United States v. Mendenhall

On the morning of February 10, 1976, Sylvia Mendenhall was walking through the concourse of Detroit Metropolitan Airport after disembarking a commercial flight returning from Los Angeles. During her walk through the airport, she was noticed by two Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agents. The two agents grew suspicious, later stating that she appeared to have the characteristics of a person unlawfully transporting narcotics. The agents approached Mendenhall and identified themselves as federal agents. Following procedure, they began to question Ms. Mendenhall; their questions included, "How long were you in California?" to which she responded by stating that hers was a short, two-day trip. The agents later asked her to present identification and an airline ticket. She presented her driver’s license and the airline ticket to the agents. The name on the driver’s license said “Sylvia Mendenhall”, yet the name on the airline ticket was “Annette Ford”. Upon questioning, she responded, “[I] just felt like using that name.”[6] "Agent Anderson then specifically identified himself as a federal narcotics agent and, according to his testimony, the respondent "became quite shaken, extremely nervous. She had a hard time speaking."[7] The agents requested that the respondent accompany them to the DEA office at the Airport; she did so willingly. At the office, the agents asked for permission to inspect her handbag and her person and informed her of her right to decline. She responded, "Go ahead," while handing her purse to the agent. A female police officer arrived at the office to conduct the search. The officer also proclaimed that the respondent had the right to decline to the search. When asked to remove her clothes, she explained that she had a flight to catch, but was assured that if she had no narcotics on her, that there would be no issues. Without further comments, she began to disrobe. Two packages were found beneath her undergarments and were handed to the policewoman. One package appeared to contain an illegal substance. The respondent was arrested for possession of heroin. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan denied the motion to suppress the evidence. The court concluded that the agents' actions were permissible in investigating suspicion of criminal activity. The respondent voluntarily accompanied the agents to the DEA office. The court convicted Sylvia Mendenhall. The court of appeals reversed the decision, stating that the respondent did not properly consent to the search.[3]

The issue requesting clarification was whether or not the respondent's Fourth Amendment rights were violated. The court failed to construct a majority defining "seizure". Whether or not the respondent voluntarily consented to the search or was coerced into it, there is sufficient evidence that the respondent was given the option to go on her way. According to Justice Stewart, evidence that the respondent was not asked to go to the DEA office with the agents is not enough to dismiss that the respondent gave consent.[9] There was no evidence of force, and the respondent's voluntary accompanying the agents is sufficient to side with the District Court. Evidence that she was a 22-year-old Black woman with no high school diploma and was being apprehended by White agents, though not completely irrelevant, was held as not being decisive evidence.[2]

The Fourth Amendment serves "to prevent arbitrary and oppressive interference by enforcement officials with the privacy and personal security of individuals." United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 554. As long as the person being questioned has the right to disregard the questions and has the right to vacate, then a search does not impede on a person's liberty or privacy. Police questioning is an effective manner of enforcing criminal law. The questioning of Sylvia Mendenhall furthered the compelling interest of the DEA. "Without such investigation, those who were innocent might be falsely accused, those who were guilty might wholly escape prosecution, and many crimes would go unsolved. In short, the security of all would be diminished." Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 225. Because the respondent was not held by force and could have walked away, she was not technically "seized" by the DEA agents. Since there is no constitutionally protected interest in regard to the "seizure" of a person, we are left with the precedent in Terry v. Ohio. In Terry, a police officer identified himself and the three gentlemen in question mumbled something leading Officer McFadden to believe they were dangerous. The officer grabbed Terry and threw Terry between the officer and the other two suspects. Terry was lawfully "seized" under the impression he was dangerous. In this case, Terry was unable to walk away and forced to a search. Based on the precedent provided by Terry, the search and seizure of Mendenhall was lawful.[2]

"Mr. Justice Powell, with whom the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Blackmun join, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.

"I join Parts I, II-B, II-C, and III of the Court's opinion. Because neither of the courts below considered the question, I do not reach the Government's contention that the agents did not "seize" the respondent within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. In my view, we may assume for present purposes that the stop did constitute a seizure. I would hold—as did the District Court—that the federal agents had reasonable suspicion that the respondent was engaging in criminal activity, and, therefore, that they did not violate the Fourth Amendment by stopping the respondent for routine questioning."[2]

"Mr. Justice White, with whom Mr. Justice Brennan, Mr. Justice Marshall, and Mr. Justice Stevens join, dissenting.

"The Court today concludes that agents of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) acted lawfully in stopping a traveler changing planes in an airport terminal and escorting her to a DEA office for a strip-search of her person. This result is particularly curious because a majority of the Members of the Court refuse to reject the conclusion that Ms. Mendenhall was "seized," while a separate majority decline to hold that there were reasonable grounds to justify a seizure. Mr. Justice Stewart concludes that the DEA agents acted lawfully, regardless of whether there were any reasonable grounds for suspecting Ms. Mendenhall of criminal activity, because he finds that Ms. Mendenhall was not "seized" by the DEA agents, even though, throughout the proceedings below, the Government never questioned the fact that a seizure had occurred necessitating a [display] of antecedent reasonable suspicion. Mr. Justice Powell's opinion concludes that, even though Ms. Mendenhall may have been "seized," the seizure was lawful, because her behavior while changing planes in the airport provided reasonable suspicion that she was engaging in criminal activity. The Court then concludes, based on the absence of evidence that Ms. Mendenhall resisted her detention, that she voluntarily consented to being taken to the DEA office, even though she, in fact, had no choice in the matter. This conclusion is inconsistent with our recognition that consent cannot be presumed from a showing of acquiescence to authority, and it cannot be reconciled with our decision last Term in Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979)."[2]

• Gaswirth, Mitchell M. (1981). "Reformulating Seizures—Airport Drug Stops and the Fourth Amendment". California Law Review. 69 (5): 1486–1512. doi:10.2307/3480250. JSTOR 3480250.
• Greenberg, P. S. (1981). "Drug Courier Profiles, Mendenhall and Reid—Analyzing Police Intrusions on Less Than Probable Cause". American Criminal Law Review. 19 (1): 49–79.

• Text of United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980) is available from: Cornell  CourtListener  Google Scholar  Justia  Library of Congress