Nikita Khrushchev

Khrushchev and his first wife Euphrasinia (Yefrosinia) in 1916

Through the intervention of a friend, Khrushchev was assigned in 1921 as assistant director for political affairs for the Rutchenkovo mine in the Donbass region, where he had previously worked.[22] There were as yet few Bolsheviks in the area. At that time, the movement was split by Lenin's New Economic Policy, which allowed for some measure of private enterprise and was seen as an ideological retreat by some Bolsheviks.[22] While Khrushchev's responsibility lay in political affairs, he involved himself in the practicalities of resuming full production at the mine after the chaos of the war years. He helped restart the machines (key parts and papers had been removed by the pre-Soviet mine-owners) and he wore his old mine outfit for inspection tours.[23]

Khrushchev was highly successful at the Rutchenkovo mine, and in mid-1922 he was offered the directorship of the nearby Pastukhov mine. However, he refused the offer, seeking to be assigned to the newly established technical college (tekhnikum) in Yuzovka, though his superiors were reluctant to let him go. As he had only four years of formal schooling, he applied to the training program (rabfak, short for Рабочий факультет / Rabotchyi Fakultyet, or Worker's Faculty) attached to the tekhnikum that was designed to bring undereducated students to high-school level, a prerequisite for entry into the tekhnikum.[24] While enrolled in the rabfak, Khrushchev continued his work at the Rutchenkovo mine.[25]

Khrushchev's second wife (though they only officially married in 1965) was Ukrainian-born Nina Petrovna Kukharchuk, whom he met in 1922. Photo taken in 1924

One of his teachers later described him as a poor student.[24] He was more successful in advancing in the Communist Party; soon after his admission to the rabfak in August 1922, he was appointed party secretary of the entire tekhnikum, and became a member of the bureau—the governing council—of the party committee for the town of Yuzovka (renamed Stalino in 1924). He briefly joined supporters of Leon Trotsky against those of Joseph Stalin over the question of party democracy.[26] All of these activities left him with little time for his schoolwork, and while he later said he had finished his rabfak studies, it is unclear whether this was true.[26]

According to William Taubman, Khrushchev's studies were aided by Nina Petrovna Kukharchuk, a well-educated Party organizer and daughter of well-to-do Ukrainian peasants.[27] The family was poor, according to Nina's own recollections. The two lived together as husband and wife for the rest of Khrushchev's life, though they never registered their marriage. They had three children together: daughter Rada was born in 1929, son Sergei in 1935 and daughter Elena in 1937.

In mid-1925, Khrushchev was appointed Party secretary of the Petrovo-Marinsky raikom, or district, near Stalino. The raikom was about 1,000 square kilometres (400 sq mi) in area, and Khrushchev was constantly on the move throughout his domain, taking an interest in even minor matters.[28] In late 1925, Khrushchev was elected a non-voting delegate to the 14th Congress of the USSR Communist Party in Moscow.[29]

Lazar Kaganovich, one of the chief enforcers of Stalin's dictatorship and Khrushchev's main patron.

Khrushchev met Lazar Kaganovich as early as 1917. In 1925, Kaganovich became Party head in Ukraine[30] and Khrushchev, falling under his patronage,[31] was rapidly promoted. He was appointed second in command of Stalin's party apparatus in late 1926. Within nine months his superior, Konstantin Moiseyenko, was ousted, which, according to Taubman, was due to Khrushchev's instigation.[30] Kaganovich transferred Khrushchev to Kharkov, then the capital of Ukraine, as head of the Organizational Department of the Ukrainian Party's Central Committee.[32] In 1928, Khrushchev was transferred to Kiev, where he served as head of the organizational department,[33] second-in-command of the Party organization there.[34]

In 1929, Khrushchev again sought to further his education, following Kaganovich (now in the Kremlin as a close associate of Stalin) to Moscow and enrolling in the Stalin Industrial Academy. Khrushchev never completed his studies there, but his career in the Party flourished.[35] When the school's Party cell elected a number of rightists to an upcoming district Party conference, the cell was attacked in Pravda.[36] Khrushchev emerged victorious in the ensuing power struggle, becoming Party secretary of the school, arranging for the delegates to be withdrawn, and, afterward, purging the cell of the rightists.[36] Khrushchev rose rapidly through the Party ranks, first becoming Party leader for the Bauman district, site of the Academy, before taking the same position in the Krasnopresnensky district, the capital's largest and most important. By 1932, Khrushchev had become second in command, behind Kaganovich, of the Moscow city Party organization, and in 1934, he became Party leader for the city[35] and a member of the Party's Central Committee.[37] Khrushchev attributed his rapid rise to his acquaintance with fellow Academy student Nadezhda Alliluyeva, Stalin's wife. In his memoirs, Khrushchev stated that Alliluyeva spoke well of him to her husband. His biographer, William Tompson, downplays the possibility, stating that Khrushchev was too low in the Party hierarchy to enjoy Stalin's patronage and that if influence was brought to bear on Khrushchev's career at this stage, it was by Kaganovich.[38]

While head of the Moscow city organization, Khrushchev superintended the construction of the Moscow Metro, a highly expensive undertaking, with Kaganovich in overall charge. Faced with an already-announced opening date of 7 November 1934, Khrushchev took considerable risks in the construction and spent much of his time down in the tunnels. When the inevitable accidents did occur, they were depicted as heroic sacrifices in a great cause. The Metro did not open until 1 May 1935, but Khrushchev received the Order of Lenin for his role in its construction.[39] Later that year, he was selected as First Secretary of the Moscow Regional Committee which was responsible for Moscow oblast, a province with a population of 11 million.[35]

Khrushchev (second from right) poses for a photo alongside Joseph Stalin (far right) sometime during the 1930s.

Stalin's office records show meetings at which Khrushchev was present as early as 1932. The two increasingly built a good relationship. Khrushchev greatly admired the dictator and treasured informal meetings with him and invitations to Stalin's dacha, while Stalin felt warm affection for his young subordinate.[40] Beginning in 1934, Stalin began a campaign of political repression known as the Great Purge, during which many were executed or sent to the Gulag. Central to this campaign were the Moscow Trials, a series of show trials of the purged top leaders of the party and the military. In 1936, as the trials proceeded, Khrushchev expressed his vehement support:

Everyone who rejoices in the successes achieved in our country, the victories of our party led by the great Stalin, will find only one word suitable for the mercenary, fascist dogs of the Trotskyite-Zinovievite gang. That word is execution.[41]

Khrushchev assisted in the purge of many friends and colleagues in Moscow oblast.[42] Of 38 top Party officials in Moscow city and province, 35 were killed[42]—the three survivors were transferred to other parts of the USSR.[43] Of the 146 Party secretaries of cities and districts outside Moscow city in the province, only 10 survived the purges.[42] In his memoirs, Khrushchev noted that almost everyone who worked with him was arrested.[44] By Party protocol, Khrushchev was required to approve these arrests, and did little or nothing to save his friends and colleagues.[45]

Party leaders were given numerical quotas of "enemies" to be turned in and arrested.[45] In June 1937, the Politburo set a quota of 35,000 enemies to be arrested in Moscow province; 5,000 of these were to be executed. In reply, Khrushchev asked that 2,000 wealthy peasants, or kulaks living in Moscow be killed in part fulfillment of the quota. In any event, only two weeks after receiving the Politburo order, Khrushchev was able to report to Stalin that 41,305 "criminal and kulak elements" had been arrested. Of the arrestees, according to Khrushchev, 8,500 deserved execution.[45]

Regional party leaders in 1935. In the front row sits Nikita Khrushchev (Moscow), Andrei Zhdanov (Leningrad), Lazar Kaganovich (Ukraine), Lavrentiy Beria (Georgia), and Nestor Lakoba (Abkhazia) (behind him stands Mir Jafar Baghirov).

Khrushchev had no reason to think himself immune from the purges, and in 1937, confessed his own 1923 dalliance with Trotskyism to Kaganovich, who, according to Khrushchev, "blanched" (for his protégé's sins could affect his own standing) and advised him to tell Stalin. The dictator took the confession in his stride, and, after initially advising Khrushchev to keep it quiet, suggested that Khrushchev tell his tale to the Moscow party conference. Khrushchev did so, to applause, and was immediately reelected to his post.[46] Khrushchev related in his memoirs that he was also denounced by an arrested colleague. Stalin told Khrushchev of the accusation personally, looking him in the eye and awaiting his response. Khrushchev speculated in his memoirs that had Stalin doubted his reaction, he would have been categorized as an enemy of the people then and there.[47] Nonetheless, Khrushchev became a candidate member of the Politburo on 14 January 1938 and a full member in March 1939.[48]

External video
Khrushchev speech in 1937
Khrushchev speech at the opening of the Moscow Metro

In late 1937, Stalin appointed Khrushchev as head of the Communist Party in Ukraine, and Khrushchev duly left Moscow for Kiev, again the Ukrainian capital, in January 1938.[49] Ukraine had been the site of extensive purges, with the murdered including professors in Stalino whom Khrushchev greatly respected. The high ranks of the Party were not immune; the Central Committee of Ukraine was so devastated that it could not convene a quorum. After Khrushchev's arrival, the pace of arrests accelerated.[50] All but one member of the Ukrainian Politburo Organizational Bureau and Secretariat were arrested. Almost all government officials and Red Army commanders were replaced.[51] During the first few months after Khrushchev's arrival, almost everyone arrested received the death penalty.[52]

Biographer William Taubman suggested that because Khrushchev was again unsuccessfully denounced while in Kiev, he must have known that some of the denunciations were not true and that innocent people were suffering.[51] In 1939, Khrushchev addressed the Fourteenth Ukrainian Party Congress, saying "Comrades, we must unmask and relentlessly destroy all enemies of the people. But we must not allow a single honest Bolshevik to be harmed. We must conduct a struggle against slanderers."[51]

When Soviet troops, pursuant to the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact, invaded the eastern portion of Poland on 17 September 1939, Khrushchev accompanied the troops at Stalin's direction. A large number of ethnic Ukrainians lived in the invaded area, much of which today forms the western portion of Ukraine. Many inhabitants therefore initially welcomed the invasion, though they hoped that they would eventually become independent. Khrushchev's role was to ensure that the occupied areas voted for union with the USSR. Through a combination of propaganda, deception as to what was being voted for, and outright fraud, the Soviets ensured that the assemblies elected in the new territories would unanimously petition for union with the USSR. When the new assemblies did so, their petitions were granted by the USSR Supreme Soviet, and Western Ukraine became a part of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (Ukrainian SSR) on 1 November 1939.[53] Clumsy actions by the Soviets, such as staffing Western Ukrainian organizations with Eastern Ukrainians, and giving confiscated land to collective farms (kolkhozes) rather than to peasants, soon alienated Western Ukrainians, damaging Khrushchev's efforts to achieve unity.[54]

When Nazi Germany invaded the USSR, in June 1941, Khrushchev was still at his post in Kiev.[55] Stalin appointed him a political commissar, and Khrushchev served on a number of fronts as an intermediary between the local military commanders and the political rulers in Moscow. Stalin used Khrushchev to keep commanders on a tight leash, while the commanders sought to have him influence Stalin.[56]

As the Germans advanced, Khrushchev worked with the military to defend and save Kiev. Handicapped by orders from Stalin that under no circumstances should the city be abandoned, the Red Army was soon encircled by the Germans. While the Germans stated they took 655,000 prisoners, according to the Soviets, 150,541 men out of 677,085 escaped the trap.[57] Primary sources differ on Khrushchev's involvement at this point. According to Marshal Georgi Zhukov, writing some years after Khrushchev fired and disgraced him in 1957, Khrushchev persuaded Stalin not to evacuate troops from Kiev.[58] However, Khrushchev noted in his memoirs that he and Marshal Semyon Budyonny proposed redeploying Soviet forces to avoid the encirclement until Marshal Semyon Timoshenko arrived from Moscow with orders for the troops to hold their positions.[59] Early Khrushchev biographer Mark Frankland suggested that Khrushchev's faith in his leader was first shaken by the Red Army's setbacks.[31] Khrushchev stated in his memoirs:

But let me return to the enemy breakthrough in the Kiev area, the encirclement of our group, and the destruction of the 37th Army. Later, the Fifth Army also perished ... All of this was senseless, and from the military point of view, a display of ignorance, incompetence, and illiteracy. ... There you have the result of not taking a step backward. We were unable to save these troops because we didn't withdraw them, and as a result, we simply lost them. ... And yet it was possible to allow this not to happen.[60]

In 1942, Khrushchev was on the Southwest Front, and he and Timoshenko proposed a massive counteroffensive in the Kharkov area. Stalin approved only part of the plan, but 640,000 Red Army soldiers would still become involved in the offensive. The Germans, however, had deduced that the Soviets were likely to attack at Kharkov, and set a trap. Beginning on 12 May 1942, the Soviet offensive initially appeared successful, but within five days the Germans had driven deep into the Soviet flanks, and the Red Army troops were in danger of being cut off. Stalin refused to halt the offensive, and the Red Army divisions were soon encircled by the Germans. The USSR lost about 267,000 soldiers, including more than 200,000 men captured, and Stalin demoted Timoshenko and recalled Khrushchev to Moscow. While Stalin hinted at arresting and executing Khrushchev, he allowed the commissar to return to the front by sending him to Stalingrad.[61]

Khrushchev (left) on the Stalingrad Front

Khrushchev reached the Stalingrad Front in August 1942, soon after the start of the battle for the city.[62] His role in the Stalingrad defense was not major—General Vasily Chuikov, who led the city's defense, mentions Khrushchev only briefly in a memoir published while Khrushchev was premier—but to the end of his life, he was proud of his role.[63] Though he visited Stalin in Moscow on occasion, he remained in Stalingrad for much of the battle and was nearly killed at least once. He proposed a counterattack, only to find that Georgy Zhukov and other generals had already planned Operation Uranus, a plan to break out from Soviet positions and encircle and destroy the Germans; it was being kept secret. Before Uranus was launched, Khrushchev spent much time checking on troop readiness and morale, interrogating Nazi prisoners, and recruiting some for propaganda purposes.[62]

Soon after Stalingrad, Khrushchev met with personal tragedy, as his son Leonid, a fighter pilot, was apparently shot down and killed in action on 11 March 1943. The circumstances of Leonid's death remain obscure and controversial,[64] as none of his fellow fliers stated that they witnessed him being shot down, nor was his plane found or body recovered. As a result, Leonid's fate has been the subject of considerable speculation. One theory has Leonid surviving the crash and collaborating with the Germans, and when he was recaptured by the Soviets, Stalin ordering him shot despite Nikita Khrushchev pleading for his life.[64] This supposed killing is used to explain why Khrushchev later denounced Stalin in the Secret Speech.[64][65] While there is no supporting evidence for this account in Soviet files, some historians allege that Leonid Khrushchev's file was tampered with after the war.[66] In later years, Leonid Khrushchev's wingmate stated that he saw his plane disintegrate, but did not report it. Khrushchev biographer Taubman speculates that this omission was most likely to avoid the possibility of being seen as complicit in the death of the son of a Politburo member.[67] In mid-1943, Leonid's wife, Liuba Khrushcheva, was arrested on accusations of spying and sentenced to five years in a labor camp, and her son (by another relationship), Tolya, was placed in a series of orphanages. Leonid's daughter, Yulia, was raised by Nikita Khrushchev and his wife.[68]

After Uranus forced the Germans into retreat, Khrushchev served on other fronts of the war. He was attached to Soviet troops at the Battle of Kursk, in July 1943, which turned back the last major German offensive on Soviet soil.[69] Khrushchev related that he interrogated an SS defector, learning that the Germans intended an attack—a claim dismissed by his biographer Taubman as "almost certainly exaggerated".[70] He accompanied Soviet troops as they took Kiev in November 1943, entering the shattered city as Soviet forces drove out German troops.[70] As Soviet forces met with greater success, driving the Nazis westwards towards Germany, Nikita Khrushchev became increasingly involved in reconstruction work in Ukraine. He was appointed Premier of the Ukrainian SSR in addition to his earlier party post, one of the rare instances in which the Ukrainian party and civil leader posts were held by one person.[71]

According to Khrushchev biographer William Tompson, it is difficult to assess Khrushchev's war record, since he most often acted as part of a military council, and it is not possible to know the extent to which he influenced decisions, rather than signing off on the orders of military officers. However, Tompson points to the fact that the few mentions of Khrushchev in military memoirs published during the Brezhnev era were generally favorable, at a time when it was "barely possible to mention Khrushchev in print in any context".[72] Tompson suggests that these favorable mentions indicate that military officers held Khrushchev in high regard.[72]

The Ukrainian capital, Kiev, after the Second World War.

Almost all of Ukraine had been occupied by the Germans, and Khrushchev returned to his domain in late 1943 to find devastation. Ukraine's industry had been destroyed, and agriculture faced critical shortages. Even though millions of Ukrainians had been taken to Germany as workers or prisoners of war, there was insufficient housing for those who remained.[73] One out of every six Ukrainians were killed in World War II.[74]

Khrushchev sought to reconstruct Ukraine but also desired to complete the interrupted work of imposing the Soviet system on it, though he hoped that the purges of the 1930s would not recur.[75] As Ukraine was recovered militarily, conscription was imposed, and 750,000 men aged between nineteen and fifty were given minimal military training and sent to join the Red Army.[76] Other Ukrainians joined partisan forces, seeking an independent Ukraine.[76] Khrushchev rushed from district to district through Ukraine, urging the depleted labor force to greater efforts. He made a short visit to his birthplace of Kalinovka, finding a starving population, with only a third of the men who had joined the Red Army having returned. Khrushchev did what he could to assist his hometown.[77] Despite Khrushchev's efforts, in 1945, Ukrainian industry was at only a quarter of pre-war levels, and the harvest actually dropped from that of 1944, when the entire territory of Ukraine had not yet been retaken.[73]

In an effort to increase agricultural production, the kolkhozes (collective farms) were empowered to expel residents who were not pulling their weight. Kolkhoz leaders used this as an excuse to expel their personal enemies, invalids, and the elderly, sending them to the eastern parts of the Soviet Union. Khrushchev viewed this policy as very effective and recommended its adoption elsewhere to Stalin.[73] He also worked to impose collectivization on Western Ukraine. While Khrushchev hoped to accomplish this by 1947, lack of resources and armed resistance by partisans slowed the process.[78] The partisans, many of whom fought as the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), were gradually defeated, as Soviet police and military reported killing 110,825 "bandits" and capturing a quarter million more between 1944 and 1946.[79] About 600,000 Western Ukrainians were arrested between 1944 and 1952, with one-third executed and the remainder imprisoned or exiled to the east.[79]

The war years of 1944 and 1945 had seen poor harvests, and 1946 saw intense drought strike Ukraine and Western Russia. Despite this, collective and state farms were required to turn over 52% of the harvest to the government.[80] The Soviet government sought to collect as much grain as possible to supply communist allies in Eastern Europe.[81] Khrushchev set the quotas at a high level, leading Stalin to expect an unrealistically large quantity of grain from Ukraine.[82] Food was rationed—but non-agricultural rural workers throughout the USSR were given no ration cards. The inevitable starvation was largely confined to remote rural regions and was little noticed outside the USSR.[80] Khrushchev, realizing the desperate situation in late 1946, repeatedly appealed to Stalin for aid, to be met with anger and resistance on the part of the leader. When letters to Stalin had no effect, Khrushchev flew to Moscow and made his case in person. Stalin finally gave Ukraine limited food aid, and money to set up free soup kitchens.[83] However, Khrushchev's political standing had been damaged, and in February 1947, Stalin suggested that Lazar Kaganovich be sent to Ukraine to "help" Khrushchev.[84] The following month, the Ukrainian Central Committee removed Khrushchev as party leader in favor of Kaganovich, while retaining him as premier.[85]

Soon after Kaganovich arrived in Kiev, Khrushchev fell ill and was barely seen until September 1947. In his memoirs, Khrushchev indicates he had pneumonia; some biographers have theorized that Khrushchev's illness was entirely political, out of fear that his loss of position was the first step towards downfall and demise.[86] However, Khrushchev's children remembered their father as having been seriously ill. Once Khrushchev was able to get out of bed, he and his family took their first vacation since before the war, to a beachfront resort in Latvia.[85] Khrushchev, though, soon broke the beach routine with duck-hunting trips, and a visit to the new Soviet Kaliningrad, where he toured factories and quarries.[87] By the end of 1947, Kaganovich had been recalled to Moscow and the recovered Khrushchev had been restored to the First Secretaryship. He then resigned the Ukrainian premiership in favor of Demyan Korotchenko, Khrushchev's protégé.[86]

Khrushchev's final years in Ukraine were generally peaceful, with industry recovering,[88] Soviet forces overcoming the partisans, and 1947 and 1948 seeing better-than-expected harvests.[89] Collectivization advanced in Western Ukraine, and Khrushchev implemented more policies that encouraged collectivization and discouraged private farms. These sometimes backfired, however: a tax on private livestock holdings led to peasants slaughtering their stock.[90] With the idea of eliminating differences in attitude between town and countryside and transforming the peasantry into a "rural proletariat", Khrushchev conceived the idea of the "agro-town".[91] Rather than agricultural workers living in villages close to farms, they would live further away in larger towns which would offer municipal services such as utilities and libraries, which were not present in villages. He completed only one such town before his December 1949 return to Moscow; he dedicated it to Stalin as a 70th birthday present.[91]

In his memoirs, Khrushchev spoke highly of Ukraine, where he governed for over a decade:

I'll say that the Ukrainian people treated me well. I recall warmly the years I spent there. This was a period full of responsibilities, but pleasant because it brought satisfaction ... But far be it from me to inflate my significance. The entire Ukrainian people was exerting great efforts ... I attribute Ukraine's successes to the Ukrainian people as a whole. I won't elaborate further on this theme, but in principle, it's very easy to demonstrate. I'm Russian myself, and I don't want to offend the Russians.[92]

Joseph Stalin (third from right) presiding over a ceremony commemorating his 71st birthday a few years before his death.

From mid-December 1949, Khrushchev again served as head of the Party in Moscow city and province. His biographer Taubman suggests that Stalin most likely recalled Khrushchev to Moscow to balance the influence of Georgy Malenkov and security chief Lavrentiy Beria, who were widely seen as Stalin's heirs.[93] The aging leader rarely called Politburo meetings. Instead, much of the high-level work of government took place at dinners hosted by Stalin for his inner circle of Beria, Malenkov, Khrushchev, Kaganovich, Kliment Voroshilov, Vyacheslav Molotov, and Nikolai Bulganin. Khrushchev took early naps so that he would not fall asleep in Stalin's presence; he noted in his memoirs, "Things went badly for those who dozed off at Stalin's table."[94]

In 1950, Khrushchev began a large-scale housing program for Moscow. Five- or six-story apartment buildings became ubiquitous throughout the Soviet Union; many remain in use today.[95] Khrushchev had prefabricated reinforced concrete used, greatly speeding up construction.[96] These structures were completed at triple the construction rate of Moscow housing from 1946 to 1950, lacked elevators or balconies, and were nicknamed Khrushchyovka by the public, but because of their shoddy workmanship sometimes disparagingly called Khrushchoba, combining Khrushchev's name with the Russian word trushchoba, meaning "slum".[97] In 1995, almost 60,000,000 residents of the former Soviet Union still lived in these buildings.[95]

In his new positions, Khrushchev continued his kolkhoz consolidation scheme, which decreased the number of collective farms in Moscow province by about 70%. This resulted in farms that were too large for one chairman to manage effectively.[98] Khrushchev also sought to implement his agro-town proposal, but when his lengthy speech on the subject was published in Pravda in March 1951, Stalin disapproved of it. The periodical quickly published a note stating that Khrushchev's speech was merely a proposal, not policy. In April, the Politburo disavowed the agro-town proposal. Khrushchev feared that Stalin would remove him from office, but the leader mocked Khrushchev, then allowed the episode to pass.[99]

On 1 March 1953, Stalin suffered a massive stroke. As terrified doctors attempted treatment, Khrushchev and his colleagues engaged in an intense discussion as to the new government. On 5 March, Stalin died. [100]

Khrushchev later reflected on Stalin:

Stalin called everyone who didn't agree with him an "enemy of the people." He said that they wanted to restore the old order, and for this purpose, "the enemies of the people" had linked up with the forces of reaction internationally. As a result, several hundred thousand honest people perished. Everyone lived in fear in those days. Everyone expected that at any moment there would be a knock on the door in the middle of the night and that knock on the door would prove fatal ... [P]eople not to Stalin's liking were annihilated, honest party members, irreproachable people, loyal and hard workers for our cause who had gone through the school of revolutionary struggle under Lenin's leadership. This was utter and complete arbitrariness. And now is all this to be forgiven and forgotten? Never![101]

Georgy Malenkov, the man who briefly succeeded Stalin as leader of the Soviet Union.

On 6 March 1953, Stalin's death was announced, as was the new leadership. Malenkov was the new Chairman of the Council of Ministers, with Beria (who consolidated his hold over the security agencies), Kaganovich, Bulganin, and former Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov as first vice-chairmen. Those members of the Presidium of the Central Committee who had been recently promoted by Stalin were demoted. Khrushchev was relieved of his duties as Party head for Moscow to concentrate on unspecified duties in the Party's Central Committee.[102] The New York Times listed Malenkov and Beria first and second among the ten-man Presidium—and Khrushchev last.[103]

However, Malenkov resigned from the secretariat of the Central Committee on 14 March.[104] This came due to concerns that he was acquiring too much power. The major beneficiary was Khrushchev. His name appeared atop a revised list of secretaries—indicating that he was now in charge of the party.[105] The Central Committee formally elected him First Secretary in September.[106]

After Stalin's death, Beria launched a number of reforms. According to Taubman, "unparalleled in his cynicism, he [Beria] did not let ideology stand in his way. Had he prevailed, he would almost certainly have exterminated his colleagues, if only to prevent them from liquidating him. In the meantime, however, his burst of reforms rivaled Khrushchev's and in some ways even Gorbachev's thirty-five years later."[104] One proposal, which was adopted, was an amnesty which eventually led to the freeing of over a million non-political prisoners. Another, which was not adopted, was to release East Germany into a united, neutral Germany in exchange for compensation from the West[107]—a proposal considered by Khrushchev to be anti-communist.[108] Khrushchev allied with Malenkov to block many of Beria's proposals, while the two slowly picked up support from other Presidium members. Their campaign against Beria was aided by fears that Beria was planning a military coup,[109] and, according to Khrushchev in his memoirs, by the conviction that "Beria is getting his knives ready for us."[110] The key move by Khrushchev and Malenkov was to lure two of Beria's most powerful deputy ministers, Sergei Kruglov and Ivan Serov, to betray their boss. This allowed Khrushchev and Malenkov to arrest Beria as Beria belatedly discovered he had lost control of Ministry of Interior troops and the troops of the Kremlin guard.[111] On 26 June 1953, Beria was arrested at a Presidium meeting, following extensive military preparations by Khrushchev and his allies. Beria was tried in secret and executed in December 1953 with five of his close associates. The execution of Beria proved to be the last time the loser of a top-level Soviet power struggle paid with his life.[112]

The power struggle continued. Malenkov's power was in the central state apparatus, which he sought to extend through reorganizing the government, giving it additional power at the expense of the Party. He also sought public support by lowering retail prices and lowering the level of bond sales to citizens, which had long been effectively obligatory. Khrushchev, on the other hand, with his power base in the Party, sought to strengthen the Party and his position within it. While, under the Soviet system, the Party was to be preeminent, it had been greatly drained of power by Stalin, who had given much of that power to himself and to the Politburo (later, to the Presidium). Khrushchev saw that with the Presidium in conflict, the Party and its Central Committee might again become powerful.[113] Khrushchev carefully cultivated high Party officials, and was able to appoint supporters as local Party bosses, who then took seats on the Central Committee.[114]

Khrushchev featured on the November 1953 cover of TIME after becoming First Secretary of the Communist Party

Khrushchev presented himself as a down-to-earth activist prepared to take up any challenge, contrasting with Malenkov who, though sophisticated, came across as colourless.[114] Khrushchev arranged for the Kremlin grounds to be opened to the public, an act with "great public resonance".[115] While both Malenkov and Khrushchev sought reforms to agriculture, Khrushchev's proposals were broader and included the Virgin Lands Campaign, under which hundreds of thousands of young volunteers would settle and farm areas of Western Siberia and Northern Kazakhstan. While the scheme eventually became a tremendous disaster for Soviet agriculture, it was initially successful.[116] In addition, Khrushchev possessed incriminating information on Malenkov, taken from Beria's secret files. As Soviet prosecutors investigated the atrocities of Stalin's last years, including the Leningrad case, they came across evidence of Malenkov's involvement. Beginning in February 1954, Khrushchev replaced Malenkov in the seat of honour at Presidium meetings; in June, Malenkov ceased to head the list of Presidium members, which was thereafter organized in alphabetical order. Khrushchev's influence continued to increase, winning the allegiance of local party heads, and with his nominee heading the KGB.[117]

At a Central Committee meeting in January 1955, Malenkov was accused of involvement in atrocities, and the committee passed a resolution accusing him of involvement in the Leningrad case, and of facilitating Beria's climb to power. At a meeting of the mostly ceremonial Supreme Soviet the following month, Malenkov was demoted in favor of Bulganin, to the surprise of Western observers.[118] Malenkov remained in the Presidium as Minister of Electric Power Stations. According to Khrushchev biographer William Tompson, "Khrushchev's position as first among the members of the collective leadership was now beyond any reasonable doubt."[119]

The post-Stalin battle for political control reshaped foreign-policy. There was more realism and less ideological abstraction when confronted by European and Middle Eastern situations. Khrushchev's "secret speech" attack on Stalin in 1956 was a signal for abandoning Stalinist precepts and looking at new options, including more involvement in the Middle East. Khrushchev in power did not moderate his personality—he remained unpredictable, and was emboldened by the spectacular successes in space. He thought that would give the USSR world prestige, leading to quick Communist advances in the Third World. Khrushchev's policy was still restrained by the need to retain the support of the Presidium and to placate the inarticulate but restive Soviet masses who were thrilled by Sputnik but demanded a higher standard of living on the ground as well.[120]

After the demotion of Malenkov, Khrushchev and Molotov initially worked together well. Molotov even proposed that Khrushchev, not Bulganin, replace Malenkov as premier. However, Khrushchev and Molotov increasingly differed on policy. Molotov opposed the Virgin Lands policy, instead proposing heavy investment to increase yields in developed agricultural areas, which Khrushchev felt was not feasible due to a lack of resources and a lack of a sophisticated farm labor force. The two differed on foreign policy as well; soon after Khrushchev took power, he sought a peace treaty with Austria, which would allow Soviet troops then in occupation of part of the country to leave. Molotov was resistant, but Khrushchev arranged for an Austrian delegation to come to Moscow and negotiate the treaty.[121] Although Khrushchev and other Presidium members attacked Molotov at a Central Committee meeting in mid-1955, accusing him of conducting a foreign policy which turned the world against the USSR, Molotov remained in his position.[122]

By the end of 1955, thousands of political prisoners had returned home and told their experiences of the Gulag labor camps.[123] Continuing investigation into the abuses brought home the full breadth of Stalin's crimes to his successors. Working together with his close ally Anastas Mikoyan, Khrushchev believed that once the stain of Stalinism was removed, the Party would inspire loyalty among the people.[124] Beginning in October 1955, Khrushchev fought to tell the delegates to the upcoming 20th Party Congress about Stalin's crimes. Some of his colleagues, including Molotov and Malenkov, opposed the disclosure and managed to persuade him to make his remarks in a closed session.[125]

General Secretary Khrushchev speaking before the 20th CPSU Congress in 1956

The 20th Party Congress opened on 14 February 1956. In his opening words in his initial address, Khrushchev denigrated Stalin by asking delegates to rise in honour of the Communist leaders who had died since the last congress, whom he named, equating Stalin with Klement Gottwald and the little-known Kyuichi Tokuda.[126] In the early morning hours of 25 February, Khrushchev delivered what became known as the "Secret Speech" to a closed session of the Congress limited to Soviet delegates. In four hours, he demolished Stalin's reputation. Khrushchev noted in his memoirs that the "congress listened to me in silence. As the saying goes, you could have heard a pin drop. It was all so sudden and unexpected."[127] Khrushchev told the delegates:

It is here that Stalin showed in a whole series of cases his intolerance, his brutality, and his abuse of power ... he often chose the path of repression and physical annihilation, not only against actual enemies but also against individuals who had not committed any crimes against the party or the Soviet Government.[128]

The Secret Speech, while it did not fundamentally change Soviet society, had wide-ranging effects. The speech was a factor in unrest in Poland and revolution in Hungary later in 1956, and Stalin defenders led four days of rioting in his native Georgia in June, calling for Khrushchev to resign and Molotov to take over.[129] In meetings where the Secret Speech was read, communists would make even more severe condemnations of Stalin (and of Khrushchev), and even call for multi-party elections. However, Stalin was not publicly denounced, and his portrait remained widespread through the USSR, from airports to Khrushchev's Kremlin office. Mikhail Gorbachev, then a Komsomol official, recalled that though young and well-educated Soviets in his district were excited by the speech, many others decried it, either defending Stalin or seeing little point in digging up the past.[129] Forty years later, after the fall of the Soviet Union, Gorbachev applauded Khrushchev for his courage in taking a huge political risk and showing himself to be "a moral man after all".[130]

The term "Secret Speech" proved to be an utter misnomer. While the attendees at the Speech were all Soviet, Eastern European delegates were allowed to hear it the following night, read slowly to allow them to take notes. By 5 March, copies were being mailed throughout the Soviet Union, marked "not for the press" rather than "top secret". An official translation appeared within a month in Poland; the Poles printed 12,000 extra copies, one of which soon reached the West.[125] Khrushchev's son, Sergei, later wrote, "[C]learly, Father tried to ensure it would reach as many ears as possible. It was soon read at Komsomol meetings; that meant another eighteen million listeners. If you include their relatives, friends, and acquaintances, you could say that the entire country became familiar with the speech ... Spring had barely begun when the speech began circulating around the world."[131]

The anti-Khrushchev minority in the Presidium was augmented by those opposed to Khrushchev's proposals to decentralize authority over industry, which struck at the heart of Malenkov's power base. During the first half of 1957, Malenkov, Molotov, and Kaganovich worked to quietly build support to dismiss Khrushchev. At an 18 June Presidium meeting at which two Khrushchev supporters were absent, the plotters moved that Bulganin, who had joined the scheme, take the chair, and proposed other moves which would effectively demote Khrushchev and put themselves in control. Khrushchev objected on the grounds that not all Presidium members had been notified, an objection which would have been quickly dismissed had Khrushchev not held firm control over the military, through Minister of Defense Marshal Zhukov, and the security departments. Lengthy Presidium meetings took place, continuing over several days. As word leaked of the power struggle, members of the Central Committee, which Khrushchev controlled, streamed to Moscow, many flown there aboard military planes, and demanded to be admitted to the meeting. While they were not admitted, there were soon enough Central Committee members in Moscow to call an emergency Party Congress, which effectively forced the leadership to allow a session of the Central Committee. At that meeting, the three main conspirators were dubbed the Anti-Party Group, and denounced with accusations of factionalism and complicity in Stalin's crimes. The three were expelled from the Central Committee and Presidium, as was former Foreign Minister and Khrushchev client Dmitri Shepilov who joined them in the plot. Molotov was sent as Ambassador to Mongolia; the others were sent to head industrial facilities and institutes far from Moscow.[132]

Marshal Zhukov was rewarded for his support with full membership in the Presidium, but Khrushchev feared his popularity and power. In October 1957, the defense minister was sent on a tour of the Balkans, as Khrushchev arranged a Presidium meeting to dismiss him. Zhukov learned what was happening, and hurried back to Moscow, only to be formally notified of his dismissal. At a Central Committee meeting several weeks later, not a word was said in Zhukov's defense.[133] Khrushchev completed the consolidation of power by in March 1958 arranging for Bulganin's dismissal as premier in favor of himself (Bulganin was appointed to head the Gosbank) and by establishing a USSR Defense Council, led by himself, effectively making him commander in chief.[134] Though Khrushchev was now preeminent, he did not enjoy Stalin's absolute power.[134]

After assuming power, Khrushchev allowed a modest amount of freedom in the arts. Vladimir Dudintsev's novel Not by Bread Alone,[135] about an idealistic engineer opposed by rigid bureaucrats, was allowed to be published in 1956, though Khrushchev called the novel "false at its base".[136] In 1958, however, Khrushchev ordered a fierce attack on Boris Pasternak after his novel Doctor Zhivago was published abroad (he was denied permission to publish it in the Soviet Union). Pravda described the novel as "low-grade reactionary hackwork", and the author was expelled from the Writer's Union.[137] Pasternak was awarded the Nobel Prize for Literature, but under heavy pressure he declined it. Once he did so, Khrushchev ordered a halt to the attacks on Pasternak. In his memoirs, Khrushchev stated that he agonized over the novel, very nearly allowed it to be published, and later regretted not doing so.[137] After his fall from power, Khrushchev obtained a copy of the novel and read it (he had earlier read only excerpts) and stated, "We shouldn't have banned it. I should have read it myself. There's nothing anti-Soviet in it."[138]

Khrushchev believed that the USSR could match the West's living standards,[139] and was not afraid to allow Soviet citizens to see Western achievements.[140] Stalin had permitted few tourists to the Soviet Union, and had allowed few Soviets to travel. Khrushchev let Soviets travel (over two million Soviet citizens travelled abroad between 1957 and 1961, 700,000 of whom visited the West) and allowed foreigners to visit the Soviet Union, where tourists became subjects of immense curiosity.[141] In 1957, Khrushchev authorized the 6th World Festival of Youth and Students to be held in Moscow that summer. He instructed Komsomol officials to "smother foreign guests in our embrace".[142] The resulting "socialist carnival" involved over three million Moscovites, who joined with 30,000 young foreign visitors in events that ranged from discussion groups throughout the city to events at the Kremlin itself.[143] According to historian Vladislav Zubok, the festival "shattered propagandist clichés" about Westerners by allowing Moscovites to see them for themselves.[140]

Khrushchev, his wife, his son Sergei (far right) and his daughter Rada during their trip to USA in 1959

In 1962, Khrushchev, impressed by Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn's One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich, persuaded the Presidium to allow publication.[144] That renewed thaw ended on 1 December 1962, when Khrushchev was taken to the Manezh Gallery to view an exhibit which included a number of avant-garde works. On seeing them, Khrushchev exploded with anger, an episode known as the Manege Affair, describing the artwork as "dog shit",[145] and proclaiming that "a donkey could smear better art with its tail".[146] A week later, Pravda issued a call for artistic purity. When writers and filmmakers defended the painters, Khrushchev extended his anger to them. However, despite the premier's rage, none of the artists were arrested or exiled. The Manezh Gallery exhibit remained open for some time after Khrushchev's visit, and experienced a considerable rise in attendance after the article in Pravda.[145]

Under Khrushchev, the special tribunals operated by security agencies were abolished. These tribunals, known as troikas, had often ignored laws and procedures. Under the reforms, no prosecution for a political crime could be brought even in the regular courts unless approved by the local Party committee. This rarely happened; there were no major political trials under Khrushchev, and at most several hundred political prosecutions overall. Instead, other sanctions were imposed on Soviet dissidents, including loss of job or university position, or expulsion from the Party. During Khrushchev's rule, forced hospitalization for the "socially dangerous" was introduced.[147] According to author Roy Medvedev, who wrote an early analysis of Khrushchev's years in power, "political terror as an everyday method of government was replaced under Khrushchev by administrative means of repression".[147]

In 1958, Khrushchev opened a Central Committee meeting to hundreds of Soviet officials; some were even allowed to address the meeting. For the first time, the proceedings of the committee were made public in book form, a practice which was continued at subsequent meetings. This openness, however, actually allowed Khrushchev greater control over the committee, since dissenters would have to make their case in front of a large, disapproving crowd.[148]

In 1962, Khrushchev divided oblast level Party committees (obkoms) into two parallel structures, one for industry and one for agriculture. This was unpopular among Party apparatchiks, and led to confusions in the chain of command, as neither committee secretary had precedence over the other. As there were limited numbers of Central Committee seats from each oblast, the division set up the possibility of rivalry for office between factions, and, according to Medvedev, had the potential for beginning a two-party system.[149] Khrushchev also ordered that one-third of the membership of each committee, from low-level councils to the Central Committee itself, be replaced at each election. This decree created tension between Khrushchev and the Central Committee,[150] and upset the party leaders upon whose support Khrushchev had risen to power.[31]

Khrushchev with corncobs

Khrushchev was an expert on agricultural policies and sensed an urgent need to reform the backward, inefficient system with ideas that worked in the United States. He looked especially at collectivism, state farms, liquidation of machine-tractor stations, planning decentralization, economic incentives, increased labor and capital investment, new crops, and new production programs. Henry Ford had been at the center of American technology transfer to the Soviet Union in the 1930s; he sent over factory designs, engineers, and skilled craftsmen, as well as tens of thousands of Ford tractors. By the 1940s Khrushchev was keenly interested in American agricultural innovations, especially on large-scale family-operated farms in the Midwest. In the 1950s he sent several delegations to visit farms and land grant colleges, looking at successful farms that utilized high-yielding seed varieties, very large and powerful tractors and other machines, all guided by modern management techniques.[151] Especially after his visit to the United States in 1959, he was keenly aware of the need to emulate and even match American superiority and agricultural technology.[152][153]

A postage stamp from 1979 commemorating the 25th anniversary of the Virgin Lands campaign

Khrushchev became a hyper-enthusiastic crusader to grow corn (maize).[154] He established a corn institute in Ukraine and ordered thousands of hectares to be planted with corn in the Virgin Lands.[155] In 1955, Khrushchev advocated an Iowa-style corn belt in the Soviet Union, and a Soviet delegation visited the U.S. state that summer. The delegation chief was approached by farmer and corn seed salesman Roswell Garst, who persuaded him to visit Garst's large farm.[156] The Iowan visited the Soviet Union, where he became friends with Khrushchev, and Garst sold the USSR 4,500 metric tons (5,000 short tons) of seed corn.[157] Garst warned the Soviets to grow the corn in the southern part of the country and to ensure there were sufficient stocks of fertilizer, insecticides, and herbicides.[158] This, however, was not done, as Khrushchev sought to plant corn even in Siberia, and without the necessary chemicals. The corn experiment was not a great success, and he later complained that overenthusiastic officials, wanting to please him, had overplanted without laying the proper groundwork, and "as a result corn was discredited as a silage crop—and so was I".[158]

Khrushchev sought to abolish the Machine-Tractor Stations (MTS) which not only owned most large agricultural machines such as combines and tractors but also provided services such as plowing, and transfer their equipment and functions to the kolkhozes and sovkhozes (state farms).[159] After a successful test involving MTS which served one large kolkhoz each, Khrushchev ordered a gradual transition—but then ordered that the change take place with great speed.[160] Within three months, over half of the MTS facilities had been closed, and kolkhozes were being required to buy the equipment, with no discount given for older or dilapidated machines.[161] MTS employees, unwilling to bind themselves to kolkhozes and lose their state employee benefits and the right to change their jobs, fled to the cities, creating a shortage of skilled operators.[162] The costs of the machinery, plus the costs of building storage sheds and fuel tanks for the equipment, impoverished many kolkhozes. Inadequate provisions were made for repair stations.[163] Without the MTS, the market for Soviet agricultural equipment fell apart, as the kolkhozes now had neither the money nor skilled buyers to purchase new equipment.[164]

In the 1940s Stalin put Trofim Lysenko in charge of agricultural research, with his ideas that flouted modern genetics science. Lysenko maintained his influence under Khrushchev, and helped block the adoption of American techniques.[165] In 1959, Khrushchev announced a goal of overtaking the United States in the production of milk, meat, and butter. Local officials kept Khrushchev happy with unrealistic pledges of production. These goals were met by farmers who slaughtered their breeding herds and by purchasing meat at state stores, then reselling it back to the government, artificially increasing recorded production.[166]

In June 1962, food prices were raised, particularly on meat and butter, by 25–30%. This caused public discontent. In the southern Russian city of Novocherkassk (Rostov Region), this discontent escalated to a strike and a revolt against the authorities. The revolt was put down by the military, resulting in a massacre that killed 22 people and wounded 87 according to Soviet official accounts. In addition, 116 demonstrators were convicted of involvement and seven of them executed. Information about the revolt was completely suppressed in the USSR, but spread through Samizdat and damaged Khrushchev's reputation in the West.[167]

Drought struck the Soviet Union in 1963; the harvest of 97,500,000 t (107,500,000 short tons) of grain was down from a peak of 122,200,000 t (134,700,000 short tons) in 1958. The shortages resulted in bread lines, a fact at first kept from Khrushchev. Reluctant to purchase food in the West,[168] but faced with the alternative of widespread hunger, Khrushchev exhausted the nation's hard currency reserves and expended part of its gold stockpile in the purchase of grain and other foodstuffs.[169][170]

Khrushchev (right) with cosmonauts Yuri Gagarin, Pavel Popovich and Valentina Tereshkova, 1963

While visiting the United States in 1959, Khrushchev was greatly impressed by the agricultural education program at Iowa State University, and sought to imitate it in the Soviet Union. At the time, the main agricultural college in the USSR was in Moscow, and students did not do the manual labor of farming. Khrushchev proposed to move the programs to rural areas. He was unsuccessful, due to resistance from professors and students, who never actually disagreed with the premier, but who did not carry out his proposals.[171] Khrushchev recalled in his memoirs, "It's nice to live in Moscow and work at the Timiryazev Agricultural Academy. It's a venerable old institution, a large economic unit, with skilled instructors, but it's in the city! Its students aren't yearning to work on the collective farms because to do that they'd have to go out in the provinces and live in the sticks."[172]

Khrushchev founded several academic towns, such as Akademgorodok. The premier believed that Western science flourished because many scientists lived in university towns such as Oxford, isolated from big-city distractions, and had pleasant living conditions and good pay. He sought to duplicate those conditions in the Soviet Union. Khrushchev's attempt was generally successful, though his new towns and scientific centres tended to attract younger scientists, with older ones unwilling to leave Moscow or Leningrad.[173]

Khrushchev also proposed to restructure Soviet high schools. While the high schools provided a college preparatory curriculum, in fact, few Soviet youths went on to university. Khrushchev wanted to shift the focus of secondary schools to vocational training: students would spend much of their time at factory jobs or in apprenticeships and only a small part at the schools.[174] In practice, schools developed links with nearby enterprises and students went to work for only one or two days a week; the organizations disliked having to teach, while students and their families complained that they had little choice in what trade to learn.[175]

While the vocational proposal would not survive Khrushchev's downfall, a longer-lasting change was a related establishment of specialized high schools for gifted students or those wishing to study a specific subject.[176] These schools were modeled after the foreign-language schools that had been established in Moscow and Leningrad beginning in 1949.[177] In 1962, a special summer school was established in Novosibirsk to prepare students for Siberian math and science Olympiad. The following year, the Novosibirsk Maths and Science Boarding-School became the first permanent residential school specializing in math and science. Other such schools were soon established in Moscow, Leningrad, and Kiev. By the early 1970s, over 100 specialized schools had been established, in mathematics, the sciences, art, music, and sport.[176] Preschool education was increased as part of Khrushchev's reforms, and by the time he left office, about 22% of Soviet children attended preschool—about half of urban children, but only about 12% of rural children.[178]

The anti-religious campaign of the Khrushchev era began in 1959, coinciding with the 21st Party Congress in the same year. It was carried out by mass closures of churches[179][180] (reducing the number from 22,000 in 1959[181] to 13,008 in 1960 and to 7,873 by 1965[182]), monasteries, convents, and still-existing seminaries. The campaign also included a restriction of parental rights to teach religion to their children; a ban on the presence of children at church services (beginning with the Baptists in 1961, it was then extended to the Orthodox in 1963); and a ban on the administration of the Eucharist to children over the age of four. Khrushchev additionally banned all services held outside of churches' walls, renewed enforcement of 1929 legislation banning pilgrimages, and recorded the personal identities of all adults requesting church baptisms, weddings, or funerals.[183] He also disallowed the ringing of church bells and services in daytime in some rural settings from May to the end of October under the pretext of fieldwork requirements. Non-fulfillment of these regulations by clergy would lead to disallowance of state registration; meaning clergy could no longer do any pastoral or liturgical work without special state permission). According to Dimitry Pospielovsky, the state carried out forced retirement, arrests, and prison sentences for clergymen on "trumped-up charges," but in reality, he writes, said state actions were taken against clergy who resisted the closure of churches; delivered sermons attacking the USSR's state atheism and anti-religious campaign; conducted Christian charity; or made religion popular by personal example.[184]

Khrushchev and Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser aboard a train returning to Cairo from Alexandria, during a visit by Khrushchev to Egypt, 1964.

From 1950 to 1953 Khrushchev in the inner circle at the Kremlin was well-placed to closely observe and evaluate Stalin's foreign policy. Khrushchev considered the entire Cold War to be a serious mistake on Stalin's part. In the long-term, it created a militarized struggle with NATO, a stronger capitalist coalition. That struggle was entirely unnecessary, and was very expensive for the Soviet Union. It diverted attention away from the neutral developing world, where progress could be made, and it weakened Moscow's relationship with its East European satellites. Basically Khrushchev was much more optimistic about the future than Stalin or Molotov, and was more of an internationalist. He believed the working classes and the common peoples of the world would eventually find their way towards socialism and (possibly) even communism, and that conflicts like the Cold War diverted their attention from this eventual goal. Peaceful coexistence was instead endorsed, or the sort that Lenin himself had practiced at first. That would allow the Soviet Union and its satellite states to build up their economies and their standard of living. In specific terms Khrushchev decided that Stalin had made a series of mistakes, such as heavy-handed pressure in Turkey and Iran in 1945 and 1946, and especially heavy pressure on Berlin that led to the failed Berlin blockade in 1948. Khrushchev was pleased that when Malenkov replaced Stalin in 1953 he spoke of better relations with the West, and also with building ties to the Communist Party movements in imperialistic European colonies that would soon become independent nations across Africa and Asia. Germany was a major issue for Khrushchev, not because he feared a NATO Invasion eastward, but because it weakened the East German regime, which economically paled in comparison to the economic progress of West Germany. Khrushchev blamed Molotov for being unable to resolve the conflict with Yugoslavia, and largely ignoring the needs of the East European communist satellites.

Khrushchev chose Austria as a way to quickly come to agreement with NATO. It became a small neutralized nation economically tied to the West but diplomatically neutral and no threat.[185]

When Khrushchev took control, the outside world still knew little of him, and initially was not impressed by him. Short, heavyset, and wearing ill-fitting suits, he "radiated energy but not intellect", and was dismissed by many as a buffoon who would not last long.[186] British Foreign Secretary Harold Macmillan wondered, "How can this fat, vulgar man with his pig eyes and ceaseless flow of talk be the head—the aspirant Tsar for all those millions of people?"[187]

Khrushchev biographer Tompson described the mercurial leader:

He could be charming or vulgar, ebullient or sullen, he was given to public displays of rage (often contrived) and to soaring hyperbole in his rhetoric. But whatever he was, however, he came across, he was more human than his predecessor or even than most of his foreign counterparts, and for much of the world that was enough to make the USSR seem less mysterious or menacing.[188]

Khrushchev with Vice President Richard Nixon, 1959

Khrushchev sought to find a lasting solution to the problem of a divided Germany and of the enclave of West Berlin deep within East German territory. In November 1958, calling West Berlin a "malignant tumor", he gave the United States, United Kingdom and France six months to conclude a peace treaty with both German states and the Soviet Union. If one was not signed, Khrushchev stated, the Soviet Union would conclude a peace treaty with East Germany. This would leave East Germany, which was not a party to treaties giving the Western Powers access to Berlin, in control of the routes to the city. They proposed making Berlin a free city, which meant no outside military forces would be stationed there. West Germany, United States and France strongly opposed the ultimatum, but Britain wanted to consider it as a starting point for negotiations. No one wanted to risk war over the issue. At Britain's request, Khrushchev extended and ultimately dropped the ultimatum, as the Berlin issue became part of the complex agenda of high-level summit meetings.[189]

Khrushchev sought to sharply reduce levels of conventional weapons and to defend the Soviet Union with missiles. He believed that without this transition, the huge Soviet military would continue to eat up resources, making Khrushchev's goals of improving Soviet life difficult to achieve.[190] He abandoned Stalin's plans for a large navy in 1955, believing that the new ships would be too vulnerable to either a conventional or nuclear attack.[191] In January 1960, he took advantage of improved relations with the U.S. to order a reduction of one-third in the size of Soviet armed forces, alleging that advanced weapons would make up for the lost troops.[192] While conscription of Soviet youth remained in force, exemptions from military service became more and more common, especially for students.[193]

Khrushchev featured as Time Magazine's Man of the Year for 1957 after the launch of Sputnik

Campbell Craig and Sergey Radchenko argue that Khrushchev thought that policies like Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) were too dangerous for the Soviet Union. His approach did not greatly change his foreign policy or military doctrine but is apparent in his determination to choose options that minimized the risk of war.[194] The Soviets had few operable intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM); in spite of this, Khrushchev publicly boasted of the Soviets' missile programs, stating that Soviet weapons were varied and numerous. The First Secretary hoped that public perception that the Soviets were ahead would put psychological pressure on the West resulting in political concessions.[195] The Soviet space program, which Khrushchev firmly supported, appeared to confirm his claims when the Soviets launched Sputnik 1 into orbit, a feat that astonished the world. When it became clear that the launch was real, and Sputnik 1 was in orbit, Western governments concluded that the Soviet ICBM program was further along than it actually was.[196] Khrushchev added to this misapprehension by stating in an October 1957 interview that the USSR had all the rockets, of whatever capacity, that it needed.[197] For years, Khrushchev would make a point of preceding a major foreign trip with a rocket launch, to the discomfiture of his hosts.[197] In January 1960 Khrushchev told the Presidium that Soviet ICBMs made an agreement with the U.S. possible because "main-street Americans have begun to shake from fear for the first times in their lives".[198] The United States had learned of the underdeveloped state of the Soviet missile program from overflights in the late 1950s, but only high U.S. officials knew of the deception. The general U.S. and public perception of a "missile gap" led to a considerable defense buildup on the part of the United States.[195]

During Vice President Nixon's visit to the Soviet Union in 1959 he and Khrushchev took part in what later became known as the Kitchen Debate. Nixon and Khrushchev had an impassioned argument in a model kitchen at the American National Exhibition in Moscow, with each defending the economic system of his country.[31]

Khrushchev with Agriculture Secretary Ezra Taft Benson (left of Khrushchev) and U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Henry Cabot Lodge (far left) during his visit on 16 September 1959 to the Agricultural Research Service Center

Nixon invited Khrushchev to visit the United States, and he agreed. He made his first visit to the United States, arriving in Washington, on 15 September 1959, and spending thirteen days in the country. This first visit by a Soviet premier resulted in an extended media circus.[199] Khrushchev brought his wife, Nina Petrovna, and adult children with him, though it was not usual for Soviet officials to travel with their families.[200] The peripatetic premier visited New York City, Los Angeles, San Francisco (visiting a supermarket), Coon Rapids, Iowa (visiting Roswell Garst's farm), Pittsburgh, and Washington,[201] concluding with a meeting with President Eisenhower at Camp David.[202] During luncheon at the Twentieth Century-Fox Studio in Los Angeles Khrushchev engaged in an improvised yet jovial debate with his host Spyros Skouras over the respective merits of capitalism and communism.[203] Khrushchev was also to visit Disneyland, but the visit was canceled for security reasons, much to his disgruntlement.[204][205] He did, however, visit Eleanor Roosevelt at her home.[206] While visiting IBM's new research campus in San Jose, California, Khrushchev expressed little interest in computer technology, but he greatly admired the self-service cafeteria, and, on his return, introduced self-service in the Soviet Union.[207]

This visit resulted in an informal agreement that there would be no firm deadline over Berlin, but that there would be a four-power summit to try to resolve the issue. The Russian's goal was to present warmth, charm and peacefulness, using candid interviews to convince Americans of his humanity and good will. He performed well and Theodore Windt calls it, "the zenith of his career."[208] The friendly American audiences convinced Khrushchev that he had achieved a strong personal relationship with Eisenhower and that he could achieve détente with the Americans. Eisenhower was actually unimpressed by the Soviet leader.[209] He pushed for an immediate summit but was frustrated by French President Charles de Gaulle, who postponed it until 1960, a year in which Eisenhower was scheduled to pay a return visit to the Soviet Union.[210]

Khrushchev and head of USSR delegation Zoya Mironova at the United Nations, September 1960

A constant irritant in Soviet–U.S. relations was the overflight of the Soviet Union by American U-2 spy aircraft. On 9 April 1960, the U.S. resumed such flights after a lengthy break. The Soviets had protested the flights in the past but had been ignored by Washington. Content in what he thought was a strong personal relationship with Eisenhower, Khrushchev was confused and angered by the flights' resumption, and concluded that they had been ordered by CIA Director Allen Dulles without the U.S. President's knowledge. Nikita Khrushchev planned to visit the U.S. to meet President Eisenhower, however, the visit was canceled when Soviet Air Defence Forces brought down the U.S. U-2.[211] On 1 May, a U-2 was shot down, its pilot, Francis Gary Powers, captured alive.[212] Believing Powers to have been killed, the U.S. announced that a weather plane had been lost near the Turkish-Soviet border. Khrushchev risked destroying the summit, due to start on 16 May in Paris, if he announced the shootdown, but would look weak in the eyes of his military and security forces if he did nothing.[212] Finally, on 5 May, Khrushchev announced the shootdown and Powers' capture, blaming the overflight on "imperialist circles and militarists, whose stronghold is the Pentagon", and suggesting the plane had been sent without Eisenhower's knowledge.[213] Eisenhower could not have it thought that there were rogue elements in the Pentagon operating without his knowledge, and admitted that he had ordered the flights, calling them "a distasteful necessity".[214] The admission stunned Khrushchev and turned the U-2 affair from a possible triumph to a disaster for him, and he even appealed to U.S. Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson for help.[215]

Khrushchev was undecided what to do at the summit even as he boarded his flight to Paris. He finally decided, in consultation with his advisers on the plane and Presidium members in Moscow, to demand an apology from Eisenhower and a promise that there would be no further U-2 flights in Soviet airspace.[215] Neither Eisenhower nor Khrushchev communicated with the other in the days before the summit, and at the summit, Khrushchev made his demands and stated that there was no purpose in the summit, which should be postponed for six to eight months, that is until after the 1960 United States presidential election. The U.S. president offered no apology, but stated that the flights had been suspended and would not resume, and renewed his Open Skies proposal for mutual overflight rights. This was not enough for Khrushchev, who left the summit.[212] Eisenhower accused Khrushchev "of sabotaging this meeting, on which so much of the hopes of the world have rested".[216] Eisenhower's visit to the Soviet Union, for which the premier had even built a golf course so the U.S. president could enjoy his favorite sport,[217] was cancelled by Khrushchev.[218]

Khrushchev made his second and final visit to the United States in September 1960. He had no invitation but had appointed himself as head of the USSR's UN delegation.[219] He spent much of his time wooing the new Third World states which had recently become independent.[220] The U.S. restricted him to the island of Manhattan, with visits to an estate owned by the USSR on Long Island. The notorious shoe-banging incident occurred during a debate on 12 October over a Soviet resolution decrying colonialism. Khrushchev was infuriated by a statement of the Filipino delegate Lorenzo Sumulong charging the Soviets with employing a double standard by decrying colonialism while dominating Eastern Europe. Khrushchev demanded the right to reply immediately and accused Sumulong of being "a fawning lackey of the American imperialists". Sumulong resumed his speech and accused the Soviets of hypocrisy. Khrushchev yanked off his shoe and began banging it on his desk.[221] This behavior by Khrushchev scandalized his delegation.[222]

Khrushchev and John F. Kennedy, Vienna, June 1961

Khrushchev considered U.S. Vice President Nixon a hardliner and was delighted by his defeat in the 1960 presidential election. He considered the victor, Massachusetts Senator John F. Kennedy, as a far more likely partner for détente, but was taken aback by the newly inaugurated U.S. President's tough talk and actions in the early days of his administration.[223] Khrushchev achieved a propaganda victory in April 1961 with the first human spaceflight, while Kennedy suffered a defeat with the failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion. While Khrushchev had threatened to defend Cuba with Soviet missiles, the premier contented himself with after-the-fact aggressive remarks. The failure in Cuba led to Kennedy's determination to make no concessions at the Vienna summit scheduled for 3 June 1961. Both Kennedy and Khrushchev took a hard line, with Khrushchev demanding a treaty that would recognize the two German states and refusing to yield on the remaining issues obstructing a test-ban treaty. Kennedy, in contrast, had been led to believe that the test-ban treaty could be concluded at the summit, and felt that a deal on Berlin had to await easing of east–west tensions. Kennedy described negotiating with Khrushchev to his brother Robert as "like dealing with Dad. All give and no take."[224]

The maximum territorial extent of countries in the world under Soviet influence, after the Cuban Revolution of 1959 and before the official Sino-Soviet split of 1961

An indefinite postponement of action over Berlin was unacceptable to Khrushchev if for no other reason than that East Germany was suffering a continuous brain drain as highly educated East Germans fled west through Berlin. While the boundary between the two German states had elsewhere been fortified, Berlin, administered by the four Allied powers, remained open. Emboldened by statements from former U.S. Ambassador to Moscow Charles E. Bohlen and United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Chairman J. William Fulbright that East Germany had every right to close its borders, which were not disavowed by the Kennedy Administration, Khrushchev authorized East German leader Walter Ulbricht to begin construction of what became known as the Berlin Wall, which would surround West Berlin. Construction preparations were made in great secrecy, and the border was sealed off in the early hours of Sunday, 13 August 1961, when most East German workers who earned hard currency by working in West Berlin would be at their homes. The wall was a propaganda disaster, and marked the end of Khrushchev's attempts to conclude a peace treaty among the Four Powers and the two German states.[225] That treaty would not be signed until September 1990, as an immediate prelude to German reunification.

Superpower tensions culminated in the Cuban Missile Crisis (in the USSR, the "Caribbean crisis") of October 1962, as the Soviet Union sought to install medium-range nuclear missiles in Cuba, about 90 miles (140 km) from the U.S. coast.[31] Cuban Prime Minister Fidel Castro was reluctant to accept the missiles, and, once he was persuaded, warned Khrushchev against transporting the missiles in secret. Castro stated, thirty years later, "We had a sovereign right to accept the missiles. We were not violating international law. Why do it secretly—as if we had no right to do it? I warned Nikita that secrecy would give the imperialists the advantage."[226]

On 16 October, Kennedy was informed that U-2 flights over Cuba had discovered what were most likely medium-range missile sites, and though he and his advisors considered approaching Khrushchev through diplomatic channels, they could come up with no way of doing this that would not appear weak.[227] On 22 October, Kennedy addressed his nation by television, revealing the missiles' presence and announcing a blockade of Cuba. Informed in advance of the speech but not (until one hour before) the content, Khrushchev and his advisors feared an invasion of Cuba. Even before Kennedy's speech, they ordered Soviet commanders in Cuba that they could use all weapons against an attack—except atomic weapons.[228]

As the crisis unfolded, tensions were high in the U.S.; less so in the Soviet Union, where Khrushchev made several public appearances and went to the Bolshoi Theatre to hear American opera singer Jerome Hines, who was then performing in Moscow.[31][229] By 25 October, with the Soviets unclear about Kennedy's full intentions, Khrushchev decided that the missiles would have to be withdrawn from Cuba. Two days later, he offered Kennedy terms for the withdrawal.[230] Khrushchev agreed to withdraw the missiles in exchange for a U.S. promise not to invade Cuba and a secret promise that the U.S. would withdraw missiles from Turkey, near the Soviet heartland.[231] As the last term was not publicly announced at the request of the U.S., and was not known until just before Khrushchev's death in 1971,[31] the resolution was seen as a great defeat for the Soviets and contributed to Khrushchev's fall less than two years later.[31] Castro had urged Khrushchev to launch a preemptive nuclear attack on the U.S. in the event of an invasion of Cuba,[232] and was angered by the outcome, referring to Khrushchev in profane terms.[233]

After the crisis, superpower relations improved, as Kennedy gave a conciliatory speech at American University on 10 June 1963, recognizing the Soviet people's suffering during World War II, and paying tribute to their achievements.[234] Khrushchev called the speech the best by a U.S. president since Franklin D. Roosevelt, and, in July, negotiated a test ban treaty with U.S. negotiator Averell Harriman and with Lord Hailsham of the United Kingdom.[235] Plans for a second Khrushchev-Kennedy summit were dashed by the U.S. President's assassination in November 1963. The new U.S. president, Lyndon Johnson, hoped for continued improved relations but was distracted by other issues and had little opportunity to develop a relationship with Khrushchev before the premier was ousted.[236]

Khrushchev and Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej at Bucharest's Băneasa Airport in June 1960. Nicolae Ceaușescu can be seen at Gheorghiu-Dej's right hand side.

The Secret Speech, combined with the death of the Polish communist leader Bolesław Bierut, who suffered a heart attack while reading the Speech, sparked considerable liberalization in Poland and Hungary. In Poland, a worker's strike in Poznań developed into disturbances that left more than 50 dead in June 1956.[237] When Moscow blamed the disturbances on Western agitators, Polish leaders ignored the claim, and instead made concessions to the workers. With anti-Soviet displays becoming more common in Poland, and crucial Polish leadership elections upcoming, Khrushchev and other Presidium members flew to Warsaw on 19 October to meet with the Polish Presidium. The Soviets agreed to allow the new Polish leadership to take office, on the assurance there would be no change to the Soviet-Polish relationship.[237][238][239] A period of at least partial liberalization, known as the Polish October, followed.

The Polish settlement emboldened the Hungarians, who decided that Moscow could be defied.[240] A mass demonstration in Budapest on 23 October turned into a popular uprising. In response to the uprising, Hungarian Party leaders installed reformist Premier Imre Nagy.[241] Soviet forces in the city clashed with Hungarians and fired on demonstrators, with hundreds of both Hungarians and Soviets killed. Nagy called for a cease-fire and a withdrawal of Soviet troops, which a Khrushchev-led majority in the Presidium decided to obey, choosing to give the new Hungarian government a chance.[242] Khrushchev assumed that if Moscow announced liberalization in how it dealt with its allies, Nagy would adhere to the alliance with the Soviet Union.

On 30 October Nagy announced multiparty elections, and the next morning that Hungary would leave the Warsaw Pact.[243] On 3 November, two members of the Nagy government appeared in Ukraine as the self-proclaimed heads of a provisional government and demanded Soviet intervention, which was forthcoming. The next day, Soviet troops crushed the Hungarian uprising, with a death toll of 4,000 Hungarians and several hundred Soviet troops. Nagy was arrested, and was later executed. Despite the international outrage over the intervention, Khrushchev defended his actions for the rest of his life. Damage to Soviet foreign relations was severe, and would have been greater were it not for the fortuitous timing of the Suez crisis, which distracted world attention.[241]

Khrushchev (left) and East German leader Walter Ulbricht, 1963

In the aftermath of these crises, Khrushchev made the statement for which he became well-remembered, "We will bury you" (in Russian, "Мы вас похороним!" (My vas pokhoronim!)). While many in the West took this statement as a literal threat, Khrushchev made the statement in a speech on peaceful coexistence with the West.[244] When questioned about the statement during his 1959 U.S. visit, Khrushchev stated that he was not referring to a literal burial, but that, through inexorable historical development, communism would replace capitalism and "bury" it.[245]

Khrushchev greatly improved relations with Yugoslavia, which had been entirely sundered in 1948 when Stalin realized he could not control Yugoslav leader Josip Tito. Khrushchev led a Soviet delegation to Belgrade in 1955. Though a hostile Tito did everything he could to make the Soviets look foolish (including getting them drunk in public), Khrushchev was successful in warming relations, ending the Informbiro period in Soviet-Yugoslav relations.[246] During the Hungarian crisis, Tito initially supported Nagy, but Khrushchev persuaded him of the need for intervention.[247] Still, the intervention in Hungary damaged Moscow's relationship with Belgrade, which Khrushchev spent several years trying to repair. He was hampered by the fact that China disapproved of Yugoslavia's reformist socialism, and attempts to conciliate Belgrade resulted in an angry Beijing.[134]

Khrushchev with Mao Zedong, 1958

After completing his takeover of mainland China in 1949, Mao Zedong sought material assistance from the USSR, and also called for the return to China of territories taken from it under the Tsars.[31] As Khrushchev took control of the USSR, he increased aid to China, even sending a small corps of experts to help develop the new communist country.[248] This assistance was described by historian William C. Kirby as "the greatest transfer of technology in world history".[249] The Soviet Union spent 7% of its national income between 1954 and 1959 on aid to China.[250] On his 1954 visit to China, Khrushchev agreed to return Port Arthur and Dalian to China, though Khrushchev was annoyed by Mao's insistence that the Soviets leave their artillery as they departed.[251]

Mao bitterly opposed Khrushchev's attempts to reach a rapprochement with more liberal Eastern European states such as Yugoslavia. Khrushchev's government, on the other hand, was reluctant to endorse Mao's desires for an assertive worldwide revolutionary movement, preferring to conquer capitalism through raising the standard of living in communist-bloc countries.[31]

Relations between the two nations began to cool in 1956, with Mao angered both by the Secret Speech and by the fact that the Chinese had not been consulted in advance about it.[252] Mao believed that de-Stalinization was a mistake, and a possible threat to his own authority.[253] When Khrushchev visited Beijing in 1958, Mao refused proposals for military cooperation.[254] Hoping to torpedo Khrushchev's efforts at détente with the U.S., Mao soon thereafter provoked the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis, describing the Taiwanese islands shelled in the crisis as "batons that keep Eisenhower and Khrushchev dancing, scurrying this way and that. Don't you see how wonderful they are?"[255]

The Soviets had planned to provide China with an atomic bomb complete with full documentation, but in 1959, amid cooler relations, the Soviets destroyed the device and papers instead.[256] When Khrushchev paid a visit to China in September, shortly after his successful U.S. visit, he met a chilly reception, and Khrushchev left the country on the third day of a planned seven-day visit.[257] Relations continued to deteriorate in 1960, as both the USSR and China used a Romanian Communist Party congress as an opportunity to attack the other. After Khrushchev attacked China in his speech to the congress, Chinese leader Peng Zhen mocked Khrushchev, stating that the premier's foreign policy was to blow hot and cold towards the West. Khrushchev responded by pulling Soviet experts out of China.[258] In the dispute between Mao and Khrushchev, Albania was on the side of China, labelling Khrushchev "Rrapo Lelo", after an Albanian anti-communist peasant.[259]

Under Khrushchev, the Soviet Union provided considerable amounts of aid to the newly independent West African states of Ghana and Guinea. These were seen as ideal places to test the "socialist model of development" because of their critical dependence on economic cooperation with the Soviet Union, in contrast to larger Third World nations like Egypt and Indonesia. This project proved to be a resounding failure, although the lessons learned in West Africa during the Khrushchev years would have an important influence on Soviet foreign policy towards Africa in the following decades. Additionally, the Soviet Union's display of ineptitude during the Congo Crisis, where it failed to prevent both the newly independent Republic of the Congo from descending into chaos and the substantial military intervention by Western powers, led to a further cooling of relations between the Soviet Union and its Ghanaian and Guinean partners.[260]