Sectarianism and minorities in the Syrian civil war

In 2011, United States Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stated that the primarily Sunni protesters "have a lot of work to do internally" in order to gain the broad public support needed to form a genuinely national movement. She added, "It is not yet accepted by many groups within Syria that their life will be better without Assad than with Assad. There are a lot of minority groups that are very concerned." Clinton urged all opposition factions to extend further towards the minorities and to sustain their "moral high ground".[24] While Syrian opposition supporters are predominantly Sunni, it also include many Christian and Alawite figures in its ranks.[25]

Turkey Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has been trying to "cultivate a favorable relationship with whatever government would take the place of Assad" regardless of the group.[26] In December 2012, US president Barack Obama praised the Syrian opposition as a pluralistic, multi-ethnic and multi-cultural popular movement, stating:

"the Syrian opposition coalition is now inclusive enough, is reflective and representative enough of the Syrian population that we consider them the legitimate representative of the Syrian people in opposition to the Assad regime"[27][28]

While there are Alawite activists opposed to Assad, Reuters describes them as isolated in 2012.[74] Fadwa Soliman is a Syrian actress of Alawite descent who is widely known for leading protests in Homs.[112] She has become one of the most recognized faces of the uprising.[113] Monzer Makhous, the representative of the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces in France, is an Alawi.[114]

In 2012, General Zubaida al-Meeki, an Alawite from the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights, became the first female military officer to defect to the opposition.[115] Influential Alawite intellectual and dissident Dr. Abdul Aziz al-Khair was imprisoned by the Assad government in October 2012. This incident led to widespread outrage within the Alawite community, which was denounced by hardline Assad loyalists. A mass-shooting between Alawite clans polarised over regime's policies occurred at Qardaha, in the same month.[116][117]

According to the Financial Times: "Opposition activists have worked hard to present a non-sectarian message. Video footage of protests in the Damascus suburbs shows protesters carrying posters with the crescent of Islam beside the Christian cross. Even exiled representatives of the [Muslim] Brotherhood, banned in Syria, have avoided sectarian discourse."[118] A group calling itself the Coalition of Free Alawite Youth offered an alternative for Alawites who do not want to take up arms. It invited them to flee to Turkey, promising that "within a few days, will secure free accommodation for them with a monthly salary that will shield them from humiliation."[119]

A new Alawite opposition movement, "Upcoming Syria", was founded on 21 November 2015.[120] Testimonies from Alawites in coastal regions state that Alawite families are sending their children abroad to avoid forced conscription by the Ba'athist government.[121] According to a 2020 report published by the Arab Reform Initiative:

"Many young Alawites are prioritizing their living conditions and believe that the regime is corrupt, responsible for all the successive crises that have been affecting Syrians, including youth, and incapable of finding solutions to any of them. However, it is hard to determine the prevalence of such discontent, due to their entrenched fear of the security apparatus."[122]

Throughout the course of the conflict, Syrian Arab Armed Forces has been pursuing a military strategy of deliberately bombing churches. Various human rights organizations have also accused the Ba'athist government of targeting Christian civilians.[153] As of 2019, around 61% of churches damaged in the Syrian civil war were targeted by the government forces. Out of the 124 documented incidents of violence against Christian religious centres between 2011 and 2019; 75 attacks were perpetrated the forces loyal to the Assad regime and 33 by various factions of the opposition.[154][155][156]

Some sources inside the Syriac Orthodox Church reported in 2012 an "ongoing ethnic cleansing of Christians" is being carried out by the Free Syrian Army. In a communication received by Agenzia Fides, the sources claimed that over 90% of the Christians of Homs have been expelled by militant Islamists of the Farouq Brigades who went door to door, forcing Christians to flee without their belongings and confiscating their homes. Mgr. Giuseppe Nazzaro, the Vicar of Aleppo later clarified that these reports were unconfirmed.[157]

The Christian population of Homs had dropped from a pre-conflict total of 160,000 down to about 1,000 in early 2012, due to heavy clashes between Syrian Arab Army and the Free Syrian Army.[158] Jesuit sources in Homs said the reason for the exodus was not because of threats from insurgent groups, but rather over the Christians' fears over the situation and that they had left on their own initiative to escape the conflict between government forces and insurgents.[159] Other charitable organisations and some local Christian families reported to Fides that they were expelled from Homs because they were considered "close to the regime". Fides said that Islamist opposition groups not only targeted those who refused to join the demonstrations, but also other Christians who were in favour of the opposition.[160] According to the Catholic Near East Welfare Association, opposition forces had occupied some historical churches in the old city district of Homs, leading to the Saint Mary Church of the Holy Belt being damaged during clashes with the Syrian army, and opposition groups also vandalised icons inside some of the churches.[145]

Local sources told Fides that Christians in Qusayr, a town near Homs, were given an ultimatum in 2012 to leave by armed Sunni rebel groups.[161] Christian refugees from Qusayr, a town with a Christian population of 10,000 before the war, also reported that their male relatives had been killed by rebels.[162] The Vicar Catholic Apostolic of Aleppo, Giuseppe Nazzaro, stated that such reports were unconfirmed but noted that intolerant Islamist and terrorist movements are becoming more visible. He recalled a car bomb which exploded near a Franciscan school in Aleppo narrowly missing children present there.[163][164] These reports were also strongly denied by opposition groups who instead blamed the government forces for inflicting the damage and forced displacements. For its part, the Vatican's ambassador in Syria, Mario Zenari, denied that Christians were being discriminated, saying they shared the "same sorry fate as the rest of the Syrian people."[143]

In 2012, Robert Fisk and official Orthodox sources claimed that an attack on Christians in Saidnaya was perpetrated by the FSA.[165][166]

In a 2012 report by Al-Ahram, Abdel-Ahad Astifo, an opposition Syrian National Council member and director of the European branch of the Christian Assyrian Democratic Organisation, stated that "The regime's forces and death squads are bombing both churches and mosques in several Syrian cities, with the aim of blaming others and injecting sectarian discord into the country."[143] On 26 February 2012, Al-Arabiya reported that Christians in Syria were being persecuted by the government, though the majority of those claims were rejected by official Christian sources in Syria.[124] The Al Arabiya article claimed that the government was targeting churches for perceived support to the opposition.[124] In another incident, Al-Arabiya reported that government forces attacked and raided the historic Syriac Orthodox Saint Mary Church of the Holy Belt in Homs.[124] Official Syrian church sources maintained that it was the anti-government militias that used the church as a shield and later damaged its contents on purpose.[167][168] Al-Arabiya reports in 2012 stated that the Syrian government has been persecuting Christian community leaders by various means. In one instance, a Christian activist sympathetic to the opposition told the newspaper that one priest had been killed by the government's forces and then state-run TV blamed government opposition for his death.[124]

In 2012, British conservative politician Edward Leigh issued alarm over the collapse of Assad regime and its implications for Syrian Christians under a potential majoritarian rule.[169] Syrian Christian refugees frequently express fear of rebels. When the town of Ras al-Ayn was captureed by the FSA and al-Nusra from the government and the Kurdish-led PYD in late 2012, the Assyrian International News Agency reported that much of the town's Assyrian Christian population fled almost overnight. One refugee stated "The so-called Free Syrian Army, or rebels, or whatever you choose to call them in the West, emptied the city of its Christians, and soon there won't be a single Christian in the whole country."[170]

On 23 April 2013, the Greek Orthodox and Syriac Orthodox archbishops of Aleppo, Paul (Yazigi) and Yohanna Ibrahim, were reportedly kidnapped near Aleppo by an armed Chechen group.[171] The president of the Syrian National Council George Sabra also corraborated this, stating that the bishops were allegedly being held by a rebel group in the vicinity of Aleppo and "were in good health".[172] However, later reports have accused the Ba'athist regime of being behind their kidnapping, since they have been foricbly disappeared ever since. The kidnappings had occurred a week after Archbishop Yohanna Ibrahim's public statements criticizing Bashar al-Assad.[173][174] On 2 July 2013, the Vatican reported that Syriac Catholic priest Francois Murad was killed by rebel militia in Ghassaniyah on 23 June while taking refuge in a Franciscan convent.[175][176] On the other hand, various Christian Bishops have also strongly condemned the Assad government for its actions against Christian community.[177] Blaming Ba'athist regime's indiscriminate targeting of Syrian cities for triggering forced expulsions and large-scale migration of Christians outside of Syria, Syriac Orthodox Archbishop Yohanna Ibrahim stated:

"Christians are not targeted, nor are churches, but what happens is that they are subjected to indiscriminate attacks.. the situation in Syria differs from the situation in Iraq, and the survival of Christians in Syria is not linked to the survival of Bashar al-Assad's regime"[178][179]

Syrian Churches have been demolished by Turkistan Islamic Party in Syria fighters.[180] In Jisr al-Shughur, according to Jihadology.net, a Church's cross had a TIP flag placed on top of it after the end of the battle.[181][182][183][184] The Uzbek group Katibat al-Tawhid wal Jihad (Tavhid va Jihod katibasi) released a video featuring themselves and the TIP attacking and desecrating Christian Churches in Jisr al-Shughur.[185][186][187][188][189][190] Jabhat al Nusra and Turkistan Islamic Party fighters cleansed the rural area around Jisr al-Shughour of its Syrian Christian inhabitants and slit the throat of a Syrian Christian along with his wife accusing them of being Syrian government agents, according to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights.[191] Al-Arabiya said that the area was Alawite.[192][193] In the area to Aleppo's southwest, the entry via Turkey of Uyghurs into Syria was reported by a Syrian Christian who said they have seized control of Al Bawabiya village.[194]

In January 2016, Kurdish Asayish security forces said members of the pro-government National Defence Forces were behind two bomb blasts that killed nearly 20 people in a Christian section of the city of Qamishli.[195] Syrian Network of Human Rights stated in 2019:

"The Syrian regime has always invoked good slogans, but on the ground, it has done the opposite. While the regime claims that it has not committed any violations, and that it is keen on protecting the Syrian state and the rights of minorities, it has carried out qualitative operations in suppressing and terrorizing all those who sought political change and reform, regardless of religion or race, and of whether this causes the destruction of the heritage of Syria and the displacement of its minorities."[155]

The Arab Christians are mainly located in western Syria in Valley of Christians who are mainly Greek Orthodox or Melkites (Greek Catholics). The largest Christian denominations in Syria are the Greek Orthodox church,[196] and the Melkite Greek Catholic Church, who are exclusively Arab Christians, followed by the Syriac Orthodox. The appellation "Greek" refers to the liturgy which they use, sometimes, it is used in reference to the ancestry and ethnicity of the members, but not all of the members are of Greek ancestry; in fact, the Arabic word which is used is "Rum", which means "Byzantines", or Eastern Romans. Generally, the term is used in reference to the Greek liturgy, and the Greek Orthodox denomination in Syria. Arabic is now its main liturgical language.

Demonstrators carry Assyrian flags, Syrian independence flags, Kurdish flags, and flags of Rojava during an anti-government protest in Qamishli, 6 January 2012.

The Assyrian people, mainly located in the Northeast of Syria (with the bulk of their population in neighbouring northern Iraq, and others in south east Turkey and north west Iran), are ethnically and linguistically distinct from the main group of Syrian Christians, in that unlike the latter, who are of Aramean heritage but largely now Arabic speaking, Assyrians are of ancient Assyrian/Mesopotamian heritage, retain Eastern Aramaic as a spoken tongue, and are often members of the Assyrian Church of the East or Chaldean Catholic Church, as well as the Syriac Orthodox Church.

Unlike other Christian groups, The Assyrian dominated Christian militias in Syria are primarily allied with anti government Kurdish forces, whose secular attitude and tolerance of the minority has allowed for them both to work well in fighting against ISIS/ISIL, the enemy of both peoples. Some are pro-secularist opposition, with one militia member stating "the [Assad] regime wants us to be puppets, deny our ethnicity and demand an Arab-only state".[197] However, other armed Assyrian groups in al-Hassakah such as Sootoro, ally themselves with the government,[198] and have clashed with Kurdish YPG forces whom they accuse of trying to steal Assyrian lands.[199]

Assyrian communities, towns and villages have been targeted by Islamist rebels, and Assyrians have taken up arms against such extremists as ISIS,[200] and Assyrians and their militias and political organizations are staunchly anti-government. The Assyrian Democratic Organization is a founding member of the Syrian National Council and it is also a member of the executive committee of the council.[201] The ADO, however, have only participated at peaceful demonstrations and have warned against a "surge in the national and sectarian extremism".[202][203]

On 15 August 2012, members of the Syriac nationalist Syriac Union Party stormed the Syrian embassy in Stockholm in protest of the Syrian government. A dozen of its members were later detained by Swedish police.[204] By October 2012, the Syrian Syriac National Council had been formed. In January 2013, a military wing, the Syrian Syriac Military council, was formed, based in Al-Hasakah Governorate, home to a large Assyrian Christian population.[205]

Many Assyrian Christians found refuge in the Tur Abdin region in southern Turkey as fighting reached north-eastern Syrian by spring 2013. Many of them reported to have fled after they were targeted by armed rebels.[206]

By January 2014, the Syriac Military Council affiliated to the PYD.[207]

Several fighters killed in clashes prompted by Assyrians' move to set up checkpoints in Qamishli in fear of ISIL.[208]

Many diaspora Armenians, from both the Apostolic and Catholic churches, have fled the fighting in Syria, with 7,000[209] emigrating to Armenia and a further 5,000[210] to Lebanon by February 2013. However, most Armenians still express support for Bashar Al-Assad[211] and fear the fall of the government,[212] considering him as a protector for the Christians persecution by Muslim extremists.[213]

A controversy over the role of Turkey in the Syrian civil war also occurred due to the manner and means of which Al-Nusra Front sacked the city of Kessab, which was looked at as one of the most significant Armenian majority towns in Syria. News agencies and local residents of Kessab reported that the town's Armenian Catholic and Evangelical churches had been ruined and burnt by the Islamist groups, along with the Misakyan Cultural Centre.[214][215][216] Around 250 families from Kessab who had taken refuge in Latakia returned to their homes a day after the Syrian Army recaptured the town.[217][218]

Kurdistan, centered on the Zagros mountain range on the borders of present-day Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria, is where the majority of the Kurds live.[219] Estimates are that there are around 30 million Kurds around the world, mainly dispersed in the Middle East.[219] Approximately 1 million live in Syria and are viewed as a minority by the ruling elite because they are "a group of people, differentiated from others in the same society by race, nationality, religion, or language, who both think of themselves as a differentiated group and are of thought by others as a differentiated group with negative connotations.”[219] Most Kurds live in the region of Rojava in Western Kurdistan, with Qamishli as the largest Kurdish city in Syria and considered as the de facto capital of Western Kurdistan.[221] Many of the Kurds living in Syria have a Turkish background because of their exodus from Turkey during the Kurdish uprisings in this country in 1925.[221] With this exodus from Turkey, Kurdish nationalist intellectuals arrived in Syria as well, bringing the idea of a "national Kurdish group" to the small population of Kurds already living in Syria.[222] Because of their Turkish origin, many Kurds in northern Syria were deprived of the right to vote when the French mandate began in 1920. Even so, Kurds in Syria have positioned themselves differently from region to region. Kurds in Afrin and Damascus supported the French, while the majority of the Kurdish tribes in the Jazirah and Jarabulus region cooperated with Turkish troops loyal to Mustafa Kemal.[223] This difference in loyalty showed the various attitudes of the Kurds towards the mandate. Where some tribes supported Turkish troops, some leading Kurdish families like al-Yusiv and Shamdin opposed Arab nationalism, which Kemal propagated, because it "threatened their ethnic and clan-based networks".[223] Even though a sense of a Kurdish national identity developed slowly during the French mandate, prominent leaders of the Syrian Kurds like the Bedir Khan brothers furthered the cause of Kurdish nationalism.[221]

When Syria fell under French colonial rule in 1920, the position of the Kurds in Syria changed. The French authorities used the strategy of divide and rule to control and govern rural and urban elites and ethnic and religious minorities.[222] Contrary to how the British ruled Iraq, the French mandate system did not seek support from the Sunni-Arab majority, but started defending non-Sunni minorities, under which the Kurds.[222] The French authority for instance allowed the activities of the Khobyun League and their pursuit in strengthening the Kurdish position into one national organization. Indeed, as Tejel describes it, the French mandate actually used sectarian division to be able to govern Syria.[222] For the Kurds, the foundation of the Xoybun League in 1927 meant an unison on the part of the Kurds in their fight against Turkey.[224] For the Kurds, Turkey formed a threat to Kurdish nationalism and their pursuit for independence. For the French, the alliance with the Kurds was politically used as well in their border disputes with Turkey.[222] Researchers like Tejel and Alsopp argue that the French mandate used the "Kurdish card" as a tool to keep opposing states at bay, while at the same time ensuring the loyalty of the Kurds in their colonial rule.[224][222] The Kurds and the early rise of Kurdish nationalism was therefore embedded in a country divided by sectarian lines.[222]

As a minority having been denied rights by the government throughout history, the Kurds have opposed Arab nationalist regimes in Syria for decades. Oppression of the Kurds already began with the end of the First World War, when the Syrian government disenfranchised many Kurds in modern Syria, separating the Kurds into three separate states. Following the end of the French Mandate in Syria in 1946, a census called Decree no. 93 stripped more than 120.000 Syrian Kurds of their Syrian citizenship, leaving them stateless. Now rendered ajanib (foreigners in Arabic), they could not vote, own land or any other kind of property, work for the government or marry legally. Furthermore, stateless Kurds had no passports, disabling them to travel, were not admitted to public hospitals and were not able to apply for food subsidies. According to several researchers and organizations, the number of stateless Syrian Kurds has increased since 1962 to over 300.000 stateless Kurds, because all children of stateless Kurdish fathers inherit the same status. This discriminatory policy towards the Kurds was partly influenced by Mohammed Talib Hilal, chief of police in the 1960s, who referred to the Kurds as a “malignant tumor” .

Following Decree 93, the Kurdish status was further reduced when the creation of an Arab Belt under the government of the pan-Arab Ba'ath party in 1963 expropriated Kurds from their lands on Turkish- and Iraqi borders. Up until the Syrian civil war, several regulations and decrees put in place discriminated the Kurds further. Kurdish history in schoolbooks was erased from 1967 onwards, children with Kurdish first names were not registered when decree No.122 was put in place in 1992, and cultural material in the Kurdish language like books and videos were banned in 2000 under resolution 768. According to several scholars, these and other measures showed the state's hostility towards the Kurds. Yet, the state too, just like the French Mandate, has used the 'Kurdish card' as well. In 1980, the Kurds (together with the Alawites and other minorities) were employed to crush the problems happening in Aleppo, where the Muslim Brotherhood was revolting in 1982. This resulted in the Sunni Arab majority to view the Kurds as a collaborator with the regimes repression policy.

It was in this post-independence period that Syrian Kurdish political parties emerged, advocating for democracy in Syria and a free and united Kurdistan. However, the first Kurdish political party, Partîya Dêmokrat a Kurdî li Sûriyê, was soon crushed when Kurdish areas became Arabized by the Ba’ath party in the 1960s. Seizing power in a coup, Hafiz al-Assad made Syria a one-party state in 1970 and made Arab unity its ultimate goal. In this way, pursuing Arab nationalism legitimized the oppression of the Syrian Kurds, unless they assimilated themselves to the Arab identity of Syria. Therefore, ever since the end of the French Mandate, the Kurds and Kurdish identity has been seen as a threat by the Syrian state and until after the start of the Syrian uprising in 2011, little has been done to halt the state's discriminatory treatment of Kurds in Syria. Scholars argue that the discrimination is seen by the majority of the Kurds as a threat to their national and ethnic identity, providing the main reason for establishing Syrian Kurdish political parties.

Kurdish flag

Kurds have not only found opposition (and oppression) by the Syrian government, also opposition groups to the Assad regime, like the Muslim Brotherhood, countered Kurdish aspirations. During the Qamishli event in 2004 for example, did many Syrian Arabs oppose Kurds’ quest for democratic rights. The Muslim Brotherhood rejected the idea of giving autonomy for the Kurds and argued that democracy, equality and diversity would solve their problem after the 2004 events. They argued giving autonomy to Kurds would cause fragmentation of Syria as there are many minority groups. Especially the strive for a Kurdish nation-state in Syria was problematic for the Muslim Brotherhood. "While it is considered acceptable for Syrian Arabs to proclaim that “We are Syrian Arabs who are part of the Arab nation,” it is not permitted for the Syrian Kurds to say “We are Syrian Kurds who are part of the Kurdish nation". The rising popularity of Arab nationalism in Syria both within the Syrian regime as well as in opposition groups threatened the Kurdish interests increasingly.

The Kurdish movement in Syria has a long history and many political parties have been established on behalf of the Kurds since 1957. Even though almost all Kurdish political parties demand recognition of Kurdish identities, seek to secure their rights (political, social and cultural) and try to end the oppression and discrimination by the Syrian government, there have been deep divisions between the political parties, resulting in at least eleven splits between 1957 and 2011. With over fifteen major political parties and twenty minor political parties, there are five parties in Syria having the broadest support and wielding the most power.

•    Partîya Dêmokrat a Kurdî li Sûriyê (el-Partî)
•   Partîya Yekîtî  ya Dêmokrat a Kurd li Sûriyê
•   Partîya Yekîtî  ya Kurd li Sûriyê
•    Partîya Azadî  ya Kurd li Suryê

Between 1990 and 2000, seven more splits and four mergers between parties happened and between 2004 and 2010 over seven new Kurdish political parties were established. With all these new and slightly different parties, it is striking that only after the Qasmishli event in 2004 the nature of the newly created parties changed significantly from former parties. One of the parties established between 2004 and 2010 is the Kurdistan Freedom Movement (Harakah Huriyah Kurdistan). This party has used arms and violence to advocate for Kurdish liberation in Syria. The Kurdistan Freedom Movement has been oppressed and crushed by the Syrian government, just like Yekitiya Azadi ya Qamislo, another party of the more militant wing. These alternative parties expressed the anger and frustration with the Syrian government of mainly Kurdish youth. Shortly after the Qamishli event in 2004, several Kurdish political parties attempted to unite the political movement to bring a halt to the continuing factionalism between the parties. However, personal ambitions and divisions challenged these attempts.

Two relatively new parties, the Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD) and the Kurdish National Council (KNC) (a coalition of Kurdish political parties), currently divide the Syrian Kurds. These two parties are linked to other Kurdish rival parties based in the region. PYD is affiliated with the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) in turkey, while the KNC has ties with the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in Iraq. In 2003, followers of Abdullah Öcalan (founder of the PKK) formed the PYD. This was made possible by the Syrian regime who allowed the PKK to reside in bases and training camps in Syria. Although the two parties are grounded in the same ideological convictions, there have been tensions and both parties are organizationally distinct. When the Syrian Civil war started, the PYD had already distanced itself from the PKK and no longer sees Öcalan as its leader. The KNC was established in 2011 and attracted most Syrian Kurds not affiliated with the PYD. Alongside these two main parties, a few minor movements like the Future Movement and the Kurdish National Alliance exist. However, the PYD and KNC have played major roles for the Kurds in Syria during the Syrian uprising. Both the PYD and the KNC seek to establish autonomy for Kurds in Syria, but the KNC claimed that the PYD was too closely connected to the regime, accusing the party of creating division between the Kurds, because the PYD was associated with the PKK and Assad supported the PKK to keep Turkey at bay.

Kurdish political parties were forced to develop some form of relationship with the Syrian government if they wanted to be able to address Kurdish interests. Prior to the Syrian uprising, Kurdish parties adopted three approaches towards the Syrian regime: expressing Kurdish issues through demonstrations and protests, nurturing relations with the Arab opposition in order to influence the Syrian state and fostering direct relations with the state via (unofficial) negotiations with the government. In these ways, Kurdish political parties engaged with the Syrian state, which changed drastically with the Syrian uprising. Hence, before the uprising, Kurds generally accepted the fact of the necessity to engage with state officials to further Kurdish goals. Most political parties were cautious to confront the regime and tried not to cross the ‘red lines’ set out by the Syrian government. Consequently, up until the Syrian uprisings all these parties have operated relatively low-profile and without violence. Growing tensions between the parties have kept them in an uneasy rivalry and sources differ according to the question if the PYD and the KNC can cooperate together to fight Assad's regime or if the parties remain in a rival deadlock.

Kurdish politics has always been illegal in Syria and so all their activities are monitored and suppressed by Syrian security organizations. Nonetheless, over twenty Kurdish political parties existed by the time the Syrian civil war started and most parties focused on bringing an end to Kurdish oppression and human right violations. The aim of these parties is to bring democracy to Syria in order to end the one-party rule by Assad. However, before the Syrian uprising in 2011, only a few parties advocated for independence for the Kurds and none of the Kurdish parties has called for the creation of a Kurdish state.

Hence, Kurdish political movements have taken a relatively non-aggressive stance towards the Syrian state prior to the Syrian uprising as well as after the war started.. Before 2000, Kurdish public protests almost never occurred and demonstrations were virtually non-existent. However, after the Qamishli event in 2004, a riot between the local football team (Kurdish) and fans of the opposing team (Sunni Arab), Kurdish people and parties demonstrated en masse and public actions increased significantly. The willingness of the Kurdish political parties and the Kurds involved in the 2004 uprising to publicly confront the state, shows a gradual shift of the Kurdish people to become more visible and to be more involved in actions directed against the regime. After the 2004 events, political parties like Yekîtî and the PYD started to politice the ethnicity of the Kurds by claiming that the Syrian government repressed the Kurds throughout history because of their ethnicity, which prompted the Kurds to act in a more united way. Nevertheless, until the Syrian uprising in 2011, requiring the Kurdish political parties to come to some form of unity, the parties were deeply divided..This division was fueled by Assad who posed the Kurdish riots as “a foreign Kurdish conspiracy”. Doing so, the Syrian regime used sectarian divisions to undermine and fracture any form of protest by casting such rebellion as a hindrance for Syrian unity.

Amidst the violent sectarian conflict during the Syrian civil war, the PYD has deployed a relatively pragmatic stance, resulting in an autonomous federal government in the northern part of Syria. Emerging as the most powerful Kurdish political party amongst the Kurds, the PYD governed this 822-kilometer-long area on the Turkish-Syrian border during the first years of the Syrian civil war.

Even though the PYD found itself in a position of power when the Assad regime withdrew his military forces from border-towns in the north of Syria, this was not the case in the initial phase of the war. Indeed, prior to the outbreak of the civil war and during the outbreak of the sectarian conflict, the party was in a political crisis. With the Yekîtî demonstration in 2002 and the Qamishli uprising in 2004, national consciousness amongst the Kurds was growing. This increasing awareness that the Kurds shared a common identity, culture and belief, led the Kurds to strongly critique the political parties like the PYD because of their relatively weak stance against the regime and their support to maintain the status quo. Even though Kurdish political parties supported this national consciousness among the Kurds, they were not keen on fuelling the sectarian strife of the Kurds right from the start, because it would give the regime the possibility to label the uprisings as sectarian. This in turn could lead the protests and demonstrations to be crushed immediately. However, according to an extensive geopolitical study on sectarianism in the Syrian civil war, sectarian fragmentation had been already present with the execution of the millet system in the Ottoman Empire, where a “divide to rule” policy segregated the different communities. The Syrian civil war enhanced sectarian identities and almost all parties (e.g. the Assad regime, rebel groups, minorities) have exploited the embedded divisiveness in Syria for their own gains. Hence, sectarianism is seen as being both a cause and consequence of the Syrian civil war.

Kurdish controlled areas in Syria during the civil war

Even though the PYD was struggling to maintain a loyal base of followers, the party quickly gained momentum when the ongoing conflict between the Syrian regime and the armed opposition increased.[221][223][225] Where initially the PYD did not get involved in the war, this changed when Assad withdrew his military forces from several towns in northern Syria.[223][224][225][226] Considering the PYD was the only Kurdish political organization with a military force, the PYD seized this opportunity to capture these now unarmed towns. The military wing of the PYD, the People's Protection Units (YPG) took nearly every town in northern Syria where a Kurdish majority lived in just two months.[225] By January 2014, three autonomous cantons were established in the northern part of Syria, Rojava. The PYD's strength in the Kurdish regions in Syria is because of this well-organized and well-trained military wing. The PYD has enough resources to recruit, train and commit potential sympathizers to the party and now has an estimated 10.000-20.000 armed members.[223]

Where the PYD's pragmatism gave this Kurdish organization several opportunities to cooperate for its own gains, the party also received many accusations by Syrian Kurds for collaborating with the Assad regime and the PKK in exchange for power in northern Syria.[225] The PKK argues that they do see Assad as a dictator, but "if Assad doesn't attack Kurds we will not go to war.”[227] Although the PYD has denied these accusations, there have been several instances during the Syrian civil war where the party collaborated with its opponents, like the PKK and the Syrian regime. Despite the PKK supporting the Assad regime, the PYD did have ties with this armed group – considered by the United States, Turkey and the European Union as a terrorist group - and received training in guerrilla warfare. Furthermore, the PYD has worked together with Assad military forces to fight the Islamic State which both actors perceived as a greater security threat.[225] Although the PYD rhetorically opposes the Assad regime, the party has opted for a pragmatist policy towards Assad, which has, amongst other things, resulted in sharing power with the Syrian regime in two other Syrian northern towns: Qamishli and Hasakah. Indeed, according to several authors, precisely this pragmatic stance has led to the party's success and survival.[223][225]

On 10 October 2015, the YPG together with Arab, Assyrian, Armenian and Turkmen militias set up the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). By early 2016, the PYD had driven the Islamic State out the Kurdish areas the PYD controlled and received the United States protection against the Islamic State and Turkey.[225] With this support, the PYD was able to increase their territory in northern Syria and take the city of Hasaka in 2015. With the tides turning in their favour, the PYD installed a radical 'Kurdification' policy as part of their “Rojava revolution”. This radical democratic movement is aimed to not only establish an independent state during the sectarian struggle, but also to homogenize the ethnically diverse Rojava by using political power.[225][228] With a ‘re-Kurdification’ of Arabized Kurds, the PYD hopes to strengthen their position in areas where the Arabs are in the majority.[226] In order to keep this territory under control, the PYD has to delegate power to local Arab chieftains in areas where the Kurds are in the minority. This “blurring of sectarian lines” can be a strategic gamble or an attempt to cooperate with the Arabs to keep Rojava.[226] Here, the PYD uses the sectarian conflict in Syria to preach Kurdish nationalism as a democratic confederalism, promoting secularism, socialism and equality. However, several researchers argue that their struggle for Kurdish nationalism is only a tool for power politics.[223][225][226]

Currently, the Democratic Federation of Northern Syria (DFNS) embeds the autonomous administration led by the Kurds. DFNS is still part of the Syrian state, but is autonomous in the sense that it executes self-governance.[220] The Administrative Regions Act, which has been passed in August 2017, divides the Rojava into six cantons and three regions.[220] The DFNS recognises and accepts all ethnic groups living in the Kurdis-led regions and promotes coexistence between the different communities. DFSN states that: “Cultural, ethnic and religious groups and components shall have the right to name their self-administrations, preserve their cultures, and form their democratic organizations. No one or component shall have the right to impose their own beliefs on others by force”.[220] This democratic confederalism is the foundational doctrine of Rojava and is developed by Abdullah Öcalan, the founder of the PKK. In this concept, state power is decentralised by letting small, local councils govern. However, in this northern Kurdish border zone, encompassing a mix of different minorities, ‘Kurdification’ is still pursued by the SDF.[226] Furthermore, even though the DFNS claims it promotes local democracy, researchers argue that the power is very centralized, even authoritarian.[223][226] Some news sources call this ‘re-Kurdification’ as just another form of oppression and argue that the PYD uses education as a tool of indoctrinization of PKK-Öcalan ideology.[229][230] By closing down schools who reject to follow the PKK curriculum and using their authority to deliberately force Arab families to leave their home in Kurdish-controlled areas, the PYD is accused of "mirroring the practices of the Assad regime in areas it controls".[230][231]

In 2017, the SDF controlled around 25% of Syria.[226] The hold on these territories by the SDF was firm until Turkey launched an offensive in October 2019. Turkey's operation was aimed to create a 'safe zone' in Syria in order to push back the YPG (which Turkey sees as a terrorist organization) and relocate Syrian refugees.[221][232] This offensive has resulted in significant territorial loss for the SDF, under which key cities like Tel Abyad and Ras Al-Ayn.[232] Even though the United States supported the Kurds to fight IS back in 2014, when Erdogan told President Trump Turkey would begin with its cross-border operation to secure the safe-zone, President Trump said that the US troops would not get involved in this conflict.[221] On October 13, 2019, the Turkish offensive began with air strikes and shelling, resulting in over 13.000 people to flee the area.[232] With Kurdish forces concentrating on defending itself against Turkey, hundreds of IS-fighters and people suspected to have links with IS escaped from the camps in this affected area in which they had been held.[233] Currently, north-eastern Syria is divided by SDF-controlled areas, the Syrian regime forces, opposition militia and Turkish forces.

This caused starvation among the besieged Shia civilians in the towns (pictured: local women holding a picture of a killed defender of the towns and a poster, stating "We want bread O God").

Twelver Shia Muslims are a small minority in Syria. They are found in a number of villages in rural Aleppo (Al-Zahraa and Nubl), Homs (Akkum, Al-Aqrabiyah, Al-Masriyah, Al-Mazraa, Al-Thabitiyah, Al-Zurzuriyah, Ghawr Gharbiyah, Hawsh al-Sayyid Ali, Umm al-Amad and Zita al-Gharbiyah) and Idlib (Al-Fu'ah, Kafriya and Zarzur) in northern Syria as well as in Rif Dimashq (Sayyidah Zaynab) and Daraa (Bosra) in southern Syria.

In October 2012, various Iraqi religious sects join the conflict in Syria on both sides. Twelfer Shiites from Iraq, in Babil Governorate and Diyala Governorate, have traveled to Damascus from Tehran, or from the Shiite holy city of Najaf, Iraq, to protect Sayyidah Zaynab, an important Twelfer Shiite shrine in Damascus.[257]

In December 2012, Syrian rebel forces burned the Shia 'Husseiniya' mosque in the northern town of Jisr al-Shughur, inciting fears that the salafist groups would wage an all out war against Syria's minority religions.[258][259][260]

On 25 May 2013, Nasrallah announced that Hezbollah is fighting in the Syrian Civil War against Islamic extremists and "pledged that his group will not allow Syrian rebels to control areas that border Lebanon".[261] In the televised address, he said, "If Syria falls in the hands of America, Israel and the takfiris, the people of our region will go into a dark period."[261]

Jaysh al-Islam leader Zahran Alloush gave a speech during Ramadan of 2013 attacking Shia whom he called "Rafidis" and Alawites, whom he called "Nusayris" and the "Majus" (Zoroastrians), saying "the Mujahideen of Shaam will cleanse Shaam of the Filth of Rafidis & Rafidism, they will cleanse it for ever in sha Allah, till they will cleanse the land of Shaam of the filth of the Majoos (Fireworshippers) who fought the Religion of Allah the Almighty","the Shia are still despicable & pitiful though history", "And I give you the news, oh Filthy Rafidis: Just as Saddam Hussein crushed your heads (Shia) in the Past, the people of Ghouta & Shaam will crush them soon, They will make you taste a painful torment in this world, before Allah makes you taste it in the Hereafter, Oh you unclean Rafidis! You will collide into what you've never expected of Power from the Mujahideen of Islam".[262][263][264][265][266]

Jaysh al-Islam released a video showing the execution of ISIS members and showed a Jaysh al-Islam Sharī'ah official named Shaykh Abu Abd ar-Rahman Ka'ka (الشيخ أبو عبد الرحمن كعكة) gave a speech condemning "those who want (ISIS) to achieve" (وما الذي يريدون أن يحققوه), as "of the Madhhab of the Khawarij" (إنه مذهب الخوارج), "madhhab of hypocrisy" (مذهب النفاق), "madhhab of Abdullah ibn Saba' the Jew, who are joined with those under the banner of the dogs of (hell) fire "( مذهب عبد الله بن سبأ اليهودي إنه الإنضمام تحت لواء كلاب أهل النار).[267]

The former official Twitter account of Zahran Alloush zahran1970 which was suspended by Twitter, sent out multiple direct messages calling people "soldier of the Nusayri Electronic Army" and "follower of the Jew ibn Saba'", and "enemy of Allah", along with the last portion of Quran verse 3:119 (قل موتوا بغيظكم إن الله عليم بذات الصدور) which tells people to die in rage and that Allah knows what is in their breasts.[268]

Ismaili Shias are also found around Hama region (Masyaf and al-Qadmus) and in Salamiyah, and were early supporters of the uprising against the government.[40]

As of March 2015 opposition activists have accused the government of attempting to stoke sectarian tentions in eastern Hama and Salamiyah, the burial place of the Ismaili sect's founder Ismail bin Jaafar, with recruitment drives aimed at Ismailis for pro-government militias for the purpose of setting up checkpoints to harass, rob and kill Sunnis.[269] The Ismaili community has been known to be peaceful and aimed at not engaging in any form of sectarianism and avoiding national conflict, perhaps under the spiritual guidance of its cultured Imam abroad, his Highness the Aga Khan IV. An Ismaili delegation that traveled to Damascus seeking aid from increasing ISIS attacks were reportedly told by Assad: "You have 24,000 draft dodgers in Salamiyeh. Let them join", referring to the fact that Ismailis do not wish to be associated with government militias, and the NDF has stood accused of refusing to protect Ismaili villages and looting Ismaili victims of ISIS attacks.[40]

The Syrian Turkmen generally back the opposition and many look to Turkey for protection and support.[273][274][275][276] They have formed their own battalions within the FSA.[273] Turkey has made formal statements of political support for the Syrian Turkmen.[277][278]

One Turkmen rebel commander in Aleppo claimed that over 700 Turkmen had joined his battalion and 3,000 others were fighting the government in the province.[273] He said that Turkmen had "suffered for 40 years" under the Syrian government, explaining that Hafez al-Assad "took our lands [...] banned our language and stopped us from learning about our history and culture. He stripped us of our rights and changed our villages' names into Arabic names".[273] According to some sources Turkmen militias as of June 2013 number up to 10,000 members.[279][280]

Since the Russian military intervention in the Syrian Civil War, Turkey has accused Russia in aiding the government in ethnic cleansing against the Turkmen minority in Latakia.[281] This concern increased as hundreds of refugees were caused by the regime capture of Rabiya in January 2016, with "up to 10,000 people living in and around Yamadi" at risk of further displacement.[282]

The increasing tensions between Uyghurs and Assad's ally China have contributed to the growth of Uyghur militant movement, and some Uyghur groups have gone to Syria to fight the government, mainly as part of the Turkistan Islamic Party.[283][284]

According to anecdotal documentation, the Circassians of Syria are struggling with a neutral stance like other smaller minorities in Syria. Their villages near the Golan Heights were subjected to skirmishes between rebels and government forces to date.[306] Many Circassians are attempting to return to their ancestral North Caucasus homelands.[307]

Unlike the Circassians who try to stay from the conflict, the Chechens, due to historical grievances against Russia, has been a major force in the Syrian opposition group. A lot of ethnic Chechens, not just from Syria but also traveled from Russia and Europe, have formed and participated under various groups, the Jaish al-Muhajireen wal-Ansar, the Caucasus Emirate (Syrian branch), Junud al-Sham and Ajnad al-Kavkaz.[308] Chechen militants are also among the most active, and most violent one in the war.[309] One notable Chechen jihadist is Abu Omar al-Shishani, who was the War Minister of the self-proclaimed Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant.[310]

There are also Chechens working in support of the Syrian government, mostly sent by Putin's Chechen loyalist strongman Ramzan Kadyrov.[311]