons, and requested sanctuary from Archbishop José Sebastián Laboa, the papal nuncio.[157]

Prevented by treaty from invading the Holy See's embassy, U.S. soldiers from Delta Force erected a perimeter around the Nunciature. Attempts to dislodge Noriega from within included gunning vehicle engines, turning a nearby field into a landing pad for helicopters, and playing rock music at loud volumes (Van Halen cassette tape provided by Special Forces Sergeant John Bishop). After ten days, Noriega surrendered on January 3, 1990.[1][158] He was detained as a prisoner of war, and later taken to the United States.[27][159]

Following his capture Noriega was transferred to a cell in the Miami federal courthouse, where he was arraigned on the ten charges which the Miami grand jury had returned two years earlier.[160] The trial was delayed until September 1991 over whether Noriega could be tried after his detention as a prisoner of war, the admissibility of evidence and witnesses, and how to pay for Noriega's legal defense.[161] The trial ended in April 1992, when Noriega was convicted on eight of the ten charges of drug trafficking, racketeering, and money laundering.[162] On July 10, 1992, Noriega was sentenced to 40 years in prison.[163]

In pre-trial proceedings, the government stated that Noriega had received $322,000 from the U.S. Army and the CIA.[13] Noriega insisted that he had in fact been paid close to $10,000,000, and that he should be allowed to testify about the work he had done for the U.S. government. The district court held that information about the operations in which Noriega had played a part supposedly in return for payment from the U.S. was not relevant to his defense. It ruled that "the tendency of such evidence to confuse the issues before the jury substantially outweighed any probative value it might have had."[164] One of the witnesses in the trial was Carlton, who had previously flown shipments of drugs for Noriega.[165] Information about Noriega's connections to the CIA, including his alleged contact with Bush, were kept out of the trial.[166] After the trial, Noriega appealed this exclusionary ruling by the judge to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals. The court ruled in the government's favor, saying that the "potential probative value of this material [...] was relatively marginal".[164]

Noriega was incarcerated in the Federal Correctional Institution, Miami, in Dade County, Florida

Before receiving his permanent prison assignment, Noriega was placed in the Federal Detention Center, Miami.[167] Noriega was incarcerated in the Federal Correctional Institution, Miami.[168] Under Article 85 of the Third Geneva Convention, Noriega was considered a prisoner of war, despite his conviction for acts committed prior to his capture by the "detaining power" (the US). This status meant that he had his own prison cell, furnished with electronics and exercise equipment.[169][170] His cell was nicknamed "the presidential suite".[171][172][173] While Noriega was in prison, he was visited regularly over two years by two evangelical Christian ministers, Clift Brannon and Rudy Hernandez. Noriega, nominally a Roman Catholic, was reported to have undergone a conversion to evangelical Christianity in May 1990, and was baptized in October 1992, while still in prison.[174][175] Noriega's prison sentence was reduced from 30 years to 17 years for good behavior: his sentence thus ended on September 9, 2007.[176]

Noriega was tried in absentia in Panama for crimes committed during his rule. In October 1993 Noriega and two others were convicted of the murder of Spadafora by the court of the Third Judicial District, and sentenced to 20 years in prison. Panama's Supreme Court confirmed the sentence on December 20, 1995.[136] In 1994, Noriega and Heráclides Sucre, an agent of his secret police, were convicted by a jury of the murder of Giroldi, who had led the 1989 coup attempt against Noriega.[136] Though Noriega was tried in absentia, a judge traveled to the US to question him in December 1993. Noriega and Sucre both received a 20-year sentence, the maximum penalty sought by the prosecutor.[136] Finally, Noriega received a third 20-year sentence in 1996 for his role in the death of nine military officers supporting Giroldi; the group had been executed in a hangar at the Albrook air base after the coup attempt, in an incident that came to be known as the massacre of Albrook.[136] Noriega was also prosecuted over the 1968 disappearances of Luis Antonio Quirós and Everett Clayton Kimble Guerra in Chiriquí, and the 1971 death of Heliodoro Portugal. These cases had not reached a conclusion at the time of his death in 2017.[136]

The French government had requested Noriega's extradition after he was convicted of money laundering in 1999. It stated that Noriega had laundered $3 million in drug proceeds by purchasing luxury apartments in Paris. Noriega was convicted in absentia, but French law required a new trial after the subject of an in absentia sentence was apprehended.[170][177] France had previously made Noriega a Commandeur of the Légion d'honneur in 1987.[178][179]

In August 2007, a U.S. federal judge approved the French government's request to extradite Noriega to France after his release. Noriega appealed his extradition because he claimed France would not honor his legal status as a prisoner of war.[180] Though Noriega had been scheduled to be released in 2007, he remained incarcerated while his appeal was pending in court.[1] The Supreme Court of the United States refused to hear his appeal in January 2010, and in March declined a petition for a rehearing.[181][182] Two days after the refusal, the District Court for the Southern District of Florida in Miami lifted the stay that was blocking Noriega's extradition. Later that month Noriega's attorney stated that he would travel to France and try to arrange a deal with the French government.[183]

Noriega was extradited to France on April 26, 2010.[177] Noriega's lawyers claimed the La Santé Prison, at which he was held, was unfit for a man of his age and rank; the French government refused to grant him prisoner of war status, which he had had in the United States.[184] On July 7, 2010, Noriega was convicted by the 11th chamber of the Tribunal Correctionnel de Paris and sentenced to seven years in jail.[184][185] The prosecutor in the case had sought a ten-year prison term.[185] In addition, the court ordered the seizure of €2.3 million (approximately U.S. $3.6 million) that had long been frozen in Noriega's French bank accounts.[184]