Sertorian War

During Sulla's civil war, Quintus Sertorius fought for the Marian-Cinna faction against Sulla. In 83 BC, Sertorius, after falling out with his faction's leadership, was sent to the Iberian Peninsula as its governor. Unfortunately for Sertorius his faction lost the war in Italy and Sulla dispatched an army which drove him from Iberia. After some wandering Sertorius ended up at Tingis in North Africa; where he helped the locals depose Ascalis, a pro-Sullan Tyrant. In Tingis he was met by an embassy of discontented Lusitanians, a fierce Celtic people, who implored him to lead them against the Sullan government which was extorting them back home. The Lusitanians chose Sertorius because of the mild policy he had pursued while governor in 82 BC.[2] The Lusitani had a long history of resistance to Rome.[3] Some historians have concluded that the Lusitani were seeking independence and by taking over the leadership of the movement Sertorius was opposing Rome itself.[4] Philip Spann considers this unlikely, as for Sertorius to accept such a treasonable offer would be to destroy any hope of returning to Rome. More likely the offer grew out of an acceptance by the Lusitani that they would not be able to defeat Rome and that their best hope was to assist the establishment in Rome of a regime sympathetic to them.[5] Spann suggests that a major reason for Sertorius' acceptance was that it was becoming clearer that there would be no amnesty for him and his followers nor reconciliation with the regime set up by Sulla.[6]

In 80 BC Sertorius, after defeating off Mellaria a small naval force under Aurelius Cotta, landed in the Iberian Peninsula at Baelo, near the Pillars of Hercules (Gibraltar).[7] Plutarch's account implies that Sertorius first went to Lusitania, organized the tribes and only then returned to the Baetis valley to defeat a Roman force under Lucius Fufidius (probably the governor of Hispania Ulterior). Spann suggests that a more probable sequence is that the battle of the Baetis River occurred during Sertorius' initial march to Lusitania.[8]

Sertorius‘ victory at the Baetis brought the majority of Hispania Ulterior back under his control. While he consolidated his power in the south-west (Ulterior) he sent his trusted lieutenant, Lucius Hirtuleius, to Hispania Citerior to take care of its governor, one Cotta, and the remaining Sullan forces on the Iberian Peninsula.[9] Concerned at the growing threat, the authorities in Rome upgraded Hispania Ulterior from a propraetorian to a proconsular province,[10] and appointed Quintus Caecilius Metellus Pius, Sulla's consular partner of 80 BC, as its governor.[11] In 79 BC, with Metellus on his way, Marcus Domitius Calvinus (who had taken over Hispania Citerior from Cotta) crossed over into Hispania Ulterior, he found his passage blocked by the army of Hirtuleius who had fortified Consabura.

Hirtuleius, a lieutenant of Quintus Sertorius, was taking a handful of cohorts up a narrow road between two steep and impassable mountains. On being told that a substantial enemy force was approaching he dug a ditch between the mountains, and set a wooden rampart behind that. He then set fire to the rampart and made his escape with the enemy cut off [on the other side of the flames].[12]

Hirtuleius used guerrilla warfare to wear down Domitius Calvinus's army while he lured him inland. Eventually a battle was fought at the Anas River;[13] where Domitius was defeated; he either died in battle or was killed by his own troops who defected to the rebels.[14]

Metellus, unaware of the disaster, had already sent one of his legates, Lucius Thorius Balbus, to provide assistance to Domitius, but he too was defeated, this time by Sertorius himself. Domitius Calvinus's replacement as governor was Quintus Calidius.[15] Metellus entered Spain in late 80 or early 79 BC, basing himself at Metellinum (modern Medellin), made several thrusts into the interior,[11] but was thwarted by Sertorius who used guerrilla tactics.[16]

He [Metellus] was accustomed to regular warfare with heavy infantry. He liked to command a solid, ponderous bloc of infantry. This formation was superbly trained to push back and vanquish the enemy in combat at close quarters. For constantly chasing men who floated like the wind over mountains he had to climb, for enduring – as their enemy did – constant hunger without either tent or campfire, his army was useless. The light armour and consequent agility of his Iberian warriors meant Sertorius was constantly shifting the focus and changing the situation, until Metellus was at his wits' end. Metellus was no longer young, and after the many heroic contests of his youth he was now inclined to ease and luxury, while Sertorius was full of mature vigour. ... When Sertorius challenged Metellus to single combat, Metellus' men cheered and urged him to fight it out, general on general, and they mocked him when he declined.[17]

Lacking strong-points in central Hispania, Metellus set about creating them, he also started to methodically secure the cities and tribes of Hispania [this was the same strategy his father had used in the Jugurthine War when he had to fight king Jugurtha of Numidia who also used guerrilla tactics – Metellus had served on his father's staff back then].[18] Some of these forts are known today – Metellinum (Medellin), Castra Caecilia (Cáceres), Viccus Caecilius and Caecilina. This strategy might have worked on an inferior opponent, but Sertorius kept up a relentless campaign of hit-and-run attacks and ambuscades slowly wearing down Metellus who was soon forced to call for help.[19]

Lucius Manlius, the governor of Gallia Transalpina, tried to come to Metellus's aid, he marched with three legions and 1,500 cavalry across the Pyrenees. He fought a battle with the forces of Lucius Hirtuleius near Ilerda where he was defeated and driven back into the city. After this setback, Manlius decided to retreat to his province. Hirtuleius tried to put Manlius under siege in Ilerda, but the governor of Gaul was able to escape. When he returned to Gaul where he was attacked by the Aquitani.[20]

In 78 BC Metellus tried to take Langobriga (probably Laccobriga near Lisbon), a town allied to Sertorius. Metellus intended it to be an object lesson; he wanted the Celtic towns to know Sertorius could not protect them. Forewarned Sertorius supplied and fortified the city and stripped the countryside around Langobriga of anything useful. Through these countermeasures Sertorius not only forced Metellus into besieging the city but also caused him to run out of supplies really quickly. Metellus had to detach a legion to go scouting for provisions. Upon their return they were ambushed by Sertorius who routed them and forced them to abandon their supplies. This left Metellus with nothing to feed his army and he gave up the siege and marched back to the coast.[21] Back in Rome, Sulla died (78 BC) of natural causes leaving his faction without a strong leader.[22]

In 77 BC Metellus adopted a more cautious strategy, only holding on to the line of the Baetis river while he awaited the events in Rome where a new revolt loomed. Sertorius left Metellus to his devices and concentrated on subduing those tribes in the interior that had not yet yielded to his authority.[22]

The ongoing Sertorian threat forced the government in Rome into taking drastic measures; they agreed that the new governor of Hispania Citerior should get a proconsular command and that he should be sent out with a sizeable army to support Metellus's struggle against Sertorius and his rebels. In 76 BC the Senate accepted a proposal by Lucius Marcius Philippus to send his son-in-law Gnaeus Pompeius Magnus (Pompey), who had never been a magistrate, on behalf of the consuls (both of whom had refused the command themselves). Pompey recruited an army of 30,000 infantry and 1,000 cavalry, its size evidence of the seriousness of the threat presented by Sertorius, and marched to Hispania.[23]

In the same year (76 BC) Sertorius was joined by Marcus Perpenna, who brought the remnant of the army of rebellious consul Marcus Aemilius Lepidus from Sardinia.[11] However, Perperna had only reluctantly agreed to put himself under Sertorius's command; he had sailed his army to Liguria and was raising troops from among the Ligurians and Gauls there, when his men heard that Pompey was marching north to deal with them, they demanded that Perpenna take them to Hispania and join up with Sertorius.[24][25] Perpenna brought a substantial force of fifty-three cohorts (almost five-and-a-half legions) with him to Spain. Thus reinforced Sertorius decided to take on the eastern cities who supported the Sullan faction. His first target was the city of Lauron between Valentia and Saguntum.[26] Meanwhile, Pompey had crossed the Pyrenees and was marching his army toward Sertorius, he intended to finish the rebellion in one stroke by trying to force Sertorius into a pitched battle and defeating him. Pompey also sent a fleet under his brother-in-law, Gaius Memmius, accompanied by the Spaniard Balbus, to try and take New Carthage, secure it as a base, and from there move up the coast. Memmius was immediately blockaded in the city, probably by Sertorius's pirate allies, and was unable to play his part in the campaign.[27]

During 73 BC there was a growing division between the Roman and Native elements of the Sertorian coalition.[53] Metellus had offered a reward of one hundred silver talents and twenty-thousand acres of land to any Roman who would betray Sertorius.[54] This resulted in Sertorius no longer trusting his Roman bodyguard and he exchanged it for an Iberian one causing resentment among the Romans and Italians in the Sertorian camp who saw this as a sign that their commander did not trust them anymore.[55] Now a group of Romans began to actively plot his downfall. Plutarch tells how the Romans meted out harsh treatment to the Natives, blaming their actions on Sertorius' orders thus undermining his popularity.[56] They wanted to get rid of Sertorius, who was becoming more and more erratic and paranoid. It is normally assumed that Perperna made his move to assassinate Sertorius in 72 BC.[57] However there are strong arguments in favor of 73 BC.[53]

Perperna proceeded to invite Sertorius to a feast to celebrate a supposed victory. While under most circumstances, any festivities to which Sertorius was invited were conducted with great propriety, this particular feast was vulgar, designed to offend the skillful general. Disgusted, Sertorius changed his posture on the couch, intent on ignoring them all. At this, Perperna gave the signal to his fellow conspirators, and they murdered the unsuspecting Sertorius on the spot.[58]

Upon learning of the death of Sertorius, some of his Iberian allies sent ambassadors to Pompey or to Metellus and made peace, most simply went home. Perperna managed to retain control of some of the Roman renegades who had followed Sertorius, but he needed a quick victory to gain his people's trust. Unfortunately for Perperna and his men, Pompey had set a trap; he feigned a retreat and ambushed them. Frontinus reports:

Pompey put troops here and there, in places where they could attack from ambush. Then, pretending fear, he pulled back drawing the enemy after him. Then, when he had the enemy exposed to the ambuscade, he wheeled his army about. He attacked, slaughtering the enemy to his front and on both flanks[59]

Pompey lured Perperna's army into his ambush using 10 cohorts as bait. He allowed these to be attacked while scattered over a wide area, perhaps foraging, and as they fled they drew Perperna's army into the hidden lines of the main army. As these attacked from ambush, the 10 cohorts turned and attacked their pursuers from the front. The ensuing massacre was decisive.[60]

Pompey's successful ambush proved Plutarch's disparaging comment 'Perperna was as bad at command as he was at following orders'. Perperna attempted to plead for his life, offering to give Pompey all of Sertorius' correspondence, which would document contacts with the highest levels of Roman government and society. Pompey indicated he would accept the papers, and when they had all been gathered together, he burned them, averting the possibility of another civil war. He then executed Perperna and all of the men who had murdered Sertorius.[61] After this final battle, which seems to have taken place near Sertorius's capital of Osca, the war was as good as over.[62]

In the view of Scullard, Pompey's treatment of Hispania was humane, relative to the normal Roman treatment for traitors and rebels. Citizenship was given to many supporters and a group of fanatical opponents were resettled to Lugdunum Convenarum in southern Gaul.[57]

• 80 BC Sertorius and a small army land at Baelo (near the Pillars of Hercules)
• 80 BC At the Baetis estuary Sertorius defeats the forces of Fufidius (probably the Roman governor of Hispania Ulterior)
• 80 BC Hirtuleius (Sertorius's lieutenant) defeats Domitius Calvinus (governor of Hispania Citerior) on the banks of the Anas River
• 80/79 Sertorius defeats Lucius Thorius Balbus (a lieutenant of the consul Metellus Pius)
• 79 BC Metellus marches into Hispania, Sertorius start wearing him down by guerrilla warfare
• 79/78 Hirtuleius defeats Lucius Manlius, the governor of Gallia Transalpina, and forces him back into Gaul
• 78 BC Metellus tries to take Langobriga, Sertorius thwarts his efforts
• 77 BC Sertorius consolidates his power, he gains control of most of the Iberia peninsula
• 77 BC The Senate sends Gnaeus Pompey Magnus with a large army to reinforce Metellus
• 76 BC Pompey is outgeneraled and defeated at the Battle of Lauron (two-thirds of his army survive and he remains a force to be reckoned with)
• 76 BC Gaius Memmius (Pompey's quaestor) captures New Carthage, but is blockaded by Sertorius's allies
• 75 BC Pompey defeats Herennius and Perperna at the Battle Valentia
• 75 BC Metellus defeats Hirtuleius at the Battle of Italica
• 75 BC Pompey and Sertorius fight the indecisive Battle of Sucro, Sertorius retreats inland
• 75 BC Sertorius fights Metellus and Pompey at the Battle of Saguntum, Sertorius retreats further inland
• 75 BC Metellus and Pompey besiege Sertorius at Clunia, Sertorius breaks through their lines and escapes
• 74 BC Pompey and Metellus campaign against Sertorius's allies
• 74 BC Sertorius drives Pompey from Palentia
• 74 BC Perperna takes Cale on the Hispanic west coast
• 74 BC Sertorius rebuilds the walls of Palentia
• 74 BC Sertorius marches into the Ebro valley and surprises the Romans besieging Calgurris (killing 3000 of the besiegers)
• 74 BC Antonius, a Roman admiral, tries to break the Sertorian siege of Emporion, he failed and is recalled
• 74 BC Pompey writes his famous letter to the Senate threatening to march back to Rome unless the Senate sends funds and reinforcements
• 73 BC Metellus offers a reward to anyone who will kill Sertorius
• 73 BC There is a growing division in the Sertorian camp
• 73 BC Perperna and his fellow conspiratores assassinate Sertorius during a banquet
• 72 BC Pompey ambushes Perperna's army and defeats the last remnants of the Sertorians

• Philip Matyszak, Sertorius and the struggle for Spain, Pen & Sword Military, Barnsley (2013) ISBN 978-1848847873
• Philip Spann, Quintus Sertorius and the Legacy of Sulla, University of Arkansas Press (1987) ISBN 978-0938626640