Water management in Greater Damascus

Between 1985 and 2005 the level of groundwater in the Barada basin, on which Damascus sits, declined from 50 meters to 200 meters.[5] Intensive groundwater use began in the 1960s. Prior to that the groundwater level in the ghouta was 1-3m below the surface in winter and 2-10m in summer. The main source of water for irrigation at the time were the various branches of the Barada River. Landlords ensured that irrigation canals were maintained, and surface water was distributed through an intricate system called whereby farmers took turns (Qirat) whose length varied depending on factors such as the size of their plots and distance from the canals. After a land reform in 1958 newly created cooperatives were unable to maintain the irrigation canals and to implement the distribution system. Furthermore, surface water was increasingly polluted. As a result, farmers drilled wells - usually without a permit - and thus began the overexploitation of groundwater that persists until today.[6]

Municipal water demand in Greater Damascus is increasing due to population growth of 2.6% per year (1990–2000) [1] and also to higher living standards leading to higher water demand.

The Northern and Western parts of the city, which are closer to the Fijeh springs, receive better service than the Southern and Eastern parts that are at the end of the distribution network. Service is also better in winter when the yield of the spring is highest. During winter residents in the Northwestern parts of Damascus typically receive a continuous flow of water, while residents in the Southeastern parts of the city receive water for only a few hours per day or even every couple of days during summer. For example, the town of Sahenya, 16 km south-west of Damascus, was for 10 days without water in 2006.[7] Most houses in Damascus have rooftop tanks to store water during periods of supply. Many houses have dual plumbing systems, with one tap for water that comes directly from the network and another tap for water that comes from the rooftop tank. As a consequence, many residents do not perceive a water crisis during most of the year, because they have sufficient water either from the network or from their rooftop tanks.

Residents that do not receive enough water in summer are forced to buy water from water tankers. This water is very expensive compared to subsidized tap water. The quality of the tanker water is dubious, since it is drawn from wells that tap aquifers that may be polluted. Furthermore, there is a risk of contamination in the water tankers and in roof tanks.

Surface and groundwater in the Barada basin is polluted by industrial and domestic wastewater, as well as by agricultural non-point sources such as fertilizers and pesticides. Much of the wastewater generated from industrial activities in Greater Damascus is discharged into the environment, mainly to the Barada River, without prior treatment. The uncontrolled disposal of toxic, chemical products, primarily from lead industries and battery manufactories, has also resulted in severe soil pollution.[8] There is no pre-treatment of industrial wastewater discharged into the sewer network. As a result, the largest wastewater treatment plant of Damascus in Adra frequently malfunctions. Measured concentrations of biological oxygen demand (BOD), a measure of organic water pollution, exceeded the allowed limits in most of the branches of the Barada River.[8] According to the Syrian National Environmental Action Plan of 2003, concentrations of BOD and ammonia in the Barada River exceeded Syrian Standards for 86% of collected samples between 1995 and 2000. Well and spring water in the basin is bacteriologically contaminated because of sewage discharge. The concentrations of nitrates in some wells in the Ghouta exceeded the limits set by the drinking water standards. Because of discharges by tanneries concentrations of Chromium III reach 10 mg/liter in Al Daiyani River and exceed the allowable limits tenfold in the wells of Al Zablatini area, all located in the Barada basin.[9] Surface water pollution reduces real estate values next to the river and its branches, as well as the recreational value of the river. It also damages fishery, aquaculture and biodiversity, in addition to its health impacts.[8]

In the period 1960-2010 average precipitation in the Upper Barada basin has remained the same.[2] While the yield of the Fijeh springs has declined from an annual average of 9.5m3/second in 1967-71 to 5.5 m3/second in 1996-2000, this is due to pumping from the aquifer in the immediate vicinity of the springs that was begun in 1981 in order to supply more water to Damascus during the dry season.[1] Climate models project a reduction of rainfall and an increase of temperatures for the Eastern Mediterranean.[10] Hydrological and meteorological data are considered a state secret in Syria, so that data are only indirectly available. According to a study by the Karlsruhe Institute of Technology conducted in 2010 and financed by German development cooperation funds, the yield of the Fijeh springs during the critical low-flow period from July to December is projected to decline by about 5% in the period 2021-2050 compared to the historical average during 1962-1991. However, the model projects a stronger decline of 15% for the distant future (2069-2098) compared to the base period, and even stronger declines of up to 50% during the springs' high-flow period in March–May.[2]

The poorest section of the population of Damascus live in the Southern neighborhoods which also receive the poorest service quality both in terms of quantity and quality. These neighborhoods are served primarily by wells whose quality is dubious, especially in terms of nitrates (see pollution). Due to overexploitation the amount of water available is insufficient for continuous supply, especially during summer when demand increases and groundwater levels drop (see intermittent supply). Due to pressure changes when supply is turned on and off, pollutants are sucked into leaky distribution pipes which further contaminates drinking water. This phenomenon is more widespread in the poorer neighborhoods.

As a result of the rebel capture of the village of Ain al-Fijah in the Barada River valley and its water spring in February 2012, the flow of water to Damascus and nearby towns has been sporadically cut off by the rebels in retaliation for military operations by government forces in the region for almost 5 years.[11] The conflict escalated on 23 December 2016 when the rebels reportedly polluted the water spring with diesel fuel, although the opposition denies this and claims that the spring was damaged from barrel bombs. As a result, running water was cut off to more than 5.5 million people around Damascus and the government forces launched an offensive on rebel-held villages in the Barada River Valley.

In 2006, the authorities were forced to stop the implementation of a plan for the drilling of more than 200 wells for drinking water supply in several regions of the Ghouta, as nitrate concentrations from the excessive use of fertilizers and from untreated wastewater seeping into the ground were found in the range of 100-200 mg/L (the drinking water quality standard sets a limit of 40 mg/L).[8] The drilling of new private wells has also been banned.

Irrigation. With the assistance of JICA; the Ministry of Irrigation encouraged farmers in 2006 to switch to more efficient irrigation methods such as sprinklers.[7] It has been estimated that saving water through installing more efficient irrigation systems such as sprinkler or drip irrigation would cost about US$0.15 per cubic meter, far less than bringing in new water from the Euphrates.[1]

Municipal water use. In 2004, JICA completed a US$50m eight-year project to replace 100 km of water pipes across Damascus, which it said resulted “in a dramatic reduction in loss of water through pipe leakage from some 60 percent to 20 percent” in the sections covered [7] However, the level of leakage remained high in other sections of the network. The Damascus utility also implements an awareness program in schools to make residents aware of the water imbalance in the basin and to encourage them to conserve water. Municipal demand management is complicated by the fact that residential water tariffs are very low. A typical residential water bill is the equivalent of about one or two Euros per household and month and thus provides little incentive to save water.

In 1999 the first wastewater treatment plant of Damascus was completed in Adra to the North-East of the city, treating a significant part of the sewage collected in the city. With a capacity of 485,000 m³/day it is a large plant capable of treating the wastewater of more than 2 million people.[8] The treated wastewater is discharged into irrigation canals in the Ghouta, where it irrigates 19,000 hectares of fruit trees.[1] The plant was financed by the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development.[12] The government plans to build a total of 30 wastewater treatment plants throughout Greater Damascus, including in towns in the Barada gorge.[8] The European Investment Bank is financing the construction of four wastewater treatment plants to serve more than 400,000 inhabitants in the Southwest of Damascus. The bids for the design, construction and maintenance of the plants were published in 2008.[13] The Syrian-Qatari investment company plans to build a wastewater treatment plant in Jaramana Southeast of Damascus. Germany is also financing a wastewater treatment plant and associated sewers in the Yarmouk area South of Damascus.

In order to tackle the problem of industries scattered throughout the city that discharge untreated or poorly treated wastewater into the sewer network or into open streams, the government has built and is constantly expanding a modern industrial estate in Adra near Damascus. Treatment facilities will be provided according to the type of industrial processes. The goal is to gradually relocate all industries to this and other planned industrial estates.[8]

During winter some of the flow of the Fijeh springs exceeds demand and thus flows into the Barada river. The government plans to transfer some of this water through the existing pipelines, chlorinate it and inject it through recharge wells into the aquifer below Damascus to store it for use during summer. Pilot recharge projects have been initiated at various locations in the city using different recharge technologies. So far, the amount of water recharged remains limited and the large-scale feasibility of this option remains to be tested.

Lake Assad, a potential source of water supply for Damascus, pictured from space, June 1996.

The Syrian government has at various times considered two alternative mega-projects to bring additional water to the Greater Damascus area. One plan consisted in the transfer of water from the coastal region over a distance of at least 225 km and a cumulated difference in altitude of about 1000m. The water sources considered were two reservoirs in the coastal basin and even offshore springs in the Mediterranean or desalination of seawater at a total cost of more than US$1 per cubic meter including its transfer.[1] By 2010 this plan was considered to have been abandoned. The other plan consists in building a pipeline from the Euphrates River. In 2006 Syrian officials said they were “pressing ahead” with a feasibility study by a Swiss company to transfer water from the Euphrates to Damascus at an estimated cost of US$2 billion.[7] The project would involve conveying water from Lake Assad, some 441 kilometers away with pumping over an altitude of 712 meters. A capacity of 850 million m3 per annum has been envisaged, about twice the current water deficit in Greater Damascus.[1] The cost for bulk water before distribution losses would be more than US$0.50 per cubic meter.

Given very low water tariffs and the lack of political willingness to increase tariffs, any mega-project would have to be heavily subsidized by the government, which does not appear to have the resources to substantially increase the subsidies to the sector beyond their current level.