Afghan mujahideen

Small groups of resistance formed in parts of eastern Afghanistan by the fall of 1978, but it was in early 1979 that the situation rapidly escalated to open rebellion. As early as February 2, 1979, it was reported that Afghan dissidents were receiving guerilla training across the border in Pakistan.[5] The conflict reached a height during the Herat mutiny in March, in which a non-organized group of army mutineers and the civilians rebelled and briefly overthrew the city garrison. The incident and subsequent air bombardment gave indications of looming civil war. Sibghatullah Mojaddedi, a leader of Islamic mysticism and a hazrat, was one of the original leaders of an organized anti-government armed group. He created an organization named Afghan National Liberation Front (Jabha-i Nejat-i Milli) and on May 25, 1979, appealed for support in New York City.[6] Sayyed Ahmad Gailani, a spiritual leader (pir), also created a resistance organization during this time, called National Islamic Front (Mahaz-e-Millie-Islami). Mawlawi Mohammad Nabi Mohammadi, a religious scholar and former member of parliament in the Kingdom, formed the Revolutionary Islamic Movement (Harakat-e-Inqilab-e-Islami); he was well known for assaulting prominent leftist Babrak Karmal inside the House of Representatives in 1966.[7] On August 11, 1979, the Afghan National Liberation Front along with three others groups (Jamiat-i Islami, Hezb-i Islami Khalis, and Revolutionary Islamic Movement) formed a new organization based in Peshawar, Pakistan, aiming to establish an Islamic Republic. Other rebel movements were also active throughout the country, including Hazara tribes that had some 5,000 men as of August 1979.[8]

U.S. President Jimmy Carter and Pakistan President Zia ul-Haq

A broad mujahideen had existed as a de facto political bloc since May 1979, when the Pakistani government decided to limit the flow of financial aid to the said seven organizations, thus cutting off monetary supply to nationalist and left-wing resistance groups.[9]

The Soviet operation of December 1979 turned the civil war into a war of liberation, and the jihad (holy war) was more forceful than previous Afghan empires had fought against the British and the Sikhs. Except for pockets of supporters of the DRA regime, almost every social, religious and ethnic group protested the Soviet action (despite their removal of the tyrannical Khalq regime), and even religious minorities of Afghan Sikhs and Hindus covertly assisted the mujahideen.[7] Following the exodus of Afghans to Pakistan in 1980, as many as 84 different resistance groups were formed in Peshawar. A coalition of the resistance with a united front for military activities was demanded by Afghan refugees during meetings in Peshawar in 1980. They, including tribal and community elders, former members of parliament and mujahideen commanders, met in several loya jirgas (traditional grand assembly) to solidify the resistance, liberate Afghanistan from the Soviet Union, topple the Kabul regime, and create a single political bloc. Mojaddedi took part in these, and the first jirga passed a resolution on February 21, 1980. The last round of the jirga in May 1980 set up the Islamic National Revolutionary Council, headed by Mohammad Omar Babrakzay as acting president. It advocated for a national, Islamic, and democratic republic. The pressure persuaded leaders of the Islamic groups to make attempts to unite. A coalition of the three Islamist and three moderate organizations, the Islamic Union for the Liberation of Afghanistan, was formed, headed by Abdul Rasul Sayyaf. However, it did not last, as Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's group (Hizb-i Islami Gulbuddin) and later the three moderate groups seceded from it. These three set up the Union of the Three. The Islamic Union later called the tribal Revolutionary Council an "enemy".[7]

Because of disunity, elders from western Afghanistan attempted to hold a loya jirga, citing that party politics disunited the resisting Afghans. Fundamentalists warned against people attending the jirga, but it was held safely in September 1981 in Pishin, Pakistan, consisting of tribal elders, the Ulama, and military officers. Elders native from Nangarhar proposed that the former Afghan king, Mohammed Zahir Shah, would be an ideal "National Leader" in any coalition. However, Pakistan, which preferred a divided Afghan resistance, was against the return of the former king to Afghanistan, seeing it as a symbol of Afghan nationalism.[7]

There were seven major mujahideen groups as recognized by Pakistan and its allies, based in Peshawar and sometimes called the Peshawar Seven. They were often categorized into the fundamentalist and traditional; the fundamentalist factions were militarily stronger in the war.[10][11]

Political Islamist

• Jamiat-i Islami[12] (Islamic Society (of Afghanistan)), a mostly Tajik faction headed by Burhanuddin Rabbani, a former professor of theology at Kabul University, advocating for a semi-democratic Islamic revolutionary state - one of the strongest of the Mujahideen factions
• Hizb-i Islami (Gulbuddin)[13] (Islamic Party), a radical, oppositionist faction headed by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar who enjoyed the largest amount of ISI Pakistan funding, Saudi intelligence funding, and American CIA funding; traditionally strongest in Ghilzai Pashtun tribal regions in the south-east - aimed for a state similar to that founded and led by Khomeini in Iran
• Hizb-i Islami (Khalis)[14] (Islamic Party), a splinter faction headed by theologian Mohammad Yunus Khalis, with its supporter base having been Ghilzai Pashtuns - favored cooperation with other factions
• Ittihad-i Islami[15] (Islamic Union (for the liberation of Afghanistan)), a faction advocating for Wahhabism, led by fundamentalist Abdul Rasul Sayyaf and funded by Saudi Arabia; smaller than the other parties, but influential in international recruitment for the jihad[16]

Afghan traditionalist

• Harakat-i Inqilab-i Islami[17] (Revolutionary Islamic Movement (of Afghanistan)), a Pashtun faction led by Mohammad Nabi Mohammadi, a religious figure and former member of parliament, and gaining support among Pashtun tribes in the south
• Jabha-i Nejat-i Milli[18] ((Afghan) National Liberation Front), headed by the Sufi order Sibghatullah Mojaddedi, a monarchist faction that favored the return of Afghanistan's ousted King, Zahir Shah, in a traditional Islamic state with a parliamentary democracy; it was said to be the weakest militarily, although with a respected leader
• Mahaz-i Milli[19] (National (Islamic) Front), the most secular, pro-Western and liberal of the mujahideen factions, rejecting both communism and Islamic fundamentalism, instead adhering to Pashtun nationalism, democracy and a return of the monarchy; led by Sayid Ahmad Gailani, an Islamic mystical figure, and supported by a number of tribal leaders

Commanders

Amin Wardak, a mujahideen commander of Maidan Wardak Province

Some of the group leaders also acted as commanders, such as Khalis and Hekmatyar. The other notable mujahideen commanders were Ahmad Shah Massoud (Jamiat-i Islami), Abdul Haq (Hizb-i Islami Khalis), Ismail Khan (Jamiat-i Islami), Jalaluddin Haqqani (Hizb-i Islami Khalis), Amin Wardak (Mahaz-e Melli) and Mohammad Zabihullah (Jamiat-i Islami).[20]

Ideologies and divisions

Mujahideen guerillas in Kunar Province, Afghanistan, 1985

The Afghan mujahideen were not a united movement. The resistance parties remained deeply divided along ethnic, ideological and personal lines, despite internal and external pressures to unite. Dutch journalist Jere Van Dyk reported in 1981 that the guerillas were effectively fighting two civil wars: one against the regime and the Soviets, and another among themselves. Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's Hizb-i Islami was most cited as the initiator of cross-mujahideen clashes. Through the years, there were various efforts to create a united front, but all were either non-effective or failed in a short time. At least three different iterations of an "Islamic Unity of Afghan Mujahedin" (IUAM) were tried, none of which lasted. The formation of the Afghanistan Interim Government (AIG) in 1988 also failed to promote unity.[21] Additionally, it only included the select Sunni Muslim groups approved by Pakistan; Shi'ite groups backed by Iran and pro-Chinese (anti-Soviet) leftist groups were excluded.[7]

Mujahideen leader Mohammad Yunus Khalis thought that the lack of trust among the various leaders was a factor for the many disunited organizations.[7]

The only party fighting the Soviets was the Harakat-i Inqilab-i Islami. The others were all fighting each other.

— Eduard Lagourge, French aid worker in Afghanistan, 1988[21]

The issue of the exiled king, Mohammed Zahir Shah, also caused divisions. Zahir Shah enjoyed considerable popularity among the Afghan refugees in Pakistan. Both Hekmatyar and Khalis were strongly against the king, while Gailani, Mojaddedi and Mohammadi supported an interim coalition with him. Rabbani and Sayyaf were initially against a role for the king, later changing their minds.[21][10]

Although the Afghan mujahideen were praised for bravery in resisting a superpower, the lack of unity showed weaknesses in the guerillas, such as the lack of a clear political strategy.[21]

In an attempt to dissuade infighting and develop a de facto functioning proto state, Ahmad Shah Massoud created the Shura-e Nazar in 1984, an offshoot of the Jamiat faction. Shura-e Nazar was created as a military–political combination and consisted of an organized structure dealing with health and education in the areas it operated in (northern and north-eastern Afghanistan).

Various mujahideen weaponry seized by the Soviet army

Most of the Mujahideen's weapons were of Soviet design; this includes mostly those that were supplied by their funders and smaller numbers that were captured from the Soviet or Afghan militaries. It was disclosed in 1981 that recoilless rifles (Chinese 83mm, Blo, 70mm) were being used by the resistance. Also in use were Soviet 82 mm mortars, British mortars and Chinese Type 63 mortars. Twin barrelled Chinese-built Type 58s has been seen in smaller numbers. Lee–Enfield rifles, Egyptian made AKMs, and Chinese made SKSs have also been used by them.[25]

Beginning in 1985, they began to receive heavy equipment like bazookas and heavy machine guns, while also receiving better equipment for the cold winters, such as snow boots and ski tents. The raised fundings or assistance from the United States, China and Saudi Arabia all contributed to strengthening the Mujahideen movement by 1987.[7]

The portable surface-to-air "Stinger" missile was first used by Mujahedin in September 1986 and is considered by some to have been a turning point in the war.[26] Some military analysts considered it a "game changer" coined the term "Stinger effect" to describe it.[27] However, these statistics are based on Mujahedin self-reporting, which is of unknown reliability. A Russian general however claimed the United States "greatly exaggerated" Soviet and Afghan aircraft losses during the war.[28]

Wounded Afghan guerillas having arrived at Norton Air Force Base, the United States, for medical treatment, 1986

The mujahideen were heavily backed by Pakistan (through the Inter-Services Intelligence) and the United States (through the Central Intelligence Agency), also receiving backing primarily from Saudi Arabia and the People's Republic of China, while more covert support came from the United Kingdom, Egypt, and West Germany (through the Federal Intelligence Service). The Hezb-i Islami Gulbuddin faction received the lion's share of weapons from the ISI and CIA.[10] While Ahmad Shah Massoud's group was supported by Britain's MI6 and trained and supplied by the SAS. Britain's support to the Afghan resistance turned out to be Whitehall's most extensive covert operation since the Second World War.[29] The CIA's Operation Cyclone was said to be its "largest and 'most successful' covert operation ever."[30] Pakistan controlled which rebels received assistance: the four "fundamentalist" factions received most of the funding.[31] A large amount of funding also came from private donors and charities from the Arab states of the Persian Gulf.[32]

The areas where the different mujahideen forces operated as of 1985

By May 1980, mujahideen controlled virtually all of rural Afghanistan, and these regions were cleared of Khalqists and Parchamites. With the exception of parts of the north near the Soviet border (under Abdul Rashid Dostum's command), along with several cities, mujahideen guerillas were in control of most of the country as of 1987.[7][33]

As of 1985, the Jamiat-i Islami held some of the most territory, stretching from Herat in the west through the north to Badakhshan in the north-east. Harakat-i Inqilab also held a large amount of territory in the southern provinces, stretching from Nimroz to Logar. Hizb-i Islami Khalis had its stronghold around Nangarhar and Paktia, while Hizb-i Islami Gulbuddin held many pockets of territory throughout the country. The Mahaz-i-Milli was prominent in Loya Paktia but also had territory in other parts of the country.

As Soviet forces withdrew in 1988–89, the Mujahideen captured several key districts, towns and provincial capitals, such as Taloqan, Mahmud Raqi, Asadabad, Bamyan, Spin Boldak, Dara-i-Suf and Imam Sahib. The cities of Kunduz, Qalat, and Maidan Shahr also fell to the Mujahideen in the summer of 1988, but were retaken by the government with Soviet bombardment and logistical support.

By the time Soviet forces completed their withdrawal, the Afghan government held only sixty urban centers and the Mujahideen controlled six entire provinces. However, the Mujahideen were unable to seize the country's major cities for several years, due to the lack of coordination between the various groups and the lack of heavy firepower necessary for such actions. The Afghan Army beat back the Mujahideen's attempts to take the city of Jalalabad in March 1989, and the civil war settled into a stalemate for three years.[34]

Women also played a part in the Afghan mujahideen, often traveling with them to cook food or wash their clothes, but also taking part in weapons smuggling. There were many female sympathizers who encouraged their husbands, sons or other male family members to take part in the war against the invaders. However, women in Afghanistan were split between the two sides, with many also supporting the Democratic Republic where they enjoyed social privileges.[35] Female refugees also created and recited Landays (traditional Afghan poems) about the war.[36]

There is one recorded female mujahideen warlord, Bibi Ayesha (nicknamed Kaftar, meaning "dove"), who operated in Baghlan Province.[37][38]

On 14 April 1988, the governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan signed the Geneva Accords, guaranteed by the United States and Soviet Union. This committed the Soviet Union to withdraw all its troops from Afghanistan by 15 February 1989. The withdrawal was conducted in two phases. The first half of the contingent was removed between 15 May and 16 August 1988, and the second half after 15 November 1988. As the Soviets withdrew, they left the Afghan army in fortified positions and even helped them conduct counteroffensives, in order to leave them in as strong a position as possible.[39] The withdrawal was completed on schedule, with commander Boris Gromov of the 40th Army being the last Soviet soldier to leave Afghanistan. After the Soviet withdrawal, most of the Afghan mujahideen continued its fight against the government of Mohammad Najibullah, which continued to receive funding from Moscow, while similarly the Mujahideen was also still receiving funding from Washington and Islamabad.

Despite initial estimates, the Mujahideen proved unable to topple Najibullah's regime immediately after the Soviet withdrawal. The government concentrated its forces in defense of key cities, while relying on vast amounts of military and humanitarian aid from the Soviet Union to stay afloat. Soviet military advisors were still present in Afghanistan, helping advise the war effort and even coordinate air strikes.[39] Soviet volunteers operated the Scud missiles which gave the government an advantage in firepower. The Afghan Air Force, supplied and maintained with Soviet support, proved to be a crucial asset in keeping the government in power.[40] As late as December 1991, Soviet pilots were recorded flying bombing missions against the Mujahideen.[41]

The Mujahideen's divisions and factionalism hindered their war effort, and skirmishes between rival groups became common. Massoud was one of the most active elements in this time. In both 1990 and 1991 he staged spring offensives, capturing several cities and steadily expanding the territory under his influence.[34] The government meanwhile came to rely heavily on tribal militias to stay in power, primarily the Jowzjani militia of Abdul Rashid Dostum. After 1989, these were the only forces capable of offensives against the Mujahideen.[39]

By the summer of 1990, the Afghan government forces were on the defensive again, and by the beginning of 1991 the government controlled only 10 percent of Afghanistan. In March 1991, Mujahideen forces captured the city of Khost ending an eleven-year siege. After the failed coup d'état attempt by hardliners in the Soviet Union in August 1991, Soviet support to Najibullah's government dried up. This effectively doomed it, as the Afghan Air Force could no longer fly due to fuel shortages. Consequently, the Army's desertion rate skyrocketed.[39] In March 1992, Dostum's militiamen defected to Massoud after negotiations, and Najibullah's regime fell shortly afterwards.

In 1991, some factions of the Mujahideen were deployed in Kuwait to fight Iraq.[42] After Hekmatyar and Sayyaf publicly denounced the U.S. and the Saudi royal family for their role in the Gulf War, U.S. and Saudi officials indicated that they would stop funding both commanders, but this did not happen. However, the CIA and Saudi intelligence pressured the ISI to send captured Iraqi tanks to Haqqani instead of Hekmatyar.[43]

Progress of the continuing civil war, 1992–2001

After Najibullah's government collapsed, the Mujahideen factions (apart from Hezb-i Islami Gulbuddin) signed a power sharing agreement (the Peshawar Accord) and captured Kabul on April 28, 1992, celebrating their "Victory Day". However, the divisions between the various factions were still there and it was a catalyst that led to another civil war between the new government and Mujahideen factions that rebelled against it. This meant that after 1992, various Mujahideen factions including the Shi'ite Hezb-i Wahdat continued to exist as militias rather than merely political parties, with many fighters being loyal to specific leaders.

• Afghanistan–Pakistan relations
• Pakistan–United States relations

• Kaplan, Robert D. Soldiers of God: With the Mujahidin in Afghanistan. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1990. ISBN 0-395-52132-7
• Weisman, Steven R. "Rebel Rivalry is Hampering Afghan Talks", The New York Times, March 1, 1988.