South American dreadnought race

Major Argentine and Chilean warship purchases and orders, 1887–1902

Year	Ships (type)	Year	Ships (type)
1887	Capitán Prat (BB) Presidente Errázuriz (PC) Presidente Pinto (PC)	1896	O'Higgins (AC)
1888	Libertad (BB) Independencia (BB)	1896	San Martín (AC)
1890	Veinticinco de Mayo (PC)	1897	Pueyrredón (AC)
1891	Nueve de Julio (PC)	1898	General Belgrano (AC)
1892	Blanco Encalada (PC)	1901	Rivadavia (AC) Mariano Moreno (AC)
1894	Buenos Aires (PC)	1901	Constitución (BB) Libertad (BB)
1895	Esmeralda (AC) Ministro Zenteno (PC)	1901	Two battleships, possibly ordered
1895	Garibaldi (AC)	1901	Chacabuco (PC)
Key: Chile Argentina BB: pre-dreadnought battleship; PC: protected cruiser; AC: armored cruiser.
The dates refer to when ships were ordered from the constructors.
Information compiled from Scheina, Naval History, 46–51, 297–99.

A dispute over conflicting Argentine and Chilean claims to Patagonia, the southernmost region in South America, began in the mid-19th century. When the two nations nearly went to war over it in the late 1870s, three major new warships were ordered by both nations: the Chileans added the world's first protected cruiser, Esmeralda, and the Argentines contracted for the central battery ironclad Almirante Brown and protected cruiser Patagonia.[2]

A decade later, the Chilean government significantly increased their naval budget and ordered the battleship Capitán Prat, two protected cruisers, and two torpedo boats. These ships would be added to two central battery ironclads, Almirante Cochrane and Blanco Encalada (1870s), and Esmeralda.[3]

These naval acquisitions were a major cause for concern for the Argentine government, which still had overlapping claims to Patagonia and had just watched the Chileans decisively win the War of the Pacific. Furthermore, while the country did possess more warships than the Chileans, their vessels were smaller and their crews less experienced than the battle-tested Chileans.[3]

Facing these challenges, Argentine government quickly moved to order two battleships. This began a naval arms race between the two countries which continued through the 1890s, surviving even the expensive Chilean Civil War (1891). The two countries alternated cruiser orders over the next few years, with each order featuring an increase in capabilities; the race escalated in the middle of the decade when both countries instead began ordering powerful armored cruisers.[4]

Tensions briefly cooled beginning in 1898 with the successful American arbitration of a boundary dispute in the northern Puna de Atacama region and the submission of the Patagonia dispute to British arbitration. However, this detente broke down just three years later when the Argentine Navy bought two armored cruisers from Italy and the Chilean Navy ordered two pre-dreadnought battleships from British shipyards. The Argentines reacted by signing letters of intent to buy two larger battleships.[5]

The growing dispute disturbed the British government, as an armed conflict would disrupt the country's extensive commercial interests in the region.[6] The British mediated negotiations between Argentina and Chile, and the resulting Pacts of May were signed on 28 May 1902. The third pact limited the naval armaments of both countries; both were barred from acquiring any further warships for five years without giving the other eighteen month's notice. The warships ordered in 1901 were sold: Chile's battleships became the United Kingdom's Swiftsure class, and Argentina's armored cruisers became Japan's Kasuga class; plans for Argentina's larger battleships were discarded. In addition, Capitán Prat and two Argentine armored cruisers were disarmed with the exception of their main batteries, as there was no crane in Argentina that was capable of removing the cruisers' gun turrets.[7]

Major Brazilian warships, 1880–1906

Year	Ships (type)	Year	Ships (type)
1883	Riachuelo (BB)	1892	Benjamin Constant (PC) República (PC)
1885	Aquidabã (BB)	1896	Almirante Barroso (PC)
1890	Almirante Tamandaré (PC)	1898	Deodoro (BB) Floriano (BB)
Key: Empire of Brazil First Brazilian Republic BB: Small ironclad or coast-defense ship – PC: protected cruiser
The dates refer to when they were launched, still incomplete.
Information compiled from Scheina, "Brazil," in Gardiner and Gray, Conway's 1906–21, 403–04.

In the aftermath of an 1889 army-led coup d'etat, large portions of Brazil's navy took up arms against the new government in 1891 and 1893–94.[8] The navy's opposition cost it dearly. Despite the naval expansions in Argentina and Chile and the era's rapidly advancing naval technology,[9][upper-alpha 2] in 1896 the navy had just forty-five percent of its authorized personnel.[11] Moreover, by the end of the century its only modern armored ships were two small coast-defense vessels.[12] With such dilapidated defenses, José Paranhos Jr., the Baron of Rio Branco and Foreign Minister of Brazil, opined that Brazil's only remaining protection was "the moral force and old prestige still left" from Brazil's imperial era.[13][upper-alpha 3]

As the twentieth century began, increasing global demand for coffee and rubber led to Brazil's coffee economy and rubber boom. The resulting profits gave politicians Pinheiro Machado and Rio Branco the opportunity to construct a strong navy to achieve their goal of being recognized as an international power.[15][upper-alpha 4]

The National Congress of Brazil passed a large naval acquisition program on 14 December 1904, but the navy divided itself into two factions over what ships should be purchased.[17] One, supported by the British armament company Armstrong Whitworth (which eventually received the order), favored a fleet centered around a small number of large warships. The other, supported by Rio Branco, preferred a larger navy composed of smaller warships.[18]

At first, the smaller warships faction prevailed. After Law no. 1452 was passed on 30 December 1905, which authorized £4,214,550 for new warship construction (£1,685,820 in 1906), three small battleships, three armored cruisers, six destroyers, twelve torpedo boats, three submarines, a collier, and a training ship were ordered.[19] Though the Brazilian government later eliminated the armored cruisers for monetary reasons, the Minister of the Navy, Admiral Júlio César de Noronha, signed a contract with Armstrong Whitworth for the planned battleships on 23 July 1906.[20] The acquisition was supported by the incoming Brazilian president Afonso Pena, who told the National Congress of Brazil in November 1906 that the ships were necessary to replace the antiquated vessels composing the current navy and the battleship Aquidabã, which had unexpectedly blown up earlier that year.[21]

Even though the orders went to a British company, the British ambassador to Brazil was opposed to the planned naval expansion due to its large cost and negative impact on relations between Brazil and Argentina. He saw it as "an embodiment of national vanity, combined with personal motives of a pecuniary character."[22] The US ambassador to Brazil also spoke out against the purchase and warned his Department of State of the regional destabilization that could occur if the situation devolved into a full naval arms race. The US government attempted to diplomatically coerce the Brazilians into canceling their ships, but these attempts were dismissed; the Baron of Rio Branco remarked that caving to the American demands would render Brazil as powerless as Cuba, whose new constitution allowed the American government to intervene in Cuban affairs.[23]

The Argentine Rivadavia (pictured) and Moreno were constructed in the United States, and were the only American dreadnoughts built for a foreign country.

Argentina was highly alarmed by the Brazilian move, and they quickly moved to nullify the remaining months of the naval-limiting restrictions in the 1902 pact with Chile.[10] In November 1906, Argentina's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Manuel Augusto Montes de Oca, remarked that any one of the new Brazilian vessels could destroy the entire Argentine and Chilean fleets.[46] Despite the seeming hyperbole, his statement—made before the Brazilian government reordered the ships as dreadnoughts—ended up being close to the truth: in 1910, at least, the new Brazilian warships were seemingly stronger than any other vessel in the world, let alone any one ship in the Argentine or Chilean fleets.[47] With this in mind, the Journal of the American Society of Naval Engineers opined that maintaining the older Libertad class or Capitán Prat (respectively) was now a waste of money.[48]

The Argentine government's alarm continued under de Oca's successor, Estanislao Zeballos. In June 1908, Zeballos presented a plan to the Argentine Congress where they would offer the Brazilian government a chance to give one of their two unfinished dreadnoughts to Argentina. This would allow the two countries a chance to enjoy relative naval parity. Should the Brazilians refuse, Zeballos planned to issue an ultimatum: if they did not comply in eight days, the mobilized Argentine Army would invade what the army and navy ministers claimed was a defenseless Rio de Janeiro. Unfortunately for Zeballos, his plan was leaked to the media, and the resulting public outcry—Argentine citizens happened to not be in favor of their government borrowing large sums of money to mobilize the army and go to war—ensured his resignation.[49][upper-alpha 9]

The Argentine government was also deeply concerned with the possible effect on the country's large export trade, as a Brazilian blockade of the entrance to the River Plate would cripple the Argentine economy. The acquisition of dreadnoughts to maintain an equal footing with Brazil would, in the words of the Argentine admiral overseeing his countries' dreadnoughts while they were being constructed, avoid a "preponderance of power on the other side, where a sudden gust of popular feeling or injured pride might make [a blockade] a dangerous weapon against us."[51]

Both countries faced difficulty in financing their own dreadnoughts. Although in Argentina the ruling National Autonomist Party supported the purchases, they initially faced public resistance for such expensive acquisitions.[23] An influx of inflammatory newspaper editorials supporting new dreadnoughts, especially from La Prensa, and renewed border disputes, particularly Brazilian assertions that the Argentines were attempting to restore the Viceroyalty of the Río de la Plata, swayed the public to support the purchases.[52] The Argentine President, José Figueroa Alcorta, attempted to ease the tensions with a message warning the Brazilians of a naval arms race should they continue on their present course. The Brazilian government replied with reasoning similar to Pena's speech in 1906, in that they believed the ships were necessary to replace the antiquated equipment left by the long-term neglect of the Brazilian Navy, and they repeatedly insisted that the ships were not meant for use against Argentina.[53]

In August, a bill authorizing the Argentine Navy to acquire three dreadnoughts was passed by the Chamber of Deputies seventy-two to thirteen.[54] Three months later, it was defeated in the Senate after they approved an arbitration treaty and the government made a last-ditch offer to purchase one of the two Brazilian dreadnoughts currently being constructed.[55] The Brazilian government declined, so the bill was reintroduced and passed by the Senate on 17 December 1908 with forty-nine in support to thirteen opposed, over socialist objections that the country needed to be populated and the large sum of money (£14,000,000) could be better spent in other areas of the government.[56]

After the Argentine government sent a naval delegation to Europe to solicit and evaluate armament companies' offers,[23] they received tenders from fifteen shipyards in five countries (the United States, Great Britain, Germany, France, and Italy), and conducted a drawn-out bidding process. The Argentine delegation rejected all of the bids twice, each time recycling the best technical aspects of the tendered designs when crafting new bidding requirements.[57] The reason given for the first rejection was the appearance of the first super-dreadnought, HMS Orion.[58] Still, the shipbuilders were furious, as the process of designing a major warship took large amounts of time and money, and they believed the Argentine tactic revealed their individual trade secrets.[59] A British naval architect published a scathing condemnation of the Argentine tactics, albeit only after the contracts were not awarded to a British company:

We may assume that the British battleships embody good ideas and good practice—in all probability the very best. These cannot fail, in a greater or less degree, to become part of the design which the British shipbuilder first submits to the Argentine Government. In the second inquiry it may be presumed that everything that was good in the first proposals had been seized upon by the Argentine authorities and asked for in the new design. This second request went not only to British builders but to all the builders of the world, and in this way it is exceedingly probable that a serious leakage of ideas and practice of our ships was disseminated through the world by the Argentine government. ... The third inquiry that was issued showed to all the builders of the world what has been eliminated or modified in the second inquiry; and so the process of leakage went merrily on, and with it that of the education of foreign builders and the Argentine government.[60]

The United States' Fore River Ship and Engine Company tendered the lowest bid—in part owing to the availability of cheap steel, though they were accused of quoting an unprofitable price so the ships could act as loss leaders—and was awarded the contract.[61] This aroused further suspicion in the European bidders, who had previously believed that the United States was a non-contender, though Argentina did order twelve destroyers from British, French, and German shipyards to soften the blow.[upper-alpha 10] These bidders, along with newspapers like the Times (London), turned their anger on the American government under President William Howard Taft, whose so-called "Dollar Diplomacy" policy had led his State Department to go to great lengths to obtain the contracts.[63][upper-alpha 11] Their reactions may have been justified: Taft boasted in the high-profile 1910 State of the Union address that the Argentine dreadnought order was awarded to American manufacturers "largely through the good offices of the Department of State."[67]

Moreno being painted in dry dock at the Brooklyn Navy Yard, October 1914

The Argentine contract included an option for a third dreadnought in case the Brazilian government adhered to its contractual obligations to order a third dreadnought. Two newspapers, La Prensa and La Argentina, heavily advocated for a third ship; the latter even started a petition to raise money for a new battleship.[68] The American minister to Argentina, Charles H. Sherrill, cabled back to the United States that "this newspaper rivalry promises the early conclusion of a movement which means a third battleship whether by public subscription or by Government funds."[69] On 31 December 1910, the Argentine government decided against constructing the ship, after Roque Sáenz Peña, who had been making entreaties to Brazil to end the expensive naval race, was elected to the Presidency.[70] In addition, the intended target of the third Argentine dreadnought, the third Brazilian dreadnought, had already been canceled multiple times.[71][upper-alpha 12]

The Chilean government delayed their naval plans after a financial depression brought on by the 1906 Valparaíso earthquake and a drastic fall in the nitrate market in 1907, but these economic problems were not enough to stop them from countering the dreadnoughts purchased by their traditional rival Argentina.[73][upper-alpha 13] While Argentina's principal concern was with Brazil, Chile also wished to respond to Peruvian military acquisitions.[76]

Money for a naval building program was allocated in 1910.[77] Although the Chilean government solicited bids from several armament companies, nearly all believed that a British company would win the contract; the American naval attaché opined that without anything short of a revolution the contracts were destined for the United Kingdom. The Chilean Navy had cultivated extensive ties with the United Kingdom's Royal Navy since the 1830s, when Chilean naval officers were given places on British ships to receive training and experience they could bring back to their country. This relationship had recently been cemented when a British naval mission was requested by Chile and sent in 1911.[78] Still, the American and German governments attempted to swing sentiment to their side by dispatching modern naval vessels (Delaware and Von der Tann, respectively) to Chilean ports. Their efforts were futile, and the design tendered by Armstrong Whitworth was chosen on 25 July 1911.[79]

Other South American navies, having limited resources and little expertise in operating large warships, were in no state to respond. The Peruvian Navy, fourth largest on the continent, had been decimated during the Naval campaign of the War of the Pacific against Chile (1879–83). It took the Peruvian government more than twenty years to order new warships—the Almirante Grau class (Almirante Grau and Coronel Bolognesi), scout cruisers delivered in 1906 and 1907. They were augmented by two submarines and a destroyer ordered from France.[80] Almirante Grau was intended to be the fleet's flagship only until a more powerful warship was purchased; along with Coronel Bolognesi, they were to be the "pioneers" of a modern navy.[81] Proceedings reported in 1905 that this new navy would be composed of three Swiftsure-like pre-dreadnoughts, three armored cruisers, six destroyers, and numerous smaller warships, all acquired as part of a nine-year, $7 million outlay.[82]

None of these plans came to fruition. The closest major expansion came in 1912, when the Peruvian Navy had an agreement to acquire an obsolete French armored cruiser in 1912 (Dupuy de Lôme) for three million francs. The Peruvian government paid one of a planned three planned installments, but the purchase came under criticism at home for not being able to change any balance of power with Chile. When a potential cruiser purchase by Ecuador fell through, the Peruvians quit paying for the ship, which was later converted to a merchant ship and scrapped in 1923.[83]

Other South American navies also added smaller vessels to their naval forces in the same time period. The Uruguayan Navy acquired the protected cruiser Montevideo in 1908 and the 1,400-long-ton (1,422 t) torpedo gunboat Uruguay in 1910. The Venezuelan Navy bought an ex-Spanish 1,125-long-ton (1,143 t) protected cruiser, Mariscal Sucre, from the United States in 1912. The Ecuadorian Navy incorporated Libertador Bolívar, a torpedo gunboat bought from Chile, in 1907, complementing its fleet of two avisos, both around 800 long tons (810 t); two small steamers; and one minor coast guard ship.[84]

After the first Brazilian dreadnought, Minas Geraes, was launched, the Brazilian government began an extended campaign to remove the third dreadnought from the contract because of political—backlash from the Revolt of the Lash coupled with warming relations with Argentina—and economic reasons. After much negotiating and attempts from Armstrong to hold the Brazilian government to the contract, the Brazilians relented, due in part to lower bond rates that made it possible for the government to borrow the necessary money. Rio de Janeiro was laid down for the first time in March 1910.[103]

Agincourt depicted prior to its British modifications, which included removing the flying bridge seen here

By May, the Brazilian government asked Armstrong to stop work on the new warship and to submit new designs which took in the most recent advance in naval technology, super-dreadnoughts. Eustace Tennyson-d'Eyncourt served as Armstrong's liaison to Brazil. The 1911 Encyclopædia Britannica specifies this design as a 655-foot (200 m) long overall, 32,000-long-ton (33,000 t) ship mounting twelve 14-inch guns and costing near £3,000,000. The many requests made by the Brazilian Navy for minor changes delayed the contract signing until 10 October 1910, and the battleship's keel laying was delayed further by a labor dispute with the Worshipful Company of Shipwrights, which led to a lockout. During these delays, a new Minister of the Navy, Admiral Marques Leão, was appointed to replace de Alencar—an important development, as the contract stipulated that the design could proceed only with the approval of the new Minister. Again, however, the Brazilian Navy found itself torn between two schools of thought: Leão and others in the navy favored a reversion to the 12-inch gun, but others, led by the outgoing Minister of the Navy (de Alencar) and the head of the Brazilian naval commission in the United Kingdom (Rear Admiral Duarte Huet de Bacelar Pinto Guedes), were strongly in favor of obtaining the ship with the largest armament—in this case, a design drawn up by Bacellar, carrying eight 16-inch guns, six 9.4-inch guns, and fourteen 6-inch guns.[104]

D'Eyncourt, who had departed Brazil in October immediately after the contract was signed, returned in March 1911 to display the various design options available to the Brazilian Navy. Armstrong evidently thought the second faction would prevail, so he also took with him everything needed to close a deal on Bacellar's design. By mid-March, Armstrong's contacts in Brazil reported that Leão had convinced the recently elected President Hermes Rodrigues da Fonseca to cancel the design with twelve 14-inch guns in favor of a smaller ship.[105] The credit may not have laid with Leão alone, though; da Fonseca was already dealing with multiple issues. Most importantly, he had to deal with the fallout from a large naval revolt in November 1910 (the Revolt of the Lash), which had seen three of the new vessels just purchased by the navy, along with one older coast-defense ship, mutiny against the use of corporal punishment in the navy.[106]

To make matters worse, the dreadnoughts' expense combined with loan payments and a worsening economy led to growing government debt compounded by budget deficits. By one measure of Brazil's GDP per capita, income in the country rose from $718 in 1905 to a high of $836 in 1911 before declining over the next three years to a low of $780 in 1914 (both measured in 1990 international dollars). It did not fully recover until after the First World War.[107] At the same time, Brazil's external and internal debt reached $500 and $335 million (respectively, in contemporaneous dollar amounts) by 1913, partly through rising deficits, which were $22 million in 1908 and $47 million by 1912.[108] In May, the president commented negatively on the new ship:

When I assumed office, I found that my predecessor had signed a contract for the building of the battleship Rio de Janeiro, a vessel of 32,000 tons, with an armament of 14-inch guns. Considerations of every kind pointed to the inconvenience of acquiring such a vessel and to the revision of the contract in the sense of reducing the tonnage. This was done, and we shall possess a powerful unit which will not be built on exaggerated lines such as have not as yet stood the time of experience.[109]

D'Eyncourt probably avoided proposing any design with 16-inch guns when he saw the political situation. In meetings with Leão, designs of only ten 12-inch guns mounted on the centerline were quickly rejected, even though their broadside was as strong as that of the Minas Geraes class, but a design with no less than fourteen 12-inch guns emerged as the frontrunner. Author David Topliss attributes this to political necessity, as he believed the Minister of the Navy could not validate purchasing a seemingly less-powerful dreadnought than the Minas Geraes class: with larger guns ruled out, the only remaining choice was a larger number of guns.[110]

Sultân Osmân-ı Evvel, previously Rio de Janeiro and soon to be Agincourt, fitting-out

After numerous requests for design alterations from the Brazilian Navy were accommodated or rejected, a contract was signed for a ship with fourteen 12-inch guns on 3 June 1911 for £2,675,000, and Rio de Janeiro's keel was laid for the fourth time on 14 September. It did not take long for the Brazilian government to reconsider their decision again;[111] by mid-1912, battleships with 14-inch guns were under construction, and suddenly it seemed that Rio de Janeiro would be outclassed upon completion.[112] Making matters worse, a European depression after the end of the Second Balkan War in August 1913 reduced Brazil's ability to obtain foreign loans. This coincided with a collapse in Brazil's coffee and rubber exports, the latter due to the loss of the Brazilian rubber monopoly to British plantations in the Far East. The price of coffee declined by 20 percent and Brazilian exports of it dropped 12.5 percent between 1912 and 1913; rubber saw a similar decline of 25 and 36.6 percent, respectively.[113] The Brazilian Navy later claimed that selling Rio de Janeiro was a tactical decision, so they could have two divisions of battleships: two with 12-inch guns (the Minas Geraes class), and two with 15-inch guns.[114]

Armstrong studied whether replacing the 12-inch guns with seven 15-inch guns would be feasible, but Brazil was probably already attempting to sell the ship. In the tension building up to the First World War, many countries, including Russia, Italy, and the two participants in the Greco–Ottoman dreadnought race, were interested in purchasing the ship. While Russia quickly dropped out, the Italians seemed close to purchasing the ship until the French government decided to back the Greeks—rather than allow the Italians, who were the principal naval rivals of the French, to obtain the ship. The Grecian government made an offer for the original purchase price plus an additional £50,000, but as the Greeks worked to obtain an initial installment, the Ottoman government was also making offers.[115]

The Brazilian government rejected an Ottoman proposal to swap ships, with Brazil's Rio de Janeiro going to the Ottomans and Reşadiye going to Brazil, presumably with some amount of money. The Brazilian government would accept only a monetary offer. Lacking this, the Ottomans were forced to find a loan. Fortunately for them, they were able to obtain one from a French banker acting independent of his government, and the Ottoman Navy secured the Rio de Janeiro on 29 December 1913 for £1,200,000 as-is.[116][upper-alpha 15] As part of the purchase contract, the remainder of the ship was constructed with £2,340,000 in Ottoman money.[118] Renamed Sultân Osmân-ı Evvel, it was eventually taken over by the British shortly after the beginning of the First World War, serving with the Royal Navy as HMS Agincourt.[119][upper-alpha 16]

After selling Rio de Janeiro, the Brazilian government asked Armstrong and Vickers to prepare designs for a new battleship, something strongly supported by the Navy League of Brazil (Liga Maritima).[121] Armstrong agreed to construct the ship without any further payments from Brazil. They replied with at least fourteen designs, six from Vickers (December 1913 through March 1914) and eight from Armstrong (February 1914). Vickers' designs varied between eight and ten 15-inch and eight 16-inch guns, with speeds between 22 and 25 knots (the lower-end ships having mixed firing, the higher using oil), and displacements between 26,000 tonnes (26,000 long tons) and 30,500 tonnes (30,000 long tons). Armstrong took two basic designs, one with eight and the other with ten 15-inch guns, and varied their speed and firing.[122][upper-alpha 17]

While most secondary sources do not mention that Brazil ordered a battleship,[123] with the ship's entry in the warship encyclopedia Conway's All the World's Fighting Ships even remarking that "Brazil had not selected from the four design variations,"[124] the Brazilian government chose what was labeled as Design 781, the first of the eight 15-inch designs tendered by Armstrong, which also shared characteristics with the Queen Elizabeth and Revenge classes then being built for the United Kingdom.[125] They placed an order for one ship of this design, to be named Riachuelo, at the Armstrong Whitworth shipyard in Elswick on 12 May 1914.[126] Some preliminary gathering of materials was completed for a planned keel laying date of 10 September, but the beginning of the First World War in August 1914 delayed plans. Riachuelo was officially suspended on 14 January 1915 and canceled on 13 May 1915,[127] although at least one contemporary source stated that there was a "temporarily suspended" contract for the fourth dreadnought still out as of 1922.[128]

Pardo and preto Brazilian marines pose for a photographer on board Minas Geraes, probably during the ship's visit to the United States in early 1913.

In late November 1910, a large naval revolt, later named the Revolt of the Lash, broke out in Rio de Janeiro.[upper-alpha 18] The tension was kindled by the racial makeup of the navy's regular crewmembers, who were heavily black or mixed-race, whereas their officers were mostly white.[129] The Baron of Rio Branco commented: "For the recruitment of marines and enlisted men, we bring aboard the dregs of our urban centers, the most worthless lumpen, without preparation of any sort. Ex-slaves and the sons of slaves make up our ships' crews, most of them dark-skinned or dark-skinned mulattos."[130]

This kind of impressment, combined with the heavy use of corporal punishment for even minor offenses, meant that relations between the black crews and white officers was tepid at best. Crewmen aboard Minas Geraes began planning for a revolt in 1910. They chose João Cândido Felisberto, an experienced sailor, as their leader. The mutiny was delayed several times by disagreements among the participants. In a major meeting on 13 November, some of the revolutionaries expressed a desire to revolt when the president would be inaugurated (15 November), but another leader, Francisco Dias Martins, talked them out of the idea, insisting that their demands would be overshadowed by a perceived rebellion against the political system as a whole. The immediate catalyst for their revolt came on 21 November 1910, when an Afro-Brazilian sailor, Marcelino Rodrigues Menezes, was brutally flogged 250 times for insubordination.[131][upper-alpha 19] A Brazilian government observer, former navy captain José Carlos de Carvalho, stated that the sailor's back looked like "a mullet sliced open for salting."[134]

The revolt began aboard Minas Geraes at around 10 pm on 22 November; the ship's commander and several loyal crewmen were murdered in the process. Soon after, São Paulo, the new cruiser Bahia, the coast-defense ship Deodoro, the minelayer República, the training ship Benjamin Constant, and the torpedo boats Tamoio and Tymbira all revolted with relatively little violence. The first four ships represented the newest and strongest ships in the navy; Minas Geraes, São Paulo, and Bahia had been completed and commissioned only months before. Deodoro was twelve years old and had recently undergone a refit. The crews of the smaller warships made up only two percent of the mutineers, and some moved to the largest ships after the revolt began.[135]

Key warships that remained in government hands included the old cruiser Almirante Barroso, Bahia's sister Rio Grande do Sul, and the eight new destroyers of the Pará class. Their crews were in a state of flux at the time: with nearly half of the navy's enlisted men in Rio at that time in open revolt, naval officers were suspicious of even those who remained loyal to the government. These suspicions were perhaps well-placed, given that radio operators on loyal ships passed on operational plans to the mutineers. Enlisted men on ships that remained in government hands were reduced wherever possible, and officers took over all of the positions that would be involved in direct combat. Further complicating matters were weapon supplies, such as the destroyer's torpedoes. These could not be fired without firing caps, yet the caps were not where they were supposed to be. When they were located and delivered, they did not fit the newer torpedoes on board the destroyers. The correct caps were fitted only 48 hours after the rebellion began.[136]

Felisberto and his fellow sailors demanded an end to what they called the "slavery" being practised by the navy, most notably the continued use of whipping despite its ban in every other Western nation. Though navy officers and the president were staunchly opposed to any sort of amnesty and made plans to attack the rebel-held ships, many legislators were supportive. Over the next three days, both houses of the Brazilian National Congress, led by the influential senator Ruy Barbosa, passed a general bill granting amnesty to all involved and ending the use of corporal punishment.[137]

João Cândido Felisberto with reporters, officers and sailors on board Minas Geraes on 26 November 1910, the final day of the revolt (left); João Cândido handing control of the ship back to the navy (right).

In the aftermath of the revolt, the two Brazilian dreadnoughts were disarmed by the removal of their guns' breechblocks. The revolt and consequent state of the navy, which was essentially unable to operate for fear of another rebellion, caused many leading Brazilians, including the president, prominent politicians like Barbosa and the Baron of Rio Branco, and the editor of the most respected newspaper in Brazil, Jornal do Commercio, to question the use of the new ships and support their sale to a foreign country.[138][upper-alpha 20] The British ambassador to Brazil, W.H.D. Haggard, was ecstatic at Rio Branco's about-face, saying "This is indeed a wonderful surrender on the part of the man who was answerable for the purchase and who looked upon them as the most cherished offspring of his policy."[139] Shortly before the vote on the amnesty bill, Ruy Barbosa emphatically outlined his opposition to the ships:

Let me, in conclusion, point out two profound lessons of the bitter situation in which we find ourselves. The first is that a military government is not one whit more able to save the country from the vicissitudes of war nor any braver or resourceful in meeting them than a civil government. The second is that the policy of great armaments has no place on the American continent. At least on our part and the part of the nations which surround us, the policy which we ought to follow with joy and hope is that of drawing closer international ties through the development of commercial relations, the peace and friendship of all the peoples who inhabit the countries of America.

The experience of Brazil in this respect is decisive. All of the forces employed for twenty years in the perfecting of the means of our national defense have served, after all, to turn upon our own breasts these successive attempts at revolt. International war has not yet come to the doors of our republic. Civil war has come many times, armed by these very weapons which we have so vainly prepared for our defense against a foreign enemy. Let us do away with these ridiculous and perilous great armaments, securing international peace by means rather of just and equitable relations with our neighbors. On the American continent, at least, it is not necessary to maintain a 'peace armada'; that hideous cancer which is devouring continuously the vitals of the nations of Europe.[140]

Minas Geraes, seen from the stern of the ship

In the end, the president and cabinet decided against selling the ships because they feared it would hurt them politically. This came despite a consensus agreeing that the ships should be disposed of, possibly to fund smaller warships capable of traversing Brazil's many rivers.[141] The executive's apprehension was heightened by Barbosa's speech given before the revolt's end, as he also used the occasion to attack the government, or what he called the "brutal militaristic regime".[140] Still, the Brazilians ordered Armstrong to cease working towards laying down their third dreadnought, which induced the Argentine government to not pick up their contractual option for a third dreadnought, and the United States' ambassador to Brazil cabled home to state that the Brazilian desire for naval preeminence in Latin America was quelled, though this proved to be short-lived.[142]

Although the Minas Geraes class remained in Brazilian hands, the mutiny had a clear detrimental effect on the navy's readiness: by 1912, an Armstrong agent stated that the ships were in terrible condition, with rust already forming on turrets and boilers. The agent believed it would cost the Brazilian Navy around £700,000 to address these issues.[141] Haggard tersely commented, "These ships are absolutely useless to Brazil", a sentiment echoed by Proceedings.[143] Despite the government's refusal to sell the two Minas Geraes-class ships and subsequent support for acquiring Rio de Janeiro, some historians credit the rebellion, combined with the Baron of Rio Branco's death in 1912, as major factors in the Brazilian government's decision (which was possibly made by January 1913, but certainly by September) to sell the ship to the Ottomans.[144]

After Rio de Janeiro was purchased by the Ottoman Empire, the Argentine government bowed to popular demand and began to seek a buyer for their two dreadnoughts. The money received in return would have been devoted to internal improvements. Three bills directing that the battleships be sold were introduced into the Argentine National Congress in mid-1914, but all were defeated. Still, the British and Germans expressed worries that the ships could be sold to a belligerent nation, while the Russian, Austrian, Ottoman, Italian, and Greek governments were all reportedly interested in buying both ships.[145]

The Greek government, embroiled in a dreadnought race with the Ottoman Empire, was particularly keen to acquire one of the South American dreadnoughts. The New-York Tribune reported in late April 1913 that the Argentine government had rejected a Greek $17.5 million offer for Moreno alone, which would have netted them a large profit over the original construction cost of the ships ($12 million).[146] The Greek appetite to acquire one of these ships only grew after the surprise Ottoman acquisition of Rio de Janeiro gave them what one contemporary commentator called "assure[d] naval superiority".[118] To them, the problem was clear: with Rio de Janeiro, the Ottomans would possess two dreadnoughts by the end of 1914 (the other being Reşadiye, later taken over by the British and renamed Erin). To oppose them, Greece would have only Salamis, scheduled for completion months afterwards (March 1915), and two utterly obsolete pre-dreadnoughts, Kilkis and Lemnos, purchased from the United States in May 1914 to avert what seemed to be an imminent war.[147]

Chile's Almirante Latorre in December 1921

The United States, worried that its neutrality would not be respected and its technology would be released for study to a foreign country, put diplomatic pressure on the Argentine government to keep the ships, which it eventually did.[148] News outlets also reported in late 1913 and early 1914 that Greece had reached an accord to purchase Chile's first battleship as a counterbalance to the Ottoman acquisition of Rio de Janeiro,[149] but despite a developing sentiment within Chile to sell one or both of the dreadnoughts, no deal was struck.[150]

In each of the countries involved in the South American dreadnought arms race, movements arose that advocated the sale of the dreadnoughts to redirect the substantial amounts of money involved toward what they viewed as more worthy pursuits.[142] These costs were rightfully viewed as enormous. After the Minas Geraes class was ordered, a Brazilian newspaper equated the initial purchase cost for the original three ships as equaling 3,125 miles of railroad tracks or 30,300 homesteads. Naval historian Robert Scheina put the price at £6,110,100 without accounting for ammunition, which was £605,520, or necessary upgrades to docks, which was £832,000. Costs for maintenance and related issues, which in the first five years of Minas Geraes's and São Paulo's commissioned lives was about 60 percent of the initial cost, only added to the already staggering sum of money.[151] The two Rivadavias were purchased for nearly a fifth of the Argentine government's yearly income, a figure which did not include the later in-service costs.[152] Historian Robert K. Massie rounded the figure to a full quarter of each government's annual income.[153]

In addition, the nationalistic sentiments that exacerbated the naval arms race gave way to slowing economies and negative public opinions which came to support investing inside the country instead.[142] Commenting on this, the United States' Minister to Chile, Henry Prather Fletcher, wrote to Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan: "Since the naval rivalry began in 1910, financial conditions, which were none too good then, have grown worse; and as time approaches for the final payment, feeling has been growing in these countries that perhaps they are much more in need of money than of battleships."[154]

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