Anti-Sunnism

Anti-Sunnism is hatred of, prejudice against, discrimination against, persecution of, and violence against Sunni Muslims.[1]

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Al-Masjid an-Nabawi in Medina, Saudi Arabia, where the Prophet Muhammad, the Caliph Abu Bakr and the Caliph Omar are buried, is one of the holiest sites in Sunni Islam.

Alternatively it has also been described as "Sunniphobia", which is the "Fear or hatred of Sunnism and Sunnites".[2]

The term "Wahhabi" has frequently been used to demonize lay Salafi Muslims.[3]

War on Terror rhetoric

Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab was a Sunni Muslim reformer of 18th century Arabia.[4] The religious clergy of the Ottoman Empire considered him and his supporters to be heretics and apostates.[5] They were labelled with the term Wahhabi. During the 19th century, the British colonial government in India placed anti-colonial Sunni scholars on trial in what became known as the "Great Wahhabi Trials" to suppress an imagined "Wahhabi conspiracy".[6][7]

To be a Wahhabi is officially a crime in Russia.[8][9] In Russian aligned Central Asian dictatorships, the term "Wahhabi" is used to refer to any unsanctioned religious activity. As a result, any Sunni Muslim, whether modernist, conservative, political or apolitical, is a potential target.[10]

In response to 9/11 World Trade Centre Bombings, the United States and its allies launched a controversial policy of an unprecedented counter-terrorism effort on an international scale dubbed as the War on Terror.[11] It was characterised by the infamous words "You are either with us or against us".[12] Both this approach, as well as the purpose of a War on Terror has been questioned.[13][14] It has also been accused of inciting various forms of Islamophobia on a global scale.[15][16]

The "War on Terror" rhetoric has been adopted by other authoritarian regimes.[17] Israel, Russia, China, etc. has frequently invoked the "Wahhabi" label to target Sunni Muslims.[18][19][20] Russia has employed its own "War on Terror" in the Second Chechen War, in the insurgency in the North Caucasus, and currently in the Russian intervention in the Syrian Civil War.[21]

In a sectarian twist, War on Terror rhetoric has also been weaponised by Shiite rulers of Iran[22][23] who adhere to Khomeinism, even closely cooperating with US frequently.[24] Iranian officials commonly invoke the "Wahhabi" label to further its sectarian identity politics in the region.[25] Even prior to the War on Terror, Iranian leaders like Ayatollah Khomeini and Rafsanjani had invoked the Wahhabi label describing Sunnis as "heretics" to stir up Sunniphobia and Iran's policy of exporting its Khomeinist revolutions.[26][27] The curriculum of Khomeinist seminaries in Iran are known for their sectarian depictions against Sunni Muslims, often portraying Sunnis and revered figures in Sunni history as "Wahhabis".[28]

Omair Anas argues that after the War on Terror, an imagined Wahhabi conspiracy replaced the United States as Iran's "Great Satan".[29] In this vein, Qassem Soleimani, the former chief of Iran's IRGC, said that Wahhabism had Jewish roots.[30][31] Hassan Nasrallah, the Secretary General of Hezbollah labelled "Wahhabism" as "more evil than Israel".[32] In 2016, Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif wrote an article in The New York Times entitled "Let Us Rid the World of Wahhabism", wherein he described Wahhabism as a "theological perversion" and "a death cult" that has "wrought havoc", and argued that "virtually every terrorist group abusing the name of Islam" was inspired by Wahhabism.[33][34][35]

Historic persecution

Safavid period
Main article: Safavid conversion of Iran to Shia Islam

In response to the growth of the Sunni Islam, the Safavid dynasty killed many Sunnis, attempted to convert them to Shi'ism, many of the burials of the Sunni saints were burned by the orders of Safavid Shahs, the Sunni states were also occupied.[36][37] They also cursed the first three caliphs of Sunni Muslims, and also Aisha and Hafsa, the daughters of first two caliphs and the wives of the Islamic prophet.[38][39]

Ismail I made new laws for Iran and the lands he controlled:

  • Imposing Shiism as the state and mandatory religion for the whole nation and much forcible conversion of Iranian Sufi Sunnis to Shiism.[40][41][42]
  • He reintroduced the Sadr (Arabic, leader) – an office that was responsible for supervising religious institutions and endowments. With a view to transforming Iran into a Shiite state, the Sadr was also assigned the task of disseminating Twelver doctrine.[43]
  • He destroyed Sunni mosques and massacred many Sunni civilians in iran and iraq. This was even noted by Tomé Pires, the Portuguese ambassador to China who visited Iran in 1511–12, who when referring to Ismail noted: "He (i.e. Ismail) reforms our churches, destroys the houses of all Moors who follow (the Sunnah of) Muhammad..."[44]
  • He enforced the ritual and compulsory cursing of the first three Sunni Caliphs (Abu Bakr, Umar, and Uthman) as usurpers, from all mosques, disbanded Sunni Tariqahs and seized their assets, used state patronage to develop Shia shrines, institutions and religious art and imported Shia scholars to replace Sunni scholars.[45][46][47]
  • He killed Sunnis and destroyed and desecrated their graves and mosques. This caused the Ottoman Sultan Bayezid II (who initially congratulated Ismail on his victories) to advise and ask the young monarch (in a "fatherly" manner) to stop the anti-Sunni actions. However, Ismail was strongly anti-Sunni, ignored the Sultan's warning, and continued to spread the Shia faith by the sword.[48][49]
  • He persecuted, imprisoned, exiled, and executed stubbornly resistant Sunnis.[50][51] When they resisted, he mostly did not have them killed outright, but had them arrested and violently forced their families to accept Shi'a Islam in front of their eyes, and in the end, whether they did it or not, they were killed and beheaded anyway and theirs heads placed in the gates for display.
  • With the establishment of Safavid rule, there was a very raucous and colourful, almost carnival-like holiday on 26 Dhu al-Hijjah (or alternatively, 9 Rabi' al-awwal) celebrating the assassination of Caliph Omer. The highlight of the day was making an effigy of Umar to be cursed, insulted, and finally burned. However, as relations between Iran and Sunni countries improved, the holiday was no longer observed (at least officially).[52]
  • In 1501, Ismail invited all the Shia living outside Iran to come to Iran and be assured of protection from the Sunni majority.[53]

Modern times

Iraq
Main article: Sunni Islam in Iraq

The post-Saddam government installed after the 2003 invasion of Iraq has been responsible for systematic discrimination of Sunni Muslims in bureaucracy, politics, military, police, as well as allegedly massacring Sunni Muslim prisoners in a sectarian manner.[54] The De-Ba'athification policy implemented after the toppling of the Baathist regime has mostly been targeting Sunni civil servants, politicians and military officials; leading to anti-Sunni discrimination in the bureaucracy and worsening of the sectarian situation in Iraq.[55] Many Sunnis were killed following the 2006 al-Askari mosque bombing during the Iraqi civil war.

International organizations like the Human Rights Watch have condemned Iraqi government and Iran-backed militant groups of committing sectarian massacres against the Sunni minority in Iraq, stating that these atrocities constituted "crimes against humanity".[56]

Barwana massacre
Main article: Barwana massacre

The massacre was allegedly committed by Shia militants, as a revenge for ISIS atrocities, in the Sunni village of Barwana, allegedly killing 70 boys and men.[57]

Hay al Jihad massacre
Main article: Hay al Jihad massacre

On 9 July 2006, in the Hay al-Jihad area of Baghdad, the capital of Iraq, an estimated 40 Sunni civilians were killed in revenge attacks carried out by Shia militants from the Mahdi Army.[58]

Musab bin Umair mosque massacre
Main article: Musab bin Umair mosque massacre

On 22 August 2014, Shia militants killed at least 73 people in an attack on the Sunni Mus`ab ibn `Umair mosque in the Imam Wais village of Iraq, the attack occurred during the Friday prayers, where many of the Sunnis were attending their prayers.[59] At the time of the attack, there were about 150 worshippers at the mosque. The Iran-backed Asaib Ahl al-Haq militant group, a splinter group of the Mahdi Army, are suspected to be the perpetrators.[60][61]

Iran
See also: 2022 Zahedan massacre

Since the 1979 Iranian Revolution, Sunni minority in Iran has essentially been treated as second-class citizens through sectarian policies by Iran's Khomeinist government. Sunni-majority provinces are neglected by the government, leading to socio-economic disenfranchisement and high rates of poverty.[62][63][64] Iran's first Supreme Leader Khomeini had held deeply anti-Sunni religious views, which was also reflected in the geo-political strategy he outlined in his "Last Will and Testament".[65] During the events of 1979 Revolution, Sunni-majority cities in Khuzestan, Western Azerbaijan and Golestan provinces were targets of sectarian attacks by Khomeinist militants. Many Sunni religious leaders and intellectuals who had initially backed the revolution were imprisoned by Khomeini during the 1980s.[66]

Political discrimination have since been normalized, with Sunnis being denied representation government bodies such as the Guardian Council, Assembly of Experts and the Expediency Council which are reserved for the Shias. It has also been argued that Sunnis are marginalized by the Iranian Majlis, with less than 6% of the seats being permitted for Sunnis since the establishment of the parliamentary body in 1980;[67][68] the percentage of Sunnis in Iran is usually estimated to be 5-10%,[69] but some Sunni leaders have claimed it to be "between 12 and 25 percent".[70]

After Khomeini's death in 1989, Iranian regime began publicly exporting Anti-Sunni rhetoric through propaganda and Khomeinist media outlets across the Islamic World, in increasing proportions particularly since the 2000s.[71] Apart from persecuting Sunnis abroad, Sunnis in Iran are also subject to systematic discrimination by the government. Ethnic minorities that are predominantly Sunni; such as the Kurds, the Balochs, and the Turkmens suffer the brunt of the religious persecution; and numerous Masajid (mosques) of these communities are routinely destroyed by the security forces. In spite of the presence of 10 million Sunni inhabitants in Tehran, the regime has also banned the presence of Sunni mosques in the city, leading to widespread discontent. Many Sunni Imams independent of the regime have been assassinated by Khomeinist deathsquads.[72]

In 2007, government tightened restrictions on Sunni religious schools and universities; and has forced Sunni tullab (religious students) to study in Khomeinist institutes.[73] In 2011, Iranian regime imposed restrictions that blocked Sunni Muslims from praying Eid prayers in congregation, at the city of Tehran.[74] Sunnis have been further discriminated through state-terror and increasingly sectarian policies of hardline President Ibrahim Raisi since 2021.[75]

In a brutal massacre known as "Bloody Friday" conducted in September 2022, IRGC and Basij forces opened fired and killed over 90 Sunni worshippers during Jumu'ah prayers at Jameh Mosque of Makki in Sistan-Balochistan, the largest Sunni mosque in Iran. Some worshippers had gone out of the mosque and marched on the police station across the street in protest against the recent alleged rape of a Baloch girl by a policeman, throwing stones; the security forces responded with fire and continued to shoot at the worshippers as some of them retreated back into the mosque. As of October 2022, the massacre is the deadliest incident that occurred as part of the military crackdown on 2022 Iranian protests. Molwi Abdolhamid Ismaeelzahi, popular Baloch Islamic scholar and spiritual leader of Iran's Sunni Muslim minority, who led the prayers, denounced the regime for the massacre and its "absolute lies" stereotyping the regular Sunni worshippers as Baloch separatists.[76][77][78] In an unusual speech condemning Ali Khamenei and Iranian army for the violence and bloodshed, Abdul Hamid declared:

"The supreme leader of the Islamic Republic, as the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, as well as other officials are all responsible, and no one can evade this responsibility.."[79]

State-sanctioned executions of dissidents have witnessed a massive spike in numbers during 2023. In May 2023 alone, Iran executed at least 142 individuals (78, or 55% of them, on drug-related charges), its highest monthly rate since 2015. At least 30 of those executed were from the Sunni Baluch minority.[80][81]

1973 Hanafi Muslim massacre
Main article: 1973 Hanafi Muslim massacre

The Hanafi Muslim massacre of 1973 took place on the afternoon of 18 January 1973, when two adults and a child were shot dead. Four other children between the ages of nine and ten drowned. Two others were seriously injured. The murders took place at a home whose street address was 7700 16th Street NW, Washington, D.C., which a group of Hanafi Muslims bought and named the "Hanafi American Muslim Rifle and Pistol Club".[82][83][84]

See also

References
  1. John Richard Thackrah (5 September 2013). Dictionary of Terrorism (2, revised ed.). Routledge. p. 252. ISBN 978-1-135-16595-6.
  2. "Meaning of Sunniphobia". Words Look.
  3. "The Wahhabi Myth: Debunking the Bogeyman". Muslim Matters. April 1, 2007. Archived from the original on 29 November 2020.
  4. "Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, Muhammad (d. 1791)". Oxford Islamic Studies online. Archived from the original on 12 July 2016.
  5. SAUDI ARABIA WAHHÂBÎSM & THE SALAFÎ SECT: UNDERSTANDING THE GREAT CONSPIRACY. Johannesburg, South Africa: Dar al Ahnaf. p. 81. "Shaykh Muhammad Ibn Sulaymân al-Madanî ash-Shâfi'î, as quoted in the book 'Ashadd ul-Jihâd', declared his belief a heresy and formally excommunicated him by issuing a fatwâ, the text of which said: " This man is leading the ignoramuses of the present age to a heretical path. He is attempting to extinguish Allah's light, but Allah will not permit His light to be extinguished."
  6. Stephens, Julia (January 5, 2009). "The "Great Wahabi Trial": The Legal Construction and Deconstruction of the Muslim Jihadi in British India, 1869–71". American Historical Association. Archived from the original on 5 October 2020.
  7. Stephens, Julia (January 2013). "The Phantom Wahhabi: Liberalism and the Muslim fanatic in mid-Victorian India". Modern Asian Studies. 47 (1): 22–52. doi:10.1017/S0026749X12000649. JSTOR 23359778. S2CID 145092951 – via JSTOR. ABSTRACT In the late 1860s and early 1870s the British colonial government in India suppressed an imagined Wahhabi conspiracy, which it portrayed as a profound threat to imperial security.
  8. "Совет муфтиев России выступил против запрета ваххабизма". 2 April 2018. Archived from the original on 5 April 2018.
  9. "Attack on Wahhabi Islam divides Russian Muslims: COUNCIL OF MUFTIS OF RUSSIA SPEAKS OUT AGAINST BAN OF WAHHABISM - "While deeply aware of the vital importance of combating the ideology of intolerance and devoting great efforts in this direction, we nevertheless consider that the introduction of the principle of prosecution of believers for their convictions and not for specific illegal actions will have a most harmful effect both on the Muslim community of Russia and inter-ethnic harmony and on the legal culture of the Russia state," the statement of the Council of Muftis says, which was posted on Monday on its website". stetson.edu. Archived from the original on 26 January 2021.
  10. Commins, David (2006). The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia. London, New York: I.B.Tauris & Co Ltd. p. 192. In Russia and Central Asia, public figures and the media see Wahhabism as the inspiration for religious revival and Islamic political movements. During the Soviet era, official apprehensions emerged about an 'Islamic threat' posed by Sufi orders as nests of secret conspiracies against the communist system. In the post-Soviet era, Sufism has assumed a positive connotation as a moderate form of Islam opposed to Wahhabism, which has become a sort of bogeyman in public discourse. Pejorative use of the term cropped up in the late Soviet era, when members of the official religious establishment castigated proponents of expunging ritual of non-scriptural elements for 'importing' Wahhabism, thus implying that it is alien to the region's heritage. Many Russians believe that after the Afghan war, Wahhabis infiltrated Central Asia to spread their version of Islam. Thus, in 1998, political leaders of Russia, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan declared their readiness to confront 'a threat of aggressive fundamentalism, aggressive extremism and above all Wahhabism. This is what we have currently in Afghanistan and in troubled Tajikistan.' The government of Uzbekistan tags unsanctioned religious activity with the Wahhabi label. The problem with this outlook is that it conflates differences among a variety of Muslim religious movements, which include militant and reformist political tendencies alongside utterly apolitical ones. Thus, a leading Tajik modernist who favours a blend of democracy and Islam has been branded a Wahhabi even though he has ties to Sufi circles
  11. H. Daddler , M Lindsay, Ivo , James (Dec 1, 2001). "Nasty, Brutish and Long: America's War on Terrorism". BROOKINGS. Archived from the original on 19 November 2020.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
  12. "'You are either with us or against us'". CNN. November 6, 2001. Archived from the original on 24 January 2016.
  13. Odom, William (27 February 2014). "American Hegemony: How to Use It, How to Lose It" (PDF). Archived (PDF) from the original on 21 January 2016.
  14. K Albright, Madeleine (June 2, 2009). "Obama's Muslim Speech "According to Muslim speakers at such events, one fact stands out: When the cold war ended, America needed an enemy to replace Communism and chose Islam...Mr. Obama's dilemma is that no speech, however eloquent, can disentangle U.S.-Muslim relations from the treacherous terrain of current events in places such as Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran and the Middle East...Muslims desire respect and respect demands frankness. We cannot pretend that American soldiers and aircraft are not attacking Muslims."". The New York Times. Archived from the original on 19 July 2016.
  15. A. Beydoun, Khalid (2020). "Exporting Islamophobia in the Global "War On Terror"" (PDF). NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW ONLINE. Archived (PDF) from the original on 26 April 2020.
  16. Carrington, Kerry; Ball, Matthew; O'Brien, Erin; Tall, Juan (2013). Crime, Justice and Social Democracy: International Perspectives. UK: PALGRAVE MACMILLAN. pp. 133–144. doi:10.1057/9781137008695_9. ISBN 978-1-137-00868-8. Archived from the original on 27 March 2020. When, in September 2001, the right-wing Republican president of the US proclaimed the 'war on terrorism', which he also dubbed a 'crusade', George W. Bush was soon joined in such battle by his staunch British ally Tony Blair, a Labour prime minister. A populist prime minister of the conservative coalition in Australia, John Howard faithfully entered the fray on behalf of this nation, which likewise imagines itself to have a special relationship with the USA. All these allies participated in the unlawful invasion of Afghanistan the following month, in the name of this war on terrorism, and of Iraq eighteen months later. The forces of all three countries are still in Afghanistan, with very little difference to this fact having been made by the now Democratic presidency in the US, the now Tory-led coalition in the UK, or the now Labor government in Australia. Really, existing labour parties - when in government, that is - have taken a very similar stance in relation to securing militarily the US-led global empire to that of their conservative opponents. All have participated similarly in state crime in the 'war on terror'; indeed all have been comparably complicit in what I call 'empire crime'
  17. A Beydoun, Khaled (2020). "EXPORTING ISLAMOPHOBIA IN THE GLOBAL "WAR ON TERROR"". New York University Law Review Online. 95 (81): 84. Beyond genuine national security threats, countries across the world capitalized on the conflation of Islam with terrorism to serve discrete national interests. This American War on Terror furnished nations with license, and more importantly, a policing template and language to profile and persecute their Muslim minority populations. American Islamophobia, buoyed by swift state action including the War in Afghanistan and the USA PATRIOT Act, manifested in a surge of vigilante violence against Muslims and "Muslim-looking" groups and had global impact
  18. Delong-Bas, Natana J. (2004). Wahhabi Islam:From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad. New York: OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS. pp. 123–124. ISBN 0199883548. Many of the regimes and movements labeled as Wahhabi in the contemporary era do not necessarily share the same theological and legal orientations. The reality is that Wahhabism has become such a blanket term for any Islamic movement that has an apparent tendency toward misogyny, militantism, extremism, or strict and literal interpretation of the Quran and hadith that the designation of a regime or movement as Wahhabi or Wahhabi-like tells us little about its actual nature. Furthermore, these contemporary interpretations of Wahhabism do not nec- essarily reflect the writings or teachings of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab
  19. Atkin, Muriel. "THE RHETORIC OF ISLAMOPHOBIA". CA&C Press AB. In political, as well as religious matters, any Muslim who challenges the status quo is at risk of being labeled a Wahhabi. This is how the KGB and its post-Soviet successors have used the term. In fact, the KGB may have played a large role in promoting its use
  20. Commins, David (2006). The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia. London: I.B TAURIS. p. 192. Pejorative use of the term cropped up in the late Soviet era, when members of the official religious establishment castigated proponents of expunging ritual of non-scriptural elements for 'importing' Wahhabism, thus implying that it is alien to the region's heritage.Many Russians believe that after the Afghan war, Wahhabis infiltrated Central Asia to spread their version of Islam. Thus, in 1998, political leaders of Russia, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan declared their readiness to confront 'a threat of aggressive fundamentalism, aggressive extremism and above all Wahhabism. This is what we have currently in Afghanistan and in troubled Tajikistan. The government of Uzbekistan tags unsanctioned religious activity with the Wahhabi label. The problem with this outlook is that it conflates differences among a variety of Muslim religious movements, which include militant and reformist political tendencies alongside utterly apolitical ones. Thus, a leading Tajik modernist who favours a blend of democracy and Islam has been branded a Wahhabi even though he has ties to Sufi circles.
  21. Shuster, Simon (September 19, 2011). "How the War on Terrorism Did Russia a Favor". TIME.
  22. Zammit, Wael (30 August 2015). "US–Iran "Special" Relations Between 2001 and 2003: Friends or Foes? "The "war on terror" created a rare opportunity for Iran and U.S. to come together". E-International Relations. p. 14. Archived from the original on 20 April 2017. In one of their meetings, the member of the Iranian delegation had a message for the American government: "Iran was prepared to work unconditionally with the United States in the "war on terror" and if they could work with [the Americans] on this issue, it had the potential to fundamentally transform U.S.-Iranian relations." Commenting on this, reporter John Richardson said that such a statement had "seismic diplomatic implications" ... " In Tehran, the Iranians opted for rapprochement as they wanted to ensure that the U.S. military campaign in Afghanistan could succeed, and they had their own reasons. In fact, the American decision to destroy the infrastructure of al-Qaeda and topple the Taliban served major political, economic and strategic goals for Tehran" .. "To eliminate the Taliban regime would also mean to put an end to the support the Mujahedin-e-Khalq (MEK) received from Iran's enemies and neighbors: Afghanistan and Sadam's Iraq. Last but not least, Iran wanted to play an active role in the "war on terror;" reduce tension and improve relations with Western countries including the United States and assure Tehran's full integration in the international community." Pg.15 "The "war on terror" created a rare opportunity for Iran and U.S. to come together. Hilary Mann,who had just joined the National Security Council staff as its resident Iran expert and Ryan Crocker, a senior State Department official, sit with Iranian officials who expressed their will to cooperate with the Americans and re-establish diplomatic relations." Pg.16 "I an interview with Barbara Slavin in 2005, former Iran Revolutionary Guards Corps' chief commander, Mohsen Rezaie, stated that the Islamic Republic played an "important role" in capturing Kabul as members of IRGC "fought alongside and advised the Afghan rebels who helped U.S. forces topple Afghanistan's Taliban regime" in the months after the September 11 terrorist attacks. Such a stance is further emphasized by Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld who discussed the war on Afghanistan on CBS in November 11, 2001, two days before the fall of Kabul and asserted that "there [were] some Iranian liaison people, as well as some American liaison people working with the same Afghan forces." Besides, Slavin confirms the Iranian role and argues that members of the IRG Qods Brigade were on the field when the Alliance, with U.S. air support, took control of Kabul."... "The American-Iranian cooperation did not end after the successful overthrow of the Taliban regime. The rapprochement between the two arch-foes was further illustrated in their collaboration to create an interim post-Taliban government in Afghanistan. Whereas, Iran's role in the "war on terror" was largely secret, its role in forming a "broad-based, multiethnic, politically balanced, freely chosen" government was rather direct as the American and Iranian diplomats met and collaborated via the Six plus Two group.
  23. Sebnem Oruc, Merve (25 February 2020). "How did the world buy Assad's 'war on terror' narrative?". Daily Sabah. p. While the Assad regime and its most loyal backer Iran provided an opportunity for the rise of al-Qaida and Daesh in Syria, Damascus also allowed the radicals to travel abroad freely to confuse the Westerners. The extremists went abroad and recruited sympathizers, brought them to Syria for training and then sent them back. Assad’s clerics had already threatened the West; they kept their promise and made Daesh bombings happen in the Western countries. It was a “shock and awe” tactic that actually worked. The Western leaders who were against Assad’s rule became the targets of far-right and leftist political groups in Europe. And finally, Islamophobia – Sunniphobia is the right word actually – started to rise in the West as every Sunni was seen as a threat by the white supremacists and their circles of influence.
  24. N. Katz, Mark. "Iran and the "War on Terror"". Middle East Policy Council.
  25. Ostovar, Afshon (30 November 2016). "Sectarian Dilemmas in Iranian Foreign Policy: When Strategy and Identity Politics Collide". Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Archived from the original on 25 April 2018. However, by equating takfirism and Wahhabism, Iran further muddies the water of identity politics. It is a way of confusing the sectarian dynamic in Iraq and Syria, by asserting that the other side is not actually Sunni, but rather an extreme ideological movement (takfirism) that is beyond the pale of Islam and, therefore, not even Islamic. Like the case of the Saudi grand mufti, such rhetoric allows Iranian officials to indulge in their own game of takfir—articulating who is and who is not a Muslim and justifying actions accordingly. To neutral observers of Wahhabism, such accusations might touch on truth, but as a foreign policy tool, they only beget further acrimony from Iran's Sunni neighbors.
  26. Kramer, Martin (11 October 2010). "Khomeini's Messengers in Mecca". MartinKramer.org. Khomeini declared that the Saudi rulers, "these vile and ungodly Wahhabis, are like daggers which have always pierced the heart of the Muslims from the back," and announced that Mecca was in the hands of "a band of heretics."32 Once more, the Saudis were transformed into what the speaker of the parliament, Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani, called "Wahhabi hooligans." Rafsanjani recalled the nineteenth-century Wahhabi massacres (of Shi'ites) in Najaf and Karbala, the Wahhabi destruction of Islamic monuments in Medina (venerated by Shi'ites), and the Wahhabi burning of libraries (containing Shi'ite works). The Wahhabis "will commit any kind of crime. I ask you to pay more attention to the history of that evil clique so that you can see what kind of creatures they have been in the course of their history."33 This represented a deliberate attempt to fuel a present crisis with the memory of past sectarian hatreds."
  27. Rabinovich, Itamar; Shaked, Haim, eds. (1989). Middle East Contemporary Survey. Vol. XI 1987. Boulder, San Francisco, London: Westview Press. p. 174. ISBN 0-8133-0925-5. Iranian statements pandered to the belief still held by Shi'ites that the fanatic Saudis were driven by their own misguided beliefs to kill innocent Shi'ite pilgrims. Khomeini declared that the Saudi rulers, "these vile and ungodly Wahhabis, are like daggers which have always pierced the heart of the Muslims from the back," and announced that Mecca was in the hands of "a band of heretics." Once more, the Saudis were transformed into what the speaker of the parliament, Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani, called "Wahhabi hooligans." Rafsanjani recalled the nineteenth-century Wahhabi massacres (of Shi'ites) in Najaf and Karbala, the Wahhabi destruction of Islamic monuments in Medina (venerated by Shi'ites), and the Wahhabi burning of libraries (containing Shi'ite works). The Wahhabis "will commit any kind of crime. I ask you to pay more attention to the history of that evil clique so that you can see what kind of creatures they have been in the course of their history." This represented a deliberate attempt to fuel a present crisis with the memory of past sectarian hatreds.
  28. Luz, Anwar (28 February 2023). "How Two Months at an Iranian Seminary Changed My Life". New Lines Magazine. Archived from the original on 9 March 2023.
  29. Anas, Omair (September 17, 2016). "Iran's new Great Satan: Saudi Arabia and its Wahhabi ideology". FirstPost. Archived from the original on 21 March 2020.
  30. "Soleimani: Wahhabism Has Jewish Roots". Iran International. 23 February 2019.
  31. J. Frantzman, Seth (February 22, 2019). "IRGC General Soleimani says roots of Wahhabism are Jewish, linked to ISIS". The Jerusalem Post.
  32. Williams, Jennifer (27 September 2016). "The head of Hezbollah has found someone he hates even more than Israelis". Vox. "Hassan Nasrallah, the secretary general of a group that has been fighting Israel for decades, declared on Tuesday that "Wahhabism is more evil than Israel," Lebanon's Al Akhbar newspaper reported."... "In other words, things have gotten so bad that Hezbollah, Israel's mortal enemy, now considers Wahhabis — that is, fellow Muslims — to be worse than Israel. Bear in mind, this is coming from the same man who has described Israel as "a cancerous entity and the root of all the crises and wars" and pledged that Israel's destiny "is manifested in our motto: 'Death to Israel.'"
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