Authoritarianism

Authoritarian regimes often adopt "the institutional trappings" of democracies such as constitutions.[20] Constitutions in authoritarian states may serve a variety of roles, including "operating manual" (describing how the government is to function); "billboard" (signal of regime's intent), "blueprint" (outline of future regime plans), and "window dressing" (material designed to obfuscate, such as provisions setting forth freedoms that are not honored in practice).[21] Authoritarian constitutions may help legitimize, strengthen, and consolidate regimes.[22] An authoritarian constitution "that successfully coordinates government action and defines popular expectations can also help consolidate the regime's grip on power by inhibiting re coordination on a different set of arrangements."[23] Unlike democratic constitutions, authoritarian constitutions do not set direct limits on executive authority; however, in some cases such documents may function as ways for elites to protect their own property rights or constrain autocrats' behavior.[24]

The Soviet Constitution of 1918, the first charter of the new Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic (RSFSR), was described by Vladimir Lenin as a "revolutionary" document. It was, he said, unlike any constitution drafted by a nation-state.[25] The concept of "authoritarian constitutionalism" has been developed by legal scholar Mark Tushnet.[26] Tushnet distinguishes authoritarian constitutionalist regimes from "liberal constitutionalist" regimes ("the sort familiar in the modern West, with core commitments to human rights and self-governance implemented by means of varying institutional devices") and from purely authoritarian regimes (which reject the idea of human rights or constraints on leaders' power).[26] He describes authoritarian constitutionalist regimes as (1) authoritarian dominant-party states that (2) impose sanctions (such as libel judgments) against, but do not arbitrarily arrest, political dissidents; (3) permit "reasonably open discussion and criticism of its policies"; (4) hold "reasonably free and fair elections", without systemic intimidation, but "with close attention to such matters as the drawing of election districts and the creation of party lists to ensure as best it can that it will prevail—and by a substantial margin"; (5) reflect at least occasional responsiveness to public opinion; and (6) create "mechanisms to ensure that the amount of dissent does not exceed the level it regards as desirable." Tushnet cites Singapore as an example of an authoritarian constitutionalist state, and connects the concept to that of hybrid regimes.[26]

Scholars such as Seymour Lipset,[27] Carles Boix, Susan Stokes,[28] Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Evelyne Stephens and John Stephens[29] argue that economic development increases the likelihood of democratization. Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi argue that while economic development makes democracies less likely to turn authoritarian, there is insufficient evidence to conclude that development causes democratization (turning an authoritarian state into a democracy).[30]

Eva Bellin argues that under certain circumstances the bourgeoise and labor are more likely to favor democratization, but less so under other circumstances.[31] Economic development can boost public support for authoritarian regimes in the short-to-medium term.[32]

According to Michael Albertus, most land reform programs tend to be implemented by authoritarian regimes that subsequently withhold property rights from the beneficiaries of the land reform. Authoritarian regimes do so to gain coercive leverage over rural populations.[33]

Within authoritarian systems, there may be nominally democratic institutions such as political parties, legislatures[34] and elections,[35] but they are managed in a way so as to entrench authoritarian regimes.[36][15] Within democracies, parties serve to coordinate the pursuit of interests for like-minded citizens, whereas in authoritarian systems, they are a way for authoritarian leaders to find capable elites for the regime.[15] In a democracy, a legislature is intended to represent the diversity of interests among citizens, whereas authoritarians use legislatures to signal their own restraint towards other elites as well as to monitor other elites who pose a challenge to the regime.[15]

Fraudulent elections may serve the role of signaling the strength of the regime (to deter elites from challenging the regime) and forcing other elites to demonstrate their loyalty to the regime. By contrast, in democracies, free and fair elections are used to select representatives who represent the will of the citizens.[15][36] Elections may also motivate authoritarian party members to strengthen patron–client and information-gathering networks, which strengthens the authoritarian regime.[36][37][38] Elections may also motivate members of the ruling class to provide public goods.[39][40]

According to a 2018 study, most party-led dictatorships regularly hold popular elections. Prior to the 1990s, most of these elections had no alternative parties or candidates for voters to choose. Since the end of the Cold War, about two-thirds of elections in authoritarian systems allow for some opposition, but the elections are structured in a way to heavily favor the incumbent authoritarian regime.[36]

Hindrances to free and fair elections in authoritarian systems may include:[36]

• Control of the media by the authoritarian incumbents.
• Interference with opposition campaigning.
• Electoral fraud.
• Violence against opposition.
• Large-scale spending by the state in favor of the incumbents.
• Permitting of some parties, but not others.
• Prohibitions on opposition parties, but not independent candidates.
• Allowing competition between candidates within the incumbent party, but not those who are not in the incumbent party.

The foundations of stable authoritarian rule are that the authoritarian prevents contestation from the masses and other elites. The authoritarian regime may use co-optation or repression (or carrots and sticks) to prevent revolts.[41][42] Authoritarian rule entails a balancing act whereby the ruler has to maintain the support of other elites (frequently through the distribution of state and societal resources) and the support of the public (through distribution of the same resources): the authoritarian rule is at risk if the balancing act is lopsided, as it risks a coup by the elites or an uprising by the mass public.[43][44]

According to a 2019 study by Sergei Guriev and Daniel Treisman, authoritarian regimes have over time become less reliant on violence and mass repression to maintain control. The study shows instead that authoritarians have increasingly resorted to manipulation of information as a means of control. Authoritarians increasingly seek to create an appearance of good performance, conceal state repression, and imitate democracy.[45]

Andrew J. Nathan notes that "regime theory holds that authoritarian systems are inherently fragile because of weak legitimacy, overreliance on coercion, over-centralization of decision making, and the predominance of personal power over institutional norms. ... Few authoritarian regimes—be they communist, fascist, corporatist, or personalist—have managed to conduct orderly, peaceful, timely, and stable successions."[46]

Political scientist Theodore M. Vestal writes that authoritarian political systems may be weakened through inadequate responsiveness to either popular or elite demands and that the authoritarian tendency to respond to challenges by exerting tighter control, instead of by adapting, may compromise the legitimacy of an authoritarian state and lead to its collapse.[17]

One exception to this general trend is the endurance of the authoritarian rule of the Chinese Communist Party which has been unusually resilient among authoritarian regimes. Nathan posits that this can be attributed to four factors such as (1) "the increasingly norm-bound nature of its succession politics"; (2) "the increase in meritocratic as opposed to factional considerations in the promotion of political elites"; (3) "the differentiation and functional specialization of institutions within the regime"; and (4) "the establishment of institutions for political participation and appeal that strengthen the CCP's legitimacy among the public at large."[46]

Yale University political scientist Milan Svolik argues that violence is a common characteristic of authoritarian systems. Violence tends to be common in authoritarian states because of a lack of independent third parties empowered to settle disputes between the dictator, regime allies, regime soldiers and the masses.[41]

Authoritarians may resort to measures referred to as coup-proofing (structures that make it hard for any small group to seize power). Coup-proofing strategies include strategically placing family, ethnic, and religious groups in the military; creating of an armed force parallel to the regular military; and developing multiple internal security agencies with overlapping jurisdiction that constantly monitor one another.[47] Research shows that some coup-proofing strategies reduce the risk of coups occurring[48][49] and reduce the likelihood of mass protests.[50] However, coup-proofing reduces military effectiveness,[51][52][53][54] and limits the rents that an incumbent can extract.[55] A 2016 study shows that the implementation of succession rules reduce the occurrence of coup attempts.[56] Succession rules are believed to hamper coordination efforts among coup plotters by assuaging elites who have more to gain by patience than by plotting.[56] According to political scientists Curtis Bell and Jonathan Powell, coup attempts in neighbouring countries lead to greater coup-proofing and coup-related repression in a region.[57] A 2017 study finds that countries' coup-proofing strategies are heavily influenced by other countries with similar histories.[58] A 2018 study in the Journal of Peace Research found that leaders who survive coup attempts and respond by purging known and potential rivals are likely to have longer tenures as leaders.[59] A 2019 study in Conflict Management and Peace Science found that personalist dictatorships are more likely to take coup-proofing measures than other authoritarian regimes; the authors argue that this is because "personalists are characterized by weak institutions and narrow support bases, a lack of unifying ideologies and informal links to the ruler."[60]

According to a 2019 study, personalist dictatorships are more repressive than other forms of dictatorship.[61]

• An authoritarian regime has "a concentration of power in a leader or an elite not constitutionally responsible to the people".[64] Unlike totalitarian states, they will allow social and economic institutions not under governmental control,[65] and tend to rely on passive mass acceptance rather than active popular support.[66]
• An Autocracy is a state/government in which one person possesses "unlimited power".
• A Totalitarian state is "based on subordination of the individual to the state and strict control of all aspects of the life and productive capacity of the nation especially by coercive measures (such as censorship and terrorism)".[67] and are ruled by a single ruling party made up of loyal supporters.[68] Unlike autocracies, which "seek only to gain absolute political power and to outlaw opposition",[69] totalitarian states are characterized by an official ideology, which "seek only to gain absolute political power and to outlaw opposition",[69] and "seek to dominate every aspect of everyone's life as a prelude to world domination".[69]
• A Fascist state is autocratic and based on a political philosophy/movement, (such as that of the Fascisti of pre-WWII Italy) "that exalts nation and often race above the individual and that stands for a centralized autocratic government headed by a dictatorial leader, severe economic and social regimentation, and forcible suppression of opposition".[70]

Several subtypes of authoritarian regimes have been identified by Linz and others.[71] Linz identified the two most basic subtypes as traditional authoritarian regimes and bureaucratic-military authoritarian regimes:

• Traditional authoritarian regimes are those "in which the ruling authority (generally a single person)" is maintained in power "through a combination of appeals to traditional legitimacy, patron-client ties and repression, which is carried out by an apparatus bound to the ruling authority through personal loyalties." An example is Ethiopia under Haile Selassie I.[71]
  

  Honoring South Korean President Park Chung-hee in Army Parade at Armed Forces Day on 1 October 1973
• Bureaucratic-military authoritarian regimes are those "governed by a coalition of military officers and technocrats who act pragmatically (rather than ideologically) within the limits of their bureaucratic mentality."[71] Mark J. Gasiorowski suggests that it is best to distinguish "simple military authoritarian regimes" from "bureaucratic authoritarian regimes" in which "a powerful group of technocrats uses the state apparatus to try to rationalize and develop the economy" such South Korea under Park Chung-hee.[71]

According to Barbara Geddes, there are seven typologies of authoritarian regimes: dominant party regimes, military regime, personalist regimes, monarchies, oligarchic regimes, indirect military regimes, or hybrids of the first three.[72]

Subtypes of authoritarian regimes identified by Linz are corporatist or organic-statistic, racial and ethnic "democracy" and post-totalitarian.[71]

• Corporatist authoritarian regimes "are those in which corporatism institutions are used extensively by the state to coopt and demobilize powerful interest groups." This type has been studied most extensively in Latin America.[71]
• Racial and ethnic "democracies" are those in which "certain racial or ethnic groups enjoy full democratic rights while others are largely or entirely denied those rights", such as in South Africa under apartheid.[71]
• Post-totalitarian authoritarian regimes are those in which totalitarian institutions (such as the party, secret police and state-controlled mass media[73]) remain, but where "ideological orthodoxy has declined in favor of routinization, repression has declined, the state's top leadership is less personalized and more secure, and the level of mass mobilization has declined substantially."[71] Examples include the Russian Federation and Soviet Eastern Bloc states in the mid-1980s.[71] The post-Mao Zedong People's Republic of China was viewed as post-totalitarian in the 1990s and early 2000s, with a limited degree of increase in pluralism and civil society.[74][75] however, in the 2010s, particularly after Xi Jinping succeeded as General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party and rose to power in 2012, Chinese state repression sharply increased, aided by digital control and mass surveillance.[76][77][78]

Azerbaijan's President Ilham Aliyev and Venezuela's President Nicolas Maduro on 25 October 2019

Authoritarian regimes are also sometimes subcategorized by whether they are personalistic or populist.[71] Personalistic authoritarian regimes are characterized by arbitrary rule and authority exercised "mainly through patronage networks and coercion rather than through institutions and formal rules."[71] Personalistic authoritarian regimes have been seen in post-colonial Africa. By contrast, populist authoritarian regimes "are mobilizational regimes in which a strong, charismatic, manipulative leader rules through a coalition involving key lower-class groups."[71] Examples include Argentina under Juan Perón,[71] Egypt under Gamal Abdel Nasser[71] and Venezuela under Hugo Chávez and Nicolás Maduro.[79][80]

A typology of authoritarian regimes by political scientists Brian Lai and Dan Slater includes four categories:

• machine (oligarchic party dictatorships);
• bossism (autocratic party dictatorships);
• juntas (oligarchic military dictatorships); and
• strongman (autocratic military dictatorships).[3]

Lai and Slater argue that single‐party regimes are better than military regimes at developing institutions (e.g. mass mobilization, patronage networks ad coordination of elites) that are effective at continuing the regime's incumbency and diminishing domestic challengers; Lai and Slater also argue that military regimes more often initiate military conflicts or undertake other "desperate measures" to maintain control as compared to single‐party regimes.[3][2]

John Duckitt suggests a link between authoritarianism and collectivism, asserting that both stand in opposition to individualism.[81] Duckitt writes that both authoritarianism and collectivism submerge individual rights and goals to group goals, expectations and conformities.[82]

According to Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way, authoritarian regimes that are created in social revolutions are far more durable than other kinds of authoritarian regimes.[83]

Democracy Index by the Economist Intelligence Unit, 2020.[84] Green countries are democratic, yellow are hybrid regimes, and red are authoritarian governments.

Authoritarianism and democracy are not necessarily fundamental opposites and may be thought of as poles at opposite ends of a scale, so that it is possible for some democracies to possess authoritarian elements, and for an authoritarian system to have democratic elements.[85][86][87] Authoritarian regimes may also be partly responsive to citizen grievances, although this is generally only regarding grievances that do not undermine the stability of the regime.[88][89] An illiberal democracy, or procedural democracy, is distinguished from liberal democracy, or substantive democracy, in that illiberal democracies lack features such as the rule of law, protections for minority groups, an independent judiciary and the real separation of powers.[90][91][92][93]

A further distinction that liberal democracies have rarely made war with one another; research has extended the theory and finds that more democratic countries tend to have few wars (sometimes called militarized interstate disputes) causing fewer battle deaths with one another and that democracies have far fewer civil wars.[94][95]

Research shows that the democratic nations have much less democide or murder by government. Those were also moderately developed nations before applying liberal democratic policies.[96] Research by the World Bank suggests that political institutions are extremely important in determining the prevalence of corruption and that parliamentary systems, political stability and freedom of the press are all associated with lower corruption.[97]

A 2006 study by economist Alberto Abadie has concluded that terrorism is most common in nations with intermediate political freedom. The nations with the least terrorism are the most and least democratic nations, and that "transitions from an authoritarian regime to a democracy may be accompanied by temporary increases in terrorism."[98] Studies in 2013 and 2017 similarly found a nonlinear relationship between political freedom and terrorism, with the most terrorist attacks occurring in partial democracies and the fewest in "strict autocracies and full-fledged democracies."[99] A 2018 study by Amichai Magen demonstrated that liberal democracies and polyarchies not only suffer fewer terrorist attacks as compared to other regime types, but also suffer fewer casualties in terrorist attacks as compared to other regime types, which may be attributed to higher-quality democracies' responsiveness to their citizens' demands, including "the desire for physical safety", resulting in "investment in intelligence, infrastructure protection, first responders, social resilience, and specialized medical care" which averts casualties.[99] Magen also stated that terrorism in closed autocracies sharply increased starting in 2013.[99]

Another type of authoritarian regime is the competitive authoritarian regime, a type of civilian regime that arose in the post-Cold War era. In a competitive authoritarian regime, "formal democratic institutions exist and are widely viewed as the primary means of gaining power, but ... incumbents' abuse of the state places them at a significant advantage vis-à-vis their opponents."[100][101] The term was coined by Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way in their 2010 book of the same name to discuss a type of hybrid regime that emerged during and after the Cold War.[100][102]

Competitive authoritarian regimes differ from fully authoritarian regimes in that elections are regularly held, the opposition can openly operate without a high risk of exile or imprisonment and "democratic procedures are sufficiently meaningful for opposition groups to take them seriously as arenas through which to contest for power."[100] Competitive authoritarian regimes lack one or more of the three characteristics of democracies such as free elections (i.e. elections untainted by substantial fraud or voter intimidation); protection of civil liberties (i.e. the freedom of speech, press and association) and an even playing field (in terms of access to resources, the media and legal recourse).[103]

Authoritarianism is considered a core concept of fascism[104][105][106][107] and scholars agree that a fascist regime is foremost an authoritarian form of government, although not all authoritarian regimes are fascist. While authoritarianism is a defining characteristic of fascism, scholars argue that more distinguishing traits are needed to make an authoritarian regime fascist.[108][109][110][111][112][113][114][115][116]

Benito Mussolini, the founder of Italian Fascism, called his regime the "Totalitarian State": "Everything in the State, nothing outside the State, nothing against the State."[117]

Linz distinguished new forms of authoritarianism from personalistic dictatorships and totalitarian states, taking Francoist Spain as an example. Unlike personalistic dictatorships, new forms of authoritarianism have institutionalized representation of a variety of actors (in Spain's case, including the military, the Catholic Church, Falange, monarchists, technocrats and others). Unlike totalitarian states, the regime relies on passive mass acceptance rather than popular support.[66] According to Juan Linz the distinction between an authoritarian regime and a totalitarian one is that an authoritarian regime seeks to suffocate politics and political mobilization while totalitarianism seeks to control and utilize them.[62] Authoritarianism primarily differs from totalitarianism in that social and economic institutions exist that are not under governmental control. Building on the work of Yale political scientist Juan Linz, Paul C. Sondrol of the University of Colorado at Colorado Springs has examined the characteristics of authoritarian and totalitarian dictators and organized them in a chart:[65]

Sondrol argues that while both authoritarianism and totalitarianism are forms of autocracy, they differ in three key dichotomies:

(1) Unlike their bland and generally unpopular authoritarian brethren, totalitarian dictators develop a charismatic "mystique" and a mass-based, pseudo-democratic interdependence with their followers via the conscious manipulation of a prophetic image.

(2) Concomitant role conceptions differentiate totalitarians from authoritarians. Authoritarians view themselves as individual beings largely content to control and often maintain the status quo. Totalitarian self-conceptions are largely teleological. The tyrant is less a person than an indispensable function to guide and reshape the universe.

(3) Consequently, the utilisation of power for personal aggrandizement is more evident among authoritarians than totalitarians. Lacking the binding appeal of ideology, authoritarians support their rule by a mixture of instilling fear and granting rewards to loyal collaborators, engendering a kleptocracy.[65]

Compared to totalitarianism, "the authoritarian state still maintains a certain distinction between state and society. It is only concerned with political power and as long as that is not contested it gives society a certain degree of liberty. Totalitarianism, on the other hand, invades private life and asphyxiates it."[118] Another distinction is that "authoritarianism is not animated by utopian ideals in the way totalitarianism is. It does not attempt to change the world and human nature."[118] Carl Joachim Friedrich writes that "a totalist ideology, a party reinforced by a secret police, and monopoly control of ... industrial mass society" are the three features of totalitarian regimes that distinguish them from other autocracies.[118]

Greg Yudin, a professor of political philosophy at the Moscow School of Social and Economic Sciences, argues "political passivity and civic disengagement" are "key features" of authoritarianism, while totalitarianism relies on "mass mobilization, terror and homogeneity of beliefs".[119]

Both World War II (ending in 1945) and the Cold War (ending in 1991) resulted in the replacement of authoritarian regimes by either democratic regimes or regimes that were less authoritarian.

World War II saw the defeat of the Axis powers by the Allied powers. All the Axis powers (Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy and Imperial Japan) had totalitarian or authoritarian governments, and two of the three were replaced by governments based on democratic constitutions. The Allied powers were an alliance of Democratic states and (later) the Communist Soviet Union. At least in Western Europe the initial post-war era embraced pluralism and freedom of expression in areas that had been under control of authoritarian regimes. The memory of fascism and Nazism was denigrated. The new Federal Republic of Germany banned its expression. In reaction to the centralism of the Nazi state, the new constitution of West Germany (Federal Republic of Germany) exercised "separation of powers" and placed "law enforcement firmly in the hands" of the sixteen Länder or states of the republic, not with the federal German government, at least not at first.[127]

Culturally there was also a strong sense of anti-authoritarianism based on anti-fascism in Western Europe. This was attributed to the active resistance from occupation and to fears arising from the development of superpowers.[128] Anti-authoritarianism also became associated with countercultural and bohemian movements such as the Beat Generation in the 1950s,[129] the hippies in the 1960s[130] and punks in the 1970s.[131]

In South America, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Paraguay, Chile and Uruguay moved away from dictatorships to democracy between 1982 and 1990.[132]

With the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the Soviet Union in 1991, the other authoritarian/totalitarian "half" of the Allied Powers of World War II collapsed. This led not so much to revolt against authority in general, but to the belief that authoritarian states (and state control of economies) were outdated.[133] The idea that "liberal democracy was the final form toward which all political striving was directed"[134] became very popular in Western countries and was celebrated in Francis Fukuyama's book The End of History and the Last Man.[134] According to Charles H. Fairbanks Jr., "all the new states that stumbled out of the ruins of the Soviet bloc, except Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, seemed indeed to be moving towards democracy in the early 1990s" as were the countries of East Central Europe and the Balkans.[135]

In December 2010, the Arab Spring arose in response to unrest over economic stagnation but also in opposition to oppressive authoritarian regimes, first in Tunisia, and spreading to Libya, Egypt, Yemen, Syria, Bahrain and elsewhere. Regimes were toppled in Tunisia, Libya, Egypt and partially in Yemen while other countries saw riots, civil wars or insurgencies. Most Arab Spring revolutions failed to lead to enduring democratization. In the decade following the Arab Spring, of the countries in which an autocracy was toppled in the Arab spring, only Tunisia had become a genuine democracy; Egypt backslid to return to a military-run authoritarian state, while Libya, Syria and Yemen experienced devastating civil wars.[136][137]

Since 2005, observers noted what some have called a "democratic recession",[134][138] although some such as Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way have disputed that there was a significant democratic decline before 2013.[138] In 2018, the Freedom House declared that from 2006 to 2018 "113 countries" around the world showed "a net decline" in "political rights and civil liberties" while "only 62" experienced "a net improvement."[139] Its 2020 report marked the fourteenth consecutive year of declining scores.[140] By 2020, all countries marked as "not free" by Freedom House had also developed practices of transnational authoritarianism, aiming to police and control dissent beyond state borders.[141]

Writing in 2018, American political journalist David Frum stated: "The hopeful world of the very late 20th century—the world of NAFTA and an expanding NATO; of the World Wide Web 1.0 and liberal interventionism; of the global spread of democracy under leaders such as Václav Havel and Nelson Mandela—now looks battered and delusive."[144]

Michael Ignatieff wrote that Fukuyama's idea of liberalism vanquishing authoritarianism "now looks like a quaint artifact of a vanished unipolar moment"[134] and Fukuyama himself expressed concern.[133] By 2018, only one Arab Spring uprising (that in Tunisia) resulted in a transition to constitutional democratic governance[145] and a "resurgence of authoritarianism and Islamic extremism" in the region[146] was dubbed the Arab Winter.[147][148][149][150][151]

Various explanations have been offered for the new spread of authoritarianism. They include the downside of globalization, and the subsequent rise of populist neo-nationalism,[152] and the success of the Beijing Consensus, i.e. the authoritarian model of the People's Republic of China.[153] In countries such as the United States, factors blamed for the growth of authoritarianism include the financial crisis of 2007–2008 and slower real wage growth[154] as well as social media's elimination of so-called "gatekeepers" of knowledge – the equivalent of disintermediation in economics – so that a large fraction of the population considers to be opinion what were once "viewed as verifiable facts" – including everything from the danger of global warming to the preventing the spread of disease through vaccination – and considers to be fact what are actually only unproven fringe opinions.[155]

In United States politics, the terms "extreme right", "far-right", and "ultra-right" are labels used to describe "militant forms of insurgent revolutionary right ideology and separatist ethnocentric nationalism",[156] such as Christian Identity,[156] the Creativity Movement,[156] the Ku Klux Klan,[156] the National Socialist Movement,[156][157][158] the National Alliance,[156] the Joy of Satan Ministries,[157][158] and the Order of Nine Angles.[159] These far-right groups share conspiracist views of power which are overwhelmingly anti-Semitic and reject pluralist democracy in favour of an organic oligarchy that would unite the perceived homogeneously racial Völkish nation.[156][159] The far-right in the United States is composed of various Neo-fascist, Neo-Nazi, White nationalist, and White supremacist organizations and networks who have been known to refer to an "acceleration" of racial conflict through violent means such as assassinations, murders, terrorist attacks, and societal collapse, in order to achieve the building of a White ethnostate.[159]

The following is a non-exhaustive list of examples of states which are currently or frequently characterized as authoritarian.

State	Time period	Ruling group or person	Notes and references
Afghanistan	1996–2001; 2021–	Taliban
Angola	1975–	People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola	[160]
Azerbaijan	1993–	New Azerbaijan Party	[161]
Bahrain	1783–	House of Khalifa	[162]
Belarus	1994–	Alexander Lukashenko	[163][164][165][166][167]
Burundi	2005–	CNDD–FDD	[168]
Cambodia	1979-	Cambodian People's Party	[169][170]
Cameroon	1982–	Paul Biya	[171][172]
People's Republic of China	1949–	Chinese Communist Party	Some scholars have deemed the Chinese system "a fragmented authoritarianism" (Lieberthal), "a negotiated state", or "a consultative authoritarian regime."[173] According to research by John Kennedy et al. (2018), Chinese citizens with higher education tend to participate less in local elections and have lower levels of democratic values when compared to those with only compulsory education.[174]
Republic of the Congo	1979–1992; 1997-	Denis Sassou Nguesso	[175]
Cuba	1959–	Communist Party of Cuba	[176]
Djibouti	1977–	Hassan Gouled Aptidon and Ismaïl Omar Guelleh	[177][178]
Egypt	2014–	Abdel Fattah el-Sisi	[179]
El Salvador	2019–	Nayib Bukele	[180][181]
Equatorial Guinea	1979–	Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo	[182]
Gabon	1961–	Gabonese Democratic Party	[183]
Hungary	2010–	Viktor Orbán and Fidesz	It has recently moved more towards illiberalism.[184][185][186][187]
India*	2014–	Narendra Modi	Some scholars deem the country to be moving towards authoritarianism. Though it is subject to verification[188][189][190]
Iran	1979–	Ruhollah Khomeini and Ali Khamenei	After the Iranian Revolution, Iran became an authoritarian clerical state (nominally an "Islamic republic") based on the absolute authority of the unelected Supreme Leader of Iran, based on the Shia concept of Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist.[191][192] In 2000, Juan José Linz wrote that "it is difficult to fit the Iranian regime into the existing typology, as it combines the ideological bent of totalitarianism with the limited pluralism of authoritarianism and holds regular elections in which candidates advocating differing policies and incumbents are often defeated."[193]
Jordan	1946–	Hashemites	[194]
Laos	1975–	Lao People's Revolutionary Party	[195]
Morocco	1957–	Alaouite dynasty	[194][196][197]
Montenegro	1990–	Democratic Party of Socialists of Montenegro under Milo Đukanović	[198][199][200][201][202]
Myanmar	1962–	Ne Win, Saw Maung, Than Shwe and Min Aung Hlaing	[203]
Nicaragua	1979–1990; 2007–	Daniel Ortega and Rosario Murillo	[204][205]
North Korea	1949–	Workers' Party of Korea and Kim Dynasty
Oman	1970–	House of Al Said	Began with the 1970 coup d'état.[206]
Palestine	1964–	Palestine Liberation Organization	[207]
	2006–	Hamas
Qatar	1971–	House of Thani	[208]
Russian Federation	2000–	United Russia under Vladimir Putin	It has authoritarian tendencies and is described by some observes as "really a mixture of authoritarianism and managed democracy."[209][210][211] See Putinism for more.
Rwanda	2000–	Paul Kagame	[212]
First Saudi State	1744–1818	House of Saud	[213]
Second Saudi State	1824–1891
Saudi Arabia	1902–
Serbia	2012–	Serbian Progressive Party under Aleksandar Vučić	[214][215][216][217]
Singapore	1965–	People's Action Party	[218][219]
South Sudan	2011–	Sudan People's Liberation Movement under Salva Kiir Mayardit	[220]
Republika Srpska (part of  Bosnia and Herzegovina)	2006–	Milorad Dodik	[221][222][223]
Syria	1963–	Ba'athist regime and al-Assad family	[224]
Tajikistan	1994–	Emomali Rahmon	[225]
Thailand	2014–	King Maha Vajiralongkorn and Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha	The 2014 Thai coup d'état overthrew the democratically elected government of Yingluck Shinawatra in a military coup and installed a military junta to oversee the governance of Thailand.[226]
Togo	1967–	Eyadema Family
Turkey	2003–	Justice and Development Party under Recep Tayyip Erdoğan	It has been described by observers as a "competitive authoritarian regime."[227]
United Arab Emirates	1971–	Royal families of the United Arab Emirates	[228][229]
Uganda	1986–	Yoweri Museveni	[230]
Uzbekistan	1989–	Uzbekistan Liberal Democratic Party	[231][232][233]
Venezuela	1999–	United Socialist Party of Venezuela under Hugo Chávez and Nicolás Maduro	[234]
Vietnam	1976–	Vietnamese Communist Party	[235]
Zimbabwe	1980–	ZANU-PF	[236][237]

The following is a non-exhaustive list of examples of states which were historically authoritarian.

State	Time period	Ruling group or person	Notes and references
Algeria[238]	1999–2019	Abdelaziz Bouteflika
Argentina[239][240]	1946–1955	Justicialist Party rule of Juan Perón	See also Peronism, populist authoritarianism.
	1966–1973	Military government	See the Argentine Revolution for period of military rule.
	1973–1976	Justicialist Party rule of Juan and Isabel Perón
	1976–1983	Free trade and deregulatory rule of Jorge Rafael Videla	See also the National Reorganization Process, period of military rule.
Austria	1933–1938	Christian Social Party under Engelbert Dollfuß and Fatherland Front under Kurt Schuschnigg	See also the Federal State of Austria and Ständestaat.
Brazil[241]	1937–1945	Getúlio Vargas	See also the Vargas Era.
	1964–1985	Military dictatorship in Brazil	It started with the 1964 Brazilian coup d'état.
Burma[242]	1962–2011	Military government and the Burma Socialist Programme Party	It started with the 1962 Burmese coup d'état and ended with the 2011–2012 Burmese political reforms.
Burundi	1961–1993	UPRONA
Confederate States of America	1861–1865	Jefferson Davis	Considered as an authoritarian[243] herrenvolk republic, where the Confederacy was a "democracy of the white race."[244]
Chad	1990–2021	Idriss Déby	Killed in action by insurgents after 30 years of uninterrupted presidency[245]
Chile[246]	1973–1990	Augusto Pinochet	It started with the CIA-backed 1973 Chilean coup d'état, which overthrew the democratically elected government of democratic socialist Salvador Allende.
Republic of China	1927–1949	Kuomintang and Nationalist government (Chiang Kai-shek)	The Republic of China on Taiwan is listed further below.
Democratic Republic of the Congo	1997–2019	Laurent-Désiré Kabila and Joseph Kabila	[247] Zaïre is listed further below.
Croatia[248][249]	1990–1999	Franjo Tuđman
Czechoslovakia	1938–1939	Party of National Unity
Egypt[250]	1952–2011	Gamal Abdel Nasser, Anwar Sadat, and Hosni Mubarak
Equatorial Guinea	1968–1979	Francisco Macias Nguema
Ethiopia	1974–1987	Mengistu Haile Mariam and the Workers' Party of Ethiopia	[251]
Ethiopia	1991–2019	Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front	[252]
Fiji	2006-2014	FijiFirst[lower-alpha 1]	[253][254][255][256]
Gambia	1994–2017	Yahya Jammeh	Jammeh is overthrown by democratic elections and is forced to resign
Nazi Germany	1933–1945	Adolf Hitler	See also Nazism.
Guinea	1958–2021	Ahmed Sekou Touré, Lansana Conté, Moussa Dadis Camara and Alpha Condé	Guinea was marked by a series of authoritarian generations
Guinea-Bissau	1980–1999	Joao Bernardo Vieira	Nino Vieira would govern in an authoritarian manner in the 80s and 90s until his overthrow, in 2005 he returned to the presidency until his assassination.
Hungary[257]	1920–1944	Miklós Horthy and the Unity Party
Indonesia	1966–1998	Suharto and the Golkar Party	It started in 1966 de facto and 1967 de jure. See also the New Order and the Fall of Suharto.
Iran	1925–1979	Pahlavi dynasty	[258]
Iraq	1968–2003	Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr and Saddam Hussein
Kazakhstan	1990–2022	Nursultan Nazarbayev	[171]
Liberia	1980–1990	Samuel Doe	The Liberian president ends up captured and executed for a long time in the middle of a Civil war.
Fascist Italy	1922–1943	Benito Mussolini	[259]
Libya[260]	1969–2011	Muammar Gaddafi	It started with the 1969 Libyan coup d'état and ended with the 2011 Libyan Civil War.
Lithuania[261]	1926–1940	Antanas Smetona	See also the 1940 Soviet ultimatum to Lithuania.
FYR Macedonia[262][263]	2006–2016	Nikola Gruevski
Malaysia	1957–2018	United Malays National Organisation	See also the 1988 Malaysian constitutional crisis.
Mali	1968–1991	Moussa Traoré	Moussa is deposed in the 1991 Malian coup d'état and sentenced to death twice, exonerated in May 2002.
Ottoman Empire	1878–1908	Abdul Hamid II
	1913–1918	The Three Pashas
Nicaragua	1936–1979	Somoza Family	The Somoza clan loses power in the Sandinista revolution.
Philippines	1965–1986	Ferdinand Marcos	It ended with the People Power Revolution.
	2016–2022	Rodrigo Duterte	[264][265] It ended on June 30, term limited.
Poland	1926–1939	Sanation	See also the May Coup.
Portugal[266]	1926–1933	Military government	See the National Dictatorship.
	1933–1974	Estado Novo regime under António de Oliveira Salazar and Marcelo Caetano	It ended with the Carnation Revolution.
Rwanda	1961–1994	Gregoire Kayibanda and Juvenal Habyarimana
Somalia	1969–1991	Siad Barre
South Africa[267][268]	1948–1994	National Party	It ended with the end of apartheid.
South Korea[269][270]	1948–1960	Syngman Rhee
	1961–1987	Park Chung-hee and Chun Doo-hwan
Francoist Spain[271]	1936–1975	Francisco Franco	See also the Spanish transition to democracy.
Sudan[171]	1989–2019	Omar al-Bashir
Taiwan[272]	1945–1987	Kuomintang (Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-kuo)	The Republic of China (1927–1949) is listed further above.
Tunisia	1987–2011	Zine El Abidine Ben Ali	See also Tunisian Revolution
Turkey[273][274]	1923–1950	Republican People's Party
Soviet Union	1922–1991	Communist Party of the Soviet Union	See also authoritarian socialism.
Kingdom of Yugoslavia	1929–1934	Under Alexander I and the JRSD	See also the 6 January Dictatorship.
	1934–1941	Under Milan Stojadinović and the JRZ
SFR Yugoslavia[275][276]	1944–1980	Under Josip Broz Tito	See also the death and state funeral of Josip Broz Tito.
FR Yugoslavia[277][278]	1992–2000	Under Slobodan Milošević	See also the overthrow of Slobodan Milošević.
Zaïre	1965–1997	Mobutu Sese Seko	[247] The Democratic Republic of the Congo after 1997 is listed above.