Second Nagorno-Karabakh War

During the Soviet era, the predominantly Armenian-populated region was governed as an autonomous oblast within the Azerbaijan SSR.[130] As the Soviet Union began to disintegrate during the late 1980s the question of Nagorno-Karabakh's status re-emerged, and on 20 February 1988 the parliament of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast passed a resolution requesting transfer of the oblast from the Azerbaijan SSR to the Armenian SSR. Azerbaijan rejected the request several times,[131] and ethnic violence began shortly thereafter with a series of pogroms between 1988 and 1990 against Armenians in Sumgait, Ganja and Baku,[132][133][134][135] and against Azerbaijanis in Gugark and Stepanakert.[136][137][138][139] Following the revocation of Nagorno-Karabakh's autonomous status, an independence referendum was held in the region on 10 December 1991. The referendum was boycotted by the Azerbaijani population, which then constituted around 22.8% of the region's population; 99.8% of participants voted in favour. In early 1992, following the Soviet Union's collapse, the region descended into outright war.[131]

Ethnic groups of the region in 1995, following the end of the First Nagorno-Karabakh War and the displacement of the region's Azerbaijani and ethnic Armenian population. (See entire map)

The First Nagorno-Karabakh War resulted in the displacement of approximately 725,000 Azerbaijanis and 300,000–500,000 Armenians from both Azerbaijan and Armenia.[140] The 1994 Bishkek Protocol brought the fighting to an end and resulted in significant Armenian territorial gains: in addition to controlling most of Nagorno-Karabakh, the Republic of Artsakh also occupied the surrounding Azerbaijani-populated districts of Agdam, Jabrayil, Fuzuli, Kalbajar, Qubadli, Lachin and Zangilan.[141] The terms of the Bishkek agreement produced a frozen conflict,[142] and long-standing international mediation attempts to create a peace process were initiated by the OSCE Minsk Group in 1994, with the interrupted Madrid Principles being the most recent iteration prior to the 2020 war.[143][144] The United Nations Security Council adopted four resolutions in 1993 calling for the withdrawal of "occupying forces" from the territories surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh,[145] and in 2008 the General Assembly adopted a resolution demanding the immediate withdrawal of Armenian occupying forces,[146] although the co-chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group, Russia, France and USA, voted against it.[147]

For three decades multiple violations of the ceasefire occurred, the most serious being the four-day 2016 Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.[148] Surveys indicated that the inhabitants of Nagorno-Karabakh did not want to be part of Azerbaijan[149] and in 2020 the Armenian prime minister Nikol Pashinyan announced plans to make Shusha, a city of historical and cultural significance to both Armenians and Azerbaijanis,[132] Artsakh's new capital. In August of the same year the government of Artsakh moved the country's parliament to Shusha, escalating tensions between Armenia and Azerbaijan.[150] Further skirmishes occurred on the border between the two countries in July 2020.[148] Thousands of Azerbaijanis rallied for war against Armenia in response, and Turkey voiced its firm support for Azerbaijan.[151] On 29 July 2020, Azerbaijan conducted a series of military exercises that lasted from 29 July to 10 August 2020,[152] followed by further exercises in early September with the involvement of Turkey.[153] Prior to the resumption of hostilities, allegations emerged that Turkey had facilitated the transfer of hundreds of Syrian National Army members from the Hamza Division to Azerbaijan.[154] Baku denied the involvement of foreign fighters.[155]

Approximate frontlines at the time of the ceasefire, with Azerbaijan's territorial gains during the war in red, the Lachin corridor under Russian peacekeepers in blue, and areas ceded by Armenia to Azerbaijan hashed.

The conflict was characterised by the widespread use of combat drones, particularly by Azerbaijan,[156] as well as heavy artillery barrages, rocket attacks and trench warfare.[157] Throughout the campaign, Azerbaijan relied heavily on drone strikes against Armenian/Artsakh forces, inflicting heavy losses upon Armenian tanks, artillery, air defence systems and military personnel, although some Azerbaijani drones were shot down.[158][159] It also featured the deployment of cluster munitions, which are banned by the majority of the international community but not by Armenia or Azerbaijan.[160] Both Armenia[161] and Azerbaijan[162] used cluster munitions against civilian areas outside of the conflict zone.[163] A series of missile attacks on Ganja, Azerbaijan inflicted mass civilian casualties, as did artillery strikes on Stepanakert, Artsakh's capital.[164] Much of Stepanakert's population fled during the course of the fighting.[165] The conflict was accompanied by coordinated attempts to spread misleading content and disinformation via social media and the internet.[166]

The conflict began with an Azerbaijani ground offensive that included armoured formations, supported by artillery and drones, including loitering munitions. Armenian and Artsakh troops were forced back from their first line of defence in Artsakh's southeast and northern regions, but inflicted significant losses on Azerbaijani armoured formations with anti-tank guided missiles and artillery, destroying dozens of vehicles. Azerbaijan made heavy use of drones in strikes against Armenian air defences, taking out 13 short-range surface-to-air missile systems. Azerbaijani forces used drones to systematically isolate and destroy Armenian/Artsakh positions. Reconnaissance drones would locate a military position on the front lines and the placement of reserve forces, after which the position would be shelled along with roads and bridges that could potentially be used by the reserves to reach the position. After the Armenian/Artsakh position had been extensively shelled and cut off from reinforcement, the Azerbaijanis would move in superior forces to overwhelm it. This tactic was repeatedly used to gradually overrun Armenian and Artsakh positions.[167] Azerbaijani troops managed to make limited gains in the south in the first three days of the conflict. For the next three days, both sides largely exchanged fire from fixed positions. In the north, Armenian/Artsakh forces counterattacked, managing to retake some ground. Their largest counterattack took place on the fourth day, but incurred heavy losses when their armour and artillery units were exposed to Azerbaijani attack drones, loitering munitions, and reconnaissance drones spotting for Azerbaijani artillery as they manoeuvred in the open.[47]

Azerbaijan targeted infrastructure throughout Artsakh starting on the first day of the war, including the use of rocket artillery and cluster munitions against Stepanakert, the capital of Artsakh, and a missile strike against a bridge in the Lachin Corridor linking Armenia with Artsakh. On the 6th day of the war, Armenia/Artsakh targeted Ganja for the first of four times with ballistic missiles, nominally targeting the military portion of Ganja International Airport but instead hitting residential areas. On the morning of the seventh day, Azerbaijan launched a major offensive. The Azerbaijani Army's First, Second, and Third Army Corps, reinforced by reservists from the Fourth Army Corps, began an advance in the north, making some territorial gains, but the Azerbaijani advance stalled.[47]

Most of the fighting subsequently shifted to the south, in terrain that is relatively flat and underpopulated as compared to the mountainous north. Azerbaijani forces launched offensives toward Jabrayil and Füzuli, managing to break through the multi-layered Armenian/Artsakh defensive lines and recapture a stretch of territory held by Armenian troops as a buffer zone, but the fighting subsequently stalled.[47]

Map of the war showing Azerbaijan's day-to-day advances

After the shelling of Martuni,[168] Artsakh authorities began mobilising civilians.[169] Just before 04:00 (00:00 UTC) on 10 October 2020, Russia reported that both Armenia and Azerbaijan had agreed on a humanitarian ceasefire after ten hours of talks in Moscow (the Moscow Statement) and announced that both would enter "substantive" talks. After the declared ceasefire, the President of Artsakh admitted Azerbaijan had been able to achieve some success, moving the front deep into Artsakh territory;[170] the Armenian Prime Minister announced that Armenian forces had conducted a "partial retreat".[171]

The ceasefire quickly broke down and the Azerbaijani advance continued. Within days Azerbaijan announced the capture of dozens of villages on the southern front.[172] A second ceasefire attempt midnight 17 October 2020 was also ignored.[173] Azerbaijan announced the capture of Jabrayil on 9 October 2020 and Füzuli on 17 October 2020. Azerbaijani troops also captured the Khoda Afarin Dam and Khodaafarin Bridges. Azerbaijan announced that the border area with Iran was fully secured with the capture of Agbend on 22 October 2020.[174] Azerbaijani forces then turned northwest, advancing towards the Lachin corridor, the sole highway between Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh, putting it within artillery range. According to Artsakh, a counterattack repelled forward elements of the Azerbaijani force and pushed them back. Armenian/Artsakh resistance had managed to halt the Azerbaijani advance to within 25 kilometres of the Lachin corridor by 26 October 2020. Artsakh troops who had retreated into the mountains and forests began launching small-unit attacks against exposed Azerbaijani infantry and armour, and Armenian forces launched a counteroffensive near the far southwestern border between Armenia and Azerbaijan.[175] On 26 October 2020, a US-brokered ceasefire came into effect, but fighting resumed within minutes.[176][177] Three days later, the Artsakh authorities stated that the Azerbaijani forces were 5 km (3.1 mi) from Shusha.[178] On 8 November 2020, Azerbaijani forces seized Shusha,[179] the second-largest city in Artsakh before the war, located 15 kilometres from Stepanakert, the republic's capital.[180]

Although the amount of territory contested was relatively restricted, the conflict impacted the wider region, in part due to the type of munitions deployed. Shells and rockets landed in East Azerbaijan Province, Iran, although no damage was reported,[181][182] and Iran reported that several unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) had been downed or had crashed within its territory.[183][184][185][186] Georgia stated that two UAVs had crashed in its Kakheti Province.[187]

Map of the ceasefire agreement

  Azerbaijan outside of the conflict zone

  Armenia

  Areas captured by Azerbaijan during the war, to stay under its control

  Agdam District: evacuated by Armenia by 20 November[188][189]

  Kalbajar District: evacuated by Armenia by 25 November[190]

  Lachin District: evacuated by Armenia by 1 December[191]

  Part of Nagorno-Karabakh remaining under the control of Artsakh

  Lachin corridor, monitored by Russian peacekeepers

  Access roads into Nagorno-Karabakh

   All economic and transport connections in the region to be unblocked, including transport connections between Nakhchivan and rest of Azerbaijan (arrow's hypothetical location chosen by a Wikipedia user, and not defined by the statement itself)

  Line of contact before the 2020 conflict.

  Other areas claimed by Artsakh

On 9 November 2020, in the aftermath of the capture of Shusha, a ceasefire agreement was signed by the President of Azerbaijan, Ilham Aliyev, the Prime Minister of Armenia, Nikol Pashinyan, and the President of Russia, Vladimir Putin, ending all hostilities in the zone of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict from 10 November 2020, 00:00 Moscow time.[107][108][109] The President of Artsakh, Arayik Harutyunyan, also agreed to end the hostilities.[192]

Under the terms of the deal, both belligerent parties were to exchange prisoners of war and the bodies of the fallen. Furthermore, Armenian forces were to withdraw from Armenian-occupied territories surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh by 1 December 2020, while a peacekeeping force, provided by the Russian Ground Forces and led by Lieutenant General Rustam Muradov,[193] of just under 2,000 soldiers would be deployed for a minimum of five years along the line of contact and the Lachin corridor linking Armenia and the Nagorno-Karabakh region. Additionally, Armenia undertook to "guarantee safety" of transport communication between Azerbaijan's Nakhchivan exclave and mainland Azerbaijan in both directions, while Russia's border troops (under the Federal Security Service) were to "exercise control over the transport communication".[194][195][196]

On 15 December 2020, after several weeks of cease fire, the sides finally exchanged prisoners of war. 44 Armenian and 12 Azeri prisoners were exchanged.[197] It is unclear whether more prisoners remain in captivity on either side.

Since the beginning of the conflict, both Armenia and Azerbaijan declared martial law, limiting the freedom of speech. Meanwhile, a new law came into effect since October 2020 in Armenia, which prohibits negative coverage of the situation at the front.[198] Restrictions have been reported on the work of international journalists in Azerbaijan, with no corresponding restrictions reported in Nagorno-Karabakh.[199]

A pro-military billboard in Republic Square, Yerevan, on 7 October 2020.

On 28 September 2020, Armenia banned men aged over 18 listed in the mobilisation reserve from leaving the country.[200] The next day, it postponed the trial of former President Robert Kocharyan and other former officials charged in the 2008 post-election unrest case, owing to one of the defendants, the former Defence Minister of Armenia, Seyran Ohanyan, going to Artsakh during the conflict.[201]

On 1 October 2020, the Armenian National Security Service (NSS) stated that it had arrested and charged a former high-ranking Armenian military official with treason on suspicion of spying for Azerbaijan.[202] Three days later, the NSS stated that it had arrested several foreign citizens on suspicion of spying.[203] Protesting Israeli arms sales to Azerbaijan, Armenia recalled its ambassador to Israel.[204]

On 8 October 2020, the Armenian President, Armen Sarkissian, dismissed the director of the NSS.[205] Subsequently, the Armenian government toughened the martial law and prohibited criticising state bodies and "propaganda aimed at disruption of the defense capacity of the country".[206] On the same day, the Armenian MoD cancelled a Novaya Gazeta correspondent's journalistic accreditation, officially for entering Nagorno-Karabakh without accreditation.[207] On 9 October 2020, Armenia tightened its security legislation.[206] On 21 October 2020, the Armenian Cabinet of Ministers temporarily banned the import of Turkish goods, the decision will come into force on 31 December 2020.[208] The following day, the Armenian parliament passed a law to write off the debts of the Armenian servicemen wounded during the clashes and the debts of the families of those killed.[209]

On 27 October 2020, the Armenian president Armen Sarkissian dismissed the head of the counterintelligence department of the National Security Service, Major General Hovhannes Karumyan and the chief of staff of the border troops of the National Security Service Gagik Tevosyan.[210] On 8 November 2020, Sarkissian yet again dismissed the interim head of the National Security Service.[211]

As of 8 November 2020, one Armenian activist was fined by the police for his anti-war post.[212]

Azerbaijani flag in Jafar Jabbarly Square near the 28 May station in Baku on 10 October 2020.

On 27 September 2020, Azerbaijani authorities restricted internet access shortly after the clashes began,[213] stating it was "in order to prevent large-scale Armenian provocations." The government made a noticeable push to use Twitter, which was the only unblocked platform in the country. Despite the restrictions, some Azerbaijanis still used VPNs to bypass them.[214] The National Assembly of Azerbaijan declared a curfew in Baku, Ganja, Goygol, Yevlakh and a number of districts from midnight on 28 September 2020,[215][216] under the Interior Minister, Vilayet Eyvazov.[217] Azerbaijan Airlines announced that all airports in Azerbaijan would be closed to regular passenger flights until 30 September 2020.[218] The Military Prosecutor's Offices of Fuzuli, Tartar, Karabakh and Ganja began criminal investigations of war and other crimes.[219]

Also on 28 September 2020, the President of Azerbaijan, Ilham Aliyev, issued a decree authorising a partial mobilisation in Azerbaijan.[220] On 8 October 2020, Azerbaijan recalled its ambassador to Greece for consultations, following allegations of Armenians from Greece arriving in Nagorno-Karabakh to fight against Azerbaijan.[221] Three days later, the Azerbaijani State Security Service (SSS) warned against a potential Armenian-backed terror attack.[222]

On 17 October 2020, the Azerbaijani MoFA stated that member of the Russian State Duma from the ruling United Russia, Vitaly Milonov, was declared persona non grata in Azerbaijan for visiting Nagorno-Karabakh without permission from the Azerbaijani government.[223] On 24 October 2020, by recommendation of the Central Bank of Azerbaijan, the member banks of the Azerbaijani Banks' Association unanimously adopted a decision to write off the debts of the military servicemen and civilians who died during the conflict.[224]

On 29 October 2020, the President of Azerbaijan, Ilham Aliyev, issued a decree on the formation of temporary commandant's offices in the areas that the Azerbaijani forces seized control of during the conflict. According to the decree, the commandants will be appointed by the Ministry of Internal Affairs, but they will have to coordinate with other executive bodies of the government, including Ministry of Defense, the State Border Service, the State Security Service, and ANAMA.[225][226]

Over the course of the war several Azerbaijani activists were brought in for questioning by the State Security Service, due to their anti-war activism.[227][228] On 12 December, a decree by President Aliyev lifted the curfew that had been imposed in September.[229]

The wall with images of fallen Armenian soldiers. According to Artsakhian President, mainly 18–20 year old soldiers fought in hostilities.[232]

The Armenian authorities stated that 85 Armenian civilians were killed during the war,[lower-alpha 5] while another 21 were missing.[81] According to Azerbaijani sources, the Armenian military has targeted densely populated areas containing civilian structures.[233] As of 9 November 2020, the Prosecutor General's Office of the Republic of Azerbaijan stated that during the war, as a result of reported shelling by Armenian artillery and rocketing, 100 people had been killed, while 416 people had been wounded.[84] Also, during the post-war clashes, the Azerbaijani authorities stated that an Azercell employee was seriously injured during the installation of communication facilities and transmission equipment near Hadrut.[234]

As of 23 October 2020, the Armenian authorities has stated that the conflict had displaced more than half of Nagorno-Karabakh's population or approximately 90,000 people.[96] The International Rescue Committee has also claimed that more than half of the population of Nagorno-Karabakh has been displaced by the conflict.[235] As of 2 November 2020, the Azerbaijani authorities has stated that the conflict had displaced approximately 40,000 people in Azerbaijan.[94]

Seven journalists have been injured.[159][236] On 1 October 2020, two French journalists from Le Monde covering the clashes in Khojavend were injured by Azerbaijani shellfire.[237] A week later, three Russian journalists reporting in Shusha were seriously injured by an Azerbaijani attack.[238][239] On 19 October 2020, according to Azerbaijani sources, an Azerbaijani AzTV journalist received shrapnel wounds from Armenian shellfire in Aghdam District.[236]

Wounded Azerbaijani servicemen attending the victory parade on 10 December.

An Artsakh 2S1 Gvozdika captured as a war trophy by the Azerbaijani forces, displayed on 10 December during the victory parade.

Armenian authorities reported the deaths of 3,825 servicemen during the war, while the Azerbaijani authorities stated that more than 5,000 Armenian servicemen were killed, and several times more were wounded as of 28 October 2020.[240] After the war, the former director of the Armenian National Security Service, Artur Vanetsyan, had also stated that some 5,000 Armenians were killed during the war.[241] Also, the Armenian authorities had stated that about 60 Armenian servicemen were captured by Azerbaijan as prisoners of war.[83] The former Head of the Military Control Service of the Armenian MoD, Movses Hakobyan, stated that already on the fifth day of war there were 1,500 deserters from Armenian armed forces, who were kept in Karabakh and not allowed to return to Armenia in order to prevent panic. The press secretary of Armenian prime minister called the accusations absurd and asked the law enforcement agencies to deal with them.[242] Former military commissar of Armenia major-general Levon Stepanyan stated that the number of deserters in Armenian army was over 10,000, and it is not possible to prosecute such a large number of military personnel.[243] During the post-war clashes, the Armenian government stated that 60 servicemen went missing,[244] including several dozen that were captured.[245] and On 27 October 2020, Artsakh authorities stated that its defence minister Jalal Harutyunyan was wounded in action.[246] However, unofficial Azerbaijani military sources alleged that he was killed and released footage apparently showing the assassination from a drone camera.[247]

During the conflict, the government of Azerbaijan did not reveal the number of its military casualties.[248] On 11 January, Azerbaijan stated that 2,853 of its soldiers had been killed during the war, while another 50 went missing.[60] Also, Azerbaijani authorities stated that 11 more Azerbaijani servicemen were killed during the post-war clashes or landmine explosions.[249][250][251] On 23 October 2020, President of Azerbaijan, Ilham Aliyev, confirmed that Shukur Hamidov who was made National Hero of Azerbaijan in 2016, was killed during the operations in Qubadli District.[252] This was the first military casualty officially confirmed by the government. However, Armenian and Artsakh authorities have claimed 7,630 Azerbaijani soldiers and Syrian mercenaries were killed.[253][254]

The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights documented the death of at least 541 Syrian fighters or mercenaries fighting for Azerbaijan.[61] On 14 November 2020, the Observatory reported the death of a commander of the Syrian National Army's Hamza Division.[255]

The Armenian Apostolic Ghazanchetsots Cathedral in Shusha was shelled twice during the conflict.[256][257][258]

Azerbaijani authorities had stated that about four thousand civilian objects were damaged in the territory of the Tartar District as a result of the bombardment of the district.[259][260]

Civilian areas, including major cities, have been hit, including Azerbaijan's second-largest city, Ganja, and the region's capital, Stepanakert, with many buildings and homes destroyed.[261][262] The Ghazanchetsots Cathedral has also been damaged.[263] Several outlets reported increased cases of COVID-19 in Nagorno-Karabakh, particularly the city of Stepanakert, where the population was forced to live in overcrowded bunkers, due to Azerbaijan artillery and drone strikes conflict.[264][265] There were also reported difficulties in testing and contact tracing during the conflict.[264][265]

The Ghazanchetsots Cathedral in Shusha became damaged as a result of shelling. On 19 October 2020, a strong fire broke out in a cotton plant in Azad Qaraqoyunlu, Tartar District, as a result of the Armenian artillery shelling, with several large hangars of the plant becoming completely burned down.[266] An Armenian-backed Nagorno-Karabakh human rights ombudsman report noted 5,800 private properties and 520 private vehicles destroyed, with damage to 960 items of civilian infrastructure, and industrial and public and objects.[267] On 16 November 2020, the Prosecutor General's Office of the Republic of Azerbaijan reported 3,410 private houses, 512 civilian facilities, and 120 multi-storey residential buildings being damaged throughout the war.[84]

By 7 October 2020, Azerbaijan reported to have destroyed about 250 tanks and other armoured vehicles; 150 other military vehicles; 11 command and command-observation posts; 270 artillery units and MLRSs, including a BM-27 Uragan; 60 Armenian anti-aircraft systems, including 4 S-300 and 25 9K33 Osas; 18 UAVs and 8 arms depots.[240][268][269][270] destroyed. As of 16 October 2020, the Azerbaijani President stated that the Armenian losses were at US$2 billion.[271] In turn an Azerbaijani helicopter was stated to have been damaged, but its crew had apparently returned it to Azerbaijani-controlled territory without casualties.[272] Later it was reported that on 12 October 2020, Azerbaijan had destroyed one Tochka-U missile launcher. On 14 October 2020, Azerbaijan stated it had further destroyed five T-72 tanks, three BM-21 Grad rocket launchers, one 9K33 Osa missile system, one BMP-2 vehicle, one KS-19 air defence gun, two D-30 howitzers and several Armenian army automobiles.[273] On the same day, Azerbaijan announced the destruction of three R-17 Elbrus tactical ballistic missile launchers that had been targeting Ganja and Mingachevir.[274] BBC reporters confirmed the destruction of at least one tactical ballistic missile launcher in the vicinity of Vardenis, close to the border with Azerbaijan, and posted photo evidence in support of this information.[275] Later American journalist Josh Friedman posted a high quality video of a destroyed Armenian ballistic missile launcher.[276]

Armenian and Artsakh authorities initially reported the downing of four Azerbaijani helicopters and the destruction of ten tanks and IFVs, as well as 15 drones.[277] Later the numbers were revised to 36 tanks and armoured personnel vehicles destroyed, two armoured combat engineering vehicles destroyed and four helicopters and 27 unmanned aerial vehicles downed all within the first day of hostilities.[278] They released footage showing the destruction or damage of five Azerbaijani tanks.[279] Over the course of 2 October, the Artsakh Defence Army said they had destroyed 39 Azerbaijani military vehicles, including a T-90 tank; four SU-25 fighter-bombers; three Mi-24 attack helicopters; and 17 UAVs.[280]

According to Dutch warfare research group Oryx, which documents visually confirmed losses on both sides, Armenia lost 255 tanks (destroyed: 146, damaged: 6, captured: 103), 78 armoured fighting vehicles (destroyed: 25, damaged: 1, captured: 52), and 737 trucks, vehicles and jeeps (destroyed: 331, damaged: 18, captured: 387), while Azerbaijan lost 62 tanks (destroyed: 38, damaged: 16, abandoned: 1, captured: 7, captured but later lost: 1), 23 armoured fighting vehicles (destroyed: 6, damaged: 3, abandoned: 7, captured: 9), 76 trucks, vehicles and jeeps (destroyed: 40, damaged: 22, abandoned: 8, captured: 6), as well 11 old An-2 aircraft, used as unmanned bait in order for Armenia to reveal the location of air defence systems. Oryx only counts destroyed vehicles and equipment of which photo or videographic evidence is available, and therefore, the actual number of equipment destroyed is higher.[281]

The Armenian forces had shelled the town of Shikharkh, damaging apartments and schools.[288] The town was built for the Azerbaijani refugees of the First Nagorno-Karabakh war.[289]

Armenia struck several Azerbaijani cities outside of the conflict zone, most frequently Tartar, Beylagan and Barda.[290][291] Attacks reported by Azerbaijani authorities included an attack on Beylagan on 4 October, killing two civilians and injuring 2 others,[292][293] Goranboy on 8 October killing a civilian,[294] Hadrut on 10 October, seriously injuring a medical worker,[295] Fuzuli on 20 October, resulting in one civilian death and six injuries,[296][297] Tartar on 20 October, resulting in two civilian deaths and one civilian injury[298] and Tartar on 10 November, resulting in one civilian injury.[299] By 9 November, there had been more than 93 civilian deaths and 416 civilian injuries in areas of Azerbaijan outside of the war zone.[185][300]

Human Rights Watch reported that on 27 September, the Armenian forces had launched an artillery attack on Qaşaltı of Goranboy District, killing five members of the Gurbanov family, and damaged several homes. Human Rights Watch examined the severely damaged house and found several munition remnants in the courtyard that were consistent with fragments of large-caliber artillery. It also reported that the Armenian forces struck Hacıməmmədli of Aghdam District on 1 October, in an agricultural area, at around 11:00, killing two civilians. HRW stated that they had found no evident military objectives during their visit to the village. HRW also reported that the Armenian forces had launched an artillery attack on 4 October in Tap Qaraqoyunlu of Goranboy District at about 16:30, wounding a civilian. Then, on 5 October, Human Rights Watch reported that the Armenian forces fired a munition that landed in a field about 500 meters from Babı of Fuzuli District. The Azerbaijani authorities stated that they had identified the munition as a Scud-B ballistic missile and measured the crater as 15 meters in diameter.[288]

Armenian forces heavily shelled the district of Tartar during the war, starting from 28 September. The bombardment caused widespread destruction and many civilian deaths.[301][259] Thousands of people became refugees, making the city of Tartar a ghost town,[302] and fled to neighbouring cities such as Barda.[303][304][305] The Azerbaijani authorities stated that the Armenian forces had fired 15,500 shells on the territory of Tartar District until 29 October, with over 2,000 shells being fired upon Tartar in some days. Official Azerbaijani figures show that over a thousand civilian objects, including schools, hospitals, and government buildings were either damaged or destroyed during the bombardment.[259] Human Rights Watch confirmed many of the targeted attacks on civilians and civilian objects, such as kindergartens and hospitals, by the Armenian forces. It also stated that the Armenian military forces had carried out unlawfully indiscriminate rocket and missile strikes on the Azerbaijani territories, and that such indiscriminate attacks were war crimes.[306] The constant bombardment of the city prompted the Azerbaijani to label Tartar as the Stalingrad of Azerbaijan,[307] and the President of Azerbaijan, Ilham Aliyev, accused Armenia of trying to turn Tartar to the next Aghdam, also referred to as the Hiroshima of the Caucasus by the locals.[308][309] Turkey also condemned the Armenian shelling of a cemetery in Tartar during a funeral ceremony,[310] which foreign journalists at scene and Human Rights Watch confirmed.[311][306] On 29 October, the head of the Tartar District Executive Power, Mustagim Mammadov, stated that during the war, 17 civilians killed, and 61 people injured in Tartar District as a result of the bombardment in Tartar. According to him, in total, about 1,200 people suffered from the bombardment.[259] The Azerbaijani authorities reported two more civilian injuries later on.

Destruction in Tartar after the Armenian bombardment.

External video
Azerbaijan: footage shows shelling in city of Ganja on YouTube

Between 4 and 17 October, four separate missile attacks on the city of Ganja killed 32 civilians,[288] including a 13-year-old Russian citizen,[90] and injured 125[312][313][314][315] with women and children among the victims.[315] The attacks were condemned by the European Union,[316] and Azerbaijani authorities accused the Armenian Armed Forces of "committing war crimes through the firing of ballistic missiles at civilian settlements", calling the third attack "an act of genocide".[317][318][319] Armenia denied responsibility for the attacks.[320][315] The Artsakh Defence Army confirmed responsibility for the first attack but denied targeting residential areas, claiming that it had fired at military targets, especially Ganja International Airport.[321][322] Subsequently, both a correspondent reporting from the scene for a Russian media outlet and the airport director denied that the airport had been hit,[323] while a BBC News journalist, Orla Guerin, visited the scene and found no evidence of any military target there.[324]

On 15 October, the Armenian forces shelled a cemetery 400 metres (1,300 ft) north of the city of Tartar during a funeral ceremony, killing 4 civilians and injuring 4 more.[325] This was confirmed by local journalists,[326] TV Rain,[311] and the Human Rights Watch.[306] The Presidential Administration of Azerbaijan also confirmed that the cemetery was shelled in the morning.[327]

On 25 October, a video emerged online of an Armenian teenager in civilian clothing helping soldiers fire artillery on Azerbaijani positions. Azerbaijan subsequently accused Armenia of using child soldiers.[328][329] One day later, the Artsakh ombudsman released a statement claiming that the boy in the video was 16, was not directly engaged in military actions and was working with his father.[330]

The Human Rights Watch reported that on 28 October, at about 17:00, the Armenian forces fired a munition on Tap Qaraqoyunlu of Goranboy District that produced fragmentation and killed a civilian.[288]

The Artsakh Defence Army hit the Azerbaijani town of Barda with missiles twice on 27 and 28 October 2020, resulting in the deaths of 26 civilians and injuring over 83, making it the deadliest attack of the conflict.[331][332][333] The casualties included a 39-year-old Red Crescent volunteer, while two other volunteers were injured.[334] Civilian infrastructure and vehicles were extensively damaged.[335] Armenia denied responsibility,[336] but Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch stated that Armenia had fired, or intentionally supplied Artsakh with, the cluster munitions and Smerch rockets used in the attack.[304][337] Artsakh acknowledged responsibility, but said it was targeting military facilities.[338] Marie Struthers, Amnesty International's Regional Director for Eastern Europe and Central Asia, said that the "firing of cluster munitions into civilian areas is cruel and reckless, and causes untold death, injury and misery".[304] The Azerbaijani ombudsman called the attack a "terrorist act against civilians".[339] The use of cluster munitions was also reported by The New York Times.[340] On 7 November, according to Human Rights Watch, the Armenian forces fired a rocket that struck an agricultural field near the village of Əyricə and killed a 16-year-old boy while he playing with other children. Azerbaijani authorities stated that they had identified the munition as a 9M528 Smerch rocket, which carries a warhead that produces blast and fragmentation effect. HRW reported that the researchers did not observe any military objectives in the area.[288]

On 30 October 2020, Human Rights Watch reported that Armenia or Artsakh forces used cluster munition and stated that Armenia should immediately cease using cluster munitions or supplying them to Nagorno-Karabakh forces.[161]

Destruction in Ganja after the Armenian missile attacks on the city.

In mid-November, a video of a wounded Azerbaijani soldier Amin Musayev receiving first aid by Ukrainian journalist Alexander Kharchenko and Armenian soldiers after the ceasefire came into force was spread on social media platforms. Following this, a video was released showing Musayev being abused inside a vehicle. It is reported that he was lying on the ground in the car and asked: "where are we going?" In response, the alleged Armenian soldier said, "If you behave well, go home," and cursed, after which it became clear that the Azerbaijani soldier had been kicked. On 18 November, a representative of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in Yerevan said that information about this person was "being investigated." The ICRC's representative in Yerevan, Zara Amatuni, declined to say whether she had any information about Musayev. The Artsakh ombudsman said he had no information about the Azerbaijani soldier, but that if he was injured, he was "probably in hospital in Armenia." The Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry said in a statement that the issue was being investigated and will be reported to the relevant international organisations. According to the ministry, "the information about the torture of prisoners is first checked for accuracy and brought to the attention of relevant international organizations."[341][342] On 25 November, ICRC's representatives visited Musayev and Karimov in Yerevan.[343] On 5 December, the family of Musayev was informed of his condition through ICRC. According to a reported copy of the letter sent by Musayev, he stated that his condition was well.[341] Musayev was returned to Azerbaijan on 15 December as part of the POW exchange deal.[344] Azerbaijan had officially accused the Armenian side of ill-treating the Azerbaijani POWs.[345] Several Azerbaijani POWs, in interviews with the Azerbaijani media outlets, had stated that they were tortured by their Armenian captors until being transferred back to Azerbaijan.[346][347][348] Dilgam Asgarov, a Russian citizen of Azerbaijani descent, who was detained by the Armenian-allied forces alongside Shahbaz Guliyev, an Azerbaijani citizen, in 2014, during an incident in Kalbajar,[349] in an interview to Virtual Azərbaycan newspaper he gave after being released, also stated that the Armenian captors had tortured the Azerbaijani POWs.[350]

On 10 December, Amnesty International released a report on videos depicting war crimes. In one of the videos, the Armenian soldiers were seen cutting the throat of an Azerbaijani captive. The captive appears to be lying on the ground, whilst gagged and bound when an Armenian soldier approaches him and sticks a knife into his throat. Independent pathological analysis confirmed that the wound sustained led to his death in minutes. Eleven other videos showing inhumane treatment and outrages upon personal dignity of Azerbaijani captives by the Armenian army has come to light. In several videos, Armenian soldiers are seen cutting the ear off a dead Azerbaijani soldier, dragging a dead Azerbaijani soldier across the ground by a rope tied around his feet, and standing on the corpse of a dead Azerbaijani soldier.[283][284]

On 11 December, Human Rights Watch released an extensive report about Armenia's unlawful rocket strikes on Azerbaijani civilian areas. The report investigated 18 separate strikes, which killed 40 civilians and wounded dozens more. During on-site investigations in Azerbaijan in November, Human Rights Watch documented 11 incidents in which Armenian forces used ballistic missiles, unguided artillery rockets, large-calibre artillery projectiles and cluster munitions that hit populated areas in apparently indiscriminate attacks. In at least four other cases, munitions struck civilians or civilian objects in areas where there were no apparent military targets. In addition to causing civilian casualties, the Armenian attacks damaged homes, businesses, schools, and a health clinic, and contributed to mass displacement. It acknowledged the presence of military forces in two cities and two villages attacked by Armenian forces, claiming that Azerbaijan had unnecessarily put civilians at risk, however, it also stated that the presence of military targets did not excuse the use of inherently inaccurate weaponry with a large destructive radius in populated areas by Armenian forces. Human Rights Watch called the Armenian government to conduct transparent investigations into attacks by Armenian forces that violate international humanitarian law, or the laws of war.[288] On 15 December, Human Rights Watch released another report about Armenia's use of cluster munitions in multiple attacks on Azerbaijani civilian areas. Its researchers documented four attacks with cluster munitions in three of the country's districts, Barda, Goranboy and Tartar which killed at least seven civilians, including two children, and wounded close to 20, including two children. Human Rights Watch also stated that as Nagorno-Karabakh forces do not possess cluster munitions, it is likely that Armenian forces carried out the attacks or supplied the munitions to Nagorno-Karabakh forces.[351]

On 4 October 2020, the Armenian government stated Azerbaijan had deployed cluster munitions against residential targets in Stepanakert; an Amnesty International investigator condemned this.[352] In an Amnesty International report, the cluster bombs were identified as "Israeli-made M095 DPICM cluster munitions that appear to have been fired by Azerbaijani forces".[353] The next day, Armenian Minister of Foreign Affairs Zohrab Mnatsakanyan stated to Fox News that the targeting of civilian populations in Nagorno-Karabakh by Azerbaijani forces was tantamount to war crimes and called for an end to the "aggression".[354] In November 2020, Aliyev denied using cluster munitions against civilian areas in Stepanakert on the 1, 2, and 3 October 2020 in an interview with BBC News journalist Orla Guerin, describing as "fake news" the statements of other BBC reporters who witnessed the attacks and described them as "indiscriminate shelling of a town without clear military targets".[355]

During an on-site investigation in Nagorno-Karabakh in October 2020, Human Rights Watch documented four incidents in which Azerbaijan used Israeli-supplied cluster munitions against civilian areas of Nagorno-Karabakh. The HRW investigation team stated that they did not find any sort of military sites in the residential neighbourhoods where the cluster munitions were used and condemned its use against civilian-populated areas. Stephen Goose, arms division director at Human Rights Watch and chair of the Cluster Munition Coalition, stated that "the continued use of cluster munitions – particularly in populated areas – shows flagrant disregard for the safety of civilians". He then added that "the repeated use of cluster munitions by Azerbaijan should cease immediately as their continued use serves to heighten the danger for civilians for years to come". The HRW investigation team also noted that numerous civilian buildings and infrastructure were heavily damaged due to shelling.[356]

On 16 December, Human Rights Watch published a report about two separate attacks, hours apart, on the Ghazanchetsots Cathedral on 8 October in the town of Shusha, known to Armenians as Shushi, suggesting that the church, a civilian object with cultural significance, was an intentional target despite the absence of evidence that it was used for military purposes. The weapon remnants Human Rights Watch collected at the site corroborate the use of guided munitions. "The two strikes on the church, the second one while journalists and other civilians had gathered at the site, appear to be deliberate," said Hugh Williamson, Europe and Central Asia director at Human Rights Watch. "These attacks should be impartially investigated and those responsible held to account."[357]

Destroyed housing complex after the Azerbaijani bombardment of Stepanakert

On 15 October 2020, a video surfaced of two captured Armenians being executed by Azerbaijani soldiers;[358] Artsakh authorities identified one as a civilian.[359] Bellingcat analysed the videos and concluded that the footage was real and that both executed were Armenian combatants captured by Azerbaijani forces between 9 and 15 October 2020 and later executed.[358] The BBC also investigated the videos and confirmed that the videos were from Hadrut and were filmed some time between 9–15 October 2020. A probe has been launched by Armenia's human rights defender, Arman Tatoyan, who shared the videos with European Court of Human Rights and who will also show the videos to the UN human rights commissioner, the Council of Europe and other international organisations.[360] The U.N. human rights chief, Michelle Bachelet, stated that "in-depth investigations by media organisations into videos that appeared to show Azerbaijani troops summarily executing two captured Armenians in military uniforms uncovered compelling and deeply disturbing information".[361]

On 10 December, Amnesty International released a report on videos depicting war crimes from both sides. In some of these videos, Azerbaijani soldiers were seen decapitating the head of an Armenian soldier as he was alive. In another video, the victim is an older man in civilian clothes who gets his throat cut before the video abruptly ends.[283]

Beheadings of two elderly ethnic Armenian Civilians by Azerbaijani armed forces have been identified by The Guardian. In videos posted online on 22 November and 3 December, men in Azerbaijani military uniforms hold down and decapitate a man using a knife. One then places the severed head on a dead animal. "This is how we get revenge – by cutting off heads," a voice says off-camera. The victim was identified as Genadi Petrosyan, 69, who had moved to Matadashen in the late 1980s from Sumgait. Another video posted on 7 December showed two soldiers in Azerbaijani military uniforms pinning down an elderly man near a tree. Another soldier passes a knife to one of the attackers, who begins slicing at the victim's neck. The victim was identified as Yuri Asryan, a reclusive 82-year-old who had refused to leave his village, Azokh.[362]

In another video, a villager named Kamo Manasyan is kicked and beaten as blood streams from his right eye and then hit with a rifle stock.[362]

External video
Nagorno-Karabakh hospital hit by shelling on YouTube

On 16 October, according to Armenia's ombudsman report, an Azerbaijani serviceman had called the brother of an Armenian soldier from the latter's phone number, saying that his brother was with them and that they had beheaded him and were going to post his photos on the internet; according to Armenian sources, they did post the image online.[363] The Humanitarian Aid Relief Trust included the beheading of an Armenian soldier in their reporting.[364]

Protesters in Geneva demand the release of Armenian POWs, 15 April 2021

In early November, Armenia applied to European Convention on Human Rights over the videos of the brutal treatment of the bodies of Armenian POWs, which were spread on the social network.[365] On 23 November, ECHR announced that it applies urgent measures in case of Armenian POWs and civilians held in Azerbaijan.[366] Michael Rubin of the Washington Examiner, referring to the beheadings, the torture and mutilations of POWs, stated that, in contrast to Aliyev's reassurance of ethnic Armenians on remaining as residents of Azerbaijan, the actions of the Azerbaijani servicemen "tell a different story".[367] Human Rights Watch reported about the videos depicting physical abuse and humiliation of Armenian POWs by their Azerbaijani captors, adding that the most of the captors did not fear being held accountable, as their faces were visible in the videos.[112] HRW spoke with the families of some of the POWs in the videos, who provided photographs and other documents establishing their identity, and confirmed that these relatives were serving either in the Artsakh Defence Army, or the Armenian armed forces.[112]

Artsakhi residents try to remove car tires from a burning car shop after shelling by Azerbaijan's artillery

A criminal case was opened in Azerbaijan over the Armenian POWs videos with the country's Prosecutor General's Office stating that inhuman treatment could result in the criminal prosecution of some soldiers serving in the Azerbaijani Armed Forces. It also stated that many of these videos were fake.[286] On 14 December, the Azerbaijani security forces arrested two Azerbaijani privates and two other warrant officers accused of insulting the bodies of the Armenian servicemen and gravestones belonging to Armenians.[368] The Azerbaijani human rights activists considered the government reaction to the suspected war crimes to be adequate, although some Azerbaijani social media users argued about whether their persecution was justified, also criticising Armenia not investigating its suspected war crimes.[369]

On 19 March 2021, Human Rights Watch published a report regarding Armenian prisoners of war abused by Azerbaijani forces, subjecting them to cruel and degrading treatment and torture either when they were captured, during their transfer, or while in custody at various detention facilities. Hugh Williamson, Europe and Central Asia director at Human Rights Watch, named these actions by Azerbaijani forces "abhorrent and a war crime".[111]

On 3 May 2021, Artak Zeynalyan reported that Azerbaijani servicemen tortured and killed 19 Armenian POWs, which is a war crime. The list of 19 killed includes 12 civilians and seven servicemen.[370] According to Human Rights Defender of Armenia Arman Tatoyan, the study of the collected videos and photos shows that the tortures, cruelties, and inhuman treatment by the Azerbaijani Armed Forces against Armenian POWs have been committed with motives of ethnic hatred.[371]

On 30 October, Armenian and Artsakh authorities had accused the Azerbaijani forces of using phosphorus to burn forests near Shusha.[372][373] This was supported by "Ecocide alert" from 51 non-governmental organisations under the auspices of Transparency International.[374] France 24 reported that Azerbaijan could have used white phosphorus during the war, highlighting that its use is strictly regulated under an international agreement that neither Azerbaijan nor Armenia have signed.[375] A reporter of The Independent who visited the National Burns Centre in Yerevan saw the soldiers' burns, which, according to deputy director of the centre, were consistent with white phosphorus damage in 80% cases.[376] Patrick Knipper, an orthopaedic surgeon and a specialist in severe burns at the Assistance Publique – Hôpitaux de Paris, who was in Yerevan as part of a French assistance mission to help with the treatment of the injured arriving from the front, provided the first independent confirmation of burns being the result of white phosphorus munition use to Le Point magazine, highlighting the characteristic deep burns, hypocalcaemia and sudden deaths in his conclusion[377][378] Azerbaijan denied using white phosphorus.[379] Two interviewed Russian military experts did not find evidence provided by the Armenian side to be convincing, and expressed their doubts that white phosphorus was used by either side of the conflict.[380][381] However, on 22 September 2021, the U.S. House of Representatives passed the Amendment, calling for a report on Azerbaijani war crimes, including the use of illegal munitions and white phosphorus against Armenian civilians.[382][383]

In late October and early November, Azerbaijan accused the Armenian forces of using white phosphorus on civilian areas.[384][385] Then, on 4 November, Azerbaijan National Agency for Mine Action (ANAMA) reported finding unexploded white phosphorus munitions in Səhləbad, near Tartar, which, according to Azerbaijan, were fired by the Armenian forces.[386][387] Azerbaijani authorities claimed the Armenian forces were transporting white phosphorus into the region.[388] On 20 November, Prosecutor General's Office of Azerbaijan filed a lawsuit, accusing the Armenian Armed Forces of using phosphorus ammunition in Nagorno-Karabakh, as well as in Tartar District, and chemical munitions to "inflict large-scale and long-term harm to the environment" in Fuzuli and Tartar Districts, as well as around Shusha.[389]

Protests in Yerevan against the terms of a cease-fire agreement on 18 November 2020.[390]

Shortly after the news about the signing the ceasefire agreement broke in the early hours of 10 November violent protests erupted in Armenia against Nikol Pashinyan, claiming he was a "traitor" for having accepted the peace deal.[391] Protesters also seized the parliament building by breaking a metal door, and pulled the President of the National Assembly of Armenia Ararat Mirzoyan from a car and beat him.[392][393] Throughout November, numerous Armenian officials resigned from their posts, including the Armenian minister of foreign affairs, Zohrab Mnatsakanyan,[394] the minister of defence, David Tonoyan,[395] head of the same ministry's military control service, Movses Hakobyan,[396] and the spokesman of Armenia's Defense Ministry, Artsrun Hovhannisyan.[397]

After the ceasefire agreement was signed, President Armen Sarksyan held a meeting with Karekin II, where they both made a call to declare 22 November as the Day of Remembrance of the Heroes who fell for the Defense of the Motherland in the Artsakh Liberation War.[398] On 16 November, he declared that snap parliamentary elections and Pashinyan's resignation were inevitable, proposing that a process be overseen and managed by an interim "National Accord Government".[399]

On 10 December, the Armenian media reported that an Azerbaijani citizen was detained at night near Berdavan in Tavush Province. It was reported that an Azerbaijani civilian was observed in Berdavan between 4:00 and 5:00 in the morning. The executive head of Berdavan, Smbat Mugdesyan, said that the NSS had taken him away and that he did not know other details. According to the Armenian media, a criminal case was opened against the detained citizen on suspicion of illegally crossing to the Armenian state border. The name of the detained Azerbaijani was not disclosed. According to the BBC Azerbaijani Service, Azerbaijan's Internal Affairs, Foreign Affairs and Defence Ministries said they had no information about the incident.[400]

On 12 December, Azerbaijani trucks, accompanied by the International Committee of the Red Cross and Russian peacekeepers, entered David Bek in Syunik Province of Armenia to pick up the bodies of fallen soldiers. Armenian officials refuted the media reports of Azerbaijani vehicles entering Goris.[401]

On 16 December, the family members of the missing Armenian soldiers gathered in front of the Armenian Ministry of Defence building, demanding information about their loved ones. They were not allowed into the building and Armenian military representatives did not give a response. A scuffle ensued, during which the family members of the missing Armenian soldiers broke through to the building.[402]

Celebrations in Baku, Azerbaijan after the peace treaty.

The peace agreement and the end of the war was seen as a victory and was widely celebrated in Azerbaijan.[403][404] On 10 November 2020, crowds waved flags in Baku after the peace deal was announced.[405] On that day, President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev gave a speech in which he mockingly said Nə oldu Paşinyan? ("What happened Pashinyan?"), which became an Internet meme in Azerbaijan and Turkey.[406][407] On 11 November, at a meeting with wounded Azerbaijani servicemen who took part in the war, Aliyev said that new orders and medals would be established in Azerbaijan, and that he gave appropriate instructions on awarding civilians and servicemen who showed "heroism on the battlefield and in the rear and distinguished themselves in this war." He also proposed the names of these orders and medals.[408] About a week later, at a plenary session of the Azerbaijani National Assembly, a draft law on amendments to the law "On the establishment of orders and medals of the Republic of Azerbaijan" was submitted for discussion.[409] Seventeen new orders and medals were established on the same day in the first reading in accordance with the bill "On the establishment of orders and medals of the Republic of Azerbaijan".[410] In mid-November, Aliyev and Azerbaijan's First Vice-president, Mehriban Aliyeva, visited Fuzuli and Jabrayil Districts, both of which were ghost towns in ruins after the Armenian forces occupied it in 1993.[411] Aliyev ordered the State Agency of Azerbaijan Automobile Roads to construct a new highway, starting from Alxanlı, which will connect Fuzuli to Shusha.[412] In Jabrayil, Aliyev stated that a "new master plan" will be drawn up to rebuild the city.[413]

Azerbaijani Sukhoi Su-25 fighter jets during the victory parade in Baku on 10 December.

27 September and 10 November were declared Memorial Day and Victory Day respectively,[414][415] although the latter's date was changed to 8 November as it overlapped with Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's Memorial Day in Turkey.[416] It was also announced that the new station in the Baku Metro will be named 8 November at the suggestion of Aliyev.[417] On the same day, President Aliyev signed a decree on the establishment of the YASHAT Foundation to support the families of those wounded and killed during the war, and general control over the management of the foundation was transferred to the ASAN service.[418] On 2 December, the Association of Banks of Azerbaijan announced that the bank debts of servicemen and civilians killed during the war in Azerbaijan would be completely written off.[419] On 4 December, at 12:00 (GMT+4) local time, a moment of silence was held in Azerbaijan to commemorate the fallen soldiers of the war.[420][421] Flags were lowered across the country, and traffic halted, while ships moored in the Bay of Baku, as well as cars honked their horns.[422] A unity prayer was held at the Heydar Mosque in Baku in memory of those killed in the war, and Shaykh al-Islām Allahshukur Pashazadeh, chairman of the Religious Council of the Caucasus, said that "Sunnis and Shiites prayed for the souls of our martyrs together." Commemoration ceremonies were also held in mosques in Sumgayit, Guba, Ganja, Shamakhi, Lankaran, Shaki, in churches in Baku and Ganja, and in the synagogue of Ashkenazi Jews in Baku.[423] On 9 December, President Aliyev awarded 83 servicemen with the title of Hero of the Patriotic War,[424] 204 servicemen with Karabakh Order,[425] and 33 servicemen with Zafar Order.[426]

A victory parade was held on 10 December in honour of the Azerbaijani victory on Azadliq Square,[427] with 3,000 military servicemen who distinguished themselves during the war marched alongside military equipment, unmanned aerial vehicles and aircraft,[428] as well as Armenian war trophies,[429] and Turkish soldiers and officers.[430] Turkish President Erdoğan attended the military parade as part of a state visit to Baku.[431] In April 2021, Azerbaijan opened a Military Trophy Park featuring items from the conflict.[432]

According to peer-reviewed journal Caucasus Survey:[433]

…for the first time in the post-Soviet era, the Azerbaijani leadership has achieved a high degree of social solidarity. All opposition parties and organizations, including the Popular Front, Musavat, ReAl, and National Council, expressed their full support for the war. The citizens acquired a shared emotional experience of "making history". (...) The government received the stamp of approval from its most vicious critics. The authoritarian government and the civil society it long persecuted were united in the name of homeland. The definition of homeland, consequently, has been reduced to a military victory for the soil, not values or the rights or lives of its people. By supporting a war the government waged, both the opposition and civil society contributed to the creation of a new source and reserve of legitimacy for authoritarianism. Further, while the opposition and civil society criticized the regime in Russia for its authoritarianism and imperialist nationalism, the majority of them did not express misgivings about the no less authoritarian and imperialist politics of Turkey, and enthusiastically embraced ultra-right pan-Turkism.

Russian peacekeepers and Azerbaijani military personnel near Dadivank of Kalbajar District.

External video
Nagorno-Karabakh: The families burning down their own homes on YouTube

The Armenian population of the territories ceded to Azerbaijan was forced to flee to Armenia, sometimes destroying their houses and livestock to keep them out of Azerbaijani hands.[434][435]

In 2020, Canada suspended arms exports to Turkey due to accusations of the use of Canadian technology in the conflict, in violation of end-use assurances Turkey had given to Canada. Turkey criticised the Canadian decision.[436] In 2021, Canada prohibited arms exports to Turkey after an investigation verified the accusations.[437] Turkey protested that the embargo will harm bilateral relations and NATO alliance solidarity.[438]

While Armenians and Azerbaijanis lived side by side under Soviet rule, the collapse of the Soviet Union contributed to racialisation and fierce nationalism, causing both Armenians and Azerbaijanis to stereotype each other, shaping rhetoric on both sides.[439] Before, during and after the First Nagorno-Karabakh War, the growth of anti-Armenian and anti-Azerbaijan sentiment resulted in ethnic violence, including pogroms against Armenians in Azerbaijan, as in Sumgait and Baku,[440][441][442][443] and against Azerbaijanis in Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh, as at Gugark and Stepanakert.[136][137][138][139]

Most of Azerbaijan's initial successful advances were concentrated in the areas located along the Aras River, which has less mountainous terrain compared to the region's northern and central territories.

In a 27 September 2020 interview, regional expert Thomas de Waal said that it was highly unlikely that hostilities were initiated by the Armenian side, as they were already in possession of the disputed territory and were incentivised to normalise the status quo, while "for various reasons, Azerbaijan calculate[d] that military action w[ould] win it something".[444] The suspected immediate goal of the Azerbaijani offensive was to capture the districts of Fuzuli and Jabrayil in southern Nagorno-Karabakh, where the terrain is less mountainous and more favourable for offensive operations.[99] Political scientist Arkady Dubnov of the Carnegie Moscow Center[445][446] believed that Azerbaijan had launched the offensive to improve Azerbaijan's position in a suitable season for hostilities in the terrain.[447]

The geostrategic interests of Russia and Turkey in the region were widely commented upon during the war.[448] Both were described as benefiting from the ceasefire agreement, with The Economist stating that for Russia, China and Turkey, "all sides stand to benefit economically".[449] In late October, massed Russian airstrikes targeted a training camp for Failaq al-Sham, one of the largest Turkish-backed Sunni Islamist rebel groups in Syria's Idlib province, killing 78 militants in an act widely interpreted as a warning shot to Ankara over the latter's involvement in the Nagorno-Karabakh fighting.[450][451]

Azerbaijan and Turkey are bound by ethnic, cultural and historic ties, and both countries refer to their relationship as being one between "two states, one nation".[452] Turkey (then the Ottoman Empire) helped Azerbaijan, previously part of the Russian Empire gain its independence in 1918, and became the first country to recognise Azerbaijan's independence from the Soviet Union in 1991.[453] Turkey has also been the guarantor of the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic, an exclave of Azerbaijan, since 1921.[454][455] Other commentators have seen Turkey's support for Azerbaijan as part of an activist foreign policy, linking it with neo-Ottoman policies in Syria, Iraq, and the Eastern Mediterranean.[456][457] Turkey's highly visible role in the conflict was described by Armenians as a continuation of the Armenian genocide, the mass murder and expulsion of 1.5 million Armenians by the Ottoman government, particularly given Turkey's continued denial of the genocide.[458][459][460][461] Turkey provided military support to Azerbaijan, including military experts and Syrian mercenaries.[449] The transport communications stipulated by the ceasefire agreement, linking Nakhchivan and the main part of Azerbaijan through Armenia, would provide Turkey with trade access to Central Asia and China's Belt and Road Initiative.[449]

Russia had sought to maintain good relations with Azerbaijan and had sold weapons to both parties. Even prior to the war, Russia had possessed a military base in Armenia as part of a military alliance with Armenia, and thus was obligated by treaty to defend Armenia in the case of a war. Like in Syria and in Libya's ongoing civil war, Russia and NATO-member Turkey therefore had opposing interests.[462] Turkey appeared to use the conflict to attempt to leverage its influence in the South Caucasus along its eastern border, using both military and diplomatic resources to extend its sphere of influence in the Middle East, and to marginalise the influence of Russia, another regional power.[463][464] Russia had historically pursued a policy of maintaining neutrality in the conflict, and Armenia never formally requested aid.[98] According to the director of the Russia studies program at the CNA, at the beginning of the war Russia was judged to be unlikely to intervene militarily unless Armenia incurred drastic losses.[98] The Russian MoFA also released a statement, saying that Russia will provide Armenia with "all the necessary assistance" if the war continued on the territories of Armenia, as both countries are part of the Collective Security Treaty Organization.[465][466] Nonetheless, when the Azerbaijani forces reportedly struck the Armenian territories on 14 October 2020, Russia did not directly interfere in the conflict.[467] In a piece published by the Russian broadsheet Vedomosti on 10 November, Konstantin Makienko, a member of the State Duma Defence Committee, wrote that the geopolitical consequences of the war were "catastrophic" not only for Armenia but for Russia as well, because Moscow's influence in the Southern Caucasus had dwindled while "the prestige of a successful and feisty Turkey, contrariwise, had increased immensely".[468] Alexander Gabuev of the Carnegie Moscow Center took the opposite view, describing the peace agreement as "a win for Russia", as it had "prevented the conclusive defeat of Nagorno-Karabakh" and, by placing Russia in charge of the strategic Lachin corridor, boosted the country's leverage in the region.[469]

The relative success of Azerbaijan in meeting its strategic goals to gain control over Nagorno-Karabakh via the use of military force may have influenced the Russian decision to invade Ukraine in 2022.[470]

Bayraktar TB2 at 2020 Baku Victory Parade. Bayraktar TB2 drones were used extensively by Azerbaijani forces during the war.

Azerbaijan's oil wealth allowed a consistently higher military budget than Armenia,[449] and it purchased advanced weapons systems from Israel, Russia and Turkey.[156] Despite the similar size of both militaries, Azerbaijan possessed superior tanks, armoured personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles,[159] and had also amassed a fleet of Turkish and Israeli drones. Armenia built its own drones, but these were greatly inferior to the Turkish and Israeli drones owned by Azerbaijan.[159] Azerbaijan had a quantitative advantage in artillery systems, particularly self-propelled guns and long-range multiple rocket launchers, while Armenia had a minor advantage in tactical ballistic missiles.[47] Because of the air defence systems of both sides, there was little use of manned aviation during the conflict.[159] In the opinion of military analyst Michael Kofman, Director of the Russia Studies Program at the CNA and a Fellow at the Kennan Institute, Azerbaijan deployed mercenaries from Syria to minimise Azeri troop casualties: "They took quite a few casualties early on, especially in the south-east, and these mercenaries were essentially used as expendable assault troops to go in the first wave. They calculated quite cynically that if it turned out these offensives were not successful early on, then it was best these casualties would be among mercenaries not Azerbaijani forces."[11]

According to Gustav Gressel, a Senior Policy Fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations, the Armenian Army was superior to the Azerbaijani Army on a tactical level, with better officers, more agile leadership, and higher motivation in soldiers but these were overcome by Azerbaijan's innovative use of drones to discover Armenian forward and reserve positions followed by conventional artillery and ballistic missiles to isolate and destroy Armenian forces.[167] Gressel argues that European militaries are not better prepared for anti-drone warfare than Armenia's (with only France and Germany having some limited jamming capabilities) and warns that a lack of gun-based self-propelled air-defence systems and radar systems capable of tracking drones (using "plot-fusion" of several radar echoes) makes European forces extremely vulnerable to loitering munitions and small drones.[167]

In the opinion of a Forbes magazine contributor, Azerbaijan managed to inflict a devastating and decisive defeat through adept usage of sophisticated military hardware which avoided bogging down in a costly war of attrition. According to Forbes, Azerbaijan had prepared itself for tomorrow's war rather than a repeat of yesterday's war.[471]

The International Institute for Strategic Studies presented a summary of analyses by Russian military experts, who concluded that the Azerbaijani victory was not just a result of drone warfare and Turkish assistance, but could actually be attributed to a number of other factors, such as a more professional army with recent battlefield experience, employment by Armenia of Soviet-era tactics against the modern warfare waged by Azerbaijan, a strong national will to fight on part of Azerbaijan compared to irresolute Armenian leadership, and the Armenians believing their own propaganda and underestimating the enemy.[472]

In the opinion voiced by Russian military expert Vladimir Yevseev after the war, for unclear reasons Armenia appeared not to have executed the mobilisation it had announced and hardly any mobilised personnel were deployed to the conflict area.[473]

The Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan pipeline (green) is one of several pipelines running from Baku.

Azerbaijan made devastating use of drones and sensors, demonstrating what The Economist described as a "new, more affordable type of air power".[156] Azerbaijani drones, notably the Turkish-made Bayraktar TB2, carried out precise strikes as well as reconnaissance, relaying the coordinates of targets to Azerbaijani artillery.[102] Commentators noted how drones enabled small countries to conduct effective air campaigns, potentially making low-level conflicts much more deadly.[474] Close air support was provided by specialised suicide drones such as the Israeli-made IAI Harop loitering munition, rendering tanks vulnerable and suggesting the need for changes to armoured warfare doctrine.[475] Another suicide drone, the Turkish-made STM Kargu, was also reportedly used by Azerbaijan.[476][66]

Concerns were raised about the security of the petroleum industry in Azerbaijan.[477][478] Azerbaijan claimed that Armenia targeted, or tried to target, the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan pipeline, which accounted for around 80% of country's oil exports, and the Baku–Novorossiysk pipeline.[479][480][481] Armenia rejected the accusations.[482]

Billboards in Yerevan began displaying footage released by the Armenian Ministry of Defence at the beginning of the conflict.

Both sides engaged in extensive propaganda campaigns through official mainstream and social media accounts magnified online,[103] including in Russian media. Video from drones recording their kills was used in highly effective Azerbaijani propaganda.[102][156] In Baku, digital billboards broadcast high-resolution footage of missiles striking Armenian soldiers, tanks, and materiel. Azerbaijan's President Ilham Aliyev told Turkish television that Azerbaijani-operated drones had reduced the number of Azerbaijan's casualties, stating, "These drones show Turkey's strength" and "empower" Azerbaijanis.[159]

Hackers from Armenia and Azerbaijan as well as their allied countries have waged cyberwarfare, with Azerbaijani hackers targeting Armenian websites and posting Aliyev's statements,[483] and Greek hackers targeting Azerbaijani governmental websites.[484] There have been coordinated messages posted from both sides. Misinformation and videos of older events and other conflicts have been shared as new. New social media accounts posting about Armenia and Azerbaijan have spiked, with many from authentic users, but many inauthentic also.[485][486] According to the EU Parliament, Azerbaijani information operations also specifically aimed at harassing Armenia social media users.[487]

On 27 September 2020, the Prime Minister of Armenia, Nikol Pashinyan, accused the Azerbaijani authorities of a large-scale provocation. The Prime Minister stated that the "recent aggressive statements of the Azerbaijani leadership, large-scale joint military exercises with Turkey, as well as the rejection of OSCE proposals for monitoring" indicated that the aggression was pre-planned and constituted a major violation of regional peace and security.[488] The next day, Armenia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) issued a statement, noting that the "people of Artsakh were at war with the Turkish–Azerbaijani alliance".[489]

The same day, the Armenian ambassador to Russia, Vardan Toganyan, did not rule out that Armenia may turn to Russia for fresh arms supplies.[490] On 29 September 2020, Prime Minister Pashinyan stated that Azerbaijan, with military support from Turkey, was expanding the theatre into Armenian territory.[491] On 30 September 2020, Pashinyan stated that Armenia was considering officially recognising the Republic of Artsakh as an independent territory.[492] The same day, the Armenian MoFA stated that the Turkish Air Force had carried out provocative flights along the front between the forces of the Republic of Artsakh and Azerbaijan, including providing air support to the Azerbaijani army.[493]

On 1 October 2020, the President of Artsakh, Arayik Harutyunyan, stated that Armenians needed to prepare for a long-term war.[494] Two days later, the Nagorno-Karabakh (Artsakh) Foreign Ministry called on the international community to recognise the independence of the Republic of Artsakh in order to restore regional peace and security.[495]

On 6 October 2020, the Armenian prime minister, Nikol Pashinyan, stated that the Armenian side was prepared to make concessions, if Azerbaijan was ready to reciprocate.[496]

On 9 October 2020, Armen Sarkissian demanded that international powers, particularly, the United States, Russia and NATO, do more to stop Turkey's involvement in the war and warned that Ankara is creating "another Syria in the Caucasus".[497]

On 21 October 2020, Nikol Pashinyan stated that "it is impossible to talk about a diplomatic solution at this stage, at least at this stage", since the compromise option is not acceptable for Azerbaijan, while the Armenian side stated many times that it is ready to resolve the issue through compromises. Pashinyan said that "to fight for the rights of our people means, first of all, to take up arms and commit to the protection of the rights of the homeland".[498]

On 12 November 2020, Pashinyan addressed his nation, saying that "Armenia and the Armenian people are living extremely difficult days. There is sorrow in the hearts of all of us, tears in the eyes of all of us, pain in the souls of all of us". The prime minister pointed out that the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Armenia reported that the war "must be stopped immediately". And the President of Artsakh warned that if the hostilities do not stop, Stepanakert could be lost in days. Pashinyan also stated that the Karabakh issue was not resolved and is not resolved and that the international recognition of the Artsakh Republic is becoming an absolute priority.[499]

Meeting of the Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev with the country's Security Council on 27 September 2020

According to the Azerbaijani Ministry of Defence, the Armenian military violated the ceasefire 48 times along the line of contact on 26 September 2020, the day before the conflict. Azerbaijan stated that the Armenian side attacked first, prompting an Azerbaijani counter-offensive.[500]

On 27 September 2020, Azerbaijan accused Armenian forces of a "willful and deliberate" attack on the front line[501] and of targeting civilian areas, alleging a "gross violation of international humanitarian law".[502] On 28 September 2020, it stated that Armenia's actions had destroyed the peace negotiations through an act of aggression,[503] alleged that a war had been launched against Azerbaijan, mobilised the people of Azerbaijan, and declared a Great Patriotic War.[504] It then stated that the deployment of the Armenian military in Nagorno-Karabakh constituted a threat to regional peace and accused Armenia of propagandising, adding that the Azerbaijani military was operating according to international law.[505] The Azerbaijani authorities issued a statement accusing the Armenian military of purposefully targeting civilians, including women and children.[506] The Azerbaijani Minister of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) denied any reports of Turkish involvement, while admitting military-technical cooperation with Turkey and other countries.[507]

On 29 September 2020, the President of Azerbaijan, Ilham Aliyev, said that Armenian control of the area and aggression had led to the destruction of infrastructure and mosques, caused the Khojaly massacre and resulted in cultural genocide, and was tantamount to state-backed Islamophobia and anti-Azerbaijani sentiment.[508] The Azerbaijani MoFA demanded that Armenia stop shelling civilians and called on international organisations to ensure Armenia followed international law.[509] Azerbaijan denied reports of mercenaries brought in from Turkey by Azerbaijan,[510][511] and the First Vice-president of the Republic of Azerbaijan, Mehriban Aliyeva, stated that Azerbaijan had never laid claim to others' territory nor committed crimes against humanity.[512]

On 3 October 2020, Aliyev stated that Armenia needed to leave Azerbaijan's territory (in Nagorno-Karabakh) for the war to stop.[513] The next day, Aliyev issued an official statement that Azerbaijan was "writing a new history", describing Karabakh as an ancient Azerbaijani territory and longstanding home to Azerbaijanis, and claiming that Armenians had occupied Azerbaijan's territory, destroying its religious and cultural heritage, for three decades. He added that Azerbaijan would restore its cities and destroyed mosques and accused Armenia of distorting history.[514]

Two days later, Aliyev's aide, Hikmat Hajiyev, said that Armenia had deployed cluster munitions against cities,[515] however this had not been verified by other sources. On 7 October 2020, Azerbaijan officially notified members of the World Conference on Constitutional Justice, the Conference of European Constitutional Courts, the Association of Asian Constitutional Courts and similar organisations that it had launched the operation in line with international law to re-establish its internationally recognised territorial integrity and for the safety of its people.[516] He also accused Armenia of ethnic discrimination on account of the historical expulsion or self-exile of ethnic minority communities, highlighting its mono-ethnic population.[517]

On 10 October 2020, Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Jeyhun Bayramov stated that the truce signed on the same day was temporary.[518] Despite this, Aliyev stated that both parties were now attempting to determine a political resolution to the conflict.[519]

On 21 October 2020, Aliyev stated that Azerbaijan did not rule out the introduction of international observers and peacekeepers in Nagorno-Karabakh, but will put forward some conditions when the time comes.[520] He then added that Azerbaijan did not agree for a referendum in Nagorno-Karabakh,[521] but didn't exclude the cultural autonomy of Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh,[520] and reaffirmed that the Azerbaijan considers Armenians living in Nagorno-Karabakh as their citizens, promising security and rights.[522]

On 26 October 2020, Aliyev stated that the Azerbaijani government will inspect and record the destruction by Armenian forces in Armenian-occupied territories surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh during the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.[523]