Vyborg–Petrozavodsk offensive

In January 1944, Soviet forces raised the Siege of Leningrad and drove the German Army Group North back to the Narva-Lake Ilmen-Pskov line. Finland had conducted peace negotiations intermittently during 1943–1944 with the Western Allies and the USSR, but no agreement had been reached.[7] Finland asked for peace conditions again in February, but the Finnish Parliament (Eduskunta) considered the terms received impossible to fulfill. After Finland had rejected these peace conditions, and Germany halted the Soviet advance,[8] the Stavka (Main Command of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union) started to prepare for an offensive to force Finland's exit from the war.[9]

In order to destroy the Finnish Army and to push Finland out of the war, the Stavka decided to conduct the Vyborg–Petrozavodsk offensive.[10][11] The strategy called for a two-pronged offensive, one from Leningrad via Viborg to the Kymi river, and the second across the Svir River through Petrozavodsk and Sortavala past the 1940 border, preparing for an advance deep into Finland.[12] The plan called for the Finnish army to be destroyed on the Karelian Isthmus, and the remains blocked against the western shore of Lake Ladoga between the two assaults and Lake Saimaa.[10][11]

Finnish defensive positions. The Soviet offensive was stopped at the VKT-line.

The main strategic objectives of the offensive were to push Finnish forces away from the north of Leningrad, to drive Finland out of the war,[12][13] and to create better conditions for a major offensive to the south against Germany.[14][15][16][17]

The Finnish army had been preparing defensive fortifications since 1940, and three lines of defence on the Karelian Isthmus. The first two were the "Main line", which was constructed along the frontline of 1941, and the VT-line (Vammelsuu-Taipale) running 20 km behind the main line. These lines were reinforced with numerous concrete fortifications, but the work was still ongoing. The third line, the VKT-line (Viipuri-Kuparsaari-Taipale) was still on the drawing board and the construction of the fortifications began in late May 1944 at the Viborg sector of the line. At the northern bank of the Svir River (Finnish: Syväri) the Finnish army had prepared a defence in depth area which was fortified with strong-points with concrete pillboxes, barbed wire, obstacles and trenches. After the Winter War, the Salpa Line was built behind the 1940 border with concrete bunkers in front of the Kymi river.

To overcome these obstacles, the Stavka assigned 11 divisions and 9 tank and assault gun regiments to the Leningrad Front. That meant that there were 19 divisions, 2 division strength fortified regions, 2 tank brigades, 14 tank and assault gun regiments at the Isthmus, all of which included over 220 artillery and rocket launcher batteries (almost 3,000 guns/launchers). Around 1,500 planes from the 13th Air Army and the Baltic Fleet naval aviation also contributed to the operation which included surface and naval infantry units of the Baltic Fleet.

To the east of Karelia, the Stavka planned to use 9 divisions, 2 sapper brigades, 2 tank brigades and 3 assault gun regiments, raising the whole strength to 16 divisions, 2 fortified regions, 5 separate rifle brigades, 2 tank brigades, 3 assault gun regiments and 3 tank battalions. They were supported by Lake Ladoga and Lake Onega naval flotillas and the 7th Air Army.

At the Karelian Isthmus front there were on average 120 Red Army artillery pieces for every kilometer of frontline, with up to 220 artillery pieces per kilometer on the breakthrough sector at Valkeasaari.[12] In addition to heavy coastal artillery of the Leningrad area and the guns of the capital ships of the Baltic Fleet (Oktyabrskaya Revolutsiya, Kirov, Maxim Gorky) Stavka had also assigned heavy siege artillery (280 to 305 mm) in support of the attack.[17]

On June 9, a day before the main Soviet offensive, the 1,600-strong 13th Air Army conducted a major aerial assault. At the same time, artillery units of the Leningrad Front and the Baltic Fleet shelled Finnish positions for 10 hours.[11] The Finnish Army was in a well-fortified position, but the Soviet air attacks surprised the defending Finnish army and undermined its resistance causing many Finnish units to retreat and suffer from thousands of desertions.[18]

Valkeasaari

Memorial in Kalelovo

IS-2 heavy tank moving through forest

On June 10, the Soviet 21st Army spearheaded by 30th Guards Corps opened the offensive on the Valkeasaari sector which was defended by 1st Infantry Regiment of Finnish 10th Division. During the day, the Soviet units captured frontline trenches and destroyed fortifications, shattering the first Finnish defense line at the breakthrough sector.[11]

Kuuterselkä

Map of the battle of Kuuterselka

On June 13, the Soviet 21st Army's offensive reached the partially completed VT-line.[11] The defensive position was breached at Kuuterselkä by June 15. Though the line was breached the Finnish resistance managed to delay further Soviet advances.[17]

Siiranmäki

Memorial in Siiranmäki

Simultaneous to Kuuterselkä the Soviet 23rd Army attempted to break through at a perceived weak point in the Finnish VT-line at Siiranmäki. Siiranmäki was the first place where Finnish troops were able to use Panzerfausts and Panzerschrecks imported from Germany. Though Finnish troops managed to contain the Soviet breakthrough at Siiranmäki it was not enough to keep the VT-line as Kuuterselkä had already been breached. Soviet 98th Infantry Corps fighting in Siiranmäki against Finnish 7th Regiment announced to have lost during period of June 13 to June 16: 3 784 soldiers including 887 killed in action based on their own report. Red Army and especially Guard units took heavy losses in Siiranmäki-Kuuterselkä with 20,000 KIA, MIA or WIA.

Mannerheim had asked for German help, and on June 17 Gefechtsverband Kuhlmey arrived in Finland, followed on June 21 by the 303rd Assault Gun Brigade (at half strength) and the 122nd Infantry Division. Also, new German anti-tank weapons, Panzerfausts and Panzerschrecks, were issued to Finnish army troops. Late on June 21, German foreign minister von Ribbentrop arrived to Finland in an attempt to extract political concessions from the military help.

On June 21, Stavka ordered continued attacks on the Imatra–Lappeenranta–Virojoki defence line, on the Salpa Line sector of the front. Another group would attack northwards to Käkisalmi (now Priozersk, Russia) and surround the Finns defending the eastern VKT-line while preparations would be made for an advance towards Kotka, Kouvola and the Kymi river.[10][11]

On June 21 the Finnish government asked for Soviet peace terms. The response arrived on the next day and it demanded Finnish capitulation before any conditions could be presented. This created confusion in the Finnish government, where Ryti and Tanner were willing to repeat the inquiry about the conditions, while others opposed the capitulation. During the meeting Marshal Mannerheim was called, and he stated that the Soviet demand constituted an unconditional surrender. When Paasikivi's negotiation trip to Moscow in March 1944, which was initiated by the Soviet ambassador in Stockholm, but turned out to be a Soviet dictation of terms,[19][20] was remembered, the government decided to interpret the Soviet response as a demand for unconditional surrender.[19][21] It seemed that after Finnish unwillingness to accept the Soviet proposals in April 1944, owing to excessive reparation demands, Finland was to be offered only unconditional surrender.[22] This was in line with Churchill's statement that as an Axis belligerent, Finland's surrender must be unconditional.[23] The Soviet authorities denied this interpretation in an article published in Pravda on July 2, 1944,[24][25] Furthermore, it is also known that at June 26 Stalin even told American ambassador Harriman that US diplomats could try to clarify to the Finns that he did not intend to take over the country.[26] An unsigned draft document called "The Terms for Finnish Unconditional Surrender" was found in October 1993 in the Russian Foreign Ministry archive, which led some historians to conclude that unconditional surrender was indeed the Soviet goal.[27][28] According to Baryshnikov this and similar drafts for the other countries the USSR was at war with existed since 1943, and they were replaced by new ones in the summer of 1944.[29]

With Finnish army reinforcements, there were 268,000 Finnish army troops with 2,350 guns (of which 1,030 field artillery, 393 heavy mortars), 110 tanks/assault guns and 250 planes facing the two Red Army Fronts; 40% of the men and guns, and all the tanks were on the Isthmus. In total, the Red Army had a 1.7:1 advantage in men, 5.2:1 advantage in guns, and 6–7:1 advantage in planes and tanks against the Finnish army. However Finnish forces with 14 infantry divisions (a' 13,200), one armour division (9,200), 5 infantry brigades (a' 6,700), one cavalry regiment (4,300), 7 independent front border jaeger battalions, coastal defence forces and HQ/Corps artillery units even with full strength had less than 230,000 men. Less than 40 Finnish tanks and assault guns were modern (StuG III, T-34, KV-1) and less than 60 aircraft too (Bf 109 dayfighter and Ju 88 medium bomber). With these figures Red Army material advantage was about 1:20 at mid June 1944 (armour and aircraft).[11]

The offensive continued on June 25, when the Red Army breached the VKT-line at Tali, between the Viborg Bay and the Vuoksi river. On June 26 the Finnish president Ryti gave the guarantee to Ribbentrop that Finland would fight to the end alongside Germany. When it became evident that a breakthrough was not possible at Ihantala, the Leningrad Front attempted to double envelope the defenders with the twin assaults at the Viborg Bay and Vuosalmi. However, the Finnish army was able to hold its positions on these sectors of the front. On July 12 Stavka ordered Leningrad front to release offensive elements from the Finnish front, and on July 15, the Red Army troops were ordered to assume a defensive posture, and offensive elements (mostly armor) were transferred to the German front for use in Narva offensive and Operation Bagration.[30]

The Soviet troops tried to penetrate deep west after the Battle of Ihantala: in Äyräpää until July 18 and in Karelian Front even in early August. All offensives continued until very end – when there was no chance of a final decisive breakthrough. There hardly were any "limited objectives" on the Karelian Isthmus and Karelia. In the official history of the Great Patriotic War, failed offensives usually disappeared from memory as happened with the Vyborg–Petrozavodosk offensive. After Vyborg, the plan was to reach the Kymi river.[10][11]

The Soviet Union's Karelian Front attacked in the Olonets sector of White Karelia on June 20. Weakened Finnish forces proved unable to stop the offensive which reached Olonets on June 25 and on June 29 took Petrozavodsk, one of the main goals of the operation. The long advance and the delaying tactics of the Finnish forces sapped the Soviet strength and the main push of the 7th Army stopped at the Finnish U-line. The Soviet 7th Army and the 32nd Army tried to go around the U-line attacking further to the north but failed to break through the defending Finnish units in battles fought in the wilderness of Karelia. The last attempt to resume the offensive was made further north by two divisions of the Soviet 32nd Army which were defeated by counterattacking Finns in the Battle of Ilomantsi.

The offensive succeeded in reclaiming East Karelia and driving the Finnish army to the northern side of Viborg Bay and the Vuoksi River. It also reopened the original route of the Murman Railway and the White Sea Canal to the Karelian Front forces.[11] However, the offensive failed to breach the VKT-line and reach the Kymi River[17][34][35] as ordered by the Stavka.[10][11] In fact by the end of summer 1944 the Finnish armed forces were stronger and better equipped than ever before.[36]

Despite the losses suffered, the Finnish army managed to avoid encirclement of battalion-size units[Notes 4] and benefited from supplies delivered by Germany.[38]

Based on documents found after 1991 in Russia the most important point of the plan - the destruction of Finnish forces in Karelian Isthmus in a determined time and reaching a certain line (Kotka) - had failed.[39][40] Despite that, the psychological effect of the offensive on the Finnish leadership should not be underestimated. Even though the Finns had stopped the offensive at the Karelian Isthmus after 100 km and the Battle of Ilomantsi had shown that the Finnish army was still a viable fighting force,[41] it was estimated that should the Soviet offensive continue at its full strength, the Finnish army would be able to last for three months at most. For Finland the overall situation required peace especially when Germans had not much chance to keep Finns on their side longer.[41] At the same time western allies had already made their crucial breakthrough in Normandy and were driving fast to the east.

During the height of the offensive in June 1944, the Finns asked for negotiations and the Soviets responded with a demand for surrender, which in Finland was interpreted as an ambiguous demand for unconditional surrender and rejected. After the fighting had reached a stalemate in August 1944, another attempt to seek peace was made by Finland. In September 1944 the Soviets offered peace terms that were roughly the same as in April 1944, though some of the demands, which had been seen by the Finns as impossible to concede to, were reduced. The $600 million war reparations were halved and the time to pay them off was extended.[42][43] This was probably in part brought about by international pressure exerted on the Soviets, especially by the U.S. and Britain.[44] However, after the ceasefire the Soviets demanded that payments be based on 1938 prices which nearly doubled the actual amount to be paid,[42][43] and so the Finns complained that the Soviets only pretended to lower the reparations.[44]

Despite not achieving all of the goals set by the Stavka, the offensive forced Finland from the war and to accept Soviet peace terms,[6][11][14][15][16] or at least was an important factor leading to the ceasefire negotiations that were resumed a month after the offensive had ended.[17][35][45][46]

• Ilya Moshansky: Sturm Karelskogo Vala. Vyborgsko-Petrozavodskaja strategicheskaja nastupatelnaja operazija 10 ijuna – 9 avgusta 1944 goda., "Vojennaja Letopis", BTV-MN, Moscow, 2005.