Battle of Anzio

At the end of 1943, following the Allied invasion of Italy, Allied forces were bogged down at the Gustav Line, a defensive line across Italy south of the strategic objective of Rome. The terrain of central Italy had proved ideally suited to defense, and Field Marshal Albert Kesselring took full advantage.

Operation Shingle was originally conceived by British Prime Minister Winston Churchill in December 1943, as he lay recovering from pneumonia in Marrakesh. His concept was to land two divisions at Anzio, bypassing German forces in central Italy, and take Rome, the strategic objective of the current Battle of Rome.[5] By January he had recovered and was badgering his commanders for a plan of attack, accusing them of not wanting to fight but of being interested only in drawing pay and eating rations.[6] General Harold Alexander, commander of the Allied Armies in Italy, had already considered such a plan since October using five divisions. However, the 5th Army did not have the troops nor the means to transport them. Clark proposed landing a reinforced division to divert German troops from Monte Cassino. This second landing, however, instead of failing similarly, would hold "the shingle" for a week in expectation of a breakthrough at Cassino, and so the operation was named Shingle.[7][8]

The Anzio beachhead is at the northwestern end of a tract of reclaimed marshland, formerly the Pontine Marshes, now the Pontine Fields (Agro Pontino). Previously uninhabitable due to mosquitoes carrying malaria, in Roman times armies marched as quickly as possible across it on the military road, the Via Appia. The marsh was bounded on one side by the sea and on others by mountains: the Monti Albani, the Monti Lepini, the Monti Ausoni and further south the Monti Aurunci (where the allies had been brought to a halt before Monte Cassino). Overall these mountains are referenced by the name Monti Laziali, the mountains of Lazio, the ancient Latium. Invading armies from the south had the choice of crossing the marsh or taking the only other road to Rome, the Via Latina, running along the eastern flanks of the Monti Laziali, risking entrapment. The marshes were turned into cultivatable land in the 1930s under Benito Mussolini. Canals and pumping stations were built to remove the brackish water from the land. These canals divided the land into personal tracts with new stone houses for colonists from north Italy. Mussolini also founded the five cities destroyed by the battle.

When Lucian Truscott's 3rd Division was first selected for the operation, he pointed out to Clark that the position was a death trap and there would be no survivors. Agreeing, Clark canceled the operation, but Prime Minister Churchill revived it. Apparently, the two allies had different concepts: the Americans viewed such a landing as another distraction from Cassino, but if they could not break through at Cassino, the men at Anzio would be trapped. Churchill and the British high command envisioned an outflanking movement ending with the capture of Rome. Mediterranean Theatre commander General Dwight D. Eisenhower, leaving to take command of Operation Overlord, left the decision up to Churchill with a warning about German unpredictability.[9]

The final plan called for Lucas to lead the US VI Corps in a landing in the Anzio area, followed by an advance into the Alban Hills, to cut German communications and "threaten the rear of the German XIV Panzer Corps" (under Fridolin von Senger und Etterlin). It was hoped that such an advance would draw German forces away from the Monte Cassino area and facilitate an Allied breakthrough there.

Planners argued that if Kesselring (in charge of German forces in Italy) pulled troops out of the Gustav Line to defend against the Allied assault, then Allied forces would be able to break through the line; if Kesselring didn't pull troops out of the Gustav Line, then Operation Shingle would threaten to capture Rome and cut off the German units defending the Gustav Line. Should Germany have adequate reinforcements available to defend both Rome and the Gustav Line, the Allies felt that the operation would nevertheless be useful in engaging forces which could otherwise be committed on another front. The operation was officially canceled on December 18, 1943. However, it was later reselected.

Clark did not feel he had the numbers on the southern front to exploit any breakthrough. His plan therefore was relying on the southern offensive drawing Kesselring's reserves in and providing the Anzio force the opportunity to break inland quickly. This would also reflect the orders he had received from Alexander to "... carry out an assault landing on the beaches in the vicinity of Rome with the object of cutting the enemy lines of communication and threatening the rear of the German XIV Corps [on the Gustav Line]."[10] However, his written orders to Lucas did not really reflect this. Initially Lucas had received orders to "1. Seize and secure a beachhead in the vicinity of Anzio 2. Advance and secure Colli Laziali [the Alban Hills] 3. Be prepared to advance on Rome".[10] However, Clark's final orders stated "... 2. Advance on Colli Laziali"[11] giving Lucas considerable flexibility as to the timing of any advance on the Alban Hills. It is likely that the caution displayed by both Clark and Lucas was to some extent a product of Clark's experiences at the tough battle for the Salerno beach head[12] and Lucas' natural caution stemming from his lack of experience in battle.

Neither Clark nor Lucas had full confidence in either their superiors or the operational plan.[13] Along with most of the Fifth Army staff they felt that Shingle was properly a two corps or even a full army task.[14] A few days prior to the attack, Lucas wrote in his diary, "They will end up putting me ashore with inadequate forces and get me in a serious jam... Then, who will get the blame?"[11] and "[The operation] has a strong odour of Gallipoli and apparently the same amateur was still on the coach's bench."[14] The "amateur" can only have referred to Winston Churchill, architect of the disastrous Gallipoli landings of World War I and personal advocate of Shingle.

Order of battle

Task Force 81

Allied naval commanders for Operation Shingle

Rear Adm. Frank J. Lowry, USN

Rear Adm. Thomas H. Troubridge, RN

Rear Admiral Lowry's flagship, amphibious command ship Biscayne, anchored off Anzio

Rear Admiral Frank J. Lowry, USN

Allied forces landed: approx. 40,000 soldiers, and 5,000+ vehicles[15]

Naval losses: 2 light cruisers, 3 destroyers, 2 minesweepers, 1 hospital ship[16]

Ranger Group

Soldiers of the 3rd Ranger Battalion board LCIs that will take them to Anzio. Two weeks later, nearly all were captured or killed at Cisterna.

Captain E.C.L. Turner, RN

Comprising 1 transport, 1 submarine chaser, 7 landing craft

Attacked the port of Anzio:

• 6615th Ranger Force (Colonel William O. Darby)
  • 1st Ranger Battalion
  • 3rd Ranger Battalion
  • 4th Ranger Battalion
  • 509th Parachute Infantry Battalion (PIB)
• 83rd Chemical Mortar Battalion
• 93rd Evacuation Hospital
• 95th Evacuation Hospital

"X-Ray" Force

Shermans disembarking from an LST at Anzio

Rear Admiral Lowry

Comprising 2 light cruisers (USS Brooklyn, HMS Penelope), 11 destroyers, 2 destroyer escorts, 24 minesweepers, 166 landing craft, 20 subchasers, 3 tugs, 1 submarine, multiple salvage ships

Landed "X-Ray" Beach on the coast east of Nettuno, 6 miles (9.7 km) east of Anzio:

• US 3rd Infantry Division (Major General Lucian K. Truscott Jr.)
  • 7th Infantry Regiment
  • 15th Infantry Regiment
  • 30th Infantry Regiment
  • HHB Division Artillery
    • 9th Field Artillery Battalion (155mm)
    • 10th Field Artillery Battalion (105mm)
    • 39th Field Artillery Battalion (75mm and 105mm)
    • 41st Field Artillery Battalion (105mm)
  • 10th Engineer Battalion
  • 601st Tank Destroyer Battalion
  • 751st Tank Battalion
  • 441st AAA Automatic Weapons Battalion
  • Battery B, 36th Field Artillery Regiment (155mm Gun)(Motorized)
  • 69th Armored Field Artillery Battalion
  • 84th Chemical Battalion (Motorized)
• 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment[lower-alpha 2]

Allied plan of attack for Operation Diadem, May 1944

Both sides had realised that no decisive result could be achieved until the spring and reverted to a defensive posture involving aggressive patrolling and artillery duels whilst they worked to rebuild their fighting capabilities. In anticipation of the following spring, Kesselring ordered the preparation of a new defence line, the Caesar C line, behind the line of beachhead running from the mouth of the river Tiber just south of Rome through Albano, skirting south of the Alban Hills to Valmontone and across Italy to the Adriatic coast at Pescara, behind which 14th Army and, to their left, 10th Army might withdraw when the need arose.[50] Meanwhile, Lucian Truscott, who had been promoted from the command of U.S. 3rd Infantry Division to replace Lucas as commander of VI Corps on February 22, worked with his staff on the plans for a decisive attack as part of a general offensive which Alexander was planning for May and which would include a major offensive on the Gustav Line, Operation Diadem. The objective of the plan was to fully engage Kesselring's armies with a major offensive and remove any prospect of the Germans withdrawing forces from Italy to redeploy elsewhere. It was also intended to trap the bulk of the German 10th Army between the Allied forces advancing through the Gustav Line and VI Corps thrusting inland from Anzio.

In March, the 2nd Italian SS "Vendetta" Battalion and 29th Italian SS Rifle Battalion were sent to fight against the Anglo-American forces at the Anzio beachhead. Dispersed among German battalions, the German commanding officers later gave the Italians companies favourable reports. Members of former Blackshirt Lieutenant-Colonel Degli Oddi's "Vendetta" helped defeat a determined effort by the U.S. 3rd Infantry Division to overrun their positions and captured a number of prisoners. Their performance at Anzio led to designation as units of the Waffen-SS, with all the duties and rights that that entailed.[51]

The next few weeks saw many changes in divisions on both sides. The U.S. 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment, which had fought with distinction but suffered heavy losses, was withdrawn to England on 23 March 1944. Also in March the U.S. 34th Infantry Division and in early May, U.S. 36th Infantry Division, had arrived at Anzio. On the British side the 24th Guards Brigade of British 1st Infantry Division was replaced in the first week of March by 18th Infantry Brigade (from British 1st Armoured Division in North Africa). The Guards Brigade had suffered devastating casualties (nearly 2,000 of an initial strength of over 2,500) in just less than two months at Anzio.[41] In late March the 56th (London) Infantry Division had also been relieved, after sustaining very heavy losses (one of its battalions — 7th Ox and Bucks of 167th (London) Brigade — had been reduced from 1,000[52] to 60), by British 5th Infantry Division. By late May, there were some 150,000 Allied troops in the bridgehead,[53] including five U.S. and two British divisions, facing five German divisions. The Germans were well dug into prepared defenses, but were weak in numbers of officers and NCOs and, by the time of the late May offensive, lacked any reserves (which had all been sent south to the Gustav fighting).[54]

The Allied breakout from Anzio and advance from the Gustav Line May 1944.

Despite Alexander's overall plan for Diadem requiring VI Corps to strike inland and cut Route 6, Clark asked Truscott to prepare alternatives and to be ready to switch from one to another at 48 hours' notice. Of the four scenarios prepared by Truscott, Operation Buffalo called for an attack through Cisterna, into the gap in the hills and to cut Route 6 at Valmontone. Operation Turtle on the other hand foresaw a main thrust to the left of the Alban Hills taking Campoleone, Albano and on to Rome. On May 5, Alexander selected Buffalo and issued Clark with orders to this effect.[55]

However, Clark was determined that VI Corps should strike directly for Rome as evidenced in his later writing: "We not only wanted the honor of capturing Rome, but felt that we deserved it... Not only did we intend to become the first army to seize Rome from the south, but we intended to see that people at home knew that it was the Fifth Army that did the job, and knew the price that had been paid for it."[56] He argued to Alexander that VI Corps did not have the strength to trap the German 10th Army and Alexander, instead of making his requirements clear, was conciliatory and gave the impression that a push on Rome was still a possibility if Buffalo ran into difficulties.[57] On May 6, Clark informed Truscott that "..the capture of Rome is the only important objective and to be ready to execute Turtle as well as Buffalo".[57]

Truscott's planning for Buffalo was meticulous: British 5th Division and 1st Division on the left were to attack along the coast and up the Via Anziate to pin the German 4th Parachute, 65th Infantry and 3rd Panzergrenadier in place whilst the U.S. 45th Infantry, 1st Armored and 3rd Infantry Divisions would launch the main assault, engaging the German 362nd and 715th Infantry Divisions and striking towards Campoleone, Velletri and Cisterna respectively. On the Allies' far right, the 1st Special Service Force would protect the American assault's flank.[58]

At 5:45 a.m. May 23, 1944, 1,500 Allied artillery pieces commenced bombardment. Forty minutes later the guns paused as attacks were made by close air support and then resumed as the infantry and armour moved forward.[59] The first day's fighting was intense: the 1st Armored Division lost 100 tanks and 3rd Infantry Division suffered 955 casualties. The Germans suffered too, with the 362nd Infantry Division estimated to have lost 50% of its fighting strength.[60]

Men of 'D' Company, 1st Battalion, Green Howards, part of 15th Brigade of British 5th Division, occupy a captured German communications trench during the breakout at Anzio, Italy, 22 May 1944.

Mackensen had been convinced that the Allies' main thrust would be up the Via Anziate, and the ferocity of the British feint on May 23 and 24 did nothing to persuade him otherwise. Kesselring, however, was convinced that the Allies' intentions were to gain Route 6 and ordered the Hermann Göring Panzer Division, resting 150 miles (240 km) away at Livorno,[lower-alpha 3] to Valmontone to hold open Route 6 for the Tenth Army, which was retreating up this road from Cassino.[61]

In the afternoon of May 25, Cisterna finally fell to 3rd Division who had to go house to house winkling out the German 362nd Infantry which had refused to withdraw and, as a consequence, had virtually ceased to exist by the end of the day. By the end of May 25, 3rd Infantry were heading into the Velletri gap near Cori, and elements of 1st Armored had reached within 3 miles (4.8 km) of Valmontone and were in contact with units of the Hermann Göring Division which were just starting to arrive from Leghorn.[lower-alpha 3] Although VI Corps had suffered over 3,300 casualties in the three days fighting, Operation Buffalo was going to plan, and Truscott was confident that a concerted attack by 1st Armored and 3rd Infantry Divisions the next day would get his troops astride Route 6.[62]

The final move on Rome

On the evening of May 25, Truscott received new orders from Clark via his Operations Officer, Brigadier General Don Brand. These were, in effect, to implement Operation Turtle and turn the main line of attack 90 degrees to the left. Most importantly, although the attack towards Valmontone and Route 6 would continue, 1st Armored were to withdraw to prepare to exploit the planned breakthrough along the new line of attack leaving 3rd Division to continue towards Valmontone with 1st Special Service Force in support.[63] Clark informed Alexander of these developments late in the morning of May 26 by which time the change of orders was a fait accompli.[64]

At the time, Truscott was shocked, writing later

...I was dumbfounded. This was no time to drive to the north-west where the enemy was still strong; we should pour our maximum power into the Valmontone Gap to ensure the destruction of the retreating German Army. I would not comply with the order without first talking to General Clark in person. ... [However] he was not on the beachhead and could not be reached even by radio... such was the order that turned the main effort of the beachhead forces from the Valmontone Gap and prevented destruction of the German Tenth Army. On the 26th the order was put into effect.[65]

He went on to write

There has never been any doubt in my mind that had General Clark held loyally to General Alexander's instructions, had he not changed the direction of my attack to the north-west on May 26, the strategic objectives of Anzio would have been accomplished in full. To be first in Rome was a poor compensation for this lost opportunity.[66]

On May 26, while the VI Corps was initiating its difficult maneuver, Kesselring threw elements of four divisions into the Velletri gap to stall the advance on Route 6. For four days they slugged it out against 3rd Division until finally withdrawing on May 30, having kept Route 6 open and allowed seven divisions from 10th Army to withdraw and head north of Rome.[67]

Monte Artemisio (812 m) with two peaks: Monte Peschio (939 m) and Maschio d'Ariano (891 m)

[68]

On the new axis of attack little progress was made until 1st Armored were in position on May 29, when the front advanced to the main Caesar C Line defences. Nevertheless, an early breakthrough seemed unlikely until on May 30 Major General Fred L. Walker's 36th Division found a gap in the Caesar Line at the join between 1st Parachute Corps and LXXVI Panzer Corps. Climbing the steep slopes of Monte Artemisio they threatened Velletri from the rear and obliged the defenders to withdraw. This was a key turning point, and von Mackensen offered his resignation which Kesselring accepted.[69]

Raising the pressure further, Clark assigned U.S. II Corps which, fighting its way along the coast from the Gustav Line, had joined up with VI Corps on May 25 to attack around the right hand side of the Alban Hills and advance along the line of Route 6 to Rome

On June 2 the Caesar Line collapsed under the mounting pressure, and 14th Army commenced a fighting withdrawal through Rome. On the same day Hitler, fearing another Stalingrad, had ordered Kesselring that there should be "no defence of Rome".[70] Over the next day, the rearguards were gradually overwhelmed, and Rome was entered in the early hours of June 4 with Clark holding an impromptu press conference on the steps of the Town Hall on the Capitoline Hill that morning. He ensured the event was a strictly American affair by stationing military police at road junctions to refuse entry to the city by British military personnel.[71]

A British soldier guards a group of German prisoners at Anzio, 22 January 1944.

Although controversy continues regarding what might have happened if Lucas had been more aggressive from the start, most commentators agree that the initial plan for Anzio was flawed. They question whether the initial landing of just over two infantry divisions, with no supporting armour, had the strength to achieve the objectives: of cutting Route 6 and then holding off the inevitable counterattacks that would come, as Kesselring redeployed his forces.

Volume 5 of Churchill's The Second World War is riddled with implied criticism of Lucas, blaming the failure on his caution. After the war, Kesselring gave his evaluation:

It would have been the Anglo-American doom to overextend themselves. The landing force was initially weak, only a division or so of infantry, and without armour. It was a halfway measure of an offensive; that was your basic error.[72]

Furthermore, Field Marshal Sir Harold Alexander, in his Official Dispatch, stated, "The actual course of events was probably the most advantageous in the end."[72]

Churchill defended the operation[73] and believed that sufficient forces were available. He had clearly made great political efforts to procure certain resources, especially the extra LSTs needed to deliver a second division to shore, but also specific units useful to the attack such as with the 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment. He argued that even regardless of the tactical outcome of the operation, there was immediate strategic benefit with regard to the wider war. After the landings, the German High Command dropped its plans to transfer five of Kesselring's best divisions to Northwestern Europe. That obviously benefited the upcoming Operation Overlord. Churchill also had to ensure the British-dominated forces in Italy were contributing to the war at a time when the Soviet Red Army were suffering tremendous losses on the Eastern Front.

Private Phillip Johnson of the 2/6th Battalion, Queen's Royal Regiment (West Surrey) inspects British graves at Anzio, Italy, 1 March 1944.

Because of Clark's change of plan, Operation Diadem (during which the U.S. Fifth Army and the British Eighth Army sustained 44,000 casualties) failed in its objective of destroying the German 10th Army. It also condemned the Allies to another year of bloody combat in Italy, notably around the Gothic Line from August 1944 through March 1945.

The greatest loss was that if the U.S. Army VI Corps main effort had continued on the Valmontone axis from May 26, Clark could probably have reached Rome more quickly than by the route northwest from Cisterna. The VI Corps could also have cut Highway 6 and then put much more pressure on the 10th Army than it actually did.[74]

Alan Whicker, who was a war correspondent with the British Army's Film and Photo Unit and was present during the fighting, later said:

After breaking out of Anzio, Alexander's plan was for the Fifth Army to drive east to cut Kesselring's escape route to the north and trap much of his Tenth and Fourteenth Armies. The operation started well, but then suddenly, when leading troops were only six kilometers from closing their trap at Frosinone, the Fifth Army was re-directed and sent north towards Rome. The trap was left open. General Mark Clark was so eager that the world should see pictures showing him as the liberator of Rome, that he allowed the armies of a delighted Kesselring to escape.

He had ignored the orders of Field Marshall Alexander in a decision as militarily stupid as it was insubordinate.

This, vain-glorious blunder, the worst of the entire war, lost us a stunning victory, lengthened the war by many months and earned Mark Clark the contempt of other American and British generals. They saw an operation that could have won the war in Italy, thrown away at the cost of many Allied lives, because of the obsession and vanity of one man.

If General Mark Clark had been in the German Army, Hitler would have had him shot.

— Alan Whicker[75]

The news cycle was similarly unkind to Clark. Just 2 days after his staged press conference on Rome's Capitolium, the "advance" was relegated to the back pages as reporting on the Normandy D Day invasion took center stage June 6.

• British actor Christopher Lee Participated in this battle in the No. 260 Squadron RAF.
• James Arness, actor best known for portraying Marshal Matt Dillon on the television series Gunsmoke for 20 years. Arness served in the United States Army during World War II and was severely wounded on the frontline of Anzio, serving with the 3rd Infantry Division, leading to a lifelong slight limp.
• James Chichester-Clark, Baron Moyola, a newly commissioned officer serving in the 1st Battalion, Irish Guards of 24th Guards Brigade of British 1st Infantry Division, who was later the fifth Prime Minister of Northern Ireland and eighth leader of the Ulster Unionist Party.
• Chester Cruikshank, twice United States hammer throw champion, received the Distinguished Service Cross for his actions in the Anzio-Nettuno area.[76]
• Denis Healey, later a Labour Party Defence Minister and Chancellor of the Exchequer, was the Military Landing Officer for the British assault brigade at Anzio.
• Hamish Henderson, noted Scottish communist and folklorist, was an intelligence officer at Anzio, where he interrogated German prisoners. It was at Anzio that he heard the tune "The Bloody Fields of Flanders", to which he later set alternative Scottish national and internationalist anthem "Freedom Come-All-Ye".[77]
• Bill Mauldin, noted cartoonist, creator of Willie and Joe, who appeared in the American Army newspaper Stars and Stripes, was in the Anzio-Nettuno area, serving with the 45th Infantry Division.
• Audie Murphy, Hollywood actor. Murphy became the most decorated United States combat soldier in United States military history. He received the Medal of Honor, the U.S. military's highest award for valor, along with 32 additional U.S. medals. He served with Company B, 1st Battalion, 15th Infantry Regiment, 3rd Infantry Division.[78]
• Major William Sidney, awarded the Victoria Cross for actions with the 5th Battalion, Grenadier Guards in the Anzio beachhead. Sidney's father in law, Lord Gort, also had been awarded the Victoria Cross in the First World War.
• BBC reporter Alan Whicker was at Anzio as a member of the British Army Film and Photo Unit. His 2004 documentary Whicker's War describes his experiences there.[75]
• William Woodruff (1916–2008), writer and historian, was a Major in the 24th Guards Brigade of the British 1st Infantry Division at Anzio. His book 'Vessel of Sadness' is based on his experience of the battle.
• Eric Fletcher Waters (1913–1944), the father of Pink Floyd bassist Roger Waters and a 2nd Lieutenant with the Royal Fusiliers, died at Anzio. Waters' death and the battle inspired his musician son to write several songs over his career, including "When The Tigers Broke Free" for the band's 1982 film, Pink Floyd – The Wall.
• General John William Vessey Jr., the tenth Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He was member of the 34th Infantry Division, and during the Battle of Anzio, he received a battlefield commission from first sergeant to second lieutenant.[79]

• Blumenson, Martin (2000) [1960]. "Chapter 13: General Lucas at Anzio". In Greenfield, Kent Roberts (ed.). Command Decisions. Vol. CMH Pub 70-7. United States Army Center of Military History. Archived from the original on 2007-12-30. Retrieved 2010-06-18.
• Muhm, Gerhard. "German Tactics in the Italian Campaign". Archived from the original on 2007-09-27. Retrieved 2007-07-26.
• Muhm, Gerhard (1993). "La Tattica tedesca nella Campagna d'Italia" [The German Tactics in the Italian Campaign]. In Montemaggi, Amedeo (ed.). Linea Gotica, avamposto dei Balcani [Gothic Line, an outpost in the Balkans] (in Italian). Rome, Italy: Edizioni Civitas. OCLC 859681332, 489650125.
• XIV Army Corps (Germany). Gliederung und Kriegstagebuch 14. Armee (From January to May 1944) (War diary of 14th German Army Corps) (in German).
• Lamson, Maj. Roy Jr.; Conn, Dr. Stetson (1948). Anzio 22 January – 22 May 1944. American Forces in Action Series. Washington: United States Army Center of Military History. CMH Pub 100-10. Archived from the original on 4 June 2011. Retrieved 4 August 2010.

Wikimedia Commons has media related to Operation Shingle.

• "A German defence Area on the Anzio Front". Intelligence Bulletin. U.S. Military Intelligence Service. 2 (11). July 1944. Retrieved 2008-09-26.
• Kappes, Irwin J. (2003). "Anzio — The Allies' Greatest Blunder of World War II". militaryhistoryonline.com website. Retrieved 2008-09-26.
• Anzio Beach head – contemporary film footage on YouTube
• The official history of the London Irish Rifles containing an account of the unit's participation in the Anzio battle
• Anzio 1944 – German 10. Armee and 14. Armee European Center of Military History