Advanced SEAL Delivery System

According to the Government Accountability Office (GAO), the initial $70 million cost-plus contract ended up costing the government $885 million by 2007.[1] Instead of entering service in 2000, as was initially planned, testing continued and the first boat was not delivered until July 2003.[1] Global Security adds that the program was initially projected to cost $527 million over its lifetime, including delivery of all six subs,[1] but by 2003 total program cost was predicted to rise to more than $2 billion—significantly more than the $1.4 billion SSGN Tactical Trident conversion program to which it is related.[4] An independent GAO audit of the program published in 2007 placed the blame for the cost overruns on Northrop Grumman, the prime contractor, for failing to meet their time and cost estimates and on the Navy for accepting the ASDS "as is" and failing to hold Northrop Grumman accountable for cost overruns and delays.[1] After 2000, most of the cost overruns were for cost- and incentives . The Department of Defense endorsed GAO's findings.[8]

Funding was provided via Congressional line item to the Special Operations Command. The Navy Deep Submergence Office was selected as the technical design agent and program office. Technical assistance was provided by the Navy Experimental Dive Unit, Panama City, Florida; the Naval Special Warfare Command, Coronado, California; SEAL Delivery Vehicle Team 2, Norfolk, Virginia; and the Special Operations Command (SOCOM) Special Operations and Acquisition Logistics (SOAL), Tampa.[1]

• Power – The long range requirement strained the ability of existing battery technology.[5]
• Shock – Shock requirements for the vessel and its equipment were four times the limit for contemporary nuclear submarines. No submarine equipment of any kind existed that could survive the shock. Displays, computers, mountings, and life support equipment were expensive to re-engineer.
• Host needs – Weight, size, and center of gravity all were limited by what could be carried on the back of a Los Angeles-class submarine.
• Life Support – The large number of passengers for the small submarine, the need for fully automated and self-controlling systems, and the long periods of submersion (days) presented serious challenges that could not be met with Commercial Off The Shelf (COTS) nor Government Off The Shelf (GOTS) systems.[9] Existing systems used on large submarines required too much space and too much power. Existing systems on small submarines lacked capacity and the ease-of-use required for combat. Internal heating and cooling systems not usually needed for large submarines were needed for the smaller sub that would go into shallower warmer waters or colder surface waters.[10]

Navigation – Sonar systems developed for attack submarines, but needed for the shallow water maneuvers, were large, power hungry, and gave off excessive heat.

Construction – Full nuclear sub shock, hull and piping requirements were imposed on the designers – nullifying the "off the shelf" design approaches requested by the government in earlier phases. To accommodate the larger piping and thicker hull, other systems had to be lightened. (Reference the GAO and RAND reports.) The pressure hull construction was HY-80 alloy steel (same as larger nuclear powered submarines) and the batteries were contained in separate titanium alloy pressure enclosures (14 total) which hung beneath the hull. The outer surfaces, control surfaces, nose, and tail were constructed of fiberglass composite to give the submersible a streamlined shape. The pressure hull consisted of three compartments; an operations compartment (forward) where the submersible was piloted and controlled; a diving lockout chamber (middle); and a troop transport compartment (aft) where special operations commandos and their equipment are transported.

In April 2006, the program for new submarines was canceled and Northrop Grumman notified of termination. The current submarine was still in development and in use until it was damaged in a "serious fire" in November 2008. As of December 2008, the cause of the fire has yet to be determined.[11] Given the probable extent of fire and water damage (the mini-sub burned for six hours and remained sealed for two weeks) it was highly unlikely that the craft could be saved.[6] Repair was expected to cost $237 million,[7] more than triple the entire original contract.[11]

On 24 July 2009, US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) announced that the ASDS was not going to be repaired citing "competing funding priorities."[7]

After the Advanced SEAL Delivery System's cancellation, the Navy pursued the Joint Multi-Mission Submersible, although this follow-on program was abandoned in 2010 over cost concerns.[12]

These abandoned programs, and the currently operational SEAL Delivery Vehicle, are to be replaced by the Shallow Water Combat Submersible.[8][13]