The Disinformation Project

In February 2020, the team began researching data on mis- and disinformation related to COVID-19 on social and mainstream media and other forms of information sharing in New Zealand. Between March and May 2020, it was said that the infodemic in the country was mostly driven by stories on social media or reported on and discussed in the media that were easy to identify as unreliable and based on misinformation. Some of these included a "distrust in government or other official health information regarding the virus and its effects; disputed or speculated on the origin of the virus, including denying its existence, and a number of health and wellbeing narratives grounded in the rejection of mainstream medical advice" but by August, the narratives had changed to a more extreme distrust in the authority of the state in general.[3] Hannah has said that COVID-19 lockdowns in New Zealand had resulted in some people becoming disconnected from their local communities, often looking to fill this in online spaces where they might feel listened to, informed and respected. There is a danger, according to Hannah, that within these online groups, discussions about genuinely important social issues might be influenced by disinformation, pushing people into extremist views.[4]

By August 2020, the work had extended to a wider approach of studying mis- and disinformation ecosystems in New Zealand, including the causes and effects of actions such as "dangerous speech, hateful expression, and criminal behaviour" and how these aligned with "global trends, themes, narratives, and actors who influence online harms in Aotearoa."[9]^: p.1 In a later paper, the researchers reflected that within New Zealand by November 2021, there had been emerging patterns in the "nature, nature and significant nodes of disinformation", evident in a "shift from vaccine hesitancy to vaccine resistance, increasingly competing ideas regarding State versus individual rights, and the normalisation of the targeting of individuals and communities with online and offline harassment."[10]^: p.139

A 2021 report by the project covering the period of 17 August to 5 November,[9] is reported in the media as showing a "rapid trajectory of growth and spread of "dangerous speech, hateful expression and criminal behaviour...on a range of platforms from Telegram to Facebook and Instagram."[11] In 2022 Kayli Taylor, a researcher with the Disinformation Project,[12] wrote in a paper that research by the project indicated dangerous and hate speech in New Zealand is being "justified" in online media. Analysis of data from social media is noted by Taylor as an indicator that this "incited and normalised violence against minority groups..[including but not limited to]... Māori, other ethnic minorities, women and gender minorities, Queer/LGBTQ+ people, and those with disabilities", placing these communities at risk of experiencing "significant and growing harms."[13]

Research by the project has been said to show that disinformation was becoming "sophisticated, motivated, adaptive, resilient, increasingly violent and significantly volatile...[with a]...shift from vaccine hesitancy to vaccine resistance...[pushing]...various far-Right and conservative views from gun control, rural land rights and 1080, Māori sovereignty land rights, free speech, abortion, euthanasia and cannabis law reform."[11] The project identified that disinformation related to COVID-19 reflecting far right ideologies, was becoming more intense and popular within the New Zealand populace.[9]^: p.1

Hannah suggested that "minimization of Covid-19 has been like a Trojan horse...it has become a really significant recruitment tool and then has created an ability to coalesce around a set of ideas that are anti the state."[14]

Occupation, 13 February 2022

After the initial occupation in February 2022, the Disinformation Project monitored social media and identified a small group that was responsible for the spreading of the majority of false information during and after the event.[15] The researchers claimed that during the occupation a great number of New Zealanders were exposed to a "splintered reality...[and pushed toward]...racist and violent ideologies." The open-source data was gathered from posts on websites [that] "ranged from mainstream platforms like Facebook, Twitter, Instagram and YouTube, to channels linked to the far right, such as Telegram, Rumble, Odysee, Gab and Gettr", with analysis showing a major increase in online traffic at the time in these spaces that often encourage disinformation. After a clash between police and protestors on 2 March, the data showed that the "subscriber count...across 140 Telegram channels and chat groups they track" had risen from 307,613 by the beginning of the occupation to 353, 377, with "73 percent of Facebook interactions over misinformation and disinformation [being] traced back to just 12 accounts – or what the analysts likened to New Zealand's version of the infamous Disinformation Dozen".[16] In the same article, Hannah noted: "The parliamentary protest exposed more New Zealanders to disinformation and revealed more splintering of reality, to the extent that the mass shooting in Buffalo, New York, which was inspired by the Christchurch mosque terrorist attacks, is widely now discussed within disinformation social media spaces as 'another false flag'."[16]

Hannah told Kathryn Ryan that the project's research had noted a swing towards disinformation since August 2021, and while there was considerable interest in what was happening at parliament with wide coverage in all forms of media, many people got their information from places that were "completely grounded in a different interpretation and a different reality of what was going on."[17] In another media interview, Hannah noted how she and her colleagues were particularly concerned that "extreme misogyny and racism...including anti-Māori, Islamophobic and antisemitic sentiment," was affecting the freedom of some to fully participate in public life.[16] In May 2022, Kayli Taylor expressed concerns, based on data, that "the Parliament Protest [had] entrenched violent expression...toxic masculinities, and other hallmarks of dangerous speech as the norm within anti-mandate and anti-vaccine social media ecologies", effectively undermining "civic life, political culture, and inclusion – pillars of social cohesion."[13] Journalist Toby Manhire in a comprehensive coverage of the project's research, prefaced his article with:

Super-spreaders of misinformation and conspiracy theory outstripped mainstream outlets in reaching online audiences, opening up two divergent realities...[and]...the 23-day occupation of parliament grounds, which came to a fiery, violent end...engendered – and fed on – an unprecedented surge in the sharing of disinformation and conspiracy theory across digital platforms in New Zealand[18]

It was reported in the Otago Daily Times on 18 May 2022, that there was evidence "Russian-linked propaganda and disinformation" was being shared at the occupation site, including posts featuring the Ukrainian flag as a "symbol for paedophiles."[16] Marc Daalder, a senior political reporter at Newsroom NZ, wrote that Research Fellow Sanjana Hattotuwa, in his role as a researcher for the Disinformation Project,[12] had monitored "more than 100 Telegram channels and dozens of Facebook, YouTube, Instagram and Twitter accounts", and the data had shown that "the Russian invasion of Ukraine was one of the two dominant topics in New Zealand anti-vax forums...and the discussion is uniformly pro-Putin."[19] This is said in the article to be a new development within the communities that the project has been following, with Hattotuwa noting that Russian news had shown scenes of the protest at parliament which could have added some legitimacy to the occupation and contributed to increasing amounts of pro-Kremlin content in the New Zealand online space. Hottotuwa concludes that online landscapes studied by the Disinformation Project, had become "gripped by a very partisan, statist, anti-Ukrainian, anti-Semitic, harmful, toxic and virulently violent commentary around that original content. The pro-Putin, pro-Kremlin content is indistinguishable from QAnon conspiratorial."[19]

When protestors returned to parliament in August 2022, Hannah said in a media interview that it had moved beyond COVID-19 and was more about getting unification around the idea of what New Zealand is and what it should be like. Protestors, she claimed, were being influenced by rhetoric from the protest leaders making false claims that "politicians, officials, journalists, academics and members of the healthcare system are responsible for what they describe as mass genocide or democide, which means the killing of a population by its government".[20]

Project researchers and independent academics were scheduled to present at two media-only information sessions on political disinformation planned for early November 2022. However, the sessions were initially cancelled after invitations to attend, that had been privately sent, appeared on extremist Telegram channels with online users showing an intention to attend. After making the decision, but before notifying attendees, Kate Hannah got a death threat by email because of the supposed "collusion of the Disinformation Project with the media". This had previously happened frequently to Hannah who said in a documentary Web of Chaos,[21] that she was on a list of people to be "executed...for implementing or supporting the Covid-19 framework", continuing a trend she identified [where] "experts and policymakers were targeted with increasingly abusive and violent rhetoric. Now even the people who study that rhetoric have become targets."[22]

In August 2022, concerns were expressed by New Zealand councils that due to fewer candidates standing for election to local government roles, some positions may not be filled, or even contested.[23] A survey of elected members of councils has shown that many of them had "experienced racism, gender discrimination, or other forms of harmful behaviour while doing their job in public office."[24] Disinformation Project researcher Sanjana Hattotuwa said it was of concern that some people putting themselves forward in this void are "unequivocally linked with mis- and disinformation production...[and]...had connections to those who, during the Parliament protest, explicitly and 'openly called for the armed insurrection of the Beehive' on livestreams."[25] In the same piece Hattotuwa notes that in the United States people who held strong "anti-mandate, anti-science and anti-government views" had been elected to offices, and if this happened in New Zealand it could shape political debates to become more "abrasive and angry."[25]

The project noted at the time, that some proponents of disinformation were looking to disrupt New Zealand by encouraging their supporters to hide their affiliations and stand for councils and school Boards of Trustees. Hannah warned the participation of candidates with such a fixed agenda to do harm to society, could result in diverse and marginalised candidates feeling less [included] "in these really critical parts of our social fabric and democracy."[20] Hattotuwa worried that "new foundations" for disinformation had now been laid in New Zealand and would change how the country engaged with elections in the future.[16]

It was revealed in the media after the local body elections in New Zealand that while two candidates with connections to conspiracy theories or misinformation were elected in the Southern region of the country, the majority were unsuccessful. Hattotuwa said it was good that most candidates with these connections were rejected but warned that this was new in elections and the possible threat should not be undermined, particularly if there was a lower voter turnout.[26]

In this working paper, the authors explore the dynamics of a transphobic narrative turn in the wake of an anti-trans rally held in Melbourne, Australia on 18 March 2023. The study examines the period until mid-April 2023, with a particular focus on 25-31 March 2023. The paper consists of three main components: a narrative analysis of discourse and community-bridging on the messaging platform Telegram; a comparative quantitative assessment of disinformation and mainstream media ecologies on Meta platforms and products; and a mixed-methods examination of the role of existing community influencers in cementing the transphobic narrative turn. Goodson and Gill's concept of the narrative turn is employed to characterize the shift from anti-mandate and anti-vaccination narratives to transphobic narratives, which serve as organizational and motivational network meta structures within disinformation communities. The authors argue that this pivot provides a central sense of narrative belonging for those involved, mirroring the role of anti-mandate narratives. This phenomenon was previously indicated in the authors' research on "Trojan Horse" narratives, which act as gateways for individuals to be drawn into more conspiratorial ideologies.