Siege of Thessalonica (1422–1430)

Map of the southern Balkans and western Anatolia in 1410. Ottoman and other Turkish territories are marked in shades of brown, Byzantine territory in pink, and Venetian and Venetian-influenced areas in green

In the 14th century, the nascent Ottoman Empire was a rising power in the Near East. After subduing much of Anatolia, with the fall of Gallipoli in 1354, Ottoman Turks also acquired a foothold in the Balkans. The Christian powers of the region, notably the declining Byzantine Empire, were weak and divided, allowing a rapid Turkish expansion across the region, conducted both by the Ottomans themselves and by semi-independent Turkish ghazi warrior-bands. In 1369 the Ottomans were able to capture Adrianople, the third-most important city of the Byzantine Empire after its capital Constantinople and Thessalonica.[1] Thessalonica, ruled by the Byzantine prince and future emperor Manuel II Palaiologos (r. 1391–1425), itself surrendered in 1387 after a lengthy siege (1383–1387),[2] along with the cities of Christopolis and Chrysopolis.[3]

Initially the surrendered cities were allowed complete autonomy in exchange for payment of the haraç poll tax. Following the death of Emperor John V Palaiologos in 1391, however, Manuel II escaped Ottoman custody and went to Constantinople, where he was crowned emperor, succeeding his father. This angered Sultan Bayezid I, who laid waste to the remaining Byzantine territories, and then turned on Chrysopolis, which was captured by storm and largely destroyed.[4] Thessalonica submitted again to Ottoman rule at this time, possibly after a brief period of resistance,[lower-alpha 1] but was treated more leniently: although the city was brought under full Ottoman control, the Christian population and the Church retained most of their possessions, and the city retained its institutions.[8][9]

Thessalonica remained in Ottoman hands until 1403, when Emperor Manuel II sided with Bayezid's eldest son Süleyman in the Ottoman succession struggle that broke out following the crushing defeat of the Ottomans and the capture of Bayezid at the Battle of Ankara against the Turco-Mongol conqueror Timur in 1402. In exchange for his support, by the Treaty of Gallipoli the Byzantine emperor secured, among other concessions, the return of Thessalonica, part of its hinterland, the Chalcidice peninsula, and the coastal region between the rivers Strymon and Pineios.[10][11]

Despite the restoration of Byzantine rule, relations between Thessalonica and Constantinople remained troubled, with Thessalonica's local aristocracy jealously guarding their extensive privileges, which according to modern scholars amounted to virtual autonomy. This was part of a wider phenomenon attested for several cities during the last century of Byzantine history, as central authority weakened and centrifugal tendencies manifested themselves. In Thessalonica's case, a tendency to pursue increased independence from the imperial capital had been evident at least since the Zealot movement of the mid-14th century, and had been reinforced by Manuel II's autonomous regime in 1382–1387.[12] Thus, after they returned to Byzantine control, Thessalonica and the surrounding region were given as an autonomous appanage to Manuel II's nephew, John VII Palaiologos. After his death in 1408, he was succeeded by Manuel's third son, the Despot, Andronikos Palaiologos, who was supervised by Demetrios Leontares until 1415. During this time, Thessalonica enjoyed a period of relative peace and prosperity, as the Turks were preoccupied with their own civil war, although it was attacked by the rival Ottoman pretenders in 1412 (by Musa Çelebi[13]) and 1416 (during the uprising of Mustafa Çelebi against Mehmed I[14]).[15][16] Once the Ottoman civil war ended, the Turkish pressure on the city built up again. Just as during the 1383–1387 siege, this led to a sharp division of opinion within the city between factions supporting resistance, if necessary with Western European ("Latin") help, and those urging submission to the Ottomans.[17]

Miniature (c. 1404) showing Emperor Manuel II Palaiologos (2nd from left) with his family: his oldest son and co-emperor John VIII is first from left, while the Despot Andronikos is fourth

The eventual victor in the Ottoman civil war, Mehmed I (r. 1413–1421), maintained good relations with the Byzantines who had supported him.[lower-alpha 2] The accession of Murad II (r. 1422–1451) changed the situation, as John VIII Palaiologos (r. 1425–1448), the heir-apparent and de facto regent for the ailing Manuel II, set up Mustafa Çelebi as a rival to Murad. After defeating his opponent, Murad, determined to extinguish the remnants of the Byzantine state, laid siege, unsuccessfully, to Constantinople from 10 June to 6 September 1422.[19][20] In June 1422, Burak Bey, the son of Evrenos, assisted by various Ottoman marcher-lords of the Balkans, besieged Thessalonica as well, and ravaged its suburbs and the western portion of Chalcidice.[21][22]

According to the city's metropolitan bishop, Symeon (in office 1416/17–1429), both he and Despot Andronikos sent repeated pleas for aid to Constantinople, but the imperial government was short of resources and preoccupied with its own problems. Eventually, a single unnamed commander was sent to the city, but he brought neither men nor money with him. This commander proposed setting up a common fund of the citizens to support the defence, but this proposal met with vehement opposition, particularly from the wealthy aristocrats, who would naturally have borne the brunt of the cost. The common people likewise proved unwilling to contribute; when the news spread that the Ottomans had offered a peaceful settlement, provided that Despot Andronikos left the city, the commoners even rioted in favour of an accommodation with the Ottomans.[23]

At that point a group of aristocrats persuaded the Despot to seek the assistance of the Republic of Venice, an initiative probably taken without consulting Constantinople.[24] In spring 1423, via the Venetian colony of Negroponte, he informed the Venetians of his intention to hand over the city to them. When he informed the Venetians, they were appalled. The only conditions Andronikos attached to his offer were that the property, customs and privileges of the city's inhabitants, their right to trade and come and go freely, and the position of the city's Orthodox Church be respected, and that Venice pledge to defend the city against the Ottomans.[25][26] The 16th-century chronicler Pseudo-Sphrantzes claims that Andronikos sold the city for 50,000 ducats, and this statement was often accepted by scholars until the mid-20th century. This is not mentioned in any other source, nor is it found in the original documents pertaining to the affair, as shown by the scholars Konstantinos Mertzios and Paul Lemerle.[27][28] On the other hand, the Venetian envoys appointed to oversee the handover were authorised to provide a sum of 20,000–40,000 aspers[lower-alpha 3] from the revenue of the city as a yearly subsidy to Andronikos, should he request it.[30]

The offer arrived in Venice at an opportune time. The election of Francesco Foscari on 15 April 1423 as Doge of Venice had placed a proponent of a more aggressive and unyielding stance against Ottoman expansionism at the head of the Republic.[31][32] But the majority of the Great Council of Venice was still dominated by the more cautious tendencies of the merchant nobility that ruled the Republic and they feared the disruption to trade that open war with the Ottomans would bring.[31] Since the Fourth Crusade, the Venetians had consciously adopted a policy of gradually acquiring outposts, fortresses and islands from the collapsing Byzantine Empire, providing bases that secured Venice's valuable trading links with the East.[33] For some time Venice had viewed Thessalonica as a possible expansion target, especially as Constantinople seemed to be on the verge of falling to the Turks. Thus in 1419, Venice re-established a consulate in the city, headed by a local Greek, George Philomati, and after his death in 1422 by his brother Demetrios.[34]

At a session of the Great Council on 7 July, Andronikos' offer was accepted. The council sent notices to the Venetian colonies in the Aegean Sea (Negroponte, Nauplia, Tinos and Mykonos) and the vassal Duke of Naxos, to prepare ships to take possession of the city, while the Republic's bailo at Constantinople was instructed to secure the assent of Emperor Manuel.[35][36] A week later Santo Venier and Niccolo Giorgio were named provveditori (plenipotentiary envoys) and tasked with going to Greece and, if Despot Andronikos were still willing, taking over the city and arranging for its defence by hiring mercenaries. Giorgio was then to go before the Sultan, inform him of Venice's acquisition of the city and justify it as an expedient to prevent the city from being captured by other Christians, who might be hostile to the Sultan. The envoys were also to arrange for peace both between the Sultan and the Republic, and between the Sultan and Emperor Manuel.[37][38] Emperor Manuel evidently gave his assent to the proposal, for on 14 September 1423 six Venetian galleys, accompanied by one Byzantine galley, entered the harbour of Thessalonica. The Venetians were greeted by a jubilant population as saviours. For the Thessalonians Venetian rule meant not only security from the Turks (some 5,000 Ottoman troops were blockading the landward city walls) but, more immediately, a secure flow of supplies.[24][30][39]

Nevertheless, large segments of the population continued to support the seeking of a settlement with the Ottomans; the writings of Metropolitan Symeon record that a number of inhabitants fled at this time to the Ottomans.[40] This sentiment even included some members of the nobility: the contemporary Byzantine historian Doukas records that soon after taking over the city, the Venetians imprisoned four leading aristocrats, led by a certain Platyskalites, for their association with the Ottomans. The four men were exiled, first to Crete, and then to Venice itself and finally to Padua. Only after the fall of Thessalonica in 1430 were the two survivors released.[41] The contemporary Venetian Morosini Codex records a story of a conspiracy – dismissed as "slanderous" by Donald Nicol[42] – led by Despot Andronikos to hand over the city to the Turks. The plot was reportedly discovered in November 1423, and Andronikos and his supporters were exiled, with the Despot sent to Nauplia.[lower-alpha 4][45]

Metropolitan Symeon of Thessalonica, miniature from an 18th-century codex

Inside Thessalonica, the siege led to much suffering, and the populace quickly became dissatisfied with their new masters. By the winter of 1426–1427, conditions in the besieged city approached the point of famine. The Thessalonians were forced to subsist on bread alone, and even that proved problematic: The authorities were forced to request more shipments of wheat from Venice when supplies ran dangerously low. The conditions of "extreme poverty, death, and destitution" made the Greek population more and more restless, and even those who had formerly welcomed the Venetians began to waver.[79][88] The lack of food even jeopardised the city's defences, since many of the mercenary guards on the walls, paid by Venice with wheat instead of cash, defected to the Turks when their rations were late. This situation became progressively worse, and by the time of the final Ottoman attack in 1430, many soldiers had no weapons because they had sold them for food.[89]

The privations of the siege led to an exodus of the city's population, as citizens with the ability to leave sold their possessions and fled to Constantinople, other Venetian-controlled Greek territories, or to the Turks.[90] From a population variously reported at 20–25 thousand, or even as many as forty thousand by contemporary Italian sources, it is estimated that only ten to thirteen thousand were left by 1430.[91] The Venetian authorities tried to put a stop to this by prohibiting the inhabitants from leaving the city, outlawing "all sales, mortgages, and transfers of property, both movable and immovable", and destroying the houses and other property – even trees – of people who had left the city. They hoped that the destruction would serve a deterrent to those who remained behind.[92] Coupled with several instances of arbitrariness, speculation, and profiteering on behalf of the Venetian authorities, these measures helped to further alienate the Thessalonians.[93] By April 1425, a Byzantine church official who had had his family flee the city wrote of the "enslavement of the city by the Venetians", and similar sentiments about Venetian tyranny are echoed in all contemporary Byzantine sources.[94] In their embassy in July 1425, the Thessalonians submitted a list of 21 complaints and demands, including fixed rations of corn for the poor and the lowering of tax dues and suspension of arrears and debt-related punishments for the duration of the siege, since the closing of the gates meant that people could no longer access their fields, which were furthermore devastated by the Turks. In a session on 23 July 1425, the Great Council acceded to many of their demands and requested that its officials respect the customs and rights of the citizens and work together with the local council of twelve nobles in the governance of the city.[59]

Whatever the Venetian efforts to secure peace, the Thessalonians were well aware, in the words of the Byzantinist Donald Nicol, that Murad "was playing for time" and he "was never going to be reconciled to the Venetian occupation of the Thessalonica".[78] As the historian Apostolos Vacalopoulos put it, the prevailing view quickly became that "since Thessalonica was bound sooner or later to fall into Turkish hands, it would be preferable to surrender peacefully there and then, and so avoid the sufferings which would ensue if the Turks had to take the city by force."[95] As conditions inside the city worsened, the pro-surrender current gained ground among the Thessalonians. This is evidenced from the writings of Metropolitan Symeon, who recounts that during one attack in 1425 or 1426, many citizens (including some of those guarding the walls) fled to the Ottomans.[96] Symeon played an important role as a spokesman and leader of the city's populace during the siege. An ardently Hesychast and anti-Latin prelate who had opposed the handover of the city to the Roman Catholic Venetians, fearing their "corrupting" influence, the Metropolitan tried to strengthen his flock's Orthodox identity against both the Latin Venetians and the Muslim Turks, as well as awaken their will to resist. He organised litanies that paraded the city's icon of the Hodegetria, and delivered sermons about the city's successful delivery from previous sieges through the intervention of her patron, Demetrius of Thessalonica. As a result, he emerged as the leading proponent of resistance, and despite his anti-Latin animus, the Venetians considered him "a most loyal servant of the Republic". His death in September 1429 contributed to the increasing demoralisation of the city's populace, who considered it an omen of the city's fall.[97][81][98]

In summer 1429, the Thessalonians sent a second embassy to Venice to complain about the restrictions placed on entry and exit from the city, continued violations of their rights, extortion by the Venetian authorities, the poor supply situation, the neglect of repairing the city's fortifications and the lack of military stores, and the Venetian mercenaries who were in contact with the Turks outside the walls. On 14 July, the Great Council gave mostly reassuring answers to a list of 31 demands, but the increasing dissatisfaction by the Greek population with Venetian rule was evident.[99][100][101] The eyewitness John Anagnostes reports that by the winter of 1429, the majority of the population had come to favour a surrender to the Turks. Sultan Murad was aware of the situation inside the walls, and twice sent Christian officers in his service into the city to incite a rebellion against the Venetians. However, as Anagnostes writes, the population was by that time so reduced in number, and divided among itself, that no common cause could be made. Furthermore, the Thessalonians were afraid of the Venetians, as they had recruited a special force of guards, the Tzetarioi, and given them the authority to kill anyone advocating a surrender.[102]

A squadron of three galleys under Antonio Diedo arrived to reinforce the city on 17 March 1430, but to little avail. A muster of the city's available defenders showed that they sufficed to man only a half or a third of the crenelles, and they were deficient in both armament and morale. News of Murad's approach at the head of an army rumoured to number 190,000 men caused widespread terror among the populace.[103][104]

The Sultan appeared before the city on Sunday, 26 March, shortly after noon.[104] Probably informed of the discontent inside the walls by Greek defectors, the Sultan appears to have expected the mere appearance of his army to force the city to surrender, or to signal an uprising of the populace against the Venetian garrison. In this vein he sent Christian officers to the walls, to call upon the inhabitants to surrender, but they were driven off by arrows from the walls before they had chance to complete their speeches.[105][106] The Sultan then began preparations to take the city by storm, which lasted for three days. On the 28th, Murad sent another offer of surrender, but this too was rejected. On the same night, a subaltern officer entered the city to inform the Venetian commanders that the Turks had prepared six ships at the Vardar River for use against the Venetian galleys in the harbour, which had been left defenceless since all available forces were concentrated in manning the city wall. Fearing that their retreat would be cut off, the Venetian commanders ordered Diedo and his men to withdraw from the wall to man the ships and the harbour defences. They did not, however, notify the population, and around midnight, Christians from the Ottoman camp approached the walls and announced that the final assault would take place the next day, from land and sea. The news spread throughout the city and panicked the populace, who spent the night in terrified vigil in the churches. The panic spread further when Diedo's withdrawal to the harbour became known. In the absence of other information, the Thessalonians believed that the Venetians were preparing to abandon them and flee. As a result, a number of defenders simply abandoned their positions on the walls and returned to their homes.[104][107]

At dawn on 29 March 1430,[lower-alpha 7] the Ottomans launched their attack under the command of Sinan Pasha, the beylerbey (military governor) of Rumelia. The main weight of the attack fell on the less well maintained eastern section of the walls, between the Trigonion and the site of the later Heptapyrgion fortress, where the Sultan himself led the attack. The Ottomans brought siege engines, ladders, and planks forward, and used them to undermine the walls. Ottoman archery proved crucial, for their shots were able to pin down the defenders and hit many who tried to peer over the battlements. As a result, much of the defenders' return fire was blind, and they began slowly abandoning their positions. Finally, at the fourth hour, the Ottoman troops broke through at multiple points along the wall; according to Anagnostes, the first Ottomans climbed the wall in the eastern section, which had been left almost defenceless.[lower-alpha 8][110][111] As the civilian population was being massacred, the Venetians fled to the harbour as best as they could – "one in his mantle, the other in his undershirt" in the words of the report to the Great Council. Many managed to escape to Diedo's ships, and thence to Negroponte. Others were less fortunate: the Venetians lost over 270 men from the galley crews alone. A number of senior officials, including the son of duke Paolo Contarini, and Leonardo Gradenigo, captain of one of the galleys, also fell.[112][113] Details on the siege were provided by a letter sent by the Venetians of Negroponte to Venice on 2 April, after the refugees from the fall of the city arrived there, and the eyewitness account of John Anagnostes.[114] On their return to Venice, the two Venetian commanders of Thessalonica faced charges of negligence and were imprisoned; they were most likely acquitted, however, for by 1432 both were once again active in the Republic's politics.[115]

Foundation inscription with the tughra of Murad II on the Heptapyrgion fortress, built in 1431 on the northeastern corner of the city

Following long-standing custom for a city taken by storm, the plundering lasted for three days. According to Anagnostes, 7,000 inhabitants,[lower-alpha 9] including himself, were taken captive to be sold in the slave markets of the Balkans and Anatolia,[117] although many were subsequently ransomed by the Despot of Serbia, Đurađ Branković.[113] The city's monuments suffered heavy damage in the sack, particularly the cathedral of Hagios Demetrios, as soldiers ransacked them for precious objects and hidden treasure.[113] This damage was compounded later when the Sultan ordered that marble sections be stripped from them and taken to his capital, Adrianople, to pave a bath.[118] On the fourth day, Sultan Murad entered the city himself and prayed at the Church of the Acheiropoietos, which became the city's first mosque.[119] The Sultan then restored order, evicting the soldiers from the homes they had occupied and returning them to their owners.[113] Only two thousand of the population were left after the sack.[120] The Sultan soon took measures to repopulate the city. He promised to return their properties to those inhabitants who had fled if they returned, and in some cases even ransomed captives from the sack himself.[117] In addition, he brought in Muslim and Christian settlers from other areas of Macedonia.[lower-alpha 10] A great number of empty houses were confiscated and given to the settlers, while most of the main churches were converted to mosques. The Turks settled mostly in the upper part of the city, from where they could better control it.[123]

The Venetians were taken by surprise when the city fell; the fleet under Morosini was still sailing off the western coast of Greece. Following their customary strategy, they reacted by sending their fleet to blockade Gallipoli and cut off passage of the Dardanelles.[124] However, the Republic was by now ready to disengage itself from this profitless venture,[lower-alpha 11] and soon instructed Morosini to seek peace.[127] In July, Hamza Bey signed a peace treaty with the Venetians (ratified on 4 September) whereby Venice recognised its loss of Thessalonica, restored passage of the Dardanelles, and acknowledged Ottoman overlordship over Patras in the Morea, with an annual tribute of 236 ducats. In exchange, the Venetians secured the Sultan's recognition of their possessions in Albania: Durazzo, Scutari, and Antivari.[124]

Following the capture of Thessalonica, the Ottomans went on to extend their rule over western Greece. A few months after the fall of the city Ioannina surrendered to Hamza Bey and Carlo II Tocco accepted Ottoman suzerainty over the southern remnant of the Despotate of Epirus around Arta. Venice moved to place Tocco's island possessions of Zante, Cephalonia, and Leucas under her protection.[128] As a result, for the next half-century, until the end of the First Ottoman–Venetian War in 1479, the main arena of confrontation between Venice and the Ottomans was to be Albania, an area of vital importance to both powers, as from there the Ottomans could threaten Italy herself.[129]

Thessalonica remained in Ottoman hands until October 1912, when it was captured by the Kingdom of Greece during the First Balkan War.[130][131] Its remaining Muslim population left the city during the Greco-Turkish population exchange in 1923.[131]

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