Opus Dei and politics

Critics, however, point to a letter written on 23 May 1958 by Escrivá to General Francisco Franco, dictator of Spain. They also say that Escrivá supported Franco. On the other hand, members of Opus Dei say that the letter of Escrivá (written 8 years after the US, the UN and Allies recognized Franco) shows his exemplary virtues as a citizen and a Catholic priest, as he says: "Although a stranger to any political activity, I cannot help but rejoice as a priest and Spaniard" that Spain's Head of State should proclaim that Spain accepts the law of God according to the doctrine of the Roman Catholic Church, a faith which will inspire its legislation. Escrivá tells him that "It is in fidelity to our people's Catholic tradition that the best guarantee of success in acts of government, the certainty of a just and lasting peace within the national community.... will always be found." According to supporters, by saying this Escrivá was encouraging Franco (together with hundreds of Spaniards who wrote to Franco) to respect human rights, human dignity and freedom. They say that Escrivá acknowledged Franco's role in bringing order to the country but he totally rejected any form of clericalism whereby Catholics have a single-party mentality or use public power as a secular arm of the Church. Supporters also refer to an immediate correction given by Escrivá to Franco when one of the numeraries was insulted by the regime as "a person without a family." (del Portillo, 1996, p. 25-28) However, historians agree that the Catholic Church, of which Escrivá was a member, was a bulwark of the Franco regime, notwithstanding the dictatorship's brutal repression against Republicans and Communists following the Spanish Civil War.

John Allen in Opus Dei: Secrets and Power in the Catholic Church (2005) states that from the very beginning to the end of the Franco regime Escrivá maintained a complete silence about Franco's government. He claims that there is not one public statement on the records from Escriva — either critical of the regime or in favor. In the 1930s and 1940s, this silence was even interpreted as passive opposition. By the 1960s and 1970s, when the overwhelming sentiment in Spanish Roman Catholicism had become critical of Franco, his silence was interpreted as a kind of covert support. This silence, according to Allen, meant there was no corporate position of Opus Dei towards Franco.

“[I]t’s worth noting that in the context of the Spanish Civil War, in which anticlerical Republican forces killed 13 bishops, 4,000 diocesan priests, 2,000 male religious, and 300 nuns, virtually every group and layer of life in the Catholic Church in Spain was ‘pro-Franco.’” Allen goes on to note that despite this fact, “there is no instance in which [Escrivá] either praised or criticized the regime” throughout its long reign. “In the 1930s and 1940s, when the overwhelming sentiment in Catholic Spain was pro-Franco, Escrivá’s silence was therefore often read to betoken a hidden liberalism; by the 1960s and 1970s, when Catholic opinion had shifted, that same silence was interpreted as masking a pro-Franco conservatism,” he writes. “The overall impression one gets is that Escrivá strove to maintain neutrality with respect to the Franco regime, even if privately he felt some sympathy for a leader trying by his lights to be an upright Christian,” Mr. Allen concludes. “A charge of ‘pro-Franco’ cannot be sustained, except in the generic sense that most Spanish Catholics were initially supportive of Franco.... The most one can say is that Escrivá was not ‘anti-Franco’ either.”

Critics underline that several Opus Dei members were appointed ministers in General Francisco Franco's government. They say that this is evidence of the organization's penetration into the highest echelons of Spain's Fascist regime. Others note the origins of Opus Dei itself and the decision of its founder, Escrivá de Balaguer, to flee first to France during the Spanish Civil War and then to join the insurgent generals in Burgos, then capital for the rebels seeking to overthrow Spain's democratically elected leftist government. It is worth noting that Opus Dei's first offices in Madrid were in the same building as the Ministry of the Interior.

According to Berglar, the claim that ministers who served under Franco are proof of the link between fascism and Opus Dei is incorrect; he argues that many Opus Dei members had the personal qualifications to be appointed in government as technocrats assisting in the NATO-USA supported economic Spanish miracle: "In 1957 Franco restructured his cabinet with a view to restoring the economy of Spain and guiding the nation toward a modern fiscal system. With such purposes in mind, he appointed a number of talented young bankers and economists." These technocrats were largely responsible for devising, introducing, and later administering the economic stabilization program that formed the basis of Spain's economic development, encouraging competition as a means of achieving rapid economic growth, and favoring economic integration with Europe.

Historian Paul Preston, a specialist on the Spanish Civil War and Franco, states the following: "The arrival of the technocrats has been interpreted variously as a planned take-over by Opus Dei and a clever move by Franco to 'fill vacant seats in the latest round of musical chairs'. In fact, the arrival of the technocrats was neither sinister nor cunning but rather a piecemeal and pragmatic response to a specific set of problems. By the beginning of 1957, the regime faced political and economic bankruptcy. Franco and Carrero Blanco were looking for new blood and fresh ideas. To be acceptable, new men had to come from within the Movimiento, be Catholic, accepted the idea of an eventual return to the monarchy and be, in Francoist terms, apolitical. López Rodó, Navarro Rubio and Ullastres were ideal. López Rodó was the nominee of Carrero Blanco. The dynamic Navarro Rubio was the Caudillo's choice. Franco had known him since 1949. He was a Procurador en Cortes for the Sindicatos and had been highly recommended by the outgoing Minister of Agriculture, Rafael Cavestany. Both López Rodó and Navarro Rubio suggested Ullastres...Bright, hard-working functionaries were emerging who were more concerned to get top jobs in the state apparatus than to implement the ideology of Falangism. That was entirely true of men like López Rodó and Navarro Rubio who were labelled as being primarily of Opus Dei but were more accurately seen as being part of what came to be called the 'bureaucracy of number ones', those who had won competitive civil service examinations or university chairs while still very young." (Italics added)

Brian Crozier also states: "The charge that Opus Dei had been aiming at political power, and had achieved it at last, was heard in February 1957, when Ullastres and Navarro Rubio joined Franco’s cabinet. In this bare form, the charge seems to be unfounded because based on a misconception of what Opus Dei is. It is not, as its enemies either think or want others to think, a political party; nor is it a political pressure group. Nor, for that matter, is it a kind of super labour-exchange for politicians... What happened was more pragmatic and less sinister. Franco had heard of the intellectual and technical merits of Ullastres and Navarro Rubio and sent for them; they happened to be members of Opus Dei. On the same occasion, he had heard of the intellectual and technical merits of Castiella and Gual Villalbi and sent for them; but Castiella and Gual Villalbi happened not to be members of Opus Dei. In other words, Opus Dei was not a group to be conciliated by being given a share in power, as the Monarchists were, or the Falange, or the Army." (Italics added)

Messori, who is not a member of Opus Dei, also states that there were only 8 members of Opus Dei (5 of whom served for only one term or but a few months) of the 116 ministers under Franco's regime, and they started serving only after 1956, a few years after the Allies recognized it. There was no Opus Dei member in his last cabinet. They were never a majority: "The myth of an Opus Dei dominated Franco government is just that--a myth" (Messori 1997, p. 30) (Berglar 1994, p. 186).

Antonio Fontán, Spanish journalist who fought for press freedom and democracy under Franco and was repeatedly persecuted by the regime. Fontan later became the first Senate President of Spain's democracy.

A number of historians say that there were members who were sentenced to prison or left Spain under Franco because they did not agree with the politics of Franco and his regime. (See Opus Dei: Prominent Members) Antonio Fontán and Rafael Calvo Serer are examples of journalists who fought for democracy and press freedom and were persecuted by Franco's Regime. Antonio Fontan would later become the Senate President. Falangists, the main political organization supporting Franco, suspected Escrivá of "internationalism, anti-Spanish sentiment, and freemasonry," according to Berglar, who states that "during "the first decade of Franco's regime, Opus Dei and Escrivá were attacked with perseverance bordering on fanaticism, not by enemies but by supporters of the new Spanish state". Escrivá was even reported to the 'Tribunal for the Fight against Freemasonry.'" (Berglar 1994, p.180-181; see also Vasquez de Prada 1997).

Investigative journalist John L. Allen Jr., who is not a member of Opus Dei, supports Berglar's statements. John Allen also says that there were Opus Dei priests who were involved in opposition movements. He also states that the only Spanish bishop who was put in jail during the Franco era is one of the two Opus Dei cardinals, Cardinal Julián Herranz, who was a young Opus Dei layman at that time fighting for agrarian revolution in Andalusia, Spain.

Allen also states that Opus Dei members (sociologically speaking and not institutionally speaking) acted towards Franco as all Spanish Catholics would. Sociologically at the beginning of Franco's regime, they hailed him as a savior who liberated them from the communism and anarchism of the Second Spanish Republic;this attitude evolved through time and in the end, like most Catholics, they were 50-50 for Franco.