Raid on Sidi Haneish Airfield

Raid on Sidi Haneish Airfield
	Part of the Western Desert Campaign of the Second World War
	; Colonel David Stirling with Lt Edward McDonald and other SAS soldiers in North Africa.
Date	26–27 July 1942
Location	Sidi Haneish Airfield, north-western Egypt31°09′45″N 27°37′38″E
Result	Allied victory
Belligerents
United Kingdom; Free France	Germany
Commanders and leaders
David Stirling; Carol Mather; Paddy Mayne	Unknown
Strength
Long Range Desert Group; 18 armed jeeps; Special Air Service	Unknown
Casualties and losses
2 killed in action; 3 jeeps lost;	37 aircraft destroyed Numerous casualties;

The Raid on Sidi Haneish Airfield was a military operation carried out the night of 26 July 1942. A British Special Air Service unit commanded by Major David Stirling attacked a German-held airfield in Egypt during the Western Desert Campaign of Second World War. Several Luftwaffe aircraft used to ferry supplies to the Axis forces were destroyed or damaged with machine-gun fire and explosives. Axis front line units were diverted to reinforce the garrisons in the rear vulnerable to attack.[1]

Background

Axis supply

In November 1941, 70% of supplies being sent to Axis forces in North Africa were lost to Allied air and naval attacks.[2] By 1942, German and Italian forces in North Africa faced a serious supply shortage with Allied forces sinking merchant ships in the Mediterranean Sea. Axis supplies were being transported down the Italian Peninsula, mainly by rail, to southern ports for shipment to North Africa. The Royal Navy was deploying growing numbers of ships and submarines to the area to intercept Axis supply convoys forcing the Luftwaffe to carry some of the burden of supplying the Afrika Korps and Italian troops by air. The terrain in North Africa often made land transport impractical, forcing aircraft to fly between remote desert airstrips to deliver supplies, parts, troops and food.[3][4]

Special Air Service

In July 1941, Major David Stirling formed the Special Air Service for bold operations behind Axis lines. Initially dubbed 'L' Detachment, Special Air Service Brigade, the unit consisted of men drawn from conventional British units and given ad hoc parachute training.[5] The unit was based in Jalo Oasis and gained a reputation for daring raids on German bases, infiltrating them and destroying parked aircraft with explosives.[6] Stirling became known among the Germans as the "Phantom Major".[7]

Prelude

Stirling had for some time been developing a plan to attack the Sidi Haneish Airfield, a complex located 235 mi (378 km) west of Cairo, which the Germans called Haggag el Qasaba. The raid was to involve a tactic unfamiliar to the SAS; storming the base in vehicles, rather than discreetly penetrating it. He enlisted the Long Range Desert Group to provide vehicles and transport, judging the firepower and speed of the jeeps to be sufficient to overcome the German defences. The raiders were to drive 50 mi (80 km) through the desert from a hideout in Bir el Quseir and then overrun the airfield in 18 jeeps in two columns, with Stirling at the lead. Each jeep carried four Vickers K machine guns, a rapid-firing weapon, originally designed for Royal Air Force (RAF) aircraft. On the night of 25/26 July, the men held a dress rehearsal.[8]

Raid

The raid commenced on the night of 26/27 July, with the 18 jeeps, each carrying three or four British or French commandos, navigating the desert in formation without headlights. The weather was ideal with a full moon and no clouds. As the raiders approached the airfield, the lights lining the runway switched on, causing concern among the commandos who feared they had been detected but the lights had been turned on for a Luftwaffe bomber to land. Stirling fired a green flare and ordered the jeeps forward onto the airfield in 'V' formation.[9] The SAS stormed the airfield, using their K guns, loaded with tracer ammunition, to fire on the parked German aircraft which included Junkers Ju 87 Stuka dive bombers, Ju 52 cargo aircraft and Messerschmitt Bf 109 fighters. German troops retaliated with machine-guns and anti-aircraft weapons, disabling one jeep. Lance Bombardier John Robson, a 21-year-old SAS soldier manning a machine-gun, was shot and killed, the only Allied casualty of the raid itself.[10] The raiders used most of their ammunition and maneuvered to escape after a last sweep for undamaged aircraft. Paddy Mayne placed a bomb in the engine of a parked bomber before withdrawing.[11] The raiders destroyed or damaged around 40 Luftwaffe aircraft, though the SAS claimed 25 as it was customary to under-report Axis losses.

Escape

The raiders escaped into the desert, less one jeep and one man killed and split into groups of three to five jeeps, seeking to evade detection by German aircraft since only two and a half hours of darkness remained; in daylight, they would become vulnerable to air attack. The SAS hid during the day, camouflaging their vehicles and all but one group reached Bir el Quseir. A group of jeeps operated by French troops were slowed by punctures and breakdowns, exposing them in the desert. They were spotted by four Stuka dive-bombers which made nine attacks, fatally wounding paratrooper André Zirnheld. After the Stukas ran out of ammunition, the commandos boarded the last operational jeep and reached safety.[12][13]

Aftermath

The raid was a great success, several of the destroyed German aircraft being Junkers 52 transport aircraft, loss of which exacerbated Axis supply difficulties.

Stirling himself was captured by the Germans in January 1943 and spent the rest of the war in and out of Axis prisoner of war camps. He was replaced by Mayne as commander of the SAS.[14]

Footnotes

Zabecki 2015, p. 543.
Polmar 2006, p. 135.
Spencer 2014, p. 16.
Zabecki 2014, p. 816.
Lewis 2015, p. 13.
Mortimer 2012, p. 134.
Mortimer 2015b, p. 57.
Mortimer 2015a, pp. 35–37.
Macintyre 2016, p. 199.
James 2015, p. 329.
Mather 1997, p. 91.
Macintyre 2016, p. 204.
Syrett 2014, p. 234.
Dilley 2013, pp. 87–89.

References

Dilley, Michael F. (30 September 2013). Behind the Lines: A Critical Survey of Special Operations in World War II. Casemate. ISBN 978-1-61200-183-8.
James, Malcolm (19 March 2015). Born of the Desert: With the SAS in North Africa. Frontline. ISBN 978-1-4738-9691-8.
Lewis, Jon E. (22 January 2015). The Mammoth Book Of Special Forces Training: Physical and Mental Secrets of Elite Military Units. Little, Brown. ISBN 978-1-4721-1178-4.
Macintyre, Ben (4 October 2016). Rogue Heroes: The History of the SAS, Britain's Secret Special Forces Unit That Sabotaged the Nazis and Changed the Nature of War. Crown/Archetype. ISBN 978-1-101-90417-6.
Mather, Carol (9 April 1997). When the Grass Stops Growing. Pen and Sword. ISBN 978-0-85052-576-2.
Mortimer, Gavin (20 June 2012). The Daring Dozen: 12 Special Forces Legends of World War II. Bloomsbury. ISBN 978-1-78096-454-6.
Mortimer, Gavin (20 April 2015a). Stirling's Desert Triumph: The SAS Egyptian Airfield Raids 1942. Bloomsbury. ISBN 978-1-4728-0764-9.
Mortimer, Gavin (20 June 2015b). The SAS in World War II. Bloomsbury. ISBN 978-1-4728-0876-9.
Polmar, Norman (1 September 2006). Aircraft Carriers: A History of Carrier Aviation and its Influence on World Events: 1909–1945. Vol. I. Potomac Books. ISBN 978-1-57488-663-4.
Spencer, MSG Napoleon (15 August 2014). Battle Of Gazala (May–June 1942) (Illus. ed.). Lucknow Books. ISBN 978-1-78289-389-9.
Syrett, David (19 August 2014). The Eyes of the Desert Rats: British Long-Range Reconnaissance Operations in the North African Desert 1940–43. Helion. ISBN 978-1-912174-63-8.
Zabecki, David T. (28 October 2014). Germany at War: 400 Years of Military History (4 volumes). ABC-CLIO. ISBN 978-1-59884-981-3.
Zabecki, David T. (May 2015). World War II in Europe: An Encyclopedia. Routledge. ISBN 978-1-135-81242-3.

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[FOOTNOTEZabecki2015543-1] Zabecki 2015, p. 543.

[FOOTNOTEPolmar2006135-2] Polmar 2006, p. 135.

[FOOTNOTESpencer201416-3] Spencer 2014, p. 16.

[FOOTNOTEZabecki2014816-4] Zabecki 2014, p. 816.

[FOOTNOTELewis201513-5] Lewis 2015, p. 13.

[FOOTNOTEMortimer2012134-6] Mortimer 2012, p. 134.

[FOOTNOTEMortimer2015b57-7] Mortimer 2015b, p. 57.

[FOOTNOTEMortimer2015a35–37-8] Mortimer 2015a, pp. 35–37.

[FOOTNOTEMacintyre2016199-9] Macintyre 2016, p. 199.

[FOOTNOTEJames2015329-10] James 2015, p. 329.

[FOOTNOTEMather199791-11] Mather 1997, p. 91.

[FOOTNOTEMacintyre2016204-12] Macintyre 2016, p. 204.

[FOOTNOTESyrett2014234-13] Syrett 2014, p. 234.

[FOOTNOTEDilley201387–89-14] Dilley 2013, pp. 87–89.