National Reconciliation (Sudan)

Nimeiri's attempt at implementing an "Islamic path" in Sudan from 1977 to 1985, including aligning with religious factions, ultimately failed. His transition from nationalist leftist ideologies to strict Islam was detailed in his books "Al-Nahj al-Islami limadha?" and "Al-Nahj al-Islami kayfa?" The connection between Islamic revival and reconciling with opponents of the 1969 revolution coincided with the rise of militant Islam in other parts of the world. Nimeiri's association with the Abu Qurun Sufi order influenced his shift towards Islam, leading him to appoint followers of the order into significant roles. The process of legislating the "Islamic path" began in 1983, culminating in the enactment of various orders and acts to implement sharia law and other Islamic principles.[11]

In September 1983, President Jaafar Nimeiri introduced sharia law in Sudan, known as September laws, symbolically disposing of alcohol and implementing hudud punishments like public amputations. Al-Turabi supported this move, differing from Al-Sadiq al-Mahdi's dissenting view. Al-Turabi and his allies within the regime also opposed self-rule in the south, a secular constitution, and non-Islamic cultural acceptance. The Islamic economy followed in early 1984, eliminating interest and instituting zakat. Nimeiri declared himself the imam of the Sudanese Umma in 1984.[11] Opposition to Nimeiri's Islamization came from various quarters. Southerners, northern secular and religious voices, and even the judiciary voiced concerns about the undemocratic implementation and lack of consultation. Sadiq al-Mahdi, leader of the Umma Party, initially jailed for his opposition.[12]

The first test of national reconciliation occurred during the February 1978 People's Assembly elections. Nimeiri authorised returning exiles who had been associated with the old Umma Party, the National Unionist Party, and the Muslim Brotherhood to stand for election as independent candidates. These independents won 140 of 304 seats, leading many observers to applaud Nimeiri's efforts to democratise Sudan's political system.[9][7] However, the People's Assembly elections marked the beginning of further political decline. The SSU's failure to sponsor official candidates weakened party discipline and prompted many assembly deputies who also were SSU members to claim that the party had betrayed them. As a result, an increasing number of assembly deputies used their offices to advance personal rather than national interests.[7]

The end of the SSU's political monopoly, coupled with rampant corruption at all levels of government, cast increasing doubt on Nimeiri's ability to govern Sudan. To preserve his regime, Nimeiri adopted a more dictatorial leadership style. He ordered the State Security Organisation to imprison without trial thousands of opponents and dissidents. Nimeiri also dismissed or transferred any minister or senior military officer who appeared to be developing their own power base. Nimeiri selected replacements based on their loyalty to him rather than on their abilities. This strategy caused the president to lose touch with popular feeling and the country's deteriorated political situation.[7]

In 1980 and 1981, Sudan faced significant challenges due to Libya's involvement in Chad and its complex relationship with Libya's Muammar Gaddafi. Tensions were further exacerbated by a history of mistrust and the fallout from a failed coup attempt in Khartoum in July 1976, in which Libyan elements played a role. This event strained Sudan-Libya relations, but over time, some of the coup plotters, including Sadiq al-Mahdi and Husayn al-Hindi, returned to Sudan, leading to a temporary improvement in relations.[13]

The situation in Chad, a country divided along religious lines, added further complexity. Sudan's involvement in brokering a ceasefire in February 1978 was short-lived, and Libya's claim to the resource-rich Aozou Strip only deepened regional tensions. In December 1980, Libyan forces occupied Chad's capital, N'Djamena, leading to concerns about the possibility of a Chado-Libyan union, which raised alarm bells in Khartoum and Cairo.[13] Sudan found itself supporting Chadian rebels, mainly from its Darfur region, which increased tensions. Libyan airstrikes on Darfur border villages prompted the U.S. to offer more support to Sudan. Although a full-scale Libyan invasion was unlikely, Sudan remained cautious due to past Libyan-backed coup attempts and took measures like detentions and military deployments to protect its stability.[13]

The eventual withdrawal of Libyan troops from Chad and the events that followed were not fully disclosed. Chadian President Goukouni Oueddei appeared to request their withdrawal, which Gaddafi complied with, and they were replaced by an OAU peacekeeping force partially funded by France. There were unconfirmed reports of a last-minute coup attempt by Libyan elements in Chad, but this seemed exaggerated.[13]

The tensions between Sudan and Chad, primarily fuelled by the Libyan presence in Chad, eased after the Libyan withdrawal. Sudan and Chad restored normal diplomatic ties, and President Nimeiri and President Oueddei established a working relationship, including an agreement to establish a "ministerial committee" to prevent Chadian rebels from using Sudan as a base.[13] However, Gaddafi's hostility toward the Nimeiri regime in Sudan persisted. There were concerns that Libya might continue its efforts to undermine the Khartoum government. Gaddafi maintained connections with anti-Nimeiri Sudanese groups in Libya and Ethiopia, and the tripartite pact between Libya, Southern Yemen, and Ethiopia remained a potential challenge to Nimeiri. This situation continued to pose a threat to Darfur and remained a challenge for U.S. policy in the region.[13]