Operation Storm

Serb-populated areas in Croatia according to the 1981 census

In August 1990, an insurgency known as the Log Revolution took place in Croatia centred on the predominantly Serb-populated areas of the Dalmatian hinterland around the city of Knin,[1] as well as in parts of the Lika, Kordun, and Banovina regions, and settlements in eastern Croatia with significant Serb populations.[2] The areas were subsequently formed into an internationally unrecognised proto-state, the Republic of Serbian Krajina (RSK), and after it declared its intention to secede from Croatia and join the Republic of Serbia, the Government of the Republic of Croatia declared the RSK a rebellion.[3]

The conflict escalated by March 1991, resulting in the Croatian War of Independence.[4] In June 1991, Croatia declared its independence as Yugoslavia disintegrated.[5] A three-month moratorium on Croatia's and the RSK's declarations followed,[6] after which the decision came into effect on 8 October.[7] During this period, the RSK initiated a campaign of ethnic cleansing against Croat civilians. In 1991, 84,000 Croats fled Serbian-held territory.[8] Most non-Serbs were expelled by early 1993. Hundreds of Croats were murdered and the total number of Croats and other non-Serbs who were expelled range from 170,000 according to the ICTY[9] and up to a quarter of a million people according to Human Rights Watch.[10] By November 1993, fewer than 400 ethnic Croats remained in the United Nations-protected area known as Sector South,[11] while a further 1,500 – 2,000 remained in Sector North.[12]

Croatian forces also engaged in ethnic cleansing against Serbs in eastern and western Slavonia and parts of the Krajina region, though on a more restricted scale and Serb victims numbered less than Croat victims of Serb forces.[13] In 1991, 70,000 Serbs were displaced from Croatian territory.[8] By October 1993, the UNHCR estimated that there was a total of 247,000 Croatian and other non-Serbian displaced persons coming from areas under the control of RSK and 254,000 Serbian displaced persons and refugees from the rest of Croatia, an estimated 87,000 of whom were inhabitants of the United Nations Protected Areas (UNPA's).[14]

During this time, Serbs living in Croatian towns, especially those near the front lines, were subjected to various forms of discrimination from being fired from jobs to having bombs planted under their cars or houses.[15] The UNHCR reported that in the Serb-controlled portions of the UNPA's, human rights abuses against Croats and non-Serbs were persistent. Some of the Krajina Serb "authorities" continued to be among the most egregious perpetrators of human rights abuses against the residual non-Serb population, as well as Serbs not in agreement with nationalistic policy. Human rights violations included killings, disappearances, beatings, harassment, forced resettlement, or exile, designed to ensure Serbian dominance of the areas.[14] In 1993, the UNHCR also reported a continued series of abuse against Serbs in Croatian government-held areas which included killings, disappearances, physical abuse, illegal detention, harassment and destruction of property.[14]

As the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) increasingly supported the RSK and the Croatian Police proved unable to cope with the situation, the Croatian National Guard (ZNG) was formed in May 1991. The ZNG was renamed the Croatian Army (HV) in November.[16]

The establishment of the military of Croatia was hampered by a UN arms embargo introduced in September.[17] The final months of 1991 saw the fiercest fighting of the war, culminating in the Battle of the Barracks,[18] the Siege of Dubrovnik,[19] and the Battle of Vukovar.[20]

In January 1992, an agreement to implement the Vance plan designed to stop the fighting was made by representatives of Croatia, the JNA and the UN.[21]

Ending the series of unsuccessful ceasefires, the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) was deployed to Croatia to supervise and maintain the agreement.[22] A stalemate developed as the conflict evolved into static trench warfare, and the JNA soon retreated from Croatia into Bosnia and Herzegovina, where a new conflict was anticipated.[21] Serbia continued to support the RSK,[23] but a series of HV advances restored small areas to Croatian control as the siege of Dubrovnik ended,[24] and Operation Maslenica resulted in minor tactical gains.[25]

In response to the HV successes, the Army of the Republic of Serb Krajina (ARSK) intermittently attacked a number of Croat towns and villages with artillery and missiles.[2][26][27]

As the JNA disengaged in Croatia, its personnel prepared to set up a new Bosnian Serb army, as Bosnian Serbs declared the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina on 9 January 1992, ahead of a 29 February – 1 March 1992 referendum on the independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The referendum was later cited as a pretext for the Bosnian War.[28] Bosnian Serbs set up barricades in the capital, Sarajevo, and elsewhere on 1 March, and the next day the first fatalities of the war were recorded in Sarajevo and Doboj. In the final days of March, the Bosnian Serb army started shelling Bosanski Brod,[29] and on 4 April, Sarajevo was attacked.[30] By the end of the year, the Bosnian Serb army—renamed the Army of Republika Srpska (VRS) after the Republika Srpska state was proclaimed—controlled about 70% of Bosnia and Herzegovina.[31] That proportion would not change significantly over the next two years.[32] Although the war originally pitted Bosnian Serbs against non-Serbs in the country, it evolved into a three-sided conflict by the end of the year, as the Croat–Bosniak War started.[33] The RSK was supported to a limited extent by the Republika Srpska, which launched occasional air raids from Banja Luka and bombarded several cities in Croatia.[34][35]

In November 1994, the Siege of Bihać, a battle of the Bosnian War, entered a critical stage as the VRS and the ARSK came close to capturing the town of Bihać from the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (ARBiH). It was a strategic area and,[36] since June 1993, Bihać had been one of six United Nations Safe Areas established in Bosnia and Herzegovina.[37]

The Clinton administration felt that its capture by Serb forces would intensify the war and lead to a humanitarian disaster greater than any other in the conflict to that point. Amongst the United States, France and the United Kingdom, division existed regarding how to protect the area.[36][38] The US called for airstrikes against the VRS, but the French and the British opposed them citing safety concerns and a desire to maintain the neutrality of French and British troops deployed as a part of the UNPROFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In turn, the US was unwilling to commit ground troops.[39]

On the other hand, the Europeans recognized that the US was free to propose military confrontation with the Serbs while relying on the European powers to block any such move,[40] since French President François Mitterrand discouraged any military intervention, greatly aiding the Serb war effort.[41] The French stance reversed after Jacques Chirac was elected president of France in May 1995,[42] pressuring the British to adopt a more aggressive approach as well.[43]

Denying Bihać to the Serbs was strategically important to Croatia,[44] and General Janko Bobetko, the Chief of the Croatian General Staff, considered the potential fall of Bihać to represent an end to Croatia's war effort.[45]

In March 1994, the Washington Agreement was signed,[45] ending the Croat–Bosniak War, and providing Croatia with US military advisors from Military Professional Resources Incorporated (MPRI).[46][47] The US involvement reflected a new military strategy endorsed by Bill Clinton in February 1993.[48]

As the UN arms embargo was still in place, MPRI was hired ostensibly to prepare the HV for participation in the NATO Partnership for Peace programme. MPRI trained HV officers and personnel for 14 weeks from January to April 1995. It has also been speculated in several sources,[46] including an article in The New York Times by Leslie Wayne and in various Serbian media reports,[49][50] that MPRI may also have provided doctrinal advice, scenario planning and US government satellite intelligence to Croatia,[46] although MPRI,[51] American and Croatian officials denied such claims.[52][53] In November 1994, the United States unilaterally ended the arms embargo against Bosnia and Herzegovina,[54] in effect allowing the HV to supply itself as arms shipments flowed through Croatia.[55]

Croatian Brigadier General Krešimir Ćosić and US Army Lieutenant General Wesley Clark discussing the Siege of Bihać on 29 November 1994

The Washington Agreement also resulted in a series of meetings between Croatian and US government and military officials in Zagreb and Washington, D.C. On 29 November 1994, the Croatian representatives proposed to attack Serb-held territory from Livno in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in order to draw away part of the force besieging Bihać and to prevent the town's capture by the Serbs. As the US officials gave no response to the proposal, the Croatian General Staff ordered Operation Winter '94 the same day, to be carried out by the HV and the Croatian Defence Council (HVO)—the main military force of Herzeg-Bosnia. In addition to contributing to the defence of Bihać, the attack shifted the HV's and HVO's line of contact closer to the RSK's supply routes.[45]

In 1994, the United States, Russia, the European Union (EU) and the UN sought to replace the Vance plan, which brought in the UNPROFOR. They formulated the Z-4 Plan giving Serb-majority areas in Croatia substantial autonomy.[56]

After numerous and frequently uncoordinated changes to the proposed plan, including leaking of its draft elements to the press in October, the Z-4 Plan was presented on 30 January 1995. Neither Croatia nor the RSK liked the plan. Croatia was concerned that the RSK might accept it, but Tuđman realised that Milošević, who would ultimately make the decision for the RSK,[57] would not accept the plan for fear that it would set a precedent for a political settlement in Kosovo—allowing Croatia to accept the plan with little possibility for it to be implemented.[56] The RSK refused to receive, let alone accept, the plan.[58]

In December 1994, Croatia and the RSK made an economic agreement to restore road and rail links, water and gas supplies, and use of a part of the Adria oil pipeline. Even though some of the agreement was never implemented,[59] a section of the Zagreb–Belgrade motorway passing through RSK territory near Okučani and the pipeline were both opened. Following a deadly incident that occurred in late April 1995 on the recently opened motorway,[60] Croatia reclaimed all of the RSK's territory in western Slavonia during Operation Flash,[61] taking full control of the territory by 4 May, three days after the battle began. In response, the ARSK attacked Zagreb using M-87 Orkan missiles with cluster munitions.[62] Subsequently, Milošević sent a senior Yugoslav Army officer to command the ARSK, along with arms, field officers and thousands of Serbs born in the RSK area who had been forcibly conscripted by the ARSK.[63]

On 17 July, the ARSK and the VRS started a fresh effort to capture Bihać by expanding on gains made during Operation Spider. The move provided the HV with a chance to extend their territorial gains from Operation Winter '94 by advancing from the Livno valley. On 22 July, Tuđman and Bosnian President Alija Izetbegović signed the Split Agreement for mutual defence, permitting the large-scale deployment of the HV in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The HV and HVO responded quickly through Operation Summer '95 (Croatian: Ljeto '95), capturing Bosansko Grahovo and Glamoč on 28–29 July.[64] The attack drew some ARSK units away from Bihać,[64][65] but not as many as expected. However, it put the HV in an excellent position,[66] as it isolated Knin from the Republika Srpska, as well as Yugoslavia.[67]

In late July and early August, there were two more attempts at resurrecting the Z-4 Plan and the 1994 economic agreement. Talks proposed on 28 July were ignored by the RSK, and last-ditch talks were held in Geneva on 3 August. These quickly broke down as Croatia and the RSK rejected a compromise proposed by Thorvald Stoltenberg, a Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General, essentially calling for further negotiations at a later date. In addition, the RSK dismissed a set of Croatian demands, including to disarm, and failed to endorse the Z-4 Plan once again. The talks were used by Croatia to prepare diplomatic ground for the imminent Operation Storm,[68] whose planning was completed during the Brijuni Islands meeting between Tuđman and military commanders on 31 July.[69]

The HV initiated large-scale mobilization in late July, soon after General Zvonimir Červenko became its new Chief of General Staff on 15 July.[70] In 2005, the Croatian weekly magazine Nacional reported that the U.S. had been actively involved in the preparation, monitoring and initiation of Operation Storm, that the green light from President Clinton was passed on by the US military attache in Zagreb, and the operations were transmitted in real time to Pentagon.[71]

Initial corps AORs in the Operation Storm
  HV,   ARSK
In Bosnia and Herzegovina:
  HV/HVO,   VRS/ARSK,   ARBiH/HVO,   APWB

The HV operational plan was set out in four separate parts, designated Storm-1 through 4, which were allocated to various corps based upon their individual areas of responsibility (AORs). Each plan was scheduled to take between four and five days.[70] The forces that the HV allocated to attack the RSK were organised into five army corps: Split, Gospić, Karlovac, Zagreb and Bjelovar Corps.[72] A sixth zone was assigned to the Croatian special police inside the Split Corps AOR,[73] near the boundary with the Gospić Corps.[74] The HV Split Corps, located in the far south of the theatre of operations and commanded by Lieutenant General Ante Gotovina, was assigned the Storm-4 plan, which was the primary component of Operation Storm.[73] The Split Corps issued orders for the battle using the name Kozjak-95 instead, which was not an unusual practice.[75] The 30,000-strong Split Corps was opposed by the 10,000-strong ARSK 7th North Dalmatia Corps,[73] headquartered in Knin and commanded by Major General Slobodan Kovačević.[74] The 3,100-strong special police, deployed to the Velebit Mountain on the left flank of the Split Corps, were directly subordinated to the HV General Staff commanded by the Lieutenant General Mladen Markač.[76]

The 25,000-strong HV Gospić Corps was assigned the Storm-3 component of the operation,[77] to the left of the special police zone. It was commanded by Brigadier Mirko Norac, and opposed by the ARSK 15th Lika Corps, headquartered in Korenica and commanded by Major General Stevan Ševo.[78] The Lika Corps, consisting of about 6,000 troops, was sandwiched between the HV Gospić Corps and the ARBiH in the Bihać pocket in ARSK rear, forming a wide but a very shallow area. The ARBiH 5th Corps deployed about 2,000 troops in the zone. The Gospić Corps, assigned a 150-kilometre (93 mi) section of the front, was tasked with cutting the RSK in half and linking up with the ARBiH, while the ARBiH was tasked with pinning down ARSK forces that were in contact with the Bihać pocket.[77]

The HV Karlovac Corps, commanded by Major General Miljenko Crnjac, on the left flank of the Gospić Corps, covered the area extending from Ogulin to Karlovac, including Kordun,[79] and executed the Storm-2 plan. The corps was composed of 15,000 troops and was tasked with pinning down the ARSK forces in the area to protect the flanks of the Zagreb and Gospić Corps.[80] It had a forward command post in Ogulin and was opposed by the ARSK 21st Kordun Corps headquartered at Petrova Gora,[79] consisting of 4,000 troops in the AOR (one of its brigades was facing the Zagreb Corps).[80] Initially, the 21st Kordun Corps was commanded by Colonel Veljko Bosanac, but he was replaced by Colonel Čedo Bulat during the evening of 5 August. In addition, the bulk of the ARSK Special Units Corps was present in the area, commanded by Major General Milorad Stupar.[79] ARSK Special Units Corps was 5,000-strong, largely facing the Bihać pocket at the onset of Operation Storm. The ARSK armour and artillery in the AOR outnumbered that of the HV.[80]

The HV Zagreb Corps, assigned the Storm-1 plan, initially commanded by Major General Ivan Basarac, on the left flank of the Karlovac Corps, was deployed on three main axes of attack—towards Glina, Petrinja and Hrvatska Kostajnica. It was opposed by the ARSK 39th Banija Corps, headquartered in Glina and commanded by Major General Slobodan Tarbuk.[81] The Zagreb Corps was tasked with bypassing Petrinja to neutralize ARSK artillery and missiles potentially targeting Croatian cities, making a secondary thrust from Sunja towards Hrvatska Kostajnica. Their secondary mission was compromised when a battalion of the special police and the 81st Guards Battalion planned to spearhead the advance were deployed elsewhere forcing modifications to the plan. The Zagreb Corps was composed of 30,000 troops, while the ARSK had 9,000 facing them and about 1,000 ARBiH troops in the Bihać pocket to their rear. At the start of Operation Storm, about 3,500 ARSK troops were in contact with the ARBiH.[82] HV Bjelovar Corps, on the left flank of the Zagreb Corps, covering the area along the Una River, had a forward command post in Novska. The corps was commanded by Major General Luka Džanko. Opposite the Bjelovar Corps was a part of the ARSK Banija Corps. The Bjelovar Corps was included in the attack on 2 August and were therefore not issued a separate operations plan.[83]

The ARSK divided its forces in the area in two, subordinating the North Dalmatia and Lika Corps to the ARSK General Staff, and grouping the rest into the Kordun Operational Group commanded by Lieutenant Colonel General Mile Novaković. Territorially, the division corresponded to the North and South sectors of the UN protected areas.[84]

Estimates of the total number of troops deployed by the belligerents vary considerably. Croatian forces have been estimated from under 100,000 to 150,000,[61][85] but most sources put the figure at about 130,000 troops.[86][87] ARSK troop strength in the Sectors North and South was estimated by the HV prior to Operation Storm at approximately 43,000.[88] More detailed HV estimates of the manpower by individual ARSK corps indicated 34,000 soldiers,[89] while Serb sources quote 27,000 troops.[90] The discrepancy is usually reflected in literature as an estimate of about 30,000 ARSK troops.[86] The ARBiH deployed approximately 3,000 troops against the ARSK positions near Bihać.[80] In late 1994, the Fikret Abdić-led Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia (APWB)—a sliver of land northwest of Bihać between its ally RSK and the pocket—commanded 4,000–5,000 soldiers who were deployed south of Velika Kladuša against the ARBiH force.[91]

MiG-21s carried out most of the CAS missions during Operation Storm.

On 4 August 1995, the CAF had at its disposal 17 MiG-21s, five attack and nine transport helicopters, three transport airplanes and two reconnaissance aircraft. On that first day of the operation, thirteen MiG-21s were used to destroy or disable six targets in the Gospić and Zagreb Corps AORs, at the cost of one severely and three slightly damaged jets. The same day, three Mi-8s were used for medical evacuation.[136] US Navy EA-6Bs and F/A-18s on patrol as part of Operation Deny Flight fired on ARSK surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites at Udbina and Knin as SAM radars locked onto the jets.[137] A few sources claim that they were deployed as a deterrent as the UN troops came under HV fire,[138] and a subsequent UN Security Council report only notes that the deployment was a result of the deterioration of the military situation and resulting low security of the peacekeepers in the area.[139] Also on 4 August, the RSK 105th Aviation Brigade based at Udbina, deployed helicopters against the Croatian special police on Velebit Mountain and against targets in the Gospić area virtually to no effect.[136]

On 5 August, the RSK air force began evacuating to Zalužani Airfield near Banja Luka, completing the move that day. At the same time the CAF deployed 11 MiG-21s to strike a communications facility and a storage site, as well as five other military positions throughout the RSK. That day, the CAF also deployed a Mi-24 to attack ARSK armour units near Sisak and five Mi-8s to transport casualties, and move troops and cargo. Five CAF MiG-21s sustained light damage in the process. The next day, jets struck an ARSK command post, a bridge and at least four other targets near Karlovac and Glina. A Mi-24 was deployed to the Slunj area to attack ARSK tanks, while three Mi-8s transported wounded personnel and supplies. An additional pair of MiG-21s was deployed to patrol the airspace over Ivanić Grad and intercept two Bosnian Serb fighter jets, but they failed to do so due to fog in the area and their low level of flight.[136] The VRS aircraft subsequently managed to strike the Petrokemija chemical plant in Kutina.[140]

On 7 August, two VRS air force jets attacked a village in the Nova Gradiška area, just north of the Sava River—the international border in the area.[141] The CAF bombed an ARSK command post, a storage facility and several tanks near Bosanski Petrovac.[136] CAF jets also struck a column of Serb refugees near Bosanski Petrovac, killing nine people, including four children.[142] Croatia has denied that it targeted civilians.[143] On 8 August, the CAF performed its last combat sorties in the operation, striking tanks and armoured vehicles between Bosanski Novi and Prijedor, and two of its MiG-21s were damaged.[136] The same day, UN military observers deployed at Croatian airfields claimed that the CAF attacked military targets and civilians in the Dvor area,[140] where refugee columns were mixed with ARSK transporting heavy weapons and large quantities of ammunition.[144] Overall, the CAF performed 67 close air support, three attack helicopter, seven reconnaissance, four combat air patrol and 111 transport helicopter sorties during Operation Storm.[136]

In order to protect areas of Croatia away from Sectors North and South, the HV conducted defensive operations while the HVO started a limited offensive north of Glamoč and Kupres to pin down part of the VRS forces, exploit the situation and gain positions for further advance.[145] On 5 August, the HVO 2nd and 3rd Guards Brigades attacked VRS positions north of Tomislavgrad, achieving small advances to secure more favourable positions for future attacks towards Šipovo and Jajce, while tying down part of the VRS 2nd Krajina Corps.[146] As a consequence of the overall battlefield situation, the VRS was limited to a few counter-attacks around Bihać and Grahovo as it was short of reserves.[147] The most significant counter-attack was launched by the VRS 2nd Krajina Corps on the night of 11/12 August. It broke through the 141st Brigade,[148] consisting of the HV's reserve infantry, reaching the outskirts of Bosansko Grahovo, only to be beaten back by the HV,[149] using one battalion drawn from the 4th Guards and the 7th Guards Brigade each, supported by the 6th and the 126th Home Guard Regiments.[148]

Zagreb

Osijek

Vinkovci

Vukovar

Beli Manastir

Sinj

Karlovac

Ogulin

Split

Šibenik

Zadar

Sisak

Slunj

Gospić

Knin

Glina

Dvor

Udbina

Bihać

Banja Luka

Croatian controlled

Serb controlled

Bosniak controlled

  RSK areas captured by Croatia in Operation Storm

  Areas remaining under RSK control after Operation Storm

Operation Storm became the largest European land battle since the Second World War,[152] encompassing a 630-kilometre (390 mi) frontline.[61] It was a decisive victory for Croatia,[153][154][155][156] restoring its control over 10,400 square kilometres (4,000 square miles) of territory, representing 18.4% of the country.[157] Losses sustained by the HV and the special police are most often cited as 174 killed and 1,430 wounded,[158] but a government report prepared weeks after the battle specified 211 killed or missing, 1,100 wounded and three captured soldiers. By 21 August, Croatian authorities recovered and buried 560 ARSK servicemen killed in the battle. The HV captured 4,000 prisoners of war,[159] 54 armoured and 497 other vehicles, six aircraft, hundreds of artillery pieces and over 4,000 infantry weapons.[157] Four UN peacekeepers were killed—three as a result of HV actions and one as a result of ARSK activities—and 16 injured. The HV destroyed 98 UN observation posts.[160]

The HV's success was a result of a series of improvements to the HV itself and crucial breakthroughs made in the ARSK positions that were subsequently exploited by the HV and the ARBiH. The attack was not immediately successful everywhere, but the seizing of key positions led to the collapse of the ARSK command structure and overall defensive capability.[130] The HV's capture of Bosansko Grahovo just before Operation Storm and the special police's advance to Gračac made Knin nearly impossible to defend.[161] In Lika, two Guards brigades rapidly cut the ARSK-held area lacking tactical depth or mobile reserve forces, isolating pockets of resistance and placing the 1st Guards Brigade in a position that allowed it to move north into the Karlovac Corps AOR, pushing ARSK forces towards Banovina. The defeat of the ARSK at Glina and Petrinja, after heavy fighting, also defeated the ARSK Banija Corps, as its reserve became immobilized by the ARBiH. The ARSK force was capable of containing or substantially holding assaults by regular HV brigades and the Home Guard, but attacks by the Guards brigades and the special police proved to be decisive.[162] Colonel Andrew Leslie, commanding the UNCRO in the Knin area,[163] assessed Operation Storm as a textbook operation that would have "scored an A-plus" by NATO standards.[164]

Even if the ARBiH had not provided aid, the HV would almost certainly have defeated the Banija Corps on its own, albeit at greater cost. The lack of reserves was the ARSK's key weakness that was exploited by the HV and the ARBiH since the ARSK's static defence could not cope with fast-paced attacks. The ARSK military was unable to check outflanking manoeuvres and their Special Units Corps failed as a mobile reserve, holding back the HV's 1st Guards Brigade south of Slunj for less than a single day.[162] The ARSK traditionally counted on the VRS and the Yugoslav military as its strategic reserve, but the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina immobilized the VRS reserves and Yugoslavia did not intervene militarily as Milošević did not order it to do so. Even if he had wished to intervene, the speed of the battle would have allowed a very limited time for Yugoslavia to deploy appropriate reinforcements to support the ARSK.[147]

Serb refugees fleeing from Croatia

The evacuation and following mass-exodus of the Serbs from the RSK led to a significant humanitarian crisis. In August 1995, the UN estimated that only 3,500 Serbs remained in Kordun and Banovina (former Sector North) and 2,000 remained in Lika and Northern Dalmatia (former Sector South), while more than 150,000 had fled to Yugoslavia, and between 10,000 and 15,000 had arrived in the Banja Luka area.[139] The number of Serb refugees was reported to be as many as 200,000 by the international media[165] and international organizations.[166] Also, 21,000 Bosniak refugees from the former APWB fled to Croatia.[139][167]

While approximately 35,000 Serb refugees, trapped with the surrendered ARSK Kordun Corps, were evacuated to Yugoslavia via Sisak and the Zagreb–Belgrade motorway,[122] the bulk of the refugees followed a route through the Republika Srpska, arriving there via Dvor in Banovina or via Srb in Lika—two corridors to Serb-held territory in Bosnia and Herzegovina left as the HV advanced.[98] The two points of retreat were created as a consequence of the delay of a northward advance of the HV Split Corps after the capture of Knin, and the decision not to use the entire HV 2nd Guards Brigade to spearhead the southward advance from Petrinja.[168] The retreating ARSK, transporting large quantities of weaponry, ammunition, artillery and tanks, often intermingled with evacuating or fleeing civilians, had few roads to use.[144] The escaping columns were reportedly intermittently attacked by CAF jets,[169] and the HV, trading fire with the ARSK located close to the civilian columns.[170] The refugees were also targeted by ARBiH troops,[171] as well as by VRS jets, and sometimes were run over by the ARSK Special Units Corps' retreating tanks.[172][173] On 9 August, a refugee convoy evacuating from the former Sector North under the terms of the ARSK Kordun Corps' surrender agreement was attacked by Croatian civilians in Sisak. The attack caused one civilian death, many injuries and damage to a large number of vehicles. Croatian police intervened in the incident after UN civilian police monitors pressured them to do so.[140] The next day, US ambassador to Croatia Peter Galbraith joined the column to protect them,[174] and the Croatian police presence along the planned route increased.[169] The refugees moving through the Republika Srpska were extorted at checkpoints and forced to pay extra for fuel and other services by local strongmen.[175]

An elderly Serb refugee in a tractor trailer, after crossing the Yugoslav border

Aiming to reduce evidence of political failure, Yugoslav authorities sought to disperse the refugees in various parts of Serbia and prevent their concentration in the capital, Belgrade.[176] The government encouraged the refugees to settle in predominantly Hungarian areas of Vojvodina, and in Kosovo, which was largely populated by Albanians, leading to increased instability in those regions.[177][178] Even though 20,000 were planned to be settled in Kosovo, only 4,000 moved to the region.[178] After 12 August, the Serbian authorities started to deport some of the refugees who were of military age, declaring them illegal immigrants.[179] They were turned over to the VRS or the ARSK in eastern Croatia for conscription.[180] Some of the conscripts were publicly humiliated and beaten for abandoning the RSK.[179] In some areas, ethnic Croats of Vojvodina were evicted from their homes by the refugees themselves to claim new accommodations.[181] Similarly, the refugees moving through Banja Luka forced Croats and Bosniaks out of their homes.[182]

Destroyed homes in the village of Živaja

The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), set up in 1993 based on the UN Security Council Resolution 827,[194] indicted Gotovina, Čermak and Markač for war crimes, specifically for their roles in Operation Storm, citing their participation in a joint criminal enterprise aimed at the permanent removal of Serbs from the ARSK-held part of Croatia. The ICTY charges specified that other participants in the joint criminal enterprise were Tuđman, Šušak, and Bobetko and Červenko,[195] however all except Bobetko were dead before the first relevant ICTY indictment was issued in 2001.[196] Bobetko was indicted by the ICTY, but died a year later, before he could be extradited for trial at the ICTY.[197] The trial of Gotovina et al began in 2008,[198] leading to the convictions of Gotovina and Markač and the acquittal of Čermak three years later.[199] Gotovina and Markač were acquitted on appeal in November 2012.[200] The ICTY concluded that Operation Storm was not aimed at ethnic persecution, as civilians had not been deliberately targeted. The Appeals Chamber stated that Croatian Army and Special Police committed crimes after the artillery assault, but the state and military leadership had no role in planning and creation of crimes. The ICTY concluded that Croatia did not have the specific intent of displacing the country's Serb minority. [201] Furthermore, they did not find that Gotovina and Markač played a role in adopting discriminatory efforts that prevent the return of Serb civilians.[188] Two judges in the panel of five dissented from this verdict.[202] The case raised significant issues for law of war and it has been described as a precedent.[203][204][205][206][207][208]

Views on whether Operation Storm itself as a whole was a war crime remain mixed. EU envoy Bildt, one of the few critics of the operation, accused Croatia of the most efficient ethnic cleansing carried out in the Yugoslav Wars. Croatia denied this claiming it had "urged Serbs to stay", however soldiers also engaged in shelling of Serb inhabited areas, killing of civilians and allowed Croats to engage in the burning and plundering of Serb homes, according to a UN report.[209] His view is supported by a number of Western analysts, such as Professor Marie-Janine Calic,[210] Miloševic biographer Adam LeBor,[211] and Professor Paul Mojzes,[212] while historians Gerard Toal and Carl T. Dahlman distinguish the Operation from "the practices of ethnic cleansing" that occurred during the offensive.[213] Historian Marko Attila Hoare disagrees that the operation was an act of ethnic cleansing, and points out that the Krajina Serb leadership evacuated the civilian population as a response to the Croatian offensive; whatever their intentions, the Croatians never had the chance to organise their removal.[214] The claims of ethnic cleansing were rejected by Galbraith.[215] Red Cross officials, UN observers and Western diplomats condemned Galbraith's denial of the ethnic cleansing, with one ambassador calling his remarks "breathtaking."[216] In the Gotovina Defence Final Trial Brief, Gotovina's lawyers Luka Misetic, Greg Kehoe and Payam Akhavan rejected the accusation of mass expulsion of Serbian population.[217] They referred to the ICTY testimony of RSK Commander Mile Mrkšić, who stated that on 4 August 1995, sometime after 16:00 hrs, it was Milan Martić and his staff who in fact made a decision to evacuate the Serb population from Krajina to Srb, a village near the Bosnian border.[218] Mojzes also notes that Serbs were ordered by their command to leave, at which a mass exodus took place from the entire Krajina region on “short notice”.[219] ICTY findings also stated evidence indicating that General Gotovina “adopted numerous measures” to prevent and curb crimes and general disorder following the artillery attacks, including crimes against Serb civilians. [188]

In February 2015, at the conclusion of the Croatia–Serbia genocide case, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) dismissed a Serbian lawsuit which alleged that Operation Storm constituted genocide,[220] ruling that Croatia did not have the specific intent to exterminate the country's Serb minority, though it reaffirmed that serious crimes against Serb civilians had taken place.[220][221] The court also found that the HV left accessible escape routes for civilians.[222] They also found that, at most, the leaders of Croatia envisaged that the military offensive would have the effect of causing the flight of the great majority of the Serb population, that they were satisfied with that consequence and they wished to encourage the departure of the Serb civilians, but do not establish the existence of the specific intent which characterizes genocide.[223] According to the judgement, Serb civilians fleeing their homes, as well as those remaining in UN protected areas, were subject to various forms of harassment by both the HV and Croatian civilians.[224] On 8 August, a refugee column was shelled.[224]

A Serb home in Sunja that was destroyed during Operation Storm

The number of civilian casualties in Operation Storm is disputed. The State Attorney's Office of the Republic of Croatia claims that 214 civilians were killed—156 in 24 instances of war crimes and another 47 as victims of murder—during the battle and in its immediate aftermath. The Croatian Helsinki Committee disputes the claim and reports that 677 civilians were killed after Operation Storm, mainly old people who remained, while an additional 837 Serb civilians are listed as missing.[225][226] When submitted as evidence, their report was rejected by the ICTY due to unsourced statements and double entries contained within.[227] Other sources indicate 181 more victims were killed by Croatian forces and buried in a mass grave in Mrkonjić Grad, following a continuation of the Operation Storm offensive into Bosnia.[228][229] Serbian sources quote 1,192 civilians dead or missing.[230] ICTY prosecutors set the number of civilian deaths at 324.[231] Croatian government officials estimate that 42 Croatian civilians were killed during the operation.[232]

It is difficult to determine the exact number of properties destroyed during and after Operation Storm, since a large number of houses had already sustained damage since the beginning of the war.[183] Human Rights Watch (HRW) estimates that more than 5,000 homes were destroyed during and after the battle.[233] Out of the 122 Serbian Orthodox churches in the area, one was destroyed and 17 were damaged, but most of the damage to the churches occurred prior to the Serb retreat.[234] HRW also reported that the vast majority of the abuses during Operation Storm were committed by Croatian forces. These abuses, which continued on a large scale for months afterward, included summary executions of elderly and infirm Serbs who remained behind and the wholesale burning and destruction of Serb villages and property. In the months following Operation Storm, at least 150 Serb civilians were summarily executed and another 110 persons forcibly disappeared.[235] One such example is the Varivode massacre, in which nine Serb civilians were killed.[236] Other recorded crimes against Serb civilians either during or in the aftermath of Operation Storm occurred in Komić, Kijani, Golubić, Uzdolje, Grubori, and Gošić.

As of November 2012, the Croatian authorities have received 6,390 reports of crimes committed in the area during or after Operation Storm, and have convicted 2,380 persons of committing looting, arson, murders, war crimes and other illegal acts. As of the same date, 24 more trials of war crimes related to Operation Storm were in progress.[237] In 2012, Serbian authorities were investigating five cases of war crimes committed during Operation Storm.[238] On the 25th anniversary of the Operation, the Balkan Investigative Reporting Network analyzed documents from the ICTY trial and found that very few of the perpetrators of killings of Serb civilians have been brought to justice while none of the commanders of the units responsible have been prosecuted.[239]

Soldiers raising the flag of Croatia in the Knin Fortress during Operation Storm commemoration, 5 August 2011

The defeat of the RSK led the Bosnian Serbs to realise that a settlement in Bosnia and Herzegovina must be negotiated as soon as possible,[240] and reversed the tide of the war against the Serbs,[164] giving US diplomacy a strong boost.[241] The success of Operation Storm also represented a strategic victory in the Bosnian War as it lifted the siege of Bihać,[168] and allowed the Croatian and Bosnian leadership to plan a full-scale military intervention in the VRS-held Banja Luka area—one aimed at creating a new balance of power in Bosnia and Herzegovina, a buffer zone along the Croatian border, and contributing to the resolution of the war.[240] The intervention materialized as Operation Mistral 2 in September 1995. Combined with a NATO air campaign in Bosnia and Herzegovina,[240] it led to the start of peace talks that would result in the Dayton Agreement a few months later.[242] The development also led to the restoration of the remaining Serb-held areas in eastern Slavonia and Baranja to Croatian control through the Erdut Agreement,[243] ending the Croatian War of Independence in November.[244]

The ease with which the HV achieved victory surprised many observers as Western intelligence services predicted a Croatian defeat.[245] International reactions to Operation Storm quickly evolved from emotive arguments, supportive of either side in the battle, to those calmly assessing the situation on the ground.[246] UN officials and most international media criticised Croatia.[247] Carl Bildt, an EU negotiator working for the former Yugoslavia, publicly condemned Croatia, while UN Special Representative Stoltenberg urged the UN Secretary General Personal Representative Yasushi Akashi to request NATO strikes against the HV.[246] German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel expressed regret but added that "... the years of Serb aggression ... have sorely tried Croatia's patience".[248] The US response was mixed. While Secretary of Defense William Perry reflected favourably on the military development,[247] while Galbraith declared his disapproval. On 10 August, the UN Security Council issued Resolution 1009 demanding that Croatia halt military operations, condemning the targeting of UN peacekeepers, and calling for the resumption of talks—but not calling for a HV withdrawal.[246] By 18 August, US diplomats on Robert Frasure's team tasked to mediate in the Bosnian War believed Operation Storm lent their diplomatic mission a chance to succeed,[249] reflecting the opinion of US President Bill Clinton that the Serbs would not negotiate seriously unless they sustained major military defeats.[250]

A ceremony marking the 16th anniversary of Operation Storm

In Serbia, Milošević condemned the Croatian attack, but the Milošević-influenced press also denounced the leadership of the RSK as being incompetent,[251] while the most extreme politicians, including Vojislav Šešelj, demanded retaliation against Croatia.[252] Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić begged for the Yugoslav Army to help while accusing Milošević of treason.[253]

In Croatia, HV units returning to their bases were given heroes' welcomes in numerous cities, and a commemorative medal was created to be issued to HV troops who took part in the operation.[254] On 26 August, Croatia organised the Freedom Train—a railroad tour taking Tuđman and the bulk of Croatia's government officials, public personalities, journalists and the diplomatic corps in Croatia from Zagreb to Karlovac, Gospić, Knin and Split.[255] Tuđman gave a speech at each of the stops.[256] In Knin, he declared: "[The Serbs] didn't even have time to collect their dirty [money] and their dirty underwear. On this day, we can say that Croatia stopped bearing its historical cross. This is not just the liberation of land, but the creation of a foundation for a free and independent Croatia for centuries to come."[257] During the final rally in Split, which drew a crowd of 300,000, Tuđman vowed to liberate Vukovar as well.[258]

Croats and Serbs hold opposing views of the operation.[259] In Croatia, 5 August—the day that the HV captured Knin—was chosen as Victory and Homeland Thanksgiving Day and the Day of Croatian Defenders, the Croatian public holiday when Operation Storm is officially celebrated.[260] In Serbia and the Republika Srpska, the day is marked by mourning for the Serbs killed and those who fled during or after the operation.[261]

In 2015, on the 20th anniversary of the operation, Croatia national TV (HRT) produced Godina Oluje, a four episode documentary about the preparation and execution of Operation Storm. The series was directed by Croatian American filmmaker Jack Baric.[262]

On the 23rd anniversary of the operation, the celebration in Knin was attended by brigadier Ivan Mašulović, military attaché of Montenegro. It was the first time that Montenegro sent an envoy to Knin. The move was heavily criticized by Montenegrin pro-Serbian politicians and Serbian media. Montenegrin right-wing party New Serb Democracy (NSD) called Mašulović a traitor, as well as those "who sent him to a celebration of a crime against the Serbian people."[263][264] Some went so far as to compare him to Montenegrin fascist collaborator Sekula Drljević.[265] Montenegrin Ministry of Defence defended their decision to send an envoy stating that "Montenegro would not fight anyone else's battles. Montenegro has the stance of building good neighbourly relations with all countries in the region," including "close and friendly" Serbia and "close and friendly" NATO ally Croatia.[266][267]

On the 25th anniversary of the operation, the celebration in Knin was attended for the first time ever by an ethnic Serb political representative, Deputy Prime Minister of Croatia Boris Milošević. His move was applauded across Croatia, with Prime Minister of Croatia Andrej Plenković stating that it will "send a new message for Croatian society, relations between Croatians and Serb minority ... between Croatia and Serbia."[268] Other notable politicians who praised it include member of the opposition Social Democratic Party (SDP) Peđa Grbin, president of the Independent Democratic Serb Party (SDSS) Milorad Pupovac, leader of the Democratic Alliance of Croats in Vojvodina (DSHV) Tomislav Žigmanov, Mayor of Knin Marko Jelić and retired general Pavao Miljavac.[269][270] Milošević's move was met with criticism from the far-right party Homeland Movement (DP) and members of Croatian Defence Forces (HOS) paramilitary. Leader of the Homeland Movement Miroslav Škoro refused to participate in the official ceremony, despite being a Deputy Speaker of the Parliament, and stated that "there is no reason for reconciliation of any kind."[271] The move was also received negatively by the Governments of Serbia and Republika Srpska. At the celebration, Prime Minister Plenković, President Zoran Milanović and General Gotovina sent messages of peace and reconciliation and sympathy for Serbian civilian victims as well.[272][268][273] Serbia held a commemoration on the Rača Bridge over the Sava River, while a tableau was staged on the bridge with actors dressed as refugees sitting in Yugoslav-era cars and tractors.[272]

Books

News reports

International, governmental, and NGO sources

Wikimedia Commons has media related to Operation Storm.

• An analysis of Operation Storm and TV footage of the operation, Croatian Radiotelevision, 5 August 2011 (in Croatian)
• Military Operation Storm and Its Aftermath Croatian Helsinki Committee for Human Rights, Zagreb 2001.
• Vladisavljevic, Anja (5 August 2020). "While Croats Celebrate August 1995, Serbs Look Back in Sorrow". Balkan Insight. Retrieved 5 August 2020.

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